Vsi vnosi v "maroški islamisti" Kategorija

Islamistične opozicijske stranke in potencial za sodelovanje v EU

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

STRATEGIJE ZA UPORABO POLITIČNEGA ISLAMA

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. rjav, amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

ISLAMISTIČNA RADIKALIZACIJA

Vprašanja v zvezi s političnim islamom še naprej predstavljajo izziv za evropsko zunanjo politiko na Bližnjem vzhodu in v Severni Afriki (MENA). Ko se je politika EU v zadnjem desetletju skušala soočiti s takšnimi izzivi, se je sam politični islam razvil. Strokovnjaki opozarjajo na vse večjo kompleksnost in raznolikost trendov znotraj političnega islama. Nekatere islamistične organizacije so okrepile svojo zavezanost demokratičnim normam in se v celoti vključile v mir, mainstream nacionalne politike. Drugi ostajajo zavezani nasilnim sredstvom. In spet drugi so se usmerili k bolj tihi obliki islama, izločil iz političnega delovanja. Politični islam v regiji Bližnjega vzhoda in severne Afrike evropskim oblikovalcem politike ne predstavlja enotnega trenda. Analitična razprava se je razvila okoli koncepta "radikalizacije". To pa je sprožilo raziskave o dejavnikih, ki spodbujajo "deradikalizacijo", in obratno, "ponovna radikalizacija". Velik del kompleksnosti izhaja iz splošno razširjenega mnenja, da se vsi ti trije pojavi pojavljajo hkrati. Tudi izrazi sami so sporni. Pogosto je bilo poudarjeno, da zmerno-radikalna dihotomija ne uspe v celoti zajeti odtenkov trendov znotraj političnega islama.. Nekateri analitiki se tudi pritožujejo, da je govorjenje o "radikalizmu" ideološko obremenjeno. Na ravni terminologije, razumemo, da je radikalizacija povezana z ekstremizmom, vendar se pogledi razlikujejo glede osrednjega pomena njegove versko-fundamentalistične v primerjavi s politično vsebino, in o tem, ali je pripravljenost zateči se k nasilju implicirana ali ne.

Takšne razlike se odražajo v pogledih samih islamistov, kot tudi v dojemanju zunanjih.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Od 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

why are there no arab democracies ?

Larry Diamond

Success of Turkey’s AK Party must not dilute worries over Arab Islamists

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “Islamistični” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – vedno kazali na Turčijo in nam govorili, da smo se ves čas motili, ko smo skrbeli za arabskega islamista’ domnevnega spogledovanja z demokracijo. “V Turčiji je delovalo, lahko deluje v arabskem svetu,” bi nam poskušali zagotoviti.Narobe. Narobe. In narobe. Prvič, Gul ni islamist. Naglavna ruta njegove žene bi lahko bila rdeča tkanina za bika sekularnih nacionalistov v Turčiji, vendar niti Gul niti stranka AK, ki je junija zmagala na parlamentarnih volitvah v Turčiji, lahko imenujemo islamisti. Pravzaprav, tako malo si stranka AK deli z Muslimansko bratovščino – poleg skupne vere svojih članov – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, the “West”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy

Mona Yacoubian

Deeming democratic change to be a long-term antidote to Islamist extremism, the Bush administration coupled its military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq with intensified efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world, underscoring the need for free and fair elections. To date, parliamentary elections of varying openness have taken place across the region, from Morocco to Kuwait. The elections ushered in a wave of Islamist victories, dubbed by many as an “Islamist tsunami.” 1The Islamists’ successes stem from their effectiveness as vehicles for popular opposition. While liberal, secular opposition parties remain largely detached from much of the population, Islamists have developed vast and easily mobilized grassroots networks through charitable organizations and mosques. The leadership is often younger and more dynamic, with strong ties to the community, and the party organizations brim with energy and ideas, attracting those who are seeking change.The U.S. government has quietly engaged a number of moderate and legal Islamist parties across the region for several years, sometimes through normal diplomatic activity, sometimes through government-funded grants to U.S. organizations. This Special Report examines U.S.-funded engagement with legal, nonviolent Islamist parties through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which have the most extensive experience engaging with Islamists in the region, and focuses on Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen, because of their relative political openness and the strength and vibrancy of their Islamist political opposition.Successful Strategy. A successful Islamist engagement strategy both empowers individuals and strengthens institutions to yield greater transparency, more accountability, and shifts toward moderation. Training and empowering individuals cultivates moderates within the parties and enhances their political sophistication and influence. Medtem, as regimes in the Arab world resist or manipulate political reforms, strengthening democracy’s infrastructure is as important as supporting individuals. Independent electoral procedures and monitoring help to establish free and fair elections. Institution building ensures appropriate checks on executive power and a strong rule of law. Strengthening parliaments is especially crucial, as Islamists participate primarily in legislatures.In assessing whether Islamist parties have moderated in response to U.S. engagement, it is difficult if not impossible to quantify or measure shifts that may themselves be relative and subjective. Directly linking greater moderation to specific U.S. engagement activities is also highly problematic. At best, this engagement should be considered a contributing factor. Kljub temu, the tentative results in Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen are promising enough that continued engagement with moderate Islamists should be encouraged, albeit with greater emphasis on institution building and an eye on the broader context of the ideological battle in the Muslim world between extremism and moderation.

POLITICAL ISLAM and the West

JOHN L.ESPOSITO

At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Iran, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Egipt, Indonezija,Jordan, Kuwait, Libanon,Malezija, Pakistan, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Building bridges not walls

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 september 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Vendar pa, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

Teroristična in ekstremistična gibanja na Bližnjem vzhodu

Terorizem in asimetrično vojskovanje sta komaj novi značilnosti bližnjevzhodnega vojaškega ravnovesja, in islamski ekstremizem je komajda edini vir ekstremističnega nasilja. Na Bližnjem vzhodu je veliko resnih etničnih in sektaških razlik, in ti že dolgo vodijo v občasno nasilje v posameznih državah, in včasih do velikih civilnih konfliktov. Primeri so državljanske vojne v Jemnu in Dhofarjev upor v Omanu, tako kot dolga zgodovina državljanske vojne v Libanonu in sirsko nasilno zatiranje islamskih političnih skupin, ki so nasprotovale režimu Hafeza al-Asada. Naraščajoča moč Palestinske osvobodilne organizacije (PLO) septembra 1970 pripeljal do državljanske vojne v Jordaniji. Iranska revolucija v 1979 je sledil resen politični boj, in prizadevanje za izvoz teokratične revolucije, ki je pomagalo sprožiti iransko-iraško vojno. Bahrajn in Savdska Arabija sta imela civilne spopade med svojimi sunitskimi vladajočimi elitami in sovražnimi šiiti, ti spopadi pa so v primeru Savdske Arabije privedli do velikega nasilja. Obstaja tudi, vendar, ima dolgo zgodovino nasilnega islamskega ekstremizma v regiji, včasih spodbujajo režimi, ki so kasneje postali tarča samih islamistov, ki so jih sprva podpirali. Sadat je poskušal uporabiti islamska gibanja kot nasprotje svoji sekularni opoziciji v Egiptu, a ga je po njegovem mirovnem sporazumu z Izraelom eno takšno gibanje umorilo.. Izrael je menil, da je varno sponzorirati islamska gibanja 1967 kot nasprotje PLO, le da bi videli hiter pojav nasilno protiizraelskih skupin. Severni in Južni Jemen sta bila od začetka šestdesetih let prizorišča državnih udarov in državljanskih vojn, in to je bila državljanska vojna v Južnem Jemnu, ki je nazadnje pripeljala do padca njegovega režima in njegove združitve s Severnim Jemnom leta 1990. Padec šaha je vodil do islamističnega prevzema oblasti v Iranu, in odpor proti sovjetski invaziji na Afganistan sta sprožila islamistično reakcijo, ki še vedno vpliva na Bližnji vzhod in ves islamski svet. Savdska Arabija se je morala soočiti z uporom v Veliki mošeji v Meki leta 1979. Verski značaj tega upora je imel veliko skupnih elementov gibanj, ki so nastala po sovjetskem umiku iz Afganistana in zalivski vojni leta 1991. Alžirska prizadevanja za zatiranje zmage islamskih političnih strank na demokratičnih volitvah v 1992 sledila je državljanska vojna, ki traja vse od takrat. Egipt je v devetdesetih letih prejšnjega stoletja vodil dolgo in večinoma uspešno bitko z lastnimi islamskimi ekstremisti, toda Egiptu je le uspelo zatreti taka gibanja, namesto da bi jih izkoreninila. V ostalem arabskem svetu, državljanske vojne na Kosovu in v Bosni so pomagale ustvariti nove kadre islamskih skrajnežev. Savdska Arabija je pred tem utrpela dva velika teroristična napada 2001. Ti napadi so prizadeli center za usposabljanje nacionalne garde in vojašnico USAF v Al Khobarju, in zdi se, da je bil vsaj eden rezultat islamskih ekstremistov. Maroko, Libija, Tunizija, Jordan, Bahrajn, Katar, Oman, in Jemnu sta videla, da so trdolinijska islamistična gibanja postala resna nacionalna grožnja. Čeprav niso neposredno del regije, Sudan je bojeval 15-letno državljansko vojno, ki je verjetno zahtevala več kot dva milijona življenj, in to vojno so podpirali trdi islamistični elementi na arabskem severu. Somalija je od takrat tudi prizorišče državljanske vojne 1991 ki je islamističnim celicam omogočil delovanje v tej državi.

Smrt političnega islama

Jon B. Alterman

Začele so se pisati osmrtnice za politični islam. Po letih na videz neustavljive rasti, Islamske stranke so se začele spotikati. V Maroku, Stranko za pravičnost in razvoj (ali PJD) na lanskih septembrskih volitvah dosegla veliko slabše od pričakovanj, jordanska Islamska akcijska fronta pa je v volitvah prejšnjega meseca izgubila več kot polovico sedežev. Nestrpno pričakovani manifest egiptovske Muslimanske bratovščine, katerega osnutek se je pojavil septembra lani,ni pokazal ne moči ne poguma. Namesto tega, je nakazovalo, da skupino pestijo intelektualna nasprotja in jo razjedajo notranji spopadi. ​​Prezgodaj je razglasiti smrt političnega islama, saj je bilo prezgodaj razglašati rojstvo liberalizma v arabskem svetu v 2003-04, vendar se njegovi obeti zdijo opazno slabši kot pred enim letom. Nekaterim, padec iz milosti je bil neizogiben; politični islam je propadel zaradi lastnih nasprotij, pravijo. Trdijo, da, v objektivnem smislu, politični islam nikoli ni bil več kot dim in ogledala. Pri religiji gre za vero in resnico, pri politiki pa gre za kompromis in prilagajanje. Gledano tako, politični islam nikoli ni bil sveto podjetje, temveč samo prizadevanje za povečanje političnih možnosti ene strani v politični razpravi. Podprto z versko avtoriteto in legitimnostjo, nasprotovanje volji islamistov ni več zgolj politično – postalo je krivoverstvo – in islamisti so imeli koristi. Ti skeptiki vidijo politični islam kot koristen način za zaščito političnih gibanj,kravji politični sovražniki, in rally podporo. Kot vladajoča strategija, vendar, trdijo, da politični islam ni prinesel nobenih uspehov. Na dveh območjih, kjer se je pred kratkim povzpel na moč, palestinske oblasti in Irak, vladanje je bilo anemično. V Iranu, kjer so mule na oblasti že skoraj tri desetletja, kleriki se borijo za spoštovanje in država izliva denar v Dubaj in druge čezmorske trge z bolj predvidljivimi pravili in pozitivnimi donosi. Najbolj odkrito verska država na Bližnjem vzhodu, Savdska Arabija, ima bistveno manj intelektualne svobode kot mnoge njene sosede, in tamkajšnji varuhi ortodoksije skrbno omejujejo versko misel. Kot francoski poznavalec islama,Olivier Roy, nepozabno opaženo pred več kot desetletjem, zlitje vere in politike ni posvetilo politike, to je politiziralo religijo. Toda islam ni zagotovil koherentne teorije upravljanja, kaj šele splošno sprejet pristop k problemom človeštva, pomembnost vere še naprej narašča med številnimi muslimani. Ta pomembnost daleč presega vprašanja oblačenja, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,”, v katerem so simboli in slogani preteklosti vpeti v prizadevanje za hitrejši vstop v prihodnost.. Islamske finance – kar pomeni, finance, ki se zanašajo na delnice in donose namesto na obresti, so v razcvetu, in elegantne bančne podružnice imajo ločene vhode za moške in ženske. Uglajeni mladi teleevangelisti se zanašajo na posvečevanje vsakdana in iskanje odpuščanja, na svoje sestanke pritegne desettisoče in milijonsko televizijsko občinstvo. Glasbeni videoposnetki, ki si jih lahko ogledate na YouTubu, spodbujajo mlade gledalce, naj sprejmejo vero in se odvrnejo od nesmiselnega posvetnega življenja. Mnogi na Zahodu vidijo sekularizem in relativizem kot konkretna znaka modernosti. Na Bližnjem vzhodu, mnogi jih vidijo kot simbole propadle sekularne nacionalistične preteklosti, ki ni uspela zagotoviti pravičnosti ali razvoja, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. Islam, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. "Islamski" ni samoumeven koncept, kot je nekoč opazil moj prijatelj Mustapha Kamal Pasha, vendar ne more biti vir moči v sodobnih družbah, če je vezan na okostenele in parohialne predstave o svoji naravi. Ukvarjanje z drugačnostjo je v osnovi politična naloga, in tukaj se bo politični islam soočil s pravim preizkusom. Formalne vladne strukture na Bližnjem vzhodu so se izkazale za vzdržljive, in verjetno ne bodo propadle pod valom islamskega aktivizma. Da bi politični islam uspel, najti mora način za združevanje različnih koalicij različnih veroizpovedi in stopenj vere, ne samo govoriti svoji bazi. Za to še ni našel načina, vendar to ne pomeni, da ne more.

The Internet and Islamist Politics in Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

Andrew Helms

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and commerce.

The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, and administrative papers through their sites. podobno, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues.

Fusing the two, Islamist political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes.

Prvič, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.

Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

Končno, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; vendar, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.