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ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Še več, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namreč, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, ZDA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (kvota)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; in (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

GLOBALIZACIJA IN POLITIČNI ISLAM: SOCIALNE OSNOVE TURŠKE STRANKE BLAGINJE

Haldun Gulalp

Politični islam je v zadnjih desetletjih v Turčiji pridobil večjo prepoznavnost. Veliko število študentk je začelo izkazovati svojo predanost z nošenjem prepovedanih islamskih pokrival v univerzitetnih kampusih, in vplivna proislamistična TV
kanali so se razširili. Ta dokument se osredotoča na dobro počutje (blaginja) Stranka kot najpomembnejši institucionalni predstavnik političnega islama v Turčiji.
Kratek mandat Stranke blaginje na oblasti kot vodilne koalicijske partnerice od sredine leta 1996 do sredine leta 1997 je bil vrhunec desetletja stalne rasti, ki so ji pomagale druge islamistične organizacije in institucije.. Te organizacije in institucije
vključevala časopise in založbe, ki so pritegnile islamistične pisce, številne islamske fundacije, islamistična sindikalna konfederacija, in združenje islamističnih poslovnežev. Te institucije so delovale v tandemu z, in v podporo, Welfare kot nesporen voditelj in predstavnik političnega islama v Turčiji, čeprav so imeli svoje partikularne cilje in ideale, ki so se pogosto razlikovali od političnih projektov Welfareja. Osredotočanje na stranko blaginje, potem, omogoča analizo širše družbene baze, na kateri je zraslo islamistično politično gibanje v Turčiji. Od vrnitve Welfareja z oblasti in njegovega končnega zaprtja, islamistično gibanje je bilo v razsulu. Ta dokument bo, torej, biti omejen na obdobje stranke blaginje.
Predhodnik družbe Welfare, stranka narodne rešitve, je deloval v sedemdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja, vendar ga je vojaški režim leta zaprl 1980. Welfare je bil ustanovljen l 1983 in je v devetdesetih letih pridobil veliko popularnost. Začenši z a 4.4 odstotka glasov občinskih volitvah v 1984, stranka blaginje je v dvanajstih letih vztrajno povečevala svoje rezultate in pomnožila svoje glasove skoraj petkrat. To je najprej vznemirilo turški sekularni establišment na občinskih volitvah leta 1994, z 19 odstotkov vseh glasov po vsej državi in ​​županska mesta v Istanbulu in Ankari, nato splošnih volitvah v 1995 ko je osvojila pluralnost z 21.4 odstotkov državnih glasov. Kljub temu, Stranka blaginje je le za kratek čas lahko vodila koalicijsko vlado v partnerstvu z desno Stranko prave poti Tansuja C¸ illerja.

Democracy in Islamic Political Thought

Azzam S. Tamimi

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, v 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, v 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

Islamska politična kultura, demokracija, in človekove pravice

Daniel E. Cena

Trdimo, da islam olajša avtoritarnost, nasprotuje

vrednote zahodnih družb, in pomembno vpliva na pomembne politične rezultate

pri muslimanskih narodih. Posledično, učenjaki, komentatorji, in vlada

uradniki pogosto navajajo, da je naslednji "islamski fundamentalizem"

ideološka grožnja liberalnim demokracijam. Ta pogled, vendar, temelji predvsem na

o analizi besedil, Islamska politična teorija, in ad hoc študije

posameznih držav, ki ne upoštevajo drugih dejavnikov. Moja trditev je

da so besedila in tradicije islama, kot druge religije,

se lahko uporablja za podporo različnih političnih sistemov in politik. Država

specifične in opisne študije nam ne pomagajo najti vzorcev, ki bodo pomagali

razložimo različna razmerja med islamom in politiko po vsej Evropi

države muslimanskega sveta. Od tod tudi, nov pristop k preučevanju

zahteva se povezava med islamom in politiko.
predlagam, s strogo oceno odnosa med islamom,

demokracija, in človekove pravice na mednarodni ravni, da preveč

poudarek je na moči islama kot politične sile. Jaz prvi

uporabi primerjalne študije primerov, ki se osredotočajo na dejavnike, ki se nanašajo na medsebojno delovanje

med islamskimi skupinami in režimi, ekonomski vplivi, etnične razcepe,

in družbeni razvoj, razložiti odstopanje v vplivu

Islam o politiki v osmih državah.

Islamska politična kultura, demokracija, in človekove pravice

Daniel E. Cena

Trdimo, da islam olajša avtoritarnost, nasprotuje

vrednote zahodnih družb, in pomembno vpliva na pomembne politične rezultate
pri muslimanskih narodih. Posledično, učenjaki, komentatorji, in vlada
uradniki pogosto navajajo, da je naslednji "islamski fundamentalizem"
ideološka grožnja liberalnim demokracijam. Ta pogled, vendar, temelji predvsem na
o analizi besedil, Islamska politična teorija, in ad hoc študije
posameznih držav, ki ne upoštevajo drugih dejavnikov. Moja trditev je
da so besedila in tradicije islama, kot druge religije,
se lahko uporablja za podporo različnih političnih sistemov in politik. Država
specifične in opisne študije nam ne pomagajo najti vzorcev, ki bodo pomagali
razložimo različna razmerja med islamom in politiko po vsej Evropi
države muslimanskega sveta. Od tod tudi, nov pristop k preučevanju
zahteva se povezava med islamom in politiko.
predlagam, s strogo oceno odnosa med islamom,
demokracija, in človekove pravice na mednarodni ravni, da preveč
poudarek je na moči islama kot politične sile. Jaz prvi
uporabi primerjalne študije primerov, ki se osredotočajo na dejavnike, ki se nanašajo na medsebojno delovanje
med islamskimi skupinami in režimi, ekonomski vplivi, etnične razcepe,

in družbeni razvoj, razložiti odstopanje v vplivu

Islam o politiki v osmih državah.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. rjav, amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, vendar, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politika, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAMISTIČNA RADIKALIZACIJA

PREDGOVOR
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Vprašanja v zvezi s političnim islamom še naprej predstavljajo izziv za evropsko zunanjo politiko na Bližnjem vzhodu in v Severni Afriki (MENA). Ko se je politika EU v zadnjem desetletju skušala soočiti s takšnimi izzivi, se je sam politični islam razvil. Strokovnjaki opozarjajo na vse večjo kompleksnost in raznolikost trendov znotraj političnega islama. Nekatere islamistične organizacije so okrepile svojo zavezanost demokratičnim normam in se v celoti vključile v mir, mainstream nacionalne politike. Drugi ostajajo zavezani nasilnim sredstvom. In spet drugi so se usmerili k bolj tihi obliki islama, izločil iz političnega delovanja. Politični islam v regiji Bližnjega vzhoda in severne Afrike evropskim oblikovalcem politike ne predstavlja enotnega trenda. Analitična razprava se je razvila okoli koncepta "radikalizacije". To pa je sprožilo raziskave o dejavnikih, ki spodbujajo "deradikalizacijo", in obratno, "ponovna radikalizacija". Velik del kompleksnosti izhaja iz splošno razširjenega mnenja, da se vsi ti trije pojavi pojavljajo hkrati. Tudi izrazi sami so sporni. Pogosto je bilo poudarjeno, da zmerno-radikalna dihotomija ne uspe v celoti zajeti odtenkov trendov znotraj političnega islama.. Nekateri analitiki se tudi pritožujejo, da je govorjenje o "radikalizmu" ideološko obremenjeno. Na ravni terminologije, razumemo, da je radikalizacija povezana z ekstremizmom, vendar se pogledi razlikujejo glede osrednjega pomena njegove versko-fundamentalistične v primerjavi s politično vsebino, in o tem, ali je pripravljenost zateči se k nasilju implicirana ali ne.

Takšne razlike se odražajo v pogledih samih islamistov, kot tudi v dojemanju zunanjih.

ISLAM, ISLAMISTS, AND THE ELECTORAL PRINCIPLE I N THE MIDDLE EAST

James Piscatori

For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing

number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated

a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western

European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess

their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own

rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,

with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow

for flexible politics and participatory government?

The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative

that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story

concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary

story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual

baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has

become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,

the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,

and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.

To Be A Muslim

Fath Yakan

All praises to Allah, and blessings and peace to His Messenger.This book is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the characteristics that every single Muslim should portray in order to fulfill the conditions of being a Muslim in both belief and practice. Many people are Muslim by identity,because they were ”born Muslim” from Muslim parents. Theymay not know what Islam really means or its requirements, an dso may lead a very secular life. The purpose of this first partis to explain the responsibility of every Muslim to become aknowledgeable and true believer in Islam.The second part of this book discusses the responsibility to become an activist for Islam and participate in the Islamic Movement. It explains the nature of this movement and its goals, philosophy, strategy, and tactics, as well as the desirable characteristics of it members.The failure of various movements in the Islamic world, and especially in the Arab countries, result from a spiritual emptiness in these movements as well as in society generally. In sucha situation the principles and institutions of Islam are forgotten.The westernized leaders and movements collapse when they encounter serious challenges. These leaders and movements and the systems of government and economics they try to imposehave fallen because they lacked a solid base. They fell becausethey were artificial constructs copied from alien cultures anddid not represent the Muslim community. Therefore they wererejected by it. This situation is comparable to a kidney transplantin a human body. Although the body is able to tolerate it painfully for a short period of time, eventually the kidney willbe rejected and die.When the sickness of the Muslim Ummah became acute few Muslims thought of building a new society on Islamic principles.Instead many tried to import man made systems and principles, which looked good but really were grossly defectiveand so could be easily toppled and crushed.

the 500 most influential muslims

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

The publication you have in your hands is the first of what we hope will be anannual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslimworld. We have strived to highlight people who are influential as Muslims, thatis, people whose influence is derived from their practice of Islam or from the factthat they are Muslim. We think that this gives valuable insight into the differentways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, pointing to an old astrological idea that unseen forces (like themoon) affect humanity. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. The 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Their influence comes from a variety of sources; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leaders into 15 categories—Scholarly, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, ženske, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, mediji, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

Beyond Post-Islamism

Ihsan Yilmaz


With the increased international prominence of Turkey and its successful and internationallyrespected AK Party government, the Academia’s attention has focused on the Turkish Islamistexperience. Turkey had already been seen as an almost unique case as far Islam-state-secularismdemocracyrelations were concerned but the recent transformation of Turkish Islamism coupledwith the global turmoil in the post-9/11 world has made the Turkish case much more important.While Turkish Islamists’ recent transformation that has brought about their rise to the power hasbeen applauded at home and abroad, there are relatively very few studies that analyze theirtransformation by taking into account the unique experience of Turkish Islamism starting from the18th & 19th centuries’ Ottoman secularization, Young Ottomans of the 1860s and the Ottomanconstitutionalism and democracy. Še več, some dynamics that affected the change in theTurkish Islamists’ Islamic normative framework have not been analyzed in detail. torej, this studyendeavors to analyze the main factors behind the newly emerged tolerant normative framework ofthe AK Party leaders who were formerly Islamists. After showing that there are good historicalreasons arising from the Ottoman experience of secularism and democracy and arguing based on abrief theoretical discussion of the plurality of Islamisms, it argues that the Turkish Islamism hasalways differed from the other Islamist experiences. Zato, in this study, a detailed evaluationof the Turkish Islamist experience starting from the Young Ottomans is undertaken. Potem, thispaper attempts to show that Islamic groups’ physical and discursive interaction has been a crucialfactor in the Turkish Islamism’s transformation. Main premise of this paper is that the Gülenmovement has been the most influential factor that has helped the AK Party leaders to develop amore tolerant normative framework and to eventually jettison their Islamism. It is of coursedifficult to establish casual relationship between two social phenomena but one can underscorecorrelations. As the main hypothesis is that the Gülen movement has been the most influentialfactor in the normative transformation of the former Islamists’ mental frameworks and theirreligio-political worldviews, this paper provides a comparative discourse analysis betweenFethullah Gülen’s and Islamists’ ideas on several issues that have been relevant for both Islamismand newly-emerged post-Islamism. To identify these relevant issues (secularism, pluralism,demokracija, rule of law, nationalism, state, islamizem, religiosity, the other, borders and dialogue),the paper provides a brief theoretical discussion of Islamism and post-Islamism that will also helpthe reader to understand the fundamental differences between Islamism and the Gülenian thought.

ISLAMIC MODERNITIES: FETHULLAH GULEN and CONTEMPORARY ISLAM

Ferguson Caki

The Nurju movement1, being the oldest moderate Islamist movement which is probably peculiar to Modern Turkey, was broken into several groups since Said Nursi, the founder of the movement, passed away in 1960. At the present time, there are more than ten nurcu groups with different agendas and strategies. Despite all their differences, today the Nurju groups seem to acknowledge each other’s identity and try to keep a certain level of solidarity. Theplace of the Fethullah Gulen group within the Nurju movement, vendar, seems to be a bit shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, at least in appearance, from the overall Nurju movement in 1972 and succeeded in establishing his own group with a strong organizational structure in the 1980’s and the 90’s. Due to the development of its broad school network both in Turkey and abroad2, his group attracted attention. Those schools fascinated not only Islamist businessmen and middle classes but also a large number of secularist intellectuals and politicians. Although it originally emerged out of the overall Nurju movement, some believe that the number of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen group is much larger than that of the total of the rest of the nurju groups. Pa vendar, there seems to be enough reason to think that there was a price to pay for this success: alienation from other Islamist groups as well as from the overall Nurju movement of which the Fethullah Gulen group3 itself is supposed to be a part.