RSSTë gjitha Hyrje në "Lëvizjet e re sufi" Kategori

ISLAM, DEMOKRACIA & USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Për më tepër, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, domethënë, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, SHBA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

Saktësi në luftën globale ndaj terrorit:

Sherifa Zuhur

Shtatë vjet pas shtator 11, 2001 (9/11) sulmet, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Europa e Mesme, and European nations, si në komplot kapur në shtator 2007 in Germany. Bruce shtetet Riedel: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Kalimi në mjetet e "pushtetit të butë,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Pse, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
këtë përpjekje.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; dhe (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Shtoni në këtë zemërim amerikan, fear, dhe ankthi në lidhje me ngjarjet vdekjeprurës i 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

GLOBALIZIMI DHE ISLAM POLITIKE: Bazat social të Turqisë MIRËQENIES PARTIA

Haldun Gulalp

Islami politik ka fituar dukshmëri rritur në dekadat e fundit në Turqi. numër i madh i studenteve femra kanë filluar të tregojnë përkushtimin e tyre duke veshur model flokësh ndaluar islamik në kampuset universitare, dhe me ndikim pro-islamike TV
kanale janë shtuar. Ky artikull përqendrohet në mirëqenien (mirëqenie) Party si përfaqësues kryesorja institucional të islamit politik në Turqi.
Mbajtje e shkurtër Partia e Mirëqënies në pushtet si partnerin kryesor të koalicionit nga mesi i vitit 1996 deri në mesin e vitit 1997 ishte kulmi i një dekade të rritjes së qëndrueshme që ishte ndihmuar nga organizata të tjera islamike dhe institucionet. Këto organizata dhe institucione
përfshihen gazetat dhe shtëpi botuese që tërhoqën shkrimtarëve islamikë, Themelet shumta islame, një sindikata Konfederata islamike, dhe shoqata një islamist Biznesmenëve. Këto institucione kanë punuar së bashku me, dhe në mbështetje të, Welfare si lider i padiskutueshëm dhe përfaqësues i islamit politik në Turqi, edhe pse ata kishin qëllimet e tyre partikulariste dhe idealet, të cilat shpesh devijuan nga projektet politike të mirëqenies së. Duke u ndalur në Partinë Mirëqenies, atëherë, lejon për një analizë të bazës më të gjerë shoqëror mbi të cilën lëvizja islamike politike u rrit në Turqi. Që nga rrëzimi i Mirëqenies nga pushteti dhe mbylljen e saj eventual, lëvizja islamike ka qenë në rrëmujë. Ky dokument do të, prandaj, të kufizohet në periudhën Welfare Partisë.
Paraardhësi i Mirëqenies së, Partia Kombëtare Shpëtimi, ishte aktiv në vitet 1970, por u mbyll nga regjimi ushtarak në 1980. Mirëqenia u themelua në 1983 dhe fitoi popullaritet të madh në vitet 1990. Duke filluar me një 4.4 për qind të votave në zgjedhjet komunale të 1984, Partia e Mirëqenies në mënyrë të qëndrueshme në rritje që tregon e saj dhe u shumua votën e saj gati pesë herë në dymbëdhjetë vjet. Ajo alarmuar ngritjen sekular të Turqisë për herë të parë në zgjedhjet komunale të 1994, me 19 përqind e të gjitha vota në shkallë vendi dhe vendet e prefektit si në Stamboll dhe Ankara, pastaj në zgjedhjet e përgjithshme të 1995 kur ajo fitoi një shumicë me 21.4 për qind të votave kombëtare. Megjithatë, Partia e Mirëqenies ishte vetëm një kohë të shkurtër në gjendje për të udhëhequr një qeveri koalicioni në partneritet me rrugën e krahut të djathtë e vërtetë Partia e Tansu C iller.

Democracy in Islamic Political Thought

Azzam S. Tamimi

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, në 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, në 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

Kulturës islame Politike, Demokraci, dhe të Drejtat e Njeriut

Daniel E. Çmimi

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. Si pasojë, scholars, commentators, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, megjithatë, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,

can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Prandaj, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,

demokraci, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Kulturës islame Politike, Demokraci, dhe të Drejtat e Njeriut

Daniel E. Çmimi

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Si pasojë, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, megjithatë, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Prandaj, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
demokraci, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

LËVIZJET islamike dhe procesit demokratik në botën arabe: Eksplorimi i Zonat Gray

Nathan J. I nxirë nga dielli, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, lëvizjet islamike, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, Shtetet e Bashkuara, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, megjithatë, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politikë, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

ISLAM, Islamistët, DHE PARIMI ZGJEDHOR në Lindjen e Mesme

James Piscatori

For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing

number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated

a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western

European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess

their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own

rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,

with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow

for flexible politics and participatory government?

The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative

that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story

concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary

story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual

baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has

become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,

the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,

and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.

To Be A Muslim

Fathi Yakan

All praises to Allah, and blessings and peace to His Messenger.This book is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the characteristics that every single Muslim should portray in order to fulfill the conditions of being a Muslim in both belief and practice. Many people are Muslim by identity,because they were ”born Muslim” from Muslim parents. Theymay not know what Islam really means or its requirements, an dso may lead a very secular life. The purpose of this first partis to explain the responsibility of every Muslim to become aknowledgeable and true believer in Islam.The second part of this book discusses the responsibility to become an activist for Islam and participate in the Islamic Movement. It explains the nature of this movement and its goals, philosophy, strategy, and tactics, as well as the desirable characteristics of it members.The failure of various movements in the Islamic world, and especially in the Arab countries, result from a spiritual emptiness in these movements as well as in society generally. In sucha situation the principles and institutions of Islam are forgotten.The westernized leaders and movements collapse when they encounter serious challenges. These leaders and movements and the systems of government and economics they try to imposehave fallen because they lacked a solid base. They fell becausethey were artificial constructs copied from alien cultures anddid not represent the Muslim community. Therefore they wererejected by it. This situation is comparable to a kidney transplantin a human body. Although the body is able to tolerate it painfully for a short period of time, eventually the kidney willbe rejected and die.When the sickness of the Muslim Ummah became acute few Muslims thought of building a new society on Islamic principles.Instead many tried to import man made systems and principles, which looked good but really were grossly defectiveand so could be easily toppled and crushed.

the 500 myslimanet më me ndikim

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

Ky botim që ju keni në duart tuaja është i pari i asaj që ne shpresojmë se do të jetë seri anannual që ofron një dritare në Levizesit dhe edited directory e Muslimworld. Ne kemi përpjekur të nxjerrë në pah njerëzit që janë me ndikim si myslimanë, thatis, njerëz ndikimi i të cilit është nxjerrë nga praktika e tyre e Islamit apo nga factthat ata janë muslimanë. Ne mendojmë se kjo jep informacion të vlefshëm në differentways se muslimanët ndikojnë botën, dhe gjithashtu tregon diversitetin e se si peopleare jetojnë si muslimanë today.Influence është një koncept i ndërlikuar. kuptimi i saj rrjedh nga fjala latine influensmeaning të rrjedhë-in, duke treguar një ide të vjetër astrologjike se forcat e padukshme (si TheMoon) ndikojnë njerëzimit. Shifrat në këtë listë kanë aftësinë të ndikojnë humanitytoo. Në një shumëllojshmëri të mënyrave të ndryshme çdo person në këtë listë ka ndikim mbi thelives e një numri të madh të njerëzve në tokë. The 50 më figuresare ndikim profilizuar. Ndikimi i tyre vjen nga një shumëllojshmëri e burimeve; megjithatë ata areunified nga fakti se ata çdo ndikojnë ngastra të mëdha të humanity.We kanë shkatërruar atëherë 500 liderët në 15 kategori-Dijetari, politik,administrativ, racë, Preachers, Gratë, të rinjtë, filantropi, zhvillim,Shkencë dhe Teknologji, Artit dhe kulturës, Media, radikalët, IslamicNetworks ndërkombëtare, dhe çështjet e ditës, për t'ju ndihmuar të kuptoni llojet e ndryshme ofways Islamit dhe muslimanëve ndikim në botë të today.Two listat përbërë tregojnë se si ndikimi punon në mënyra të ndryshme: InternationalIslamic Rrjetet tregon njerëz të cilët janë në krye të transnationalnetworks të rëndësishme të muslimanëve, dhe çështjet e ditës nxjerr në pah individët whoseimportance është për shkak të çështjeve aktuale që ndikojnë njerëzimin.

Përtej-Islamism Post

Ihsan Jilmaz


Me rritjen e famës ndërkombëtare të Turqisë dhe qeverisë së saj të suksesshme dhe internationallyrespected AK Partisë, vëmendja e akademisë së është fokusuar në Islamistexperience turke. Turqia tashmë ishte parë si një rast pothuajse unik sa i përket Islam-shtetërore-secularismdemocracyrelations ishin të shqetësuar, por transformimin e fundit të islamizmit turk coupledwith trazirave globale në post-9/11 bota e ka bërë çështjen turke shumë më important.While turke islamistë "transformimi i kohëve të fundit që ka sjellë rritjen e tyre në hasbeen energjisë duartrokitën në shtëpi dhe jashtë vendit, ka relativisht shumë pak studime që analizojnë theirtransformation duke marrë parasysh përvojën unike të islamizmit turk, duke filluar nga the18th & 19Shekullarizimi osmane shekujt ', Rinj osmanët e 1860 dhe Ottomanconstitutionalism dhe demokracia. Për më tepër, disa dinamika që kanë ndikuar në ndryshimin e kornizës islame normativ theTurkish islamistët 'nuk janë analizuar në mënyrë të detajuar. Kështu, Kjo studyendeavors për të analizuar faktorët kryesorë pas kuadrin e sapo dalë tolerante normativ ofthe udhëheqësve të AK Partisë që ishin më parë islamikët. Pas duke treguar se ka historicalreasons mira që dalin nga përvoja Otomane e sekularizmit dhe demokracisë dhe duke argumentuar në bazë të abrief diskutimin teorik të pluralitetit të Islamisms, ai argumenton se hasalways turq Islamizmi ndryshonte nga përvojat e tjera islamike. prandaj, ne kete studim, një detajuar evaluationof përvojës turke islamike duke filluar nga osmanët rinj ndërmerret. atëherë, thispaper përpiqet për të treguar se bashkëveprimi fizike dhe diskursive grupeve islamike 'ka qenë një crucialfactor në transformimin e islamizmit turke. Premisa kryesore e këtij punimi është se Gülenmovement ka qenë faktori më me ndikim që ka ndihmuar udhëheqësit e Partisë AK për të zhvilluar kornizën Amore tolerante normativ dhe që përfundimisht sende të hedhura islamizmin e tyre. Ajo është e coursedifficult të krijojë marrëdhënie rastësore mes dy fenomeneve sociale por mund underscorecorrelations. Si hipoteza kryesore është se lëvizja Gylen ka qenë më i influentialfactor në transformimin normativ të kornizave mendore e ish islamistëve dhe botëkuptimet theirreligio-politike, ky dokument ofron një analizë krahasuese diskursit betweenFethullah Gylen-së dhe idetë e islamistëve 'mbi disa çështje që kanë qenë të rëndësishme për të dy Islamismand sapo doli post-islamizmi. Për të identifikuar këto çështje të rëndësishme (kundërlaicizim, pluralizëm,demokraci, sundimit të ligjit, nacionalizmi, shtet, Islamism, fetari, tjetri, kufijtë dhe dialogu),gazeta ofron një diskutim të shkurtër teorike të islamizmit dhe post-islamizmit që do të helpthe lexuesin për të kuptuar dallimet themelore midis islamizmit dhe mendimit Gülenian.

Islame MODERNITIES: Fethullah Gulen dhe bashkëkohor islamik

Nderit thikë

Movement1 Nurju, duke qenë më të vjetër lëvizjen e moderuar islamike e cila është ndoshta e veçantë për Turqinë Moderne, ishte thyer në disa grupe që nga Said Nursi, themeluesi i lëvizjes, ndërroi jetë në 1960. Ne kohen e tashme, ka më shumë se dhjetë grupe nurcu me agjendat dhe strategjitë e ndryshme. Pavarësisht nga të gjitha dallimet e tyre, sot grupet Nurju duket të pranojnë identitetin e njëri-tjetrit dhe të përpiqemi për të mbajtur një nivel të caktuar të solidaritetit. Theplace i grupit të Fethullah Gylenit në kuadër të lëvizjes Nurju, megjithatë, duket të jetë pak shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) ndarë veten, të paktën në dukje, nga lëvizja e përgjithshme Nurju në 1972 dhe sukses në krijimin e grupit e tij me një strukturë të fortë organizative në 1980 dhe 90-. Për shkak të zhvillimit të rrjetit të saj të gjerë shkollor si në Turqi dhe abroad2, grupi i tij tërhoqi vëmendjen. Këto shkolla shtangur jo vetëm biznesmenët islamikë dhe klasat e mesme, por edhe një numër të madh të intelektualëve laikë dhe politikanëve. Edhe pse ai fillimisht doli nga lëvizja e përgjithshme Nurju, disa besojnë se numri i pasuesve të grupit Fethullah Gylen është shumë më i madh se ajo e totali i pjesës tjetër të grupeve nurju. Akoma, nuk duket të jetë arsye e mjaftueshme për të menduar se ka pasur një çmim për të paguar për këtë sukses: Largimi nga grupet e tjera islamike, si dhe nga lëvizja e përgjithshme Nurju të cilat vetë group3 Fethullah Gulen është menduar të jetë një pjesë.