中的所有條目 "摩洛哥伊斯蘭主義" 類別

伊斯蘭反對黨和歐盟參與的潛力

托比·阿徹

海蒂Huuhtanen

參與政治伊斯蘭的策略

沙迪哈米德

AMANDA卡德萊茨

伊斯蘭運動和阿拉伯世界的民主進程: 探索灰色地帶

彌敦道Ĵ. 棕色, 阿穆爾·哈薩,

瑪麗娜奧特維

伊斯蘭激進化

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

政治伊斯蘭教和歐洲外交政策

政治伊斯蘭教和歐洲鄰國政策

邁克爾·愛默生

理查德·楊斯

自從 2001 以及隨之而來的西方與政治伊斯蘭之間關係性質的國際事件已成為外交政策的決定性問題. 近年來，對政治伊斯蘭問題進行了大量的研究和分析。. 這有助於糾正西方以前對伊斯蘭價值觀和意圖的性質的一些簡單化和危言聳聽的假設. 與此平行, 歐盟 (歐盟) 制定了許多政策舉措，主要是歐洲鄰里政策(ENP) 原則上致力於對話和更深入的參與(非暴力) 阿拉伯國家內的政治行為者和民間社會組織. 然而，許多分析家和政策制定者現在抱怨在概念辯論和政策制定中的某個獎杯. 已經確定，政治伊斯蘭教是一個不斷變化的景觀, 深受各種情況的影響, 但辯論似乎常常停留在“伊斯蘭主義者是否民主”這樣簡單的問題上?’ 許多獨立分析家仍然主張與伊斯蘭主義者接觸, 但西方政府與伊斯蘭組織之間的實際和解仍然有限 .

為什麼沒有阿拉伯民主國家 ?

戴蒙德

土耳其正義與發展黨的成功絕不能淡化對阿拉伯伊斯蘭主義者的擔憂

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “伊斯蘭主義者” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – were always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamist’ alleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. 事實上, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhood – aside from the common faith of its members – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, 該 “西方”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

與伊斯蘭主義者接觸並促進民主

莫娜Yacoubian

Deeming democratic change to be a long-term antidote to Islamist extremism, the Bush administration coupled its military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq with intensified efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world, underscoring the need for free and fair elections. To date, parliamentary elections of varying openness have taken place across the region, from Morocco to Kuwait. The elections ushered in a wave of Islamist victories, dubbed by many as an “Islamist tsunami.” 1The Islamists’ successes stem from their effectiveness as vehicles for popular opposition. While liberal, secular opposition parties remain largely detached from much of the population, Islamists have developed vast and easily mobilized grassroots networks through charitable organizations and mosques. The leadership is often younger and more dynamic, with strong ties to the community, and the party organizations brim with energy and ideas, attracting those who are seeking change.The U.S. government has quietly engaged a number of moderate and legal Islamist parties across the region for several years, sometimes through normal diplomatic activity, sometimes through government-funded grants to U.S. organizations. This Special Report examines U.S.-funded engagement with legal, nonviolent Islamist parties through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which have the most extensive experience engaging with Islamists in the region, and focuses on Morocco, 約旦, and Yemen, because of their relative political openness and the strength and vibrancy of their Islamist political opposition.Successful Strategy. A successful Islamist engagement strategy both empowers individuals and strengthens institutions to yield greater transparency, more accountability, and shifts toward moderation. Training and empowering individuals cultivates moderates within the parties and enhances their political sophistication and influence. 同時, as regimes in the Arab world resist or manipulate political reforms, strengthening democracy’s infrastructure is as important as supporting individuals. Independent electoral procedures and monitoring help to establish free and fair elections. Institution building ensures appropriate checks on executive power and a strong rule of law. Strengthening parliaments is especially crucial, as Islamists participate primarily in legislatures.In assessing whether Islamist parties have moderated in response to U.S. engagement, it is difficult if not impossible to quantify or measure shifts that may themselves be relative and subjective. Directly linking greater moderation to specific U.S. engagement activities is also highly problematic. At best, this engagement should be considered a contributing factor. 不過, the tentative results in Morocco, 約旦, and Yemen are promising enough that continued engagement with moderate Islamists should be encouraged, albeit with greater emphasis on institution building and an eye on the broader context of the ideological battle in the Muslim world between extremism and moderation.

政治伊斯蘭與西方

JOHN L.ESPOSITO

At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,伊朗, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, 埃及, 印度尼西亞,約旦, 科威特, 黎巴嫩,馬來西亞, 巴基斯坦, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

建造橋樑而不是牆壁

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 九月 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (印度空軍) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. 對於他們來說, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. 然而, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

中東的恐怖主義和極端主義運動

恐怖主義和不對稱戰爭並不是中東軍事平衡的新特徵, 伊斯蘭極端主義並不是極端主義暴力的唯一根源. 中東地區存在著許多嚴重的民族和宗派差異, 這些長期以來導致了特定國家內的零星暴力, 有時會導致重大國內衝突. 也門內戰和阿曼佐法爾叛亂就是例子, 黎巴嫩內戰的悠久歷史以及敘利亞對反對哈菲茲·阿薩德政權的伊斯蘭政治團體的暴力鎮壓也是如此. 巴勒斯坦解放組織的崛起 (巴解組織) 1970年9月導致約旦內戰. 伊朗革命於 1979 隨後發生了嚴重的政治鬥爭, 並努力輸出導致兩伊戰爭的神權革命. 巴林和沙烏地阿拉伯的遜尼派統治菁英和敵對的什葉派之間都曾發生內戰，這些衝突導致了沙烏地阿拉伯的嚴重暴力事件。, 然而, 該地區伊斯蘭極端主義暴力活動由來已久, 有時會受到政權的鼓勵，這些政權後來成為他們最初支持的伊斯蘭主義者的目標. 薩達特試圖利用伊斯蘭運動來對抗他在埃及的世俗反對派，結果在他與以色列達成和平協議後被一場這樣的運動暗殺. 以色列認為贊助伊斯蘭運動是安全的 1967 作為巴解組織的反制, 卻看到暴力反以色列團體迅速崛起. 自 1960 年代初以來，北也門和南葉門一直是政變和內戰的發生地, 南也門的內戰最終導致其政權垮台，並於 1990 年與北也門合併。國王的倒台導致伊斯蘭主義者在伊朗掌權, 對蘇聯入侵阿富汗的抵抗引發了伊斯蘭主義的反應，至今仍影響著中東和整個伊斯蘭世界. 沙烏地阿拉伯不得不應對麥加大清真寺的起義 1979. 這次起義的宗教性質與 1991 年蘇聯從阿富汗撤軍和海灣戰爭後發生的運動有許多共同點。阿爾及利亞努力鎮壓伊斯蘭政黨在民主選舉中的勝利 1992 隨後發生了一場持續至今的內戰. 1990 年代，埃及與其本國的伊斯蘭極端分子進行了一場長期且基本成功的戰鬥, 但埃及只是壓制了這類運動，而不是根除它們. 在阿拉伯世界的其他地區, 科索沃和波斯尼亞內戰造就了新的伊斯蘭極端主義幹部。沙烏地阿拉伯此前曾遭受兩次重大恐怖攻擊 2001. 這些攻擊襲擊了胡拜爾的國民警衛隊訓練中心和美國空軍軍營, 至少其中一個似乎是伊斯蘭極端分子造成的. 摩洛哥, 利比亞, 突尼斯, 約旦, 巴林, 卡塔爾, 阿曼, 和也門都看到強硬的伊斯蘭運動成為嚴重的國家威脅。雖然不直接屬於該地區, 蘇丹經歷了長達 15 年的內戰，可能造成超過 200 萬人喪生, 這場戰爭得到了阿拉伯北部強硬伊斯蘭分子的支持. 自建國以來索馬利亞也一直處於內戰現場 1991 這使得伊斯蘭組織能夠在該國活動.

政治伊斯蘭教的消亡

喬恩乙. 奧特曼

The obituaries for political Islam have begun to be written. After years of seemingly unstoppablegrowth, Islamic parties have begun to stumble. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. 反而, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, 然而, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, 沙特阿拉伯, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. In the Middle East, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. 伊斯蘭教, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.

約旦的互聯網與伊斯蘭政治, 摩洛哥和埃及.

安德魯·赫爾姆斯

二十世紀末和二十一世紀初，互聯網作為傳播的中心得以傳播, 信息, 娛樂和商業.

互聯網的傳播遍及全球四個角落, 將南極洲的研究員與危地馬拉的農民和莫斯科的新聞播音員連接到埃及的貝都因人.

通過互聯網, 信息和實時新聞流遍及各大洲, 婚姻中的聲音可能會通過博客表達他們以前沉默的聲音, 網站和社交網站.

左右連續統中的政治組織將互聯網作為未來的政治動員, 現在政府可以訪問歷史文件, 派對平台, 和行政文件通過他們的網站. 相似地, 宗教團體通過官方網站在線展示其信仰, 和論壇允許來自全球的成員辯論末世論的問題, 矯正和許多細微的神學問題.

融合兩者, 伊斯蘭政治組織已通過詳細介紹其政治平台的複雜網站來宣傳他們的存在, 相關新聞報導, 宗教性材料討論他們的神學觀點. 本文將專門研究這種聯繫-中東約旦國家中的伊斯蘭政治組織對互聯網的使用, 摩洛哥和埃及.

儘管各種各樣的伊斯蘭政治組織都利用互聯網作為論壇來宣傳他們的觀點並建立國家或國際聲譽, 這些小組的方法和意圖相差很大，並取決於組織的性質.

本文將研究三個“溫和的”伊斯蘭政黨對互聯網的使用: 約旦伊斯蘭行動陣線, 摩洛哥的正義與發展黨和埃及的穆斯林兄弟會. 隨著這三個政黨的政治成熟度和聲譽的提高, 國內外, 他們越來越多地將Internet用於各種目的.

第一, 伊斯蘭組織已將互聯網用作公共領域的當代擴展, 各方通過其構架的領域, 與更廣泛的公眾溝通和製度化想法.

其次, 互聯網為伊斯蘭組織提供了一個未經過濾的論壇，官員可以通過該論壇宣傳和宣傳其立場和觀點, 以及規避國家施加的當地媒體限制.

最後, 互聯網允許伊斯蘭組織發表反對霸權政體或君主制的反霸權言論，或向國際觀眾展示. 第三種動機最明確地適用於穆斯林兄弟會, 該網站展示了以西方風格設計並針對特定學者群體量身定制的精緻英語網站, 政治家和記者.

MB在所謂的“ bridgeblogging”方面表現出色 1 並為試圖影響國際對其立場和工作的看法的伊斯蘭政黨設定了標準. 內容在網站的阿拉伯文和英文版本之間有所不同, 並將在“穆斯林兄弟會”部分中進行進一步研究.

這三個目標的意圖和預期結果有很大的重疊; 然而, 每個目標都針對不同的演員: 公眾, 媒體, 和政權. 在對這三個領域進行分析之後, 本文將對IAF網站進行案例分析, PJD和穆斯林兄弟會.