Όλες οι συμμετοχές στο "Νέα Κινήματα Σούφι" Κατηγορία
ΙΣΛΑΜ, ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΑ & Η ΗΠΑ:
Ίδρυμα Κόρδοβα
Αμπντουλάχ Faliq
Εισαγωγή ,
ΑΚΡΙΒΕΙΑ ΣΤΟΝ ΠΑΓΚΟΣΜΙΟ ΠΟΛΕΜΟ ΚΑΤΑ ΤΟΥ ΤΡΟΜΟΥ:
Sherifa Zuhur
GLOBALIZATION AND POLITICAL ISLAM: THE SOCIAL BASES OF TURKEY’S WELFARE PARTY
Haldun Gulalp
Η δημοκρατία στην ισλαμική πολιτική σκέψη
Azzam S. Tamimi
Ισλαμικός Πολιτικός Πολιτισμός, Δημοκρατία, και Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων
Daniel E. Τιμή
Ισλαμικός Πολιτικός Πολιτισμός, Δημοκρατία, και Ανθρωπίνων Δικαιωμάτων
Daniel E. Τιμή
ΙΣΛΑΜΙΣΤΙΚΑ ΚΙΝΗΜΑΤΑ ΚΑΙ Η ΔΗΜΟΚΡΑΤΙΚΗ ΔΙΑΔΙΚΑΣΙΑ ΣΤΟΝ ΑΡΑΒΙΚΟ ΚΟΣΜΟ: Εξερευνώντας τις Γκρίζες Ζώνες
Nathan J. καφέ, Amr Hamzawy,
Μαρίνα Ottaway
ΙΣΛΑΜΙΣΤΙΚΗ ΡΙΖΟΣΠΟΠΟΙΗΣΗ
Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.
Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.
ΙΣΛΑΜ, ΙΣΛΑΜΙΣΤΕΣ, ΚΑΙ Η ΕΚΛΟΓΙΚΗ ΑΡΧΗ ΣΤΗ ΜΕΣΗ ΑΝΑΤΟΛΗ
James Piscatori
To Be A Muslim
Fath Yakan
All praises to Allah, and blessings and peace to His Messenger.This book is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the characteristics that every single Muslim should portray in order to fulfill the conditions of being a Muslim in both belief and practice. Many people are Muslim by identity,because they were ”born Muslim” from Muslim parents. Theymay not know what Islam really means or its requirements, an dso may lead a very secular life. The purpose of this first partis to explain the responsibility of every Muslim to become aknowledgeable and true believer in Islam.The second part of this book discusses the responsibility to become an activist for Islam and participate in the Islamic Movement. It explains the nature of this movement and its goals, philosophy, strategy, and tactics, as well as the desirable characteristics of it members.The failure of various movements in the Islamic world, and especially in the Arab countries, result from a spiritual emptiness in these movements as well as in society generally. In sucha situation the principles and institutions of Islam are forgotten.The westernized leaders and movements collapse when they encounter serious challenges. These leaders and movements and the systems of government and economics they try to imposehave fallen because they lacked a solid base. They fell becausethey were artificial constructs copied from alien cultures anddid not represent the Muslim community. Therefore they wererejected by it. This situation is comparable to a kidney transplantin a human body. Although the body is able to tolerate it painfully for a short period of time, eventually the kidney willbe rejected and die.When the sickness of the Muslim Ummah became acute few Muslims thought of building a new society on Islamic principles.Instead many tried to import man made systems and principles, which looked good but really were grossly defectiveand so could be easily toppled and crushed.
ο 500 οι μουσουλμάνοι με τη μεγαλύτερη επιρροή
John Esposito
Ibrahim Kalin
Η έκδοση που έχετε στα χέρια σας είναι η πρώτη από τις ετήσιες σειρές που ελπίζουμε ότι θα παρέχει ένα παράθυρο στους κινητές και τους δονητές του μουσουλμανικού κόσμου. Προσπαθήσαμε να αναδείξουμε ανθρώπους που έχουν επιρροή ως μουσουλμάνους, αυτό είναι, άτομα των οποίων η επιρροή πηγάζει από την πρακτική τους στο Ισλάμ ή από το γεγονός ότι είναι μουσουλμάνοι. Πιστεύουμε ότι αυτό δίνει πολύτιμη εικόνα για τους διαφορετικούς τρόπους με τους οποίους οι Μουσουλμάνοι επηρεάζουν τον κόσμο, και δείχνει επίσης την ποικιλομορφία του πώς ζουν οι άνθρωποι ως μουσουλμάνοι σήμερα. Η επιρροή είναι μια δύσκολη έννοια. Η σημασία του προέρχεται από τη λατινική λέξη influens που σημαίνει εισροή, δείχνοντας σε μια παλιά αστρολογική ιδέα ότι αόρατες δυνάμεις (σαν το φεγγάρι) επηρεάζουν την ανθρωπότητα. Τα στοιχεία αυτής της λίστας έχουν την ικανότητα να επηρεάσουν και την ανθρωπότητα. Με διάφορους τρόπους, κάθε άτομο σε αυτήν τη λίστα έχει επιρροή στη ζωή ενός μεγάλου αριθμού ανθρώπων στη γη. ο 50 Τα πρόσωπα με τη μεγαλύτερη επιρροή παρουσιάζονται προφίλ. Η επιρροή τους προέρχεται από ποικίλες πηγές; Ωστόσο, τους ενώνει το γεγονός ότι το καθένα επηρεάζει τεράστια τμήματα της ανθρωπότητας. 500 ηγέτες σε 15 κατηγορίες — Ακαδημαϊκά, Πολιτικός,Διοικητικός, Καταγωγή, Κήρυκες, γυναίκες, Νεολαία, Φιλανθρωπία, Ανάπτυξη,Επιστήμη και Τεχνολογία, Τέχνες και Πολιτισμός, Μεσο ΜΑΖΙΚΗΣ ΕΝΗΜΕΡΩΣΗΣ, Ριζοσπάστες, Διεθνή Ισλαμικά Δίκτυα, και Θέματα της Ημέρας—για να σας βοηθήσουν να κατανοήσετε τους διαφορετικούς τρόπους με τους οποίους το Ισλάμ και οι Μουσουλμάνοι επηρεάζουν τον κόσμο σήμερα. Δύο σύνθετες λίστες δείχνουν πώς λειτουργεί η επιρροή με διαφορετικούς τρόπους: Το InternationalIslamic Networks δείχνει ανθρώπους που βρίσκονται επικεφαλής σημαντικών διεθνικών δικτύων μουσουλμάνων, και τα Θέματα της Ημέρας επισημαίνουν άτομα των οποίων η σημασία οφείλεται σε τρέχοντα ζητήματα που επηρεάζουν την ανθρωπότητα.
Beyond Post-Islamism
Ιχσάν Γιλμάζ
With the increased international prominence of Turkey and its successful and internationallyrespected AK Party government, the Academia’s attention has focused on the Turkish Islamistexperience. Turkey had already been seen as an almost unique case as far Islam-state-secularismdemocracyrelations were concerned but the recent transformation of Turkish Islamism coupledwith the global turmoil in the post-9/11 world has made the Turkish case much more important.While Turkish Islamists’ recent transformation that has brought about their rise to the power hasbeen applauded at home and abroad, there are relatively very few studies that analyze theirtransformation by taking into account the unique experience of Turkish Islamism starting from the18th & 19th centuries’ Ottoman secularization, Young Ottomans of the 1860s and the Ottomanconstitutionalism and democracy. Εξάλλου, some dynamics that affected the change in theTurkish Islamists’ Islamic normative framework have not been analyzed in detail. όπως η Χαμάς, this studyendeavors to analyze the main factors behind the newly emerged tolerant normative framework ofthe AK Party leaders who were formerly Islamists. After showing that there are good historicalreasons arising from the Ottoman experience of secularism and democracy and arguing based on abrief theoretical discussion of the plurality of Islamisms, it argues that the Turkish Islamism hasalways differed from the other Islamist experiences. Επομένως, in this study, a detailed evaluationof the Turkish Islamist experience starting from the Young Ottomans is undertaken. Επειτα, thispaper attempts to show that Islamic groups’ physical and discursive interaction has been a crucialfactor in the Turkish Islamism’s transformation. Main premise of this paper is that the Gülenmovement has been the most influential factor that has helped the AK Party leaders to develop amore tolerant normative framework and to eventually jettison their Islamism. It is of coursedifficult to establish casual relationship between two social phenomena but one can underscorecorrelations. As the main hypothesis is that the Gülen movement has been the most influentialfactor in the normative transformation of the former Islamists’ mental frameworks and theirreligio-political worldviews, this paper provides a comparative discourse analysis betweenFethullah Gülen’s and Islamists’ ideas on several issues that have been relevant for both Islamismand newly-emerged post-Islamism. To identify these relevant issues (secularism, pluralism,Δημοκρατία, rule of law, nationalism, state, ισλαμισμός, religiosity, the other, borders and dialogue),the paper provides a brief theoretical discussion of Islamism and post-Islamism that will also helpthe reader to understand the fundamental differences between Islamism and the Gülenian thought.
ISLAMIC MODERNITIES: FETHULLAH GULEN and CONTEMPORARY ISLAM
Φέργκιουσον Caki
The Nurju movement1, being the oldest moderate Islamist movement which is probably peculiar to Modern Turkey, was broken into several groups since Said Nursi, the founder of the movement, passed away in 1960. At the present time, there are more than ten nurcu groups with different agendas and strategies. Despite all their differences, today the Nurju groups seem to acknowledge each other’s identity and try to keep a certain level of solidarity. Theplace of the Fethullah Gulen group within the Nurju movement, ωστόσο, seems to be a bit shaky.Fethullah Gulen (b.1938) split himself, at least in appearance, from the overall Nurju movement in 1972 and succeeded in establishing his own group with a strong organizational structure in the 1980’s and the 90’s. Due to the development of its broad school network both in Turkey and abroad2, his group attracted attention. Those schools fascinated not only Islamist businessmen and middle classes but also a large number of secularist intellectuals and politicians. Although it originally emerged out of the overall Nurju movement, some believe that the number of the followers of the Fethullah Gulen group is much larger than that of the total of the rest of the nurju groups. Ακόμη, there seems to be enough reason to think that there was a price to pay for this success: alienation from other Islamist groups as well as from the overall Nurju movement of which the Fethullah Gulen group3 itself is supposed to be a part.