Allar Færslur í "Marokkó Islamists" Flokkur

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

STEFNI TIL AÐ TAKA PÓLITÍSKA ÍSLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. Brúnn, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Síðan 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

hvers vegna eru engar Arab lýðræðisríki ?

Larry Diamond

Árangur Tyrklands AK flokks má ekki draga úr áhyggjum af arabískum íslamistum

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “Íslamista” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – were always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamist’ alleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. Reyndar, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhood – aside from the common faith of its members – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, the “West”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

Grípandi Íslamistar og stuðla að lýðræði

Mona Yacoubian

Deeming lýðræðisleg breyting að vera til langs tíma móteitur til Íslamista extremism, Bush par her inngrip í Afganistan og Írak með aukinni viðleitni til að efla lýðræði í Arabaheiminum, underscoring þörfina fyrir frjálsa og sanngjarnra kosninga. To date, parliamentary elections of varying openness have taken place across the region, from Morocco to Kuwait. The elections ushered in a wave of Islamist victories, dubbed by many as an “Islamist tsunami.” 1The Islamists’ successes stem from their effectiveness as vehicles for popular opposition. While liberal, secular opposition parties remain largely detached from much of the population, Islamists have developed vast and easily mobilized grassroots networks through charitable organizations and mosques. The leadership is often younger and more dynamic, with strong ties to the community, and the party organizations brim with energy and ideas, attracting those who are seeking change.The U.S. government has quietly engaged a number of moderate and legal Islamist parties across the region for several years, sometimes through normal diplomatic activity, sometimes through government-funded grants to U.S. organizations. This Special Report examines U.S.-funded engagement with legal, nonviolent Islamist parties through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which have the most extensive experience engaging with Islamists in the region, and focuses on Morocco, Jórdanía, and Yemen, because of their relative political openness and the strength and vibrancy of their Islamist political opposition.Successful Strategy. A successful Islamist engagement strategy both empowers individuals and strengthens institutions to yield greater transparency, more accountability, and shifts toward moderation. Training and empowering individuals cultivates moderates within the parties and enhances their political sophistication and influence. Á meðan, as regimes in the Arab world resist or manipulate political reforms, strengthening democracy’s infrastructure is as important as supporting individuals. Independent electoral procedures and monitoring help to establish free and fair elections. Institution building ensures appropriate checks on executive power and a strong rule of law. Strengthening parliaments is especially crucial, as Islamists participate primarily in legislatures.In assessing whether Islamist parties have moderated in response to U.S. engagement, it is difficult if not impossible to quantify or measure shifts that may themselves be relative and subjective. Directly linking greater moderation to specific U.S. engagement activities is also highly problematic. At best, this engagement should be considered a contributing factor. Nevertheless, the tentative results in Morocco, Jórdanía, and Yemen are promising enough that continued engagement with moderate Islamists should be encouraged, albeit with greater emphasis on institution building and an eye on the broader context of the ideological battle in the Muslim world between extremism and moderation.

Pólitíska Íslam og Vesturlönd

JOHN L.ESPOSITO

Í dögun 21. centurypolitical Íslam, ormore almennt Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa helstu viðveru í ríkisstjórn andoppositional stjórnmálum frá Norður Africato Suðaustur-Asíu. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Íran, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Egyptaland, Indónesía,Jórdanía, Kuwait, Líbanon,Malasía, Pakistan, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Bygging brúar ekki veggir

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Hins vegar, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

Terrorist og öfga hreyfingar í Mið-Austurlöndum

Hryðjuverk og ósamhverfum stríðsrekstri eru varla nýjar aðgerðir í Mið-Austur-hersins jafnvægi, og Islamicextremism er varla eina uppspretta af öfga ofbeldi. There ert margir alvarlega þjóðarbrota og sectarian differencesin Mið-Austurlöndum, og þessir hafa löngum leiddi til tilfallandi ofbeldi innan gefa ríkjum, og stundum mikil civilconflicts. The borgarastríð í Jemen og Dhofar Uppreisn í Óman eru dæmi, sem eru lengri sögu civilwar í Líbanon og ofbeldi kúgun Sýrland um íslamska pólitíska hópa sem andvígir því fyrirkomulagi sem Hafez al-Asad. Vaxandi krafti Palestínumanna Liberation Organization (PLO) leitt til borgarastyrjaldar í Jórdaníu í September1970. The Íran byltingu í 1979 var fylgt eftir alvarlegum pólitískum berjast, og viðleitni til að flytja út theocraticrevolution sem hjálpaði kalla Íran-Írak stríðsins. Barein og Sádi-Arabíu hafa bæði haft borgarastyrjöld átökum milli theirSunni elites úrskurð og fjandsamlegt Shi'ites og þessar átökum leitt til verulegra ofbeldi er að ræða Saudi Arabia.There einnig, þó, hefur verið sér langa sögu ofbeldi íslamskra extremism á svæðinu, stundum hvattir byregimes sem síðar varð að miða á mjög Íslamistar þeir styðja fyrst. Sadat reyndi að nota Islamicmovements sem gegn veraldlegu andstöðu sína í Egyptalandi einungis að vera myrtur af einum slíkum för eftir samkomulagi hispeace við Ísrael. Ísrael þótti óhætt að styrkja íslamska hreyfing eftir 1967 sem gegn thePLO, aðeins til að sjá hröð tilkomu violently and-Ísraels hópa. Norður-og Suður-Jemen var vettvangur ofcoups og borgarastríð síðan snemma 1960, og það var borgarastyrjöld í Suður-Jemen sem á endanum leitt til collapseof stjórn þess og samruna þess við Norður-Jemen í 1990.The falli Shah leitt til Íslamista yfirtöku á Íran, og andstöðu við sovéska innrás í Afganistan triggeredan Íslamista viðbrögð, sem enn hefur áhrif á Mið-Austurlöndum og allt íslamska heimsins. Sádi-Arabía hafði til að takast á withan uppreisn á Grand Mosque í Mekka í 1979. Trúarleg einkenni þessarar uppreisnar deildu mörgum þáttum hreyfinganna sem urðu til eftir brotthvarf Sovétríkjanna frá Afganistan og Persaflóastríðinu 1991. Viðleitni Alsírs til að bæla niður sigur íslamskra stjórnmálaflokka í lýðræðislegum kosningum í 1992 var fylgt bya borgarastyrjöld sem hefur staðið síðan. Egyptaland börðust lengi og að mestu vel berjast við eigin Islamicextremists sinni í 1990, en Egyptaland hefur tekist að hafa bæla slíkar hreyfingar frekar en eradicatedthem. Í the hvíla af the Arab World, á borgarastríð í Kosovo og Bosníu hjálpaði skapa nýja íslamska öfga cadres.Saudi Arabia þjást af tveimur stóru hryðjuverkaárásirnar áður 2001. Þessar árásir laust á National GuardTraining miðju og felldi bandaríkjaher kastalann á Al Khobar, og að minnsta kosti eitt virðist hafa verið vegna Islamicextremists. Marokkó, Libya, Túnis, Jórdanía, Barein, Katar, Óman, og Jemen hafa allir séð harða línu Islamistmovements orðið alvarlegt landsvísu threat.While ekki beint hluti af svæðinu, Súdan hefur barist við 15-ára langa borgarastyrjöld, sem hefur að öllum líkindum kosta yfir twomillion líf, og þetta stríð hefði verið stutt af frumefni Íslamista harða línu í arabísku norður. Sómalía hefur alsobeen vettvangi í borgarastyrjöld síðan 1991 sem hefur gert Íslamista klefi til starfa í því landi.

Dauða Political Islam

Jon B. Alterman

Byrjað er að skrifa minningargreinar um pólitískt íslam. Eftir margra ára að því er virðist óstöðvandi vöxt, Íslamskir flokkar eru farnir að hrasa. Í Marokkó, Réttlætis- og þróunarflokkurinn (eða PJD) gekk mun verr en búist var við í kosningunum í september síðastliðnum, og Jordan's Islamic Action Front missti meira en helming þingsæta sinna í skoðanakönnun í síðasta mánuði. Hið beðið með mikilli eftirvæntingu birtingarmynd múslimska bræðralags Egyptalands, drög að þeim birtust í september sl,sýndi hvorki styrk né áræðni. Í staðinn, það benti til þess að hópurinn væri umkringdur vitsmunalegum mótsögnum og eyðilagður af innanhússátökum. Það er of snemmt að lýsa dauða pólitísks íslams, þar sem það var ótímabært að boða fæðingu frjálshyggju í arabaheiminum í 2003-04, en horfur þess virðast áberandi daufari en þær gerðu jafnvel fyrir ári síðan. Sumum, náðarfallið var óumflýjanlegt; pólitískt íslam hefur hrunið undir eigin mótsögnum, þeir segja. Þeir halda því fram, í hlutlægum skilningi, pólitískt íslam var aldrei annað en reykur og speglar. Trúarbrögð snúast um trú og sannleika, og stjórnmál snúast um málamiðlanir og aðbúnað. Svona séð, pólitískt íslam var aldrei heilagt fyrirtæki, eingöngu viðleitni til að efla pólitískar horfur annarrar hliðar í pólitískri umræðu. Stuðningur við trúarlegt vald og lögmæti, andstaða við vilja íslamista hætti að vera eingöngu pólitísk – hún varð villutrú – og íslamistar nutu góðs af. Þessir efasemdarmenn líta á pólitískt íslam sem gagnlega leið til að vernda stjórnmálahreyfingar,kúa pólitíska fjandmenn, og safna stuðningi. Sem stjórnarstefna, þó, þeir halda því fram að pólitískt íslam hafi ekki skilað neinum árangri. Á tveimur svæðum þar sem það hækkaði nýlega til valda, heimastjórn Palestínumanna og Írak, stjórnarfar hefur verið blóðleysi. Í Íran, þar sem þemullar hafa verið við völd í næstum þrjá áratugi, klerkar berjast fyrir virðingu og landið blæðir fé til Dubai og annarra erlendra markaða með fyrirsjáanlegri reglum og jákvæðari ávöxtun. Yfirlýsta trúarríki Miðausturlanda, SaudiArabia, hefur áberandi minna vitsmunafrelsi en mörg nágrannaríki, og verndarar rétttrúnaðarins þar afmarka trúarlega hugsun vandlega. Sem franski fræðimaðurinn í íslam,Olivier Roy, eftirminnilega séð fyrir meira en áratug, samruni trúarbragða og stjórnmála helgaði ekki stjórnmálin, það pólitískt trúarbrögð. En á meðan íslam hefur ekki veitt samræmda kenningu um stjórnarhætti, hvað þá almennt viðurkennda nálgun á vandamálum mannkyns, áberandi trúarbragða heldur áfram að vaxa meðal margra múslima. Það áberandi nær miklu lengra en klæðaburður, sem hafa orðið íhaldssamari fyrir bæði konur og karla á undanförnum árum, og handan tungumálsins, sem ákallar nafn Guðs mun meira en raunin var fyrir áratug síðan. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, Fjármögnun sem byggir á hlutabréfum og ávöxtun frekar en vöxtum — er í uppsveiflu, og glæsileg bankaútibú innihalda aðskilda innganga fyrir karla og konur. Sléttir ungir sjónvarpsstöðvar treysta á vígbúnað þess að helga hversdagsleikann og leita fyrirgefningar, draga tugi þúsunda á fundi sína og sjónvarpsáhorfendur í milljónum. Tónlistarmyndbönd – sem hægt er að skoða á YouTube – hvetja unga áhorfendur til að tileinka sér trú og hverfa frá tilgangslausu veraldlegu lífi. Margir á Vesturlöndum líta á veraldarhyggju og afstæðishyggju sem raunveruleg merki nútímans.. Í Miðausturlöndum, margir líta á þá sem tákn gjaldþrota veraldlegrar þjóðernisfortíðar sem ekki skilaði réttlæti eða þróun, frelsi eða framfarir. Þjáning veraldarhyggjunnar er tilgangslaus, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. Íslam, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, eins og vinur minn Mustapha Kamal Pasha sá einu sinni, en það getur ekki verið uppspretta styrks í nútíma samfélögum ef það er bundið við óbeinar og krúttlegar hugmyndir um eðli þess. Að takast á við mismun er í grundvallaratriðum pólitískt verkefni, og það er hér sem pólitískt íslam mun standa frammi fyrir sannri prófraun sinni. Formlegt skipulag stjórnvalda í Miðausturlöndum hefur reynst varanlegt, og ólíklegt er að þeir molni undir bylgju íslamskrar aktívisma. Til að pólitísk íslam nái árangri, það þarf að finna leið til að sameina fjölbreytt bandalag af mismunandi trúarbrögðum og trúarstigum, ekki bara tala við grunn sinn. Það hefur ekki enn fundið leið til þess, en það er ekki þar með sagt að það geti það ekki.

The Internet og Íslamista stjórnmál í Jórdanía, Marokkó og Egyptalandi.

Andrew Helms

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, Upplýsingar, entertainment and commerce.

Útbreiðslu Internet náð öllum fjórum hornum heimsins, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

Gegnum Internetið, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, vefsíður og félagslegur net staður.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, og ríkisstjórnir veita nú aðgang að sögulegum skjölum, aðila palla, and administrative papers through their sites. Á sama hátt, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy og allir tala um nuanced guðfræðileg málefni.

Bræða saman tvö, Íslamista pólitísk samtök hafa gert tilvist þeirra er vitað með háþróaðri vefsíður útlista pólitíska umhverfi þeirra, viðeigandi fréttir, og trúarlegum stilla efni að ræða guðfræðileg sjónarmið þeirra. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Marokkó og Egyptalandi.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, Justice og þróun aðila í Marokkó og múslima Brotherhood í Egyptalandi. Eins og þessir þrír aðilar hafa aukið pólitískt tæknibúnaður þeirra og orðspor, both at home and abroad, þeir hafa í auknum mæli nýtt Netið til margs konar tilgangi.

First, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, samskipti og institutionalize hugmyndir að víðtækari opinber.

Í öðru lagi, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

Loksins, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, stjórnmálamenn og blaðamenn.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; þó, hvert markmiðið markmið annað leikari: almennings, fjölmiðlar, and the regime. Eftir greiningu á þessum þremur sviðum, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, á PJD og múslima Brotherhood.