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ISLAM, LA DÉMOCRATIE & LES ÉTATS UNIS:

Fondation Cordoue

Abdullah Faliq

Introduction ,


Bien qu'il s'agisse d'un débat à la fois éternel et complexe, Arches Quarterly réexamine à partir de motifs théologiques et pratiques, l'important débat sur la relation et la compatibilité entre l'islam et la démocratie, comme en écho dans le programme d'espoir et de changement de Barack Obama. Alors que beaucoup célèbrent l'ascension d'Obama au bureau ovale comme une catharsis nationale pour les États-Unis, d'autres restent moins optimistes quant à un changement d'idéologie et d'approche sur la scène internationale. Alors qu'une grande partie de la tension et de la méfiance entre le monde musulman et les États-Unis peut être attribuée à l'approche de promotion de la démocratie, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
En outre, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Faire appel à l'expertise et à la perspicacité de prolifi
c érudits, universitaires, journalistes et politiciens chevronnés, Arches Quarterly met en lumière la relation entre l'islam et la démocratie et le rôle de l'Amérique - ainsi que les changements apportés par Obama, dans la recherche d'un terrain d'entente. Anas Altikriti, le PDG de la Fondation Cordoba fournit le pari d'ouverture de cette discussion, où il réfléchit sur les espoirs et les défis qui reposent sur le chemin d'Obama. Suivant Altikriti, l'ancien conseiller du président Nixon, Le Dr Robert Crane offre une analyse approfondie du principe islamique du droit à la liberté. Anouar Ibrahim, ancien vice-premier ministre de Malaisie, enrichit la discussion avec les réalités pratiques de la mise en œuvre de la démocratie dans les sociétés à dominante musulmane, à savoir, en Indonésie et en Malaisie.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, Etats-Unis, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (Guerre contre le terrorisme)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; et (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL ISLAM: THE SOCIAL BASES OF TURKEY’S WELFARE PARTY

Haldun Gulalp

Political Islam has gained heightened visibility in recent decades in Turkey. Large numbers of female students have begun to demonstrate their commitment by wearing the banned Islamic headdress on university campuses, and influential pro-Islamist TV
channels have proliferated. This paper focuses on the Welfare (Refah) Party as the foremost institutional representative of political Islam in Turkey.
The Welfare Party’s brief tenure in power as the leading coalition partner from mid-1996 to mid-1997 was the culmination of a decade of steady growth that was aided by other Islamist organizations and institutions. These organizations and institutions
included newspapers and publishing houses that attracted Islamist writers, numerous Islamic foundations, an Islamist labor-union confederation, and an Islamist businessmen’s association. These institutions worked in tandem with, and in support of, Welfare as the undisputed leader and representative of political Islam in Turkey, even though they had their own particularistic goals and ideals, which often diverged from Welfare’s political projects. Focusing on the Welfare Party, then, allows for an analysis of the wider social base upon which the Islamist political movement rose in Turkey. Since Welfare’s ouster from power and its eventual closure, the Islamist movement has been in disarray. This paper will, donc, be confined to the Welfare Party period.
Welfare’s predecessor, the National Salvation Party, was active in the 1970s but was closed down by the military regime in 1980. Welfare was founded in 1983 and gained great popularity in the 1990s. Starting with a 4.4 percent vote in the municipal elections of 1984, the Welfare Party steadily increased its showing and multiplied its vote nearly five times in twelve years. It alarmed Turkey’s secular establishment first in the municipal elections of 1994, with 19 percent of all votes nationwide and the mayor’s seats in both Istanbul and Ankara, then in the general elections of 1995 when it won a plurality with 21.4 percent of the national vote. Nevertheless, the Welfare Party was only briefly able to lead a coalition government in partnership with the right-wing True Path Party of Tansu C¸ iller.

La démocratie dans la pensée politique islamique

Azzam S. Tamimi

La démocratie préoccupe les penseurs politiques arabes depuis l'aube de la renaissance arabe moderne il y a environ deux siècles. Depuis, le concept de démocratie a changé et s'est développé sous l'influence de divers développements sociaux et politiques. La discussion sur la démocratie dans la littérature arabo-islamique remonte à Rifa'a Tahtawi, le père de la démocratie égyptienne selon Lewis Awad,[3] qui peu de temps après son retour au Caire de Paris a publié son premier livre, Takhlis Al-Ibriz Ila Talkhis Bariz, dans 1834. Le livre résumait ses observations sur les mœurs et les coutumes du français moderne,[4] et a fait l'éloge du concept de démocratie tel qu'il le voyait en France et en étant témoin de sa défense et de sa réaffirmation à travers le 1830 Révolution contre le roi Charles X.[5] Tahtawi a tenté de montrer que le concept démocratique qu'il expliquait à ses lecteurs était compatible avec la loi de l'islam. Il a comparé le pluralisme politique aux formes de pluralisme idéologique et jurisprudentiel qui existaient dans l'expérience islamique:
La liberté religieuse est la liberté de croyance, d'opinion et de secte, à condition de ne pas contredire les fondements de la religion . . . La même chose s'appliquerait à la liberté de pratique politique et d'opinion des principaux administrateurs, qui s'efforcent d'interpréter et d'appliquer les règles et les dispositions conformément aux lois de leur propre pays. Les rois et les ministres sont autorisés dans le domaine de la politique à suivre diverses voies qui, en fin de compte, servent un seul but.: bonne administration et justice.[6] Un jalon important à cet égard a été la contribution de Khairuddin At-Tunisi (1810- 99), leader du mouvement de réforme du XIXe siècle en Tunisie, qui, dans 1867, a formulé un plan général de réforme dans un livre intitulé Aqwam Al-Masalik Fi Taqwim Al- Revenir (La voie directe pour réformer les gouvernements). La principale préoccupation du livre était d'aborder la question de la réforme politique dans le monde arabe. Tout en appelant les politiciens et les universitaires de son temps à rechercher tous les moyens possibles afin d'améliorer le statut de la
communauté et développer sa courtoisie, il a mis en garde le grand public musulman de ne pas fuir les expériences d'autres nations sur la base de l'idée fausse que tous les écrits, inventions, les expériences ou les attitudes des non-musulmans doivent être rejetées ou ignorées.
Khairuddin a en outre appelé à la fin du régime absolutiste, qu'il a blâmé pour l'oppression des nations et la destruction des civilisations.

La culture islamique politiques, Démocratie, et droits de l'homme

Daniel E. Prix

Il a été avancé que l'islam facilite l'autoritarisme, contredit le

valeurs des sociétés occidentales, et affecte de manière significative des résultats politiques importants

dans les pays musulmans. par conséquent, savants, commentateurs, et gouvernement

les responsables désignent fréquemment le «fondamentalisme islamique» comme le prochain

menace idéologique pour les démocraties libérales. Cette vue, cependant, est basé principalement

sur l'analyse des textes, Théorie politique islamique, et études ad hoc

de pays individuels, qui ne tiennent pas compte d'autres facteurs. C'est mon argument

que les textes et traditions de l'islam, comme ceux des autres religions,

peut être utilisé pour soutenir une variété de systèmes politiques et de politiques. De campagne

des études spécifiques et descriptives ne nous aident pas à trouver des modèles qui aideront

nous expliquons les relations variables entre l'islam et la politique à travers le

pays du monde musulman. D'où, une nouvelle approche de l'étude des

un lien entre l'islam et la politique est nécessaire.
je suggère, par une évaluation rigoureuse de la relation entre l'Islam,

la démocratie, et les droits de l'homme au niveau transnational, trop

l'accent est mis sur le pouvoir de l'islam en tant que force politique. Je l'ai fait en premier

utiliser des études de cas comparatives, qui se concentrent sur les facteurs liés à l'interaction

entre groupes et régimes islamiques, influences économiques, clivages ethniques,

et développement sociétal, pour expliquer la variance de l'influence de

L'Islam et la politique dans huit pays.

La culture islamique politiques, Démocratie, et droits de l'homme

Daniel E. Prix

Il a été avancé que l'islam facilite l'autoritarisme, contredit le

valeurs des sociétés occidentales, et affecte de manière significative des résultats politiques importants
dans les pays musulmans. par conséquent, savants, commentateurs, et gouvernement
les responsables désignent fréquemment le «fondamentalisme islamique» comme le prochain
menace idéologique pour les démocraties libérales. Cette vue, cependant, est basé principalement
sur l'analyse des textes, Théorie politique islamique, et études ad hoc
de pays individuels, qui ne tiennent pas compte d'autres facteurs. C'est mon argument
que les textes et traditions de l'islam, comme ceux des autres religions,
peut être utilisé pour soutenir une variété de systèmes politiques et de politiques. De campagne
des études spécifiques et descriptives ne nous aident pas à trouver des modèles qui aideront
nous expliquons les relations variables entre l'islam et la politique à travers le
pays du monde musulman. D'où, une nouvelle approche de l'étude des
un lien entre l'islam et la politique est nécessaire.
je suggère, par une évaluation rigoureuse de la relation entre l'Islam,
la démocratie, et les droits de l'homme au niveau transnational, trop
l'accent est mis sur le pouvoir de l'islam en tant que force politique. Je l'ai fait en premier
utiliser des études de cas comparatives, qui se concentrent sur les facteurs liés à l'interaction
entre groupes et régimes islamiques, influences économiques, clivages ethniques,

et développement sociétal, pour expliquer la variance de l'influence de

L'Islam et la politique dans huit pays.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. Brun, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, cependant, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordanie, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politique, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

ISLAM, ISLAMISTES, ET LE PRINCIPE DES ÉLECTIONS AU MOYEN-ORIENT

James Piscatori

For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing

number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated

a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western

European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess

their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own

rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,

with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow

for flexible politics and participatory government?

The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative

that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story

concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary

story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual

baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has

become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,

the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,

and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.

To Be A Muslim

Fathi Yakan

All praises to Allah, and blessings and peace to His Messenger.This book is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the characteristics that every single Muslim should portray in order to fulfill the conditions of being a Muslim in both belief and practice. Many people are Muslim by identity,because they were ”born Muslim” from Muslim parents. Theymay not know what Islam really means or its requirements, an dso may lead a very secular life. The purpose of this first partis to explain the responsibility of every Muslim to become aknowledgeable and true believer in Islam.The second part of this book discusses the responsibility to become an activist for Islam and participate in the Islamic Movement. It explains the nature of this movement and its goals, philosophy, strategy, and tactics, as well as the desirable characteristics of it members.The failure of various movements in the Islamic world, and especially in the Arab countries, result from a spiritual emptiness in these movements as well as in society generally. In sucha situation the principles and institutions of Islam are forgotten.The westernized leaders and movements collapse when they encounter serious challenges. These leaders and movements and the systems of government and economics they try to imposehave fallen because they lacked a solid base. They fell becausethey were artificial constructs copied from alien cultures anddid not represent the Muslim community. Therefore they wererejected by it. This situation is comparable to a kidney transplantin a human body. Although the body is able to tolerate it painfully for a short period of time, eventually the kidney willbe rejected and die.When the sickness of the Muslim Ummah became acute few Muslims thought of building a new society on Islamic principles.Instead many tried to import man made systems and principles, which looked good but really were grossly defectiveand so could be easily toppled and crushed.

le 500 musulmans les plus influents

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

La publication que vous avez dans vos mains est le premier de ce que nous espérons sera anannual série qui fournit une fenêtre sur les personnes influentes de la Muslimworld. Nous avons cherché à mettre en évidence les personnes qui ont de l'influence que les musulmans, thatis, les personnes dont l'influence est dérivée de leur pratique de l'islam ou de la factthat ils sont musulmans. Nous pensons que cela donne un aperçu précieux des différentes manières dont les musulmans ont un impact sur le monde, et montre également la diversité de la façon dont les gens vivent en tant que musulmans aujourd'hui. L'influence est un concept délicat. Son sens dérive du mot latin influens qui signifie affluer, pointant vers une vieille idée astrologique selon laquelle des forces invisibles (comme la lune) affecter l'humanité. Les chiffres de cette liste ont aussi la capacité d'affecter l'humanité. De différentes manières, chaque personne sur cette liste a une influence sur la vie d'un grand nombre de personnes sur la terre.. Le 50 les personnalités les plus influentes sont présentées. Leur influence provient de diverses sources; cependant ils sont unifiés par le fait qu'ils affectent chacun d'énormes pans de l'humanité. 500 leaders en 15 catégories: savant, Politique,Administratif, Lignée, Prédicateurs, Femmes, Jeunesse, Philanthropie, Développement,Science et technologie, Arts et culture, Médias, Radicaux, Réseaux islamiques internationaux, et Questions du jour—pour vous aider à comprendre les différentes manières dont l'Islam et les musulmans ont un impact sur le monde aujourd'hui. Deux listes composites montrent comment l'influence fonctionne de différentes manières.: InternationalIslamic Networks montre des personnes qui sont à la tête d'importants réseaux transnationaux de musulmans, et Les questions du jour met en évidence les personnes dont l'importance est due aux problèmes actuels affectant l'humanité.

Au-delà de post-islamisme

Ihsan Yilmaz


With the increased international prominence of Turkey and its successful and internationallyrespected AK Party government, the Academia’s attention has focused on the Turkish Islamistexperience. Turkey had already been seen as an almost unique case as far Islam-state-secularismdemocracyrelations were concerned but the recent transformation of Turkish Islamism coupledwith the global turmoil in the post-9/11 world has made the Turkish case much more important.While Turkish Islamists’ recent transformation that has brought about their rise to the power hasbeen applauded at home and abroad, there are relatively very few studies that analyze theirtransformation by taking into account the unique experience of Turkish Islamism starting from the18th & 19th centuries’ Ottoman secularization, Young Ottomans of the 1860s and the Ottomanconstitutionalism and democracy. En outre, some dynamics that affected the change in theTurkish Islamists’ Islamic normative framework have not been analyzed in detail. Thus, this studyendeavors to analyze the main factors behind the newly emerged tolerant normative framework ofthe AK Party leaders who were formerly Islamists. After showing that there are good historicalreasons arising from the Ottoman experience of secularism and democracy and arguing based on abrief theoretical discussion of the plurality of Islamisms, it argues that the Turkish Islamism hasalways differed from the other Islamist experiences. Par conséquent, in this study, a detailed evaluationof the Turkish Islamist experience starting from the Young Ottomans is undertaken. Ensuite,, thispaper attempts to show that Islamic groups’ physical and discursive interaction has been a crucialfactor in the Turkish Islamism’s transformation. Main premise of this paper is that the Gülenmovement has been the most influential factor that has helped the AK Party leaders to develop amore tolerant normative framework and to eventually jettison their Islamism. It is of coursedifficult to establish casual relationship between two social phenomena but one can underscorecorrelations. As the main hypothesis is that the Gülen movement has been the most influentialfactor in the normative transformation of the former Islamists’ mental frameworks and theirreligio-political worldviews, this paper provides a comparative discourse analysis betweenFethullah Gülen’s and Islamists’ ideas on several issues that have been relevant for both Islamismand newly-emerged post-Islamism. To identify these relevant issues (laïcité, pluralism,la démocratie, rule of law, nationalism, state, Islamisme, religiosity, the other, borders and dialogue),the paper provides a brief theoretical discussion of Islamism and post-Islamism that will also helpthe reader to understand the fundamental differences between Islamism and the Gülenian thought.

Modernités ISLAMIQUE: Gulen Fethullah et musulman contemporain

Honoraire Knife

Le Nurju movement1, étant le plus ancien mouvement islamiste modéré qui est probablement propre à la Turquie moderne, a été divisée en plusieurs groupes depuis Said Nursi, le fondateur du mouvement, est décédé en 1960. À l'heure actuelle, il ya plus de groupes Nurcu dix programmes différents et des stratégies. Malgré toutes leurs différences, aujourd'hui les groupes Nurju semblent reconnaître mutuellement leur identité et essayer de garder un certain niveau de solidarité. Le lieu «du groupe de Fethullah Gülen dans le mouvement Nurju, cependant, semble être un peu shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, du moins en apparence, du mouvement d'ensemble dans Nurju 1972 et réussi à établir son propre groupe avec une solide structure organisationnelle dans les années 1980 et les années 90. En raison du développement de son réseau d'écoles large tant en Turquie et étranger2, son groupe a attiré l'attention. Ces écoles fasciné non seulement les hommes d'affaires islamistes et les classes moyennes, mais aussi un grand nombre d'intellectuels et de politiciens laïques. Bien qu'il a vu le jour sur l'ensemble du mouvement Nurju, Certains croient que le nombre des adeptes du groupe Fethullah Gülen est beaucoup plus grande que celle de l'ensemble du reste des groupes nurju. Encore, il semble y avoir une raison suffisante de croire qu'il y avait un prix à payer pour cette réussite: l'aliénation d'autres groupes islamistes, ainsi que de l'ensemble du mouvement Nurju dont le Gulen Fethullah groupe3 lui-même est censé être une partie.