RSSL-Iskrizzjonijiet kollha fil- "Movimenti Sufi Ġodda" Kategorija

L-ISLAM, DEMOKRAZIJA & L-Istati Uniti:

Fondazzjoni Cordoba

Abdullah Faliq |

Intro ,


Minkejja li huwa kemm dibattitu perenni kif ukoll kumpless, Arches Quarterly jeżamina mill-ġdid minn raġunijiet teoloġiċi u prattiċi, id-dibattitu importanti dwar ir-relazzjoni u l-kompatibilità bejn l-Islam u d-Demokrazija, kif imtenni fl-aġenda ta’ tama u bidla ta’ Barack Obama. Filwaqt li ħafna jiċċelebraw l-axxendent ta’ Obama fl-Uffiċċju Ovali bħala katarsi nazzjonali għall-Istati Uniti, oħrajn jibqgħu inqas ottimisti dwar bidla fl-ideoloġija u l-approċċ fl-arena internazzjonali. Filwaqt li ħafna mit-tensjoni u n-nuqqas ta’ fiduċja bejn id-dinja Musulmana u l-Istati Uniti jistgħu jiġu attribwiti għall-approċċ tal-promozzjoni tad-demokrazija, tipikament jiffavorixxu dittatorjati u reġimi tal-pupazzi li jħallsu s-servizz bla xkiel għall-valuri demokratiċi u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem, il-konsegwenza ta ' 9/11 tassew ikkummenta aktar id-dubji permezz tal-pożizzjoni ta ’l-Amerika dwar l-Islam politiku. Ħoloq ħajt ta ’negattività kif jinstab minn worldpublicopinion.org, skond liema 67% tal-Eġizzjani jemmnu li globalment l-Amerika għandha rwol "prinċipalment negattiv".
Ir-rispons ta ’l-Amerika b’hekk kien xieraq. Billi jeleġġi lil Obama, ħafna madwar id-dinja qed jagħżlu t-tamiet tagħhom biex jiżviluppaw inqas beligeranti, iżda politika barranija aktar ġusta lejn id-dinja Musulmana. It-test għal Obama, kif niddiskutu, huwa kif l-Amerika u l-alleati tagħha jippromwovu d-demokrazija. Se jkun qed jiffaċilita jew jimponi?
Barra minn hekk, jista 'jkun importanti li jkun sensar onest f'żoni mtawla ta' kunflitti? Ir-rikors għall-għarfien espert u għarfien tal-prolifi
c studjużi, akkademiċi, ġurnalisti u politiċi imħawwar, Arches Quarterly joħroġ għar-relazzjoni bejn l-Iżlam u d-Demokrazija u r-rwol tal-Amerika - kif ukoll il-bidliet li ġab Obama, fit-tfittxija tal-bażi komuni. Anas Altikriti, il-Kap Eżekuttiv tal-Fondazzjoni Cordoba jipprovdi l-gambit tal-ftuħ għal din id-diskussjoni, fejn jirrifletti fuq it-tamiet u l-isfidi li jistrieħu fit-triq ta ’Obama. Wara Altikriti, l-eks konsulent tal-President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane joffri analiżi bir-reqqa tal-prinċipju Iżlamiku tad-dritt għal-libertà. Anwar Ibrahim, eks Deputat Prim Ministru tal-Malasja, tarrikkixxi d-diskussjoni bir-realtajiet prattiċi tal-implimentazzjoni tad-demokrazija f'soċjetajiet dominanti Musulmani, jiġifieri, fl-Indoneżja u l-Malasja.
Għandna wkoll lil Dr Shireen Hunter, ta 'l-Università ta' Georgetown, L-Istati Uniti, li jesplora pajjiżi Musulmani li għadhom lura fid-demokratizzazzjoni u l-modernizzazzjoni. Dan huwa kkumplimentat minn kittieb tat-terroriżmu, L-ispjegazzjoni ta ’Dr Nafeez Ahmed dwar il-kriżi ta’ wara l-modernità u l-
mewt tad-demokrazija. Dr Daud Abdullah (Direttur tal-Lvant Nofsani Media Monitor), Alan Hart (ex korrispondent tal-ITN u tal-BBC Panorama; awtur taż-Żjoniżmu: L-Għedewwa Veru tal-Lhud) u Asem Sondos (Editur ta ’kull ġimgħa ta’ l-Eġittu Sawt Al Omma) tikkonċentra fuq Obama u r-rwol tiegħu vis-à-vis il-promozzjoni tad-demokrazija fid-dinja Musulmana, kif ukoll ir-relazzjonijiet tal-Istati Uniti mal-Iżrael u l-Fratellanza Musulmana.
Il-Ministru tal-Affarijiet Barranin jixxandar, Maldivi, Ahmed Shaheed jispekula dwar il-futur tal-Iżlam u d-Demokrazija; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– membru tas-Sinn Féin li ġarrab erba' snin ħabs għal attivitajiet Repubblikani Irlandiżi u kampanjatur għall-Guildford 4 u Birmingham 6, jirrifletti fuq il-vjaġġ reċenti tiegħu f'Gaża fejn ra l-impatt tal-brutalità u l-inġustizzja li saru kontra l-Palestinjani; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Id-Direttur taċ-Ċentru għall-Istudju tar-Radikalizzazzjoni u l-Vjolenza Politika Kontemporanja jiddiskuti l-isfidi tar-riċerka kritika tat-terrur politiku; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, kittieb u drammaturgu, jiddiskuti prospetti ta' paċi fid-Darfur; u fl-aħħar il-ġurnalist u attivist tad-drittijiet tal-bniedem Ashur Shamis iħares b’mod kritiku lejn id-demokratizzazzjoni u l-politiċizzazzjoni tal-Musulmani llum.
Nittamaw li dan kollu jagħmel qari komprensiv u sors ta 'riflessjoni fuq kwistjonijiet li jaffettwawna lkoll f'dawl ġdid ta' tama.
Grazzi

PREĊIŻJONI FIL-GWERRA GLOBALI DWAR IT-TERROR:

Sherifa zuhur

Seba’ snin wara Settembru 11, 2001 (9/11) attakki, ħafna esperti jemmnu li l-al-Qa'ida reġgħet kisbet is-saħħa u li l-kopja jew l-affiljati tagħha huma aktar letali minn qabel. L-Istima ta' l-Intelliġenza Nazzjonali ta' 2007 sostna li al-Qa’ida hija aktar perikoluża issa minn qabel 9/11.1 L-emulaturi ta’ Al-Qa’ida jkomplu jheddu l-Punent, Lvant Nofsani, u nazzjonijiet Ewropej, bħal fil-plott żbaljat f'Settembru 2007 fil-Ġermanja. Bruce Riedel jiddikjara: Grazzi l-aktar għall-ħeġġa ta’ Washington li jmur fl-Iraq aktar milli jikkaċċa lill-mexxejja tal-al Qaeda, l-organizzazzjoni issa għandha bażi soda ta 'operazzjonijiet fil-badlands tal-Pakistan u franchise effettiva fil-Punent tal-Iraq. Il-firxa tagħha nfirxet mad-dinja Musulmana u fl-Ewropa . . . Osama bin Laden organizza kampanja ta’ propaganda ta’ suċċess. . . . L-ideat tiegħu issa jattiraw aktar segwaċi minn qatt qabel.
Huwa minnu li diversi organizzazzjonijiet salafi-jihadist għadhom qed jitfaċċaw madwar id-dinja Iżlamika. Għaliex risponsi ħafna riżorsi għat-terroriżmu Iżlamiku li qed insejħu jihad globali ma ppruvawx estremament effettivi?
Nimxu għall-għodod ta '"soft power,” xi ngħidu dwar l-effikaċja tal-isforzi tal-Punent biex isaħħu lill-Musulmani fil-Gwerra Globali kontra t-Terroriżmu (GWOT)? Għaliex l-Istati Uniti rebħu daqshekk ftit "qlub u mħuħ" fid-dinja Iżlamika usa'? Għaliex il-messaġġi strateġiċi Amerikani dwar din il-kwistjoni jilagħbu daqshekk ħażin fir-reġjun? Għaliex, minkejja diżapprovazzjoni Musulmana wiesgħa tal-estremiżmu kif muri fi stħarriġ u stqarrijiet uffiċjali minn mexxejja Musulmani ewlenin, għandu l-appoġġ għal bin Ladin fil-fatt żdied fil-Ġordan u fil-Pakistan?
Din il-monografija mhux se tirrevedi l-oriġini tal-vjolenza Iżlamista. Minflok hija mħassba b’tip ta’ falliment kunċettwali li jibni ħażin il-GWOT u li jiskoraġġixxi lill-Musulmani milli jappoġġjawh. Huma ma jistgħux jidentifikaw mal-kontromiżuri trasformattivi proposti minħabba li jagħrfu xi wħud mit-twemmin u l-istituzzjonijiet ewlenin tagħhom bħala miri fil-
dan l-isforz.
Diversi xejriet problematiċi profondament iħawdu l-kunċettwali Amerikani tal-GWOT u l-messaġġi strateġiċi mfassla biex tiġġieled dik il-Gwerra.. Dawn jevolvu minn (1) approċċi politiċi post-kolonjali lejn Musulmani u nazzjonijiet b’maġġoranza Musulmana li jvarjaw ħafna u għalhekk jipproduċu impressjonijiet u effetti konfliġġenti u konfużi; u (2) injoranza ġeneralizzata residwa ta' u preġudizzju lejn l-Islam u l-kulturi subreġjonali. Żid ma’ din ir-rabja Amerikana, biża, u ansjetà dwar l-avvenimenti fatali ta 9/11, u ċerti elementi li, minkejja t-tħeġġiġ tal-irjus li jkessħu, iżommu lill-Musulmani u r-reliġjon tagħhom responsabbli għall-atti ħżiena tal-korreliġjonarji tagħhom, jew li jsibuha utli li jagħmlu dan għal raġunijiet politiċi.

GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL ISLAM: THE SOCIAL BASES OF TURKEY’S WELFARE PARTY

Haldun Gulalp

Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, imbagħad, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. This paper will, therefore, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, with 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. Nevertheless, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.

Democracy in Islamic Political Thought

Azzam S. Tamimi

Democracy has preoccupied Arab political thinkers since the dawn of the modern Arab renaissance about two centuries ago. Since then, the concept of democracy has changed and developed under the influence of a variety of social and political developments.The discussion of democracy in Arab Islamic literature can be traced back to Rifa’a Tahtawi, the father of Egyptian democracy according to Lewis Awad,[3] who shortly after his return to Cairo from Paris published his first book, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, fi 1834. The book summarized his observations of the manners and customs of the modern French,[4] and praised the concept of democracy as he saw it in France and as he witnessed its defence and reassertion through the 1830 Revolution against King Charles X.[5] Tahtawi tried to show that the democratic concept he was explaining to his readers was compatible with the law of Islam. He compared political pluralism to forms of ideological and jurisprudential pluralism that existed in the Islamic experience:
Religious freedom is the freedom of belief, of opinion and of sect, provided it does not contradict the fundamentals of religion . . . The same would apply to the freedom of political practice and opinion by leading administrators, who endeavour to interpret and apply rules and provisions in accordance with the laws of their own countries. Kings and ministers are licensed in the realm of politics to pursue various routes that in the end serve one purpose: good administration and justice.[6] One important landmark in this regard was the contribution of Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader of the 19th-century reform movement in Tunisia, who, fi 1867, formulated a general plan for reform in a book entitled Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Mamalik (The Straight Path to Reforming Governments). The main preoccupation of the book was in tackling the question of political reform in the Arab world. While appealing to politicians and scholars of his time to seek all possible means in order to improve the status of the
community and develop its civility, he warned the general Muslim public against shunning the experiences of other nations on the basis of the misconception that all the writings, inventions, experiences or attitudes of non-Muslims should be rejected or disregarded.
Khairuddin further called for an end to absolutist rule, which he blamed for the oppression of nations and the destruction of civilizations.

Kultura Politika Iżlamika, Demokrazija, u Drittijiet tal-Bniedem

Daniele. Prezz

Ġie argumentat li l-Iżlam jiffaċilita l-awtoritarjaniżmu, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. Konsegwentement, studjużi, kummentaturi, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. Din il-fehma, madankollu, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Teorija politika Islamika, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, li ma jqisux fatturi oħra. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, bħal dawk ta’ reliġjonijiet oħra,

jistgħu jintużaw biex jappoġġjaw varjetà ta’ sistemi u politiki politiċi. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Għalhekk, approċċ ġdid għall-istudju tal-

konnessjoni bejn l-Islam u l-politika hija mitluba.
Nissuġġerixxi, permezz ta’ evalwazzjoni rigoruża tar-relazzjoni bejn l-Islam,

demokrazija, u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem fil-livell transnazzjonali, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, influwenzi ekonomiċi, qsim etniku,

u l-iżvilupp tas-soċjetà, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Kultura Politika Iżlamika, Demokrazija, u Drittijiet tal-Bniedem

Daniele. Prezz

Ġie argumentat li l-Iżlam jiffaċilita l-awtoritarjaniżmu, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Konsegwentement, studjużi, kummentaturi, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. Din il-fehma, madankollu, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Teorija politika Islamika, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, li ma jqisux fatturi oħra. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, bħal dawk ta’ reliġjonijiet oħra,
jistgħu jintużaw biex jappoġġjaw varjetà ta’ sistemi u politiki politiċi. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Għalhekk, approċċ ġdid għall-istudju tal-
konnessjoni bejn l-Islam u l-politika hija mitluba.
Nissuġġerixxi, permezz ta’ evalwazzjoni rigoruża tar-relazzjoni bejn l-Islam,
demokrazija, u d-drittijiet tal-bniedem fil-livell transnazzjonali, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, influwenzi ekonomiċi, qsim etniku,

u l-iżvilupp tas-soċjetà, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

MOVIMENTI IŻLAMISTI U L-PROĊESS DEMOKRATIKU FID-DINJA Għarbija: Nesploraw iż-Żoni Griżi

Nathan J. Kannella, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

Matul l-aħħar għaxar snin, Il-movimenti Iżlamiċi stabbilixxew lilhom infushom bħala atturi politiċi ewlenin fil-Lvant Nofsani. Flimkien mal-gvernijiet, Movimenti Iżlamiċi, moderat kif ukoll radikali, se jiddetermina kif il-politika tar-reġjun tiżvolġi fil-futur prevedibbli. Urew il-ħila mhux biss li jfasslu messaġġi b'appell popolari mifrux iżda wkoll, u l-aktar importanti, biex jinħolqu organizzazzjonijiet b'bażijiet soċjali ġenwini u jiġu żviluppati strateġiji politiċi koerenti. Partijiet oħra,
b'mod ġenerali, fallew fuq il-kontijiet kollha.
Il-pubbliku e fil-Punent u, partikolarment, l-Istati Uniti, sar konxju biss tal-importanza tal-movimenti Iżlamiċi wara avvenimenti drammatiċi, bħar-rivoluzzjoni fl-Iran u l-qtil tal-President Anwar al-Sadat fl-Eġittu. L-attenzjoni kienet ferm aktar sostnuta mill-attakki terroristiċi ta’ Settembru 11, 2001. B'riżultat ta 'dan, Il-movimenti Iżlamiċi huma ġeneralment meqjusa bħala perikolużi u ostili. Filwaqt li tali karatterizzazzjoni hija preċiża fir-rigward tal-organizzazzjonijiet fl-aħħar radikali tal-ispettru Iżlamiku, li huma perikolużi minħabba r-rieda tagħhom li jirrikorru għal vjolenza indiskriminata biex isegwu l-għanijiet tagħhom, mhijiex karatterizzazzjoni preċiża tal-ħafna gruppi li rrinunzjaw jew evitaw il-vjolenza. Għax organizzazzjonijiet terroristiċi joħolqu immedjat
theddida, madankollu, dawk li jfasslu l-politika fil-pajjiżi kollha taw attenzjoni sproporzjonata lill-organizzazzjonijiet vjolenti.
Huwa l-organizzazzjonijiet Islamisti mainstream, mhux dawk radikali, li se jkollu l-akbar impatt fuq l-evoluzzjoni politika futura tal-Lvant Nofsani. L-għanijiet grandjużi tar-radikali li jerġgħu jistabbilixxu kalifat li jgħaqqad id-dinja Għarbija kollha, jew saħansitra li jiġu imposti fuq pajjiżi Għarab individwali liġijiet u drawwiet soċjali ispirati minn interpretazzjoni fundamentalista tal-Iżlam huma sempliċement 'il bogħod wisq mir-realtà tal-lum biex jiġu realizzati. Dan ma jfissirx li l-gruppi terroristiċi mhumiex perikolużi—jistgħu jikkawżaw telf kbir ta’ ħajjiet anke fl-insegwiment ta’ miri impossibbli—iżda li x’aktarx ma jbiddlux il-wiċċ tal-Lvant Nofsani.. L-organizzazzjonijiet Islamisti mainstream huma ġeneralment kwistjoni differenti. Diġà kellhom impatt qawwi fuq id-drawwiet soċjali f'ħafna pajjiżi, iwaqqaf u jreġġa’ lura x-xejriet sekularisti u jbiddel il-mod kif ħafna Għarab jilbsu u jġibu ruħhom. U l-għan politiku immedjat tagħhom, biex issir forza qawwija billi tipparteċipa fil-politika normali ta’ pajjiżhom, mhix waħda impossibbli. Diġà qed jiġi realizzat f'pajjiżi bħall-Marokk, Il-Ġordan, u anke l-Eġittu, li għadha tipprojbixxi l-organizzazzjonijiet politiċi Iżlamiċi kollha iżda issa għandha tmienja u tmenin Musulmani Brother fil-Parlament. Politika, mhux vjolenza, huwa dak li jagħti lill-Iżlamisti mainstream l-influwenza tagħhom.

RADIKALIZZAZZJONI IŻLAMISTA

DAĦLA
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Kwistjonijiet relatati mal-Iżlam politiku jkomplu jippreżentaw sfidi għall-politiki barranin Ewropej fil-Lvant Nofsani u l-Afrika ta' Fuq (MENA). Hekk kif il-politika tal-UE fittxet li tilqa’ ma’ sfidi bħal dawn matul l-aħħar għaxar snin jew hekk, l-Islam politiku nnifsu evolva. L-esperti jindikaw il-kumplessità u l-varjetà dejjem tikber ta 'xejriet fi ħdan l-Iżlam politiku. Xi organizzazzjonijiet Iżlamiċi saħħew l-impenn tagħhom għal normi demokratiċi u impenjaw ruħhom bis-sħiħ fil-paċi, politika nazzjonali prinċipali. Oħrajn jibqgħu miżżewġin ma’ mezzi vjolenti. U oħrajn għaddew lejn forma aktar kwietista tal-Iżlam, diżingaġġat mill-attività politika. L-Iżlam politiku fir-reġjun MENA ma jippreżenta l-ebda tendenza uniformi għal dawk li jfasslu l-politika Ewropej. Id-dibattitu analitiku kiber madwar il-kunċett ta’ ‘radikalizzazzjoni’. Dan imbagħad wassal għal riċerka dwar il-fatturi li jmexxu 'd-diżradikalizzazzjoni', u bil-maqlub, ‘ri-radikalizzazzjoni’. Ħafna mill-kumplessità ġejja mill-fehma mifruxa ħafna li dawn it-tliet fenomeni qed iseħħu fl-istess ħin. Anke t-termini nfushom huma kkontestati. Ħafna drabi ġie rrimarkat li d-dikotomija moderat-radikali tonqos bis-sħiħ milli taqbad l-isfumaturi tax-xejriet fl-Islam politiku. Xi analisti jilmentaw ukoll li t-taħdit dwar ‘radikaliżmu’ huwa ideoloġikament mgħobbi. Fil-livell tat-terminoloġija, nifhmu li r-radikalizzazzjoni hija assoċjata mal-estremiżmu, iżda l-fehmiet ivarjaw fuq iċ-ċentralità tal-kontenut reliġjuż–fundamentalist tiegħu versus politiku, u fuq jekk ir-rieda li wieħed jirrikorri għall-vjolenza hijiex implikata jew le.

Differenzi bħal dawn huma riflessi fil-fehmiet li għandhom l-Iżlamisti nfushom, kif ukoll fil-perċezzjonijiet tal-barranin.

L-ISLAM, IŻLAMTI, U L-PRINĊIPJU ELETTORALI FIL-LVANT NOFSANI

James Piscatori

Għal idea li suppost wasal iż-żmien tagħha, ÒdemokrazijaÓ taħbi għaġeb

numru ta’ mistoqsijiet mhux imwieġba u, fid-dinja Musulmana, iġġenerat

ammont notevoli ta 'sħana. Huwa terminu kulturalment speċifiku, jirrifletti tal-Punent

esperjenzi Ewropej matul diversi sekli? Is-soċjetajiet mhux tal-Punent għandhom

l-istandards tagħhom ta' parteċipazzjoni u responsabbiltà—u tabilħaqq tagħhom

ritmi ta' żviluppÑli jikkmandaw l-attenzjoni, jekk mhux rispett? Jagħmel l-Islam,

bl-enfasi tagħha fuq l-awtorità skritturali u ċ-ċentralità tal-liġi sagra, jippermettu

għal politika flessibbli u gvern parteċipattiv?

It-tweġibiet għal dawn il-mistoqsijiet jiffurmaw parti minn narrattiva u kontronarrattiva

li huma stess huma parti integrali minn diskors ikkontestat. L-istorja akbar

jitħasseb jekk l-ÒIslamÓ jikkostitwixxix theddida għall-Punent jew le, u l-supplimentari

L-istorja tinvolvi l-kompatibbiltà tal-Islam mad-demokrazija. L-intellettwali

bagalji, biex tibdel il-metafora, bilkemm huwa newtrali. Id-diskussjoni nnifisha għandha

isiru politizzati akut, maqbuda fil-kontroversji relatati dwar l-Orjentaliżmu,

l-eċċezzjonaliżmu tal-Lvant Nofsani b'mod partikolari u tad-dinja Musulmana b'mod ġenerali,

u l-moderniżmu tal-movimenti reliġjużi ÒfundamentalistiÓ.

To Be A Muslim

Fathi Yakan

All praises to Allah, and blessings and peace to His Messenger.This book is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the characteristics that every single Muslim should portray in order to fulfill the conditions of being a Muslim in both belief and practice. Many people are Muslim by identity,because they were ”born Muslim” from Muslim parents. Theymay not know what Islam really means or its requirements, an dso may lead a very secular life. The purpose of this first partis to explain the responsibility of every Muslim to become aknowledgeable and true believer in Islam.The second part of this book discusses the responsibility to become an activist for Islam and participate in the Islamic Movement. It explains the nature of this movement and its goals, philosophy, strategy, and tactics, as well as the desirable characteristics of it members.The failure of various movements in the Islamic world, and especially in the Arab countries, result from a spiritual emptiness in these movements as well as in society generally. In sucha situation the principles and institutions of Islam are forgotten.The westernized leaders and movements collapse when they encounter serious challenges. These leaders and movements and the systems of government and economics they try to imposehave fallen because they lacked a solid base. They fell becausethey were artificial constructs copied from alien cultures anddid not represent the Muslim community. Therefore they wererejected by it. This situation is comparable to a kidney transplantin a human body. Although the body is able to tolerate it painfully for a short period of time, eventually the kidney willbe rejected and die.When the sickness of the Muslim Ummah became acute few Muslims thought of building a new society on Islamic principles.Instead many tried to import man made systems and principles, which looked good but really were grossly defectiveand so could be easily toppled and crushed.

il 500 l-iktar Musulmani influwenti

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

Il-pubblikazzjoni li għandek f'idejk hija l-ewwel waħda minn dak li nittamaw li tkun serje annwali li tipprovdi tieqa għall-movers u shakers tad-dinja Musulmana. Aħna stinkajna biex nenfasizzaw nies li huma influwenti bħala Musulmani, thatis, nies li l-influwenza tagħhom hija derivata mill-prattika tagħhom tal-Iżlam jew mill-fatt li huma Musulmani. Aħna naħsbu li dan jagħti ħarsa siewja lejn il-modi differenti li l-Musulmani jħallu impatt fuq id-dinja, u juri wkoll id-diversità ta 'kif in-nies jgħixu bħala Musulmani llum. L-influwenza hija kunċett delikat. It-tifsira tagħha ġejja mill-kelma Latina influens li tfisser li tidħol, li tipponta lejn idea astroloġika antika li forzi li ma jidhrux (bhal themoon) jaffettwaw lill-umanità. Iċ-ċifri fuq din il-lista għandhom il-ħila li jaffettwaw ukoll lill-umanità. F’varjetà ta ’modi differenti kull persuna fuq din il-lista għandha influwenza fuq il-ħajja ta’ numru kbir ta ’nies fuq l-art. Il 50 il-figuri l-aktar influwenti huma profilati. L-influwenza tagħhom ġejja minn varjetà ta 'sorsi; madankollu huma magħqudin bil-fatt li kull wieħed jaffettwa meded kbar ta 'umanità 500 mexxejja 15 kategoriji — Akkademiku, Politiku,Amministrattiv, Nisel, Predikaturi, Nisa, Żgħażagħ, Filantropija, Żvilupp,Xjenza u Teknoloġija, Arti u Kultura, Midja, Radikali, Netwerks Iżlamiċi Internazzjonali, u Kwistjonijiet tal-Ġurnata - biex jgħinuk tifhem it-tipi differenti ta 'modi li l-Islam u l-Musulmani jħallu impatt fuq id-dinja llum. Żewġ listi komposti juru kif l-influwenza taħdem b'modi differenti: In-Netwerks Iżlamiċi Internazzjonali juri nies li huma fil-kap ta 'netwerks transnazzjonali importanti tal-Musulmani, u Kwistjonijiet tal-Ġurnata jenfasizzaw individwi li l-importanza tagħhom hija dovuta għal kwistjonijiet kurrenti li jaffettwaw lill-umanità.

Beyond Post-Islamism

Ihsan Yilmaz


With the increased international prominence of Turkey and its successful and internationallyrespected AK Party government, the Academia’s attention has focused on the Turkish Islamistexperience. Turkey had already been seen as an almost unique case as far Islam-state-secularismdemocracyrelations were concerned but the recent transformation of Turkish Islamism coupledwith the global turmoil in the post-9/11 world has made the Turkish case much more important.While Turkish Islamists’ recent transformation that has brought about their rise to the power hasbeen applauded at home and abroad, there are relatively very few studies that analyze theirtransformation by taking into account the unique experience of Turkish Islamism starting from the18th & 19th centuries’ Ottoman secularization, Young Ottomans of the 1860s and the Ottomanconstitutionalism and democracy. Barra minn hekk, some dynamics that affected the change in theTurkish Islamists’ Islamic normative framework have not been analyzed in detail. Għalhekk, this studyendeavors to analyze the main factors behind the newly emerged tolerant normative framework ofthe AK Party leaders who were formerly Islamists. After showing that there are good historicalreasons arising from the Ottoman experience of secularism and democracy and arguing based on abrief theoretical discussion of the plurality of Islamisms, it argues that the Turkish Islamism hasalways differed from the other Islamist experiences. Għalhekk, in this study, a detailed evaluationof the Turkish Islamist experience starting from the Young Ottomans is undertaken. Then, thispaper attempts to show that Islamic groups’ physical and discursive interaction has been a crucialfactor in the Turkish Islamism’s transformation. Main premise of this paper is that the Gülenmovement has been the most influential factor that has helped the AK Party leaders to develop amore tolerant normative framework and to eventually jettison their Islamism. It is of coursedifficult to establish casual relationship between two social phenomena but one can underscorecorrelations. As the main hypothesis is that the Gülen movement has been the most influentialfactor in the normative transformation of the former Islamists’ mental frameworks and theirreligio-political worldviews, this paper provides a comparative discourse analysis betweenFethullah Gülen’s and Islamists’ ideas on several issues that have been relevant for both Islamismand newly-emerged post-Islamism. To identify these relevant issues (secularism, pluralism,demokrazija, rule of law, nationalism, state, Iżlamiżmu, religiosity, the other, borders and dialogue),the paper provides a brief theoretical discussion of Islamism and post-Islamism that will also helpthe reader to understand the fundamental differences between Islamism and the Gülenian thought.

MODERNITAJIET IŻLAMIĊI: FETHULLAH GULEN u IŻLAM KONTEMPORANJU

FAHRI CAKI

Il-moviment Nurju1, huwa l-eqdem moviment Iżlamiku moderat li probabbilment huwa partikolari għat-Turkija Moderna, kien maqsum f’diversi gruppi minn Said Nursi, il-fundatur tal-moviment, miet fi 1960. Fil-preżent, hemm aktar minn għaxar gruppi nurcu b'aġendi u strateġiji differenti. Minkejja d-differenzi kollha tagħhom, illum il-gruppi Nurju donnhom jirrikonoxxu l-identità ta' xulxin u jippruvaw iżommu ċertu livell ta' solidarjetà. Il-post tal-grupp Fethullah Gulen fi ħdan il-moviment Nurju, madankollu, jidher li hu daqsxejn mfixkel.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) maqsum lilu nnifsu, għallinqas fid-dehra, mill-moviment ġenerali ta’ Nurju fi 1972 u rnexxielu jistabbilixxi l-grupp tiegħu stess bi struttura organizzattiva b’saħħitha fis-snin 80 u 90. Minħabba l-iżvilupp tan-netwerk skejjel wiesa' tagħha kemm fit-Turkija kif ukoll barra mill-pajjiż2, il-grupp tiegħu ġibed l-attenzjoni. Dawk l-iskejjel affaxxinaw mhux biss negozjanti u klassijiet tan-nofs Iżlamiċi iżda wkoll numru kbir ta’ intellettwali u politiċi sekulari.. Għalkemm oriġinarjament ħarġet mill-moviment ġenerali ta 'Nurju, xi wħud jemmnu li n-numru tas-segwaċi tal-grupp Fethullah Gulen huwa ħafna akbar minn dak tat-total tal-bqija tal-gruppi nurju. Madankollu, jidher li hemm raġuni biżżejjed biex wieħed jaħseb li kien hemm prezz x’tħallas għal dan is-suċċess: aljenazzjoni minn gruppi Iżlamiċi oħra kif ukoll mill-moviment ġenerali ta’ Nurju li l-grupp Fethullah Gulen3 innifsu suppost jagħmel parti minnu.