Сите записи во "Мароко исламисти" Категорија
Исламистичките опозициски партии и потенцијалот за ангажман во ЕУ
Тоби Арчер
Хајди Huuhtanen
СТРАТЕГИИ ЗА ВКЛУЧУВАЊЕ НА ПОЛИТИЧКИОТ ИСЛАМ
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA Kadlec
ИСЛАМИСТИЧКИ ДВИЖЕЊА И ДЕМОКРАТСКИ ПРОЦЕС ВО АРАПСКИОТ СВЕТ: Истражување на сивите зони
Натан J. Браун, Амр Hamzawy,
Марина Ottaway
ИСЛАМИСТИЧКА РАДИКАЛИЗАЦИЈА
Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.
Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.
Политички ислам и европска надворешна политика
POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
MICHAEL EMERSON
RICHARD YOUNGS
Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .
зошто нема арапски демократии ?
Лари Дајмонд
Успехот на турската АК Партија не смее да ги намали грижите за арапските исламисти
Mona Eltahawy
It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “Исламист” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – were always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamist’ alleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. Всушност, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhood – aside from the common faith of its members – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, на “Вест”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.
Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy
Мона Yacoubian
Deeming democratic change to be a long-term antidote to Islamist extremism, the Bush administration coupled its military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq with intensified efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world, underscoring the need for free and fair elections. To date, parliamentary elections of varying openness have taken place across the region, from Morocco to Kuwait. The elections ushered in a wave of Islamist victories, dubbed by many as an “Islamist tsunami.” 1The Islamists’ successes stem from their effectiveness as vehicles for popular opposition. While liberal, secular opposition parties remain largely detached from much of the population, Islamists have developed vast and easily mobilized grassroots networks through charitable organizations and mosques. The leadership is often younger and more dynamic, with strong ties to the community, and the party organizations brim with energy and ideas, attracting those who are seeking change.The U.S. government has quietly engaged a number of moderate and legal Islamist parties across the region for several years, sometimes through normal diplomatic activity, sometimes through government-funded grants to U.S. organizations. This Special Report examines U.S.-funded engagement with legal, nonviolent Islamist parties through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which have the most extensive experience engaging with Islamists in the region, and focuses on Morocco, Џордан, и Јемен, because of their relative political openness and the strength and vibrancy of their Islamist political opposition.Successful Strategy. A successful Islamist engagement strategy both empowers individuals and strengthens institutions to yield greater transparency, more accountability, and shifts toward moderation. Training and empowering individuals cultivates moderates within the parties and enhances their political sophistication and influence. Meanwhile, as regimes in the Arab world resist or manipulate political reforms, strengthening democracy’s infrastructure is as important as supporting individuals. Independent electoral procedures and monitoring help to establish free and fair elections. Institution building ensures appropriate checks on executive power and a strong rule of law. Strengthening parliaments is especially crucial, as Islamists participate primarily in legislatures.In assessing whether Islamist parties have moderated in response to U.S. engagement, it is difficult if not impossible to quantify or measure shifts that may themselves be relative and subjective. Directly linking greater moderation to specific U.S. engagement activities is also highly problematic. At best, this engagement should be considered a contributing factor. Nevertheless, the tentative results in Morocco, Џордан, and Yemen are promising enough that continued engagement with moderate Islamists should be encouraged, albeit with greater emphasis on institution building and an eye on the broader context of the ideological battle in the Muslim world between extremism and moderation.
POLITICAL ISLAM and the West
JOHN L.ESPOSITO
At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Иран, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Египет, Индонезија,Џордан, Kuwait, Либан,Малезија, Пакистан, и Јемен. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence
Building bridges not walls
Alex Glennie
Since the terror attacks of 11 септември 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Сепак, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.
Терористички и екстремистички движења на Блискиот исток
Тероризмот и асиметричната војна се едвај нови карактеристики на блискоисточната воена рамнотежа, а исламикстестремизмот е тешко единствениот извор на екстремистичко насилство. Постојат многу сериозни етнички и секташки разлики на Блискиот исток, и овие одамна доведоа до спорадично насилство во рамките на дадените држави, а понекогаш и до големи граѓански конфликти. Граѓанските војни во Јемен и бунтот Дхофар во Оман се примери, како што е долгата историја на граѓанската војна во Либан и насилното сузбивање на исламските политички групи што се спротивставија на режимот на Хафез ал-Асад во Сирија. Зголемената моќ на Палестинската ослободителна организација (ПЛО) доведе до граѓанска војна во Јордан во септември 1970 година. Иранската револуција во 1979 беше проследено со сериозни политички борби, и обид за извоз на теократска револуција што помогна во активирањето на Иранско-ирачката војна. И Бахреин и Саудиска Арабија имаа граѓански судири меѓу нивните сунитски владејачки елити и непријателски шиити и овие судири доведоа до значително насилство во случајот на Саудиска Арабија. Таму исто така, сепак, е долга историја на насилниот исламски екстремизам во регионот, понекогаш охрабрени од страна на режими кои подоцна станаа мета на самите исламисти кои првично ги поддржуваа. Садат се обиде да ги користи исламските движења како контра на неговото секуларно спротивставување во Египет, за потоа да биде убиен од едно такво движење по договорот за мир со Израел. Израел сметаше дека е безбедно да ги спонзорира исламските движења потоа 1967 како бројач на ПЛО, само за да се види брзото појавување на насилно анти-израелски групи. Северен и јужен Јемен беа сцени на корупции и граѓански војни од раните 1960-ти, и тоа беше граѓанска војна во Јужен Јемен што на крајот доведе до распад на неговиот режим и нејзино спојување со Северен Јемен во 1990 година. Падот на шахот доведе до преземање на исламистите во Иран, и отпорот кон советската инвазија на Авганистан предизвика исламистичка реакција која сè уште влијае на Блискиот исток и целиот исламски свет. Саудиска Арабија мораше да се справи со востанието во Големата џамија во Мека во 1979. Религиозниот карактер на ова востание споделуваше многу елементи на движењата што се појавија по повлекувањето на Советскиот Сојуз од Авганистан и Заливската војна во 1991 година. 1992 следеше граѓанска војна што трае од тогаш. Египет водеше долга и главно успешна битка со сопствените исламиксестремисти во 90-тите години на минатиот век, но Египет успеа само да ги потисне ваквите движења отколку да ги искорени. Во остатокот од арапскиот свет, граѓанските војни во Косово и Босна помогнаа да се создадат нови исламистички екстремистички кадри. Саудиска Арабија претрпе порано од два големи терористички напади 2001. Овие напади се случија во Центарот за обука на Националната гарда и касарната на УСАФ кај Ал Хобар, и се чини дека барем еден бил резултат на исламиксестремисти. Мароко, Либија, Тунис, Џордан, Бахреин, Катар, Оман, и Јемен видоа дека тврдокорните исламистички движења стануваат сериозна национална закана. Додека не се директно дел од регионот, Судан водеше граѓанска војна во траење од 15 години, што веројатно чинеше над дваесет милиони животи, и оваа војна беше поддржана од тврди исламистички елементи на арапскиот север. Оттогаш, Сомалија има и сцена на граѓанска војна 1991 што им овозможи на исламистичките ќелии да работат во таа земја.
The Death of Political Islam
Jon B. Alterman
The obituaries for political Islam have begun to be written. After years of seemingly unstoppablegrowth, Islamic parties have begun to stumble. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. Наместо тоа, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, сепак, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, Саудиска Арабија, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. In the Middle East, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. исламот, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.
The Internet and Islamist Politics in Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.
Андреј Хелмс
На крајот на дваесеттиот век и почетокот на дваесет и првиот видов ширење на интернетот, како центар на комуникација, information, забава и трговија.
The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, поврзување на истражувач во Антарктикот со земјоделец во Гватемала и портпарол во Москва на Бедуините во Египет.
Through the Internet, протокот на информации и реално време вести краишта од различни континенти, и гласовите на subalternity имаат потенцијал да ги проектираат своите претходно замолчени гласови преку блогови, websites and social networking sites.
Политичките организации во лево-десно континуум се фокусирани на интернет како политички мобилизатор на иднината, and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, и административни документи преку нивните сајтови. Слично на тоа, религиозни групи се прикаже своите ставови онлајн преку официјалната веб-сајтови, и форуми им овозможи на членовите од целиот свет да се расправа за прашањата на есхатологијата, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues.
Fusing the two, Исламски политички организации го направија своето присуство познат преку софистицирани веб-сајтови со детали за нивните политички платформи, relevant news stories, и религиозно ориентирана материјал разговараат за своите теолошки ставови. Во овој труд ќе се конкретно испита овој врската - користењето на интернет од страна на исламски политички организации на Блискиот Исток и во земјите на Јордан, Morocco and Egypt.
Иако широк спектар на исламски политички организации користат интернетот како форум за објавување на своите ставови и да се создаде национална или меѓународна репутација, методите и намерите на овие групи се разликуваат во голема мера и зависи од природата на организацијата.
Овој труд ќе се анализира користењето на интернет од страна на три "умерено" исламистички партии: Исламската акција фронт во Јордан, Партијата на правдата и развојот во Мароко и на Муслиманското братство во Египет. Како овие три партии се зголеми нивната политичка софистицираност и угледот, и дома и во странство, тие се повеќе се користат на интернет за различни намени.
прво, Исламистички организации го користат интернетот како современа продолжување на јавната сфера, сфера преку кои партиите рамка, комуницираат и да ја институционализираат идеи на пошироката јавност.
Второ, Интернетот дава исламистички организации на нефилтриран форум преку кој официјални лица може да се промовира и рекламира своите ставови, како и заобиколат локалните медиуми ограничувања наметнати од страна на државата.
конечно, Интернет им овозможува на исламистички организации да го претстави counterhegemonic дискурс во опозиција на владејачкиот режим или монархија или на екранот за меѓународната јавност. Овој трет мотивација се однесува најмногу конкретно на Муслиманското братство, што претставува софистициран сајт на јазик Англиски дизајниран во еден западен стил и прилагодени да се постигне селективен публика на научници, политичари и новинари.
УО има брилираа во овој т.н. "bridgeblogging" 1 и го постави стандардот за исламските партии се обидуваат да влијаат на меѓународниот перцепциите на своите позиции и работа. Содржината се движи меѓу верзии на сајтот арапски и англиски јазик, и ќе се испитува понатаму, во делот за Муслиманското братство.
Овие три цели значително се преклопуваат во нивните намери и посакуваните резултати; сепак, секоја цел е насочена кон различни актер: јавноста, медиумите, и режим. По анализата на овие три области, овој труд ќе продолжи во анализа на студии на случај на веб-сајтовите на IAF, на PJD и Муслиманското братство.