RSSL-Iskrizzjonijiet kollha fil- "Islamisti Marokkini" Kategorija

Partiti tal-Oppożizzjoni Iżlamiċi u l-Potenzjal għall-Impenn tal-UE

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Fid-dawl tal-importanza dejjem tikber tal-movimenti Iżlamiċi fid-dinja Musulmana u

il-mod kif ir-radikalizzazzjoni influwenzat avvenimenti globali mill-bidu tas-seklu, dan

huwa importanti għall-UE li tevalwa l-politiki tagħha lejn atturi fi ħdan dak li jista' jkun laxk

imsejħa d-'dinja Islamika'. Huwa partikolarment importanti li wieħed jistaqsi jekk u kif jimpenja ruħu

mad-diversi gruppi Iżlamiċi.

Dan jibqa’ kontroversjali anke fi ħdan l-UE. Xi wħud iħossu li l-Iżlamiċi jgħollu dan

jinsabu wara partiti Iżlamiċi huma sempliċement inkompatibbli mal-ideali tal-punent tad-demokrazija u

drittijiet umani, filwaqt li oħrajn jaraw l-ingaġġ bħala ħtieġa realistika minħabba t-tkabbir

importanza domestika tal-partiti Iżlamiċi u l-involviment dejjem akbar tagħhom fil-qasam internazzjonali

affarijiet. Perspettiva oħra hija li d-demokratizzazzjoni fid-dinja Musulmana tiżdied

sigurtà Ewropea. Il-validità ta’ dawn u argumenti oħra dwar jekk u kif il-

L-UE għandha timpenja ruħha tista' tiġi ttestjata biss billi tistudja l-movimenti Iżlamiċi differenti u

iċ-ċirkostanzi politiċi tagħhom, pajjiż b’pajjiż.

Id-demokratizzazzjoni hija tema ċentrali tal-azzjonijiet tal-politika barranija komuni tal-UE, kif imqiegħda

fl-Artikolu 11 tat-Trattat dwar l-Unjoni Ewropea. Ħafna mill-istati kkunsidrati f'dan

rapport mhumiex demokratiċi, jew mhux kompletament demokratiku. F'ħafna minn dawn il-pajjiżi, Iżlamiku

partiti u movimenti jikkostitwixxu oppożizzjoni sinifikanti għar-reġimi prevalenti, u

f’xi wħud jiffurmaw l-akbar blokk ta’ oppożizzjoni. Id-demokraziji Ewropej ilhom jagħmlu

jittrattaw reġimi governattivi li huma awtoritarji, iżda huwa fenomenu ġdid għall-istampa

għal riforma demokratika fi stati fejn l-aktar benefiċjarji probabbli jista' jkollhom, minn

l-opinjoni tal-UE, approċċi differenti u kultant problematiċi għad-demokrazija u tagħha

valuri relatati, bħall-minoranzi u d-drittijiet tan-nisa u l-istat tad-dritt. Dawn il-ħlasijiet huma

spiss imqiegħda kontra movimenti Iżlamiċi, għalhekk huwa importanti għal dawk li jfasslu l-politika Ewropej li

ikollhom stampa preċiża tal-politiki u l-filosofiji tal-imsieħba potenzjali.

Esperjenzi minn pajjiżi differenti għandhom it-tendenza li jissuġġerixxu li l-iżlamista aktar libertà

partijiet huma permessi, aktar ikunu moderati fl-azzjonijiet u l-ideat tagħhom. F'ħafna

każi partiti u gruppi Iżlamiċi ilhom li tbiegħdu mill-għan oriġinali tagħhom

tat-twaqqif ta’ stat Iżlamiku rregolat mil-liġi Iżlamika, u waslu biex jaċċettaw bażiku

prinċipji demokratiċi tal-kompetizzjoni elettorali għall-poter, l-eżistenza ta’ politika oħra

kompetituri, u pluraliżmu politiku.

STRATEĠIJI GĦALL-IMPENĠĠ TAL-IŻLAM POLITIKU

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

L-Iżlam Politiku huwa l-aktar forza politika waħda attiva fil-Lvant Nofsani llum. Il-futur tagħha huwa marbut mill-qrib ma’ dak tar-reġjun. Jekk l-Istati Uniti u l-Unjoni Ewropea huma impenjati li jappoġġaw ir-riforma politika fir-reġjun, se jkollhom bżonn ifasslu l-konkrit, strateġiji koerenti għall-involviment ta' gruppi Iżlamiċi. Madankollu, l-U.S. ġeneralment ma kienx lest li jiftaħ djalogu ma’ dawn il-movimenti. Bl-istess mod, L-impenn tal-UE mal-Iżlamisti kien l-eċċezzjoni, mhux ir-regola. Fejn jeżistu kuntatti ta’ livell baxx, huma prinċipalment iservu għal skopijiet ta' ġbir ta' informazzjoni, mhux għanijiet strateġiċi. L-U.S. u l-UE għandhom għadd ta’ programmi li jindirizzaw l-iżvilupp ekonomiku u politiku fir-reġjun – fosthom l-Inizjattiva ta’ Sħubija fil-Lvant Nofsani (MEPI), il-Korporazzjoni tal-Isfida tal-Millenju (MCC), l-Unjoni għall-Mediterran, u l-Politika Ewropea tal-Viċinat (ENP) – iżda ftit għandhom xi jgħidu dwar kif l-isfida tal-oppożizzjoni politika Iżlamista tidħol fi ħdan objettivi reġjonali usa'. L-Istati Uniti. u l-assistenza u l-ipprogrammar tad-demokrazija tal-UE huma diretti kważi kollha kemm lejn gvernijiet awtoritarji nfushom jew gruppi sekulari tas-soċjetà ċivili b’appoġġ minimu fis-soċjetajiet tagħhom stess..
Wasal iż-żmien għal valutazzjoni mill-ġdid tal-politiki attwali. Mill-attakki terroristiċi ta’ Settembru 11, 2001, l-appoġġ għad-demokrazija fil-Lvant Nofsani ħa importanza akbar għal dawk li jfasslu l-politika tal-Punent, li jaraw rabta bejn in-nuqqas ta’ demokrazija u l-vjolenza politika. Attenzjoni akbar ġiet iddedikata għall-fehim tal-varjazzjonijiet fi ħdan l-Islam politiku. L-amministrazzjoni l-ġdida Amerikana hija aktar miftuħa biex twessa’ l-komunikazzjoni mad-dinja Musulmana. Sadanittant, il-maġġoranza l-kbira tal-organizzazzjonijiet Islamisti mainstream – inkluż il-Fratellanza Musulmana fl-Eġittu, Front ta’ Azzjoni Iżlamika tal-Ġordan (IAF), Partit tal-Ġustizzja u l-Iżvilupp tal-Marokk (PJD), il-Moviment Kostituzzjonali Iżlamiku tal-Kuwajt, u l-Jemen Islah Party – għamlu dejjem aktar l-appoġġ għar-riforma politika u d-demokrazija komponent ċentrali fil-pjattaformi politiċi tagħhom. Barra minn hekk, ħafna wrew interess qawwi fil-ftuħ ta’ djalogu mal-U.S. u l-gvernijiet tal-UE.
Il-futur tar-relazzjonijiet bejn in-nazzjonijiet tal-Punent u l-Lvant Nofsani jista’ jkun iddeterminat fil-biċċa l-kbira mill-grad sa liema l-ewwel jimpenjaw partiti Iżlamiċi mhux vjolenti fi djalogu wiesa’ dwar interessi u għanijiet kondiviżi.. Kien hemm proliferazzjoni riċenti ta 'studji dwar l-involviment mal-Iżlamisti, iżda ftit jindirizzaw b'mod ċar x'jista' jinvolvi fil-prattika. Bħala Zoe Nautre, sħabi viżitatur fil-Kunsill Ġermaniż dwar ir-Relazzjonijiet Barranin, tpoġġiha, “l-UE qed taħseb dwar l-impenn iżda ma tafx verament kif.”1 Bit-tama li tiċċara d-diskussjoni, niddistingwu bejn tliet livelli ta’ “ingaġġ,” kull wieħed b’mezzi u għanijiet differenti: kuntatti ta’ livell baxx, djalogu strateġiku, u sħubija.

MOVIMENTI IŻLAMISTI U L-PROĊESS DEMOKRATIKU FID-DINJA Għarbija: Nesploraw iż-Żoni Griżi

Nathan J. Kannella, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

Matul l-aħħar għaxar snin, Il-movimenti Iżlamiċi stabbilixxew lilhom infushom bħala atturi politiċi ewlenin fil-Lvant Nofsani. Flimkien mal-gvernijiet, Movimenti Iżlamiċi, moderat kif ukoll radikali, se jiddetermina kif il-politika tar-reġjun tiżvolġi fil-futur prevedibbli. Urew il-ħila mhux biss li jfasslu messaġġi b'appell popolari mifrux iżda wkoll, u l-aktar importanti, biex jinħolqu organizzazzjonijiet b'bażijiet soċjali ġenwini u jiġu żviluppati strateġiji politiċi koerenti. Partijiet oħra,
b'mod ġenerali, fallew fuq il-kontijiet kollha.
Il-pubbliku e fil-Punent u, partikolarment, l-Istati Uniti, sar konxju biss tal-importanza tal-movimenti Iżlamiċi wara avvenimenti drammatiċi, bħar-rivoluzzjoni fl-Iran u l-qtil tal-President Anwar al-Sadat fl-Eġittu. L-attenzjoni kienet ferm aktar sostnuta mill-attakki terroristiċi ta’ Settembru 11, 2001. B'riżultat ta 'dan, Il-movimenti Iżlamiċi huma ġeneralment meqjusa bħala perikolużi u ostili. Filwaqt li tali karatterizzazzjoni hija preċiża fir-rigward tal-organizzazzjonijiet fl-aħħar radikali tal-ispettru Iżlamiku, li huma perikolużi minħabba r-rieda tagħhom li jirrikorru għal vjolenza indiskriminata biex isegwu l-għanijiet tagħhom, mhijiex karatterizzazzjoni preċiża tal-ħafna gruppi li rrinunzjaw jew evitaw il-vjolenza. Għax organizzazzjonijiet terroristiċi joħolqu immedjat
theddida, madankollu, dawk li jfasslu l-politika fil-pajjiżi kollha taw attenzjoni sproporzjonata lill-organizzazzjonijiet vjolenti.
Huwa l-organizzazzjonijiet Islamisti mainstream, mhux dawk radikali, li se jkollu l-akbar impatt fuq l-evoluzzjoni politika futura tal-Lvant Nofsani. L-għanijiet grandjużi tar-radikali li jerġgħu jistabbilixxu kalifat li jgħaqqad id-dinja Għarbija kollha, jew saħansitra li jiġu imposti fuq pajjiżi Għarab individwali liġijiet u drawwiet soċjali ispirati minn interpretazzjoni fundamentalista tal-Iżlam huma sempliċement 'il bogħod wisq mir-realtà tal-lum biex jiġu realizzati. Dan ma jfissirx li l-gruppi terroristiċi mhumiex perikolużi—jistgħu jikkawżaw telf kbir ta’ ħajjiet anke fl-insegwiment ta’ miri impossibbli—iżda li x’aktarx ma jbiddlux il-wiċċ tal-Lvant Nofsani.. L-organizzazzjonijiet Islamisti mainstream huma ġeneralment kwistjoni differenti. Diġà kellhom impatt qawwi fuq id-drawwiet soċjali f'ħafna pajjiżi, iwaqqaf u jreġġa’ lura x-xejriet sekularisti u jbiddel il-mod kif ħafna Għarab jilbsu u jġibu ruħhom. U l-għan politiku immedjat tagħhom, biex issir forza qawwija billi tipparteċipa fil-politika normali ta’ pajjiżhom, mhix waħda impossibbli. Diġà qed jiġi realizzat f'pajjiżi bħall-Marokk, Il-Ġordan, u anke l-Eġittu, li għadha tipprojbixxi l-organizzazzjonijiet politiċi Iżlamiċi kollha iżda issa għandha tmienja u tmenin Musulmani Brother fil-Parlament. Politika, mhux vjolenza, huwa dak li jagħti lill-Iżlamisti mainstream l-influwenza tagħhom.

RADIKALIZZAZZJONI IŻLAMISTA

DAĦLA
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Kwistjonijiet relatati mal-Iżlam politiku jkomplu jippreżentaw sfidi għall-politiki barranin Ewropej fil-Lvant Nofsani u l-Afrika ta' Fuq (MENA). Hekk kif il-politika tal-UE fittxet li tilqa’ ma’ sfidi bħal dawn matul l-aħħar għaxar snin jew hekk, l-Islam politiku nnifsu evolva. L-esperti jindikaw il-kumplessità u l-varjetà dejjem tikber ta 'xejriet fi ħdan l-Iżlam politiku. Xi organizzazzjonijiet Iżlamiċi saħħew l-impenn tagħhom għal normi demokratiċi u impenjaw ruħhom bis-sħiħ fil-paċi, politika nazzjonali prinċipali. Oħrajn jibqgħu miżżewġin ma’ mezzi vjolenti. U oħrajn għaddew lejn forma aktar kwietista tal-Iżlam, diżingaġġat mill-attività politika. L-Iżlam politiku fir-reġjun MENA ma jippreżenta l-ebda tendenza uniformi għal dawk li jfasslu l-politika Ewropej. Id-dibattitu analitiku kiber madwar il-kunċett ta’ ‘radikalizzazzjoni’. Dan imbagħad wassal għal riċerka dwar il-fatturi li jmexxu 'd-diżradikalizzazzjoni', u bil-maqlub, ‘ri-radikalizzazzjoni’. Ħafna mill-kumplessità ġejja mill-fehma mifruxa ħafna li dawn it-tliet fenomeni qed iseħħu fl-istess ħin. Anke t-termini nfushom huma kkontestati. Ħafna drabi ġie rrimarkat li d-dikotomija moderat-radikali tonqos bis-sħiħ milli taqbad l-isfumaturi tax-xejriet fl-Islam politiku. Xi analisti jilmentaw ukoll li t-taħdit dwar ‘radikaliżmu’ huwa ideoloġikament mgħobbi. Fil-livell tat-terminoloġija, nifhmu li r-radikalizzazzjoni hija assoċjata mal-estremiżmu, iżda l-fehmiet ivarjaw fuq iċ-ċentralità tal-kontenut reliġjuż–fundamentalist tiegħu versus politiku, u fuq jekk ir-rieda li wieħed jirrikorri għall-vjolenza hijiex implikata jew le.

Differenzi bħal dawn huma riflessi fil-fehmiet li għandhom l-Iżlamisti nfushom, kif ukoll fil-perċezzjonijiet tal-barranin.

Iżlam Politiku u Politika Barranija Ewropea

L-IŻLAM POLITIKU U L-POLITIKA EWROPEA TAL-Viċinat

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Peress li 2001 u l-avvenimenti internazzjonali li seħħew in-natura tar-relazzjoni bejn il-Punent u l-Iżlam politiku saret kwistjoni ta' definizzjoni għall-politika barranija. F'dawn l-aħħar snin sar ammont konsiderevoli ta' riċerka u analiżi dwar il-kwistjoni tal-Iżlam politiku. Dan għen biex jikkoreġi xi wħud mis-suppożizzjonijiet simplistiċi u allarmisti li qabel kienu miżmuma fil-Punent dwar in-natura tal-valuri u l-intenzjonijiet Iżlamiċi.. Parallel għal dan, l-Unjoni Ewropea (UE) żviluppat għadd ta’ inizjattivi ta’ politika primarjament il-Politika Ewropea tal-Viċinat(ENP) li fil-prinċipju jimpenjaw ruħhom għal djalogu u impenn aktar profond kollha(mhux vjolenti) atturi politiċi u organizzazzjonijiet tas-soċjetà ċivili fil-pajjiżi Għarab. Madankollu ħafna analisti u dawk li jfasslu l-politika issa jilmentaw minn ċertu trofew kemm fid-dibattitu kunċettwali kif ukoll fl-iżvilupp tal-politika. Ġie stabbilit li l-Iżlam politiku huwa pajsaġġ li qed jinbidel, affettwati ħafna minn firxa ta’ ċirkostanzi, imma d-dibattitu ta’ spiss jidher li żamm fuq il-kwistjoni simplistika ta’ ‘huma l-Iżlamisti demokratiċi?’ Ħafna analisti indipendenti madankollu kienu favur l-involviment mal-Iżlamisti, iżda l-avviċinament attwali bejn il-gvernijiet tal-Punent u l-organizzazzjonijiet Iżlamiċi għadu limitat .

għaliex m'hemmx demokraziji Għarab ?

Larry Diamond

Waqt it-“tielet mewġa” tad-demokratizzazzjoni,” id-demokrazija ma baqgħetx aktar fenomenu tal-Punent u “marret globali.” Meta bdiet it-tielet mewġa fi 1974, id-dinja kellha biss madwar 40 demokraziji, u ftit minnhom biss kienu barra mill-Punent. Sakemm il-Ġurnal tad-Demokrazija beda jippubblika fi 1990, kien hemm 76 demokraziji elettorali (jammontaw għal ftit inqas minn nofs l-istati indipendenti tad-dinja). Permezz 1995, dak in-numru kien spara sa 117—tlieta f'kull ħames stati. Sa dakinhar, teżisti massa kritika ta’ demokraziji f’kull reġjun ewlieni tad-dinja ħlief wieħed—il-Lvant Nofsani.1 Barra minn hekk, kull wieħed mill-oqsma kulturali ewlenin tad-dinja kien sar ospitanti għal preżenza demokratika sinifikanti, għalkemm għal darb’oħra b’eċċezzjoni waħda—id-dinja Għarbija.2 Ħmistax-il sena wara, din l-eċċezzjoni għadha tinsab.
L-assenza kontinwa ta’ anki reġim demokratiku wieħed fid-dinja Għarbija hija anomalija impressjonanti—l-eċċezzjoni prinċipali għall-globalizzazzjoni tad-demokrazija. Għaliex m'hemmx demokrazija Għarbija? Tabilħaqq, għaliex huwa l-każ li fost is-sittax-il stat Għarab indipendenti tal-Lvant Nofsani u l-kosta tal-Afrika ta’ Fuq, Il-Libanu huwa l-uniku wieħed li qatt kien demokrazija?
L-iktar suppożizzjoni komuni dwar id-defiċit tad-demokrazija Għarbija hija li għandu jkollha x'taqsam mar-reliġjon jew il-kultura. Wara kollox, l-unika ħaġa li jaqsmu l-pajjiżi Għarab kollha hija li huma Għarab.

Is-suċċess tal-Partit AK tat-Turkija m'għandux inaqqas l-inkwiet dwar l-Iżlamisti Għarab

Mona Eltahawy

Ma kienx sorprendenti li minn meta Abdullah Gul sar president tat-Turkija fuq 27 Awissu li ħafna analiżi żbaljata nħela fuq kif “Iżlamiċi” jista’ jgħaddi mit-test tad-demokrazija. Ir-rebħa tiegħu kienet marbuta li tiġi deskritta bħala l- “Iżlamiku” rotta tal-politika Torka. U Iżlamiċi Għarab – fil-forma tal-Fratellanza Musulmana, partitarji u difensuri tagħhom – dejjem kienu se jindikaw lejn it-Turkija u jgħidulna li konna żbaljati l-ħin kollu biex ninkwetaw dwar l-Islam Għarbi’ allegat flirt mad-demokrazija. “Ħadem fit-Turkija, jista 'jaħdem fid-dinja Għarbija,” kienu jipprovaw jassigurawna.Żbaljat. Ħażin. U ħażin.L-ewwelnett, Gul mhuwiex Iżlamiku. Il-xalpa ta’ martu tista’ tkun id-drapp aħmar għall-barri tan-nazzjonalisti sekulari fit-Turkija, i]da la Gul u lanqas il-Partit AK li g[amlu l-elezzjonijiet parlamentari fit-Turkija f’:unju, jistgħu jissejħu Islamisti. Fil-fatt, tant ftit jaqsam il-Partit AK mal-Fratellanza Musulmana – apparti l-fidi komuni tal-membri tagħha – li huwa assurd li tuża s-suċċess tagħha fil-politika Torka bħala raġuni biex tnaqqas il-biżgħat fuq ir-rwol tal-Fratellanza Mus-limmana fil-politika Għarbija. It-tliet testijiet litmus tal-Iżlamiżmu se juru l-punt tiegħi: in-nisa u s-sess, il “Punent”, u l-Iżrael.Bħala Musulman sekulari li wiegħed li qatt ma jgħix fl-Eġittu jekk l-Iżlamisti qatt jieħdu l-poter, Qatt ma nieħu b’mod ħafif xi tentattiv biex inħallat ir-reliġjon mal-politika. Għalhekk kien b'għajn aktar minn xettika li segwejt il-politika Torka matul dawn l-aħħar snin.

Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy

Mona Yacoubian

Deeming democratic change to be a long-term antidote to Islamist extremism, the Bush administration coupled its military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq with intensified efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world, underscoring the need for free and fair elections. To date, parliamentary elections of varying openness have taken place across the region, from Morocco to Kuwait. The elections ushered in a wave of Islamist victories, dubbed by many as an “Islamist tsunami.” 1The Islamists’ successes stem from their effectiveness as vehicles for popular opposition. While liberal, secular opposition parties remain largely detached from much of the population, Islamists have developed vast and easily mobilized grassroots networks through charitable organizations and mosques. The leadership is often younger and more dynamic, with strong ties to the community, and the party organizations brim with energy and ideas, attracting those who are seeking change.The U.S. government has quietly engaged a number of moderate and legal Islamist parties across the region for several years, sometimes through normal diplomatic activity, sometimes through government-funded grants to U.S. organizations. This Special Report examines U.S.-funded engagement with legal, nonviolent Islamist parties through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which have the most extensive experience engaging with Islamists in the region, and focuses on Morocco, Il-Ġordan, and Yemen, because of their relative political openness and the strength and vibrancy of their Islamist political opposition.Successful Strategy. A successful Islamist engagement strategy both empowers individuals and strengthens institutions to yield greater transparency, more accountability, and shifts toward moderation. Training and empowering individuals cultivates moderates within the parties and enhances their political sophistication and influence. Sadanittant, as regimes in the Arab world resist or manipulate political reforms, strengthening democracy’s infrastructure is as important as supporting individuals. Independent electoral procedures and monitoring help to establish free and fair elections. Institution building ensures appropriate checks on executive power and a strong rule of law. Strengthening parliaments is especially crucial, as Islamists participate primarily in legislatures.In assessing whether Islamist parties have moderated in response to U.S. engagement, it is difficult if not impossible to quantify or measure shifts that may themselves be relative and subjective. Directly linking greater moderation to specific U.S. engagement activities is also highly problematic. At best, this engagement should be considered a contributing factor. Nevertheless, the tentative results in Morocco, Il-Ġordan, and Yemen are promising enough that continued engagement with moderate Islamists should be encouraged, albeit with greater emphasis on institution building and an eye on the broader context of the ideological battle in the Muslim world between extremism and moderation.

POLITICAL ISLAM and the West

JOHN L.ESPOSITO


At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Iran, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, L-Eġittu, L-Indoneżja,Il-Ġordan, Kuwajt, Il-Libanu,Il-Malasja, Pakistan, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Building bridges not walls

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 Settembru 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Madankollu, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

Terrorist and Extremist Movements in the Middle East

Anthony H. Cordesman

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamic
extremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differences
in the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civil
conflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civil
war in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-
Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led to a civil war in Jordan in September
1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocratic
revolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between their
Sunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.
There also, madankollu, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged by
regimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamic
movements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after his
peace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to the
PLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene of
coups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapse
of its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.
The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered
an Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal with
an uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elements
of the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.
Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed by
a civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamic
extremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicated
them. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.
Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National Guard
Training center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamic
extremists. Il-Marokk, Libya, It-Tuneżija, Il-Ġordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamist
movements become a serious national threat.
While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over two
million lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has also
been the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.a

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, madankollu, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. Il-Marokk, Libya, It-Tuneżija, Il-Ġordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.

The Death of Political Islam

Jon B. Alterman

The obituaries for political Islam have begun to be written. After years of seemingly unstoppablegrowth, Islamic parties have begun to stumble. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. Instead, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, madankollu, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, L-Għarabja Sawdita, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. In the Middle East, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. Iżlam, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.

The Internet and Islamist Politics in Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a
dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and
commerce. The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the
researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the
Bedouin in Egypt. Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches
across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously
silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites. Political organizations
across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future,
and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, u
administrative papers through their sites. Bl-istess mod, religious groups display their beliefs online
through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of
eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues. Fusing the two, Iżlamiku
political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing
their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their
theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by
Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and
L-Eġittu.
Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to
publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions
of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization. This paper will
examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in
2
Il-Ġordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home
and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes. L-ewwel, Iżlamiku
organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere
through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.
Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which
officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media
restrictions imposed by the state. Fl-aħħarnett, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a
counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an
international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim
Fratellanza, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western
style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists. The MB
has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties
attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies
between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section
on the Muslim Brotherhood. These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and
desired outcomes; madankollu, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the
reġim. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study
analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.
1

Andrew Helms

Ikhwanweb

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and commerce.

The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, and administrative papers through their sites. Bl-istess mod, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues.

Fusing the two, Islamist political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes.

L-ewwel, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.

Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

Fl-aħħarnett, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; madankollu, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.