RSSKõik kanded "Maroko islamistide" Kategooria

Islamistlikud opositsiooniparteid ja ELi kaasamise potentsiaal

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Pidades silmas islamistlike liikumiste tähtsuse suurenemist moslemimaailmas ja

viis, kuidas radikaliseerumine on mõjutanud ülemaailmseid sündmusi alates sajandivahetusest, seda

on oluline, et EL hindaks oma poliitikat osalejate suhtes, mis võivad olla lõdvalt

nimetatakse "islamimaailmaks". Eriti oluline on küsida, kas ja kuidas kaasata

erinevate islamistlike rühmitustega.

See on endiselt vastuoluline isegi ELis. Mõned arvavad, et islamid hindavad seda

islamistlike parteide taga peitumine on lihtsalt vastuolus lääne demokraatia ideaalidega ja

inimõiguste, samas kui teised peavad kaasamist reaalseks vajaduseks kasvamise tõttu

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, ja

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

islami seaduste alusel juhitava islamiriigi loomisest, ja on hakanud aktsepteerima elementaarseid

valimisvõitlemise demokraatlikud põhimõtted, muu poliitika olemasolu

võistlejad, ja poliitiline pluralism.

STRATEEGIATE tegelemise poliitilise islami

SHADI HAMID

Amanda Kadlec

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarly, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. USA. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. Autor David Zeidan, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

Islamiliikumistega ning demokraatliku araabia maailmas: Avastades Gray tsoonid

Nathan J. Pruun, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

Viimase kümne aasta jooksul, Islamiliikumistega on end tõestanud kui peamiste poliitiliste jõudude Lähis-Idas. Koos valitsused, islamiliikumistega, Mõõduka samuti radikaali, määrab, kuidas regiooni poliitikas paljastama lähitulevikus. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, siiski, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordaania, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Poliitika, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

islami RADIKALISEERUMINE

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Politiseerunud islamiga ja Euroopa Välispoliitika

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (USA) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Miks ei ole Araabia demokraatiate ?

Larry Diamond

Ajal demokratiseerimine on "kolmanda laine,"Demokraatia lõpetanud olles enamasti Lääne nähtus ja" läks ülemaailmne. "Kui kolmanda laine algas 1974, maailma oli ainult umbes 40 demokraatiate, ja ainult mõned neist panna väljaspool West. By the time the Journal of Democracy began publishing in 1990, there were 76 electoral democracies (accounting for slightly less than half the world’s independent states). By 1995, that number had shot up to 117—three in every five states. By then, a critical mass of democracies existed in every major world region save one—the Middle East.1 Moreover, every one of the world’s major cultural realms had become host to a significant democratic presence, albeit again with a single exception—the Arab world.2 Fifteen years later, this exception still stands.
The continuing absence of even a single democratic regime in the Arab world is a striking anomaly—the principal exception to the globalization of democracy. Why is there no Arab democracy? Tõepoolest, miks on nii, et kuueteistkümne iseseisva araabia riigi hulgas Lähis-Idas ja rannikuäärses Põhja-Aafrikas, Liibanon on ainus, mis on kunagi olnud demokraatia?
Kõige tavalisem oletus araabia demokraatia puudujäägi kohta on, et sellel peab olema midagi pistmist religiooni või kultuuriga. Pealegi, üks asi, mida kõik araabia riigid jagavad, on see, et nad on araablased.

Edu Türgi AK lepinguosaline ei tohi lahjendada mure Araabia islamistide

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on howIslamistscan pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as theIslamistrouting of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamistsin the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenderswere always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamistalleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. In fact, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhoodaside from the common faith of its membersthat it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, the “Läände”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy

Mona Yacoubian

Deeming democratic change to be a long-term antidote to Islamist extremism, the Bush administration coupled its military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq with intensified efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world, underscoring the need for free and fair elections. To date, parliamentary elections of varying openness have taken place across the region, from Morocco to Kuwait. The elections ushered in a wave of Islamist victories, dubbed by many as an “Islamist tsunami.” 1The Islamists’ successes stem from their effectiveness as vehicles for popular opposition. While liberal, secular opposition parties remain largely detached from much of the population, Islamists have developed vast and easily mobilized grassroots networks through charitable organizations and mosques. The leadership is often younger and more dynamic, with strong ties to the community, and the party organizations brim with energy and ideas, attracting those who are seeking change.The U.S. government has quietly engaged a number of moderate and legal Islamist parties across the region for several years, sometimes through normal diplomatic activity, sometimes through government-funded grants to U.S. organizations. This Special Report examines U.S.-funded engagement with legal, nonviolent Islamist parties through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which have the most extensive experience engaging with Islamists in the region, and focuses on Morocco, Jordaania, and Yemen, because of their relative political openness and the strength and vibrancy of their Islamist political opposition.Successful Strategy. A successful Islamist engagement strategy both empowers individuals and strengthens institutions to yield greater transparency, more accountability, and shifts toward moderation. Training and empowering individuals cultivates moderates within the parties and enhances their political sophistication and influence. Meanwhile, as regimes in the Arab world resist or manipulate political reforms, strengthening democracy’s infrastructure is as important as supporting individuals. Independent electoral procedures and monitoring help to establish free and fair elections. Institution building ensures appropriate checks on executive power and a strong rule of law. Strengthening parliaments is especially crucial, as Islamists participate primarily in legislatures.In assessing whether Islamist parties have moderated in response to U.S. engagement, it is difficult if not impossible to quantify or measure shifts that may themselves be relative and subjective. Directly linking greater moderation to specific U.S. engagement activities is also highly problematic. At best, this engagement should be considered a contributing factor. Nevertheless, the tentative results in Morocco, Jordaania, and Yemen are promising enough that continued engagement with moderate Islamists should be encouraged, albeit with greater emphasis on institution building and an eye on the broader context of the ideological battle in the Muslim world between extremism and moderation.

POLITICAL ISLAM and the West

JOHN L.ESPOSITO


At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Iraan, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Egiptus, Indoneesia,Jordaania, Kuwait, Liibanon,Malaisia, Pakistan, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Sildu ehitades ei seinte

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Kuid, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

Terroristide ja äärmuslike liikumiste kohta Lähis-Idas

Anthony H. Cordesman

Terrorism ja asümmeetriline sõjapidamine on vaevalt uusi omadusi Lähis-Ida sõjalist tasakaalu, and Islamic
extremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differences
in the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civil
conflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civil
war in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-
Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led to a civil war in Jordan in September
1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocratic
revolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between their
Sunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.
There also, siiski, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged by
regimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamic
movements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after his
peace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to the
PLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene of
coups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapse
of its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.
The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered
an Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal with
an uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elements
of the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.
Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed by
a civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamic
extremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicated
them. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.
Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National Guard
Training center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamic
extremists. Maroko, Libya, Tuneesia, Jordaania, Bahrain, Katar, Omaan, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamist
movements become a serious national threat.
While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over two
million lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has also
been the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.a

Terrorism ja asümmeetriline sõjapidamine on vaevalt uusi omadusi Lähis-Ida sõjalist tasakaalu, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, siiski, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. Maroko, Libya, Tuneesia, Jordaania, Bahrain, Katar, Omaan, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.

Surm politiseerunud islamiga

Jon B. Alterman

Surmakuulutused poliitilise islami hakanud olema kirjutatud. Pärast aastaid kestnud näiliselt unstoppablegrowth, Islami pooled on hakanud komistama. Marokos, Õigluse ja Arengu Partei (või PJD) mullu septembris toimunud valimistel läks oodatust palju kehvemini, ja Jordaania Islami Action Front kaotas eelmise kuu küsitluses enam kui pooled oma kohtadest. Egiptuse Moslemivennaskonna pikisilmi oodatud manifest, mille mustand ilmus mullu septembris,ei näidanud ei jõudu ega julgust. Selle asemel, see viitas sellele, et rühmitus on olnud intellektuaalsetest vastuoludest ja sisetülidest ahvatlev. Poliitilise islami surma on liiga vara kuulutada, aastal oli ennatlik kuulutada liberalismi sündi araabia maailmas 2003-04, kuid selle väljavaated tunduvad märgatavalt nõrgemad kui isegi aasta tagasi.Mõnedele, armust langemine oli vältimatu; poliitiline islam on oma vastuolude tõttu kokku varisenud, nad ütlesid. Nad vaidlevad selle vastu, objektiivses mõttes, poliitiline islam ei olnud kunagi midagi muud kui suits ja peeglid. Religioon on seotud usu ja tõega, ja poliitika seisneb kompromissides ja leppimises. Sedasi vaadatuna, poliitiline islam ei olnud kunagi püha ettevõtmine, vaid pingutus ühe poole poliitilisi väljavaateid poliitilises arutelus suurendada. Toetatud religioosse autoriteedi ja legitiimsuse poolt, vastuseis islamistide tahtele lakkas olemast pelgalt poliitiline – sellest sai ketserlus – ja islamistid said sellest kasu. Need skeptikud peavad poliitilist islamit kasulikuks viisiks poliitiliste liikumiste kaitsmiseks.,lehma poliitilised vaenlased, ja ralli toetus. Juhtiva strateegiana, siiski, nad väidavad, et poliitiline islam ei ole toonud edu. Kahes piirkonnas, kus see hiljuti võimule tõusis, Palestiina omavalitsus ja Iraak, valitsemine on olnud aneemia. Iraanis, kus themullad on võimul olnud peaaegu kolm aastakümmet, vaimulikud võitlevad austuse pärast ja riik hemorraagib raha Dubaisse ja teistele ülemereturgudele prognoositavamate reeglite ja positiivsema tuluga. Kõige tõenäolisemalt religioosne riik Lähis-Idas, SaudiArabia, tal on tunduvalt vähem intellektuaalset vabadust kui paljudel tema naabritel, ja sealsed õigeusu eestkostjad piiravad hoolikalt religioosset mõtlemist. Nagu prantsuse islamiuurija,Olivier Roy, meeldejäävalt enam kui kümme aastat tagasi, religiooni ja poliitika kokkusulamine ei pühitsenud poliitikat, see politiseeris religiooni.Kuid kuigi islam ei ole pakkunud ühtset valitsemisteooriat, rääkimata üldtunnustatud lähenemisest inimkonna probleemidele, religiooni esiletõstmine kasvab paljude moslemite seas. See silmapaistvus ulatub palju kaugemale riietumisküsimustest, mis on viimastel aastatel muutunud nii naiste kui ka meeste jaoks konservatiivsemaks, ja väljaspool keelt, mis kutsub Jumala nime palju rohkem esile kui kümme aastat tagasi. See ulatub ka kaugemale islami igapäevasest praktikast – palvest heategevuseni ja paastumiseni –, mis kõik on tõusuteel. Muutunud on midagi veelgi põhjapanevamat kui füüsiline välimus või rituaalpraktika, ja see on see: Üha suurem hulk moslemeid lähtub väitest, et islam on oluline nende igapäevaelu kõigi aspektide jaoks, mitte ainult teoloogia või isiklike veendumuste provints. Mõned peavad seda Lähis-Ida traditsionalismi juurde naasmiseks., kui ebausk ja vaimsus valitsesid igapäevast elu. Täpsemalt, kuigi, mida me näeme, on "uustraditsionalismi" tõus,“, kus on üles pandud mineviku sümbolid ja loosungid, et kiirendada tulevikku sisenemist. Islami rahandus – see tähendab, rahandus, mis tugineb aktsiatele ja tuludele, mitte intressidele, õitseb, ja klanitud pangakontorites on eraldi sissepääsud meestele ja naistele. Libedad noored televangelistid toetuvad igapäevase pühitsemise ja andestuse otsimise hoobile, meelitades oma koosolekutele kümneid tuhandeid inimesi ja televisiooni vaatajaid miljoneid. YouTube'is vaadatavad muusikavideod anuvad noortele vaatajatele usku omaks võtta ja mõttetust ilmalikust elust ära pöörata. Paljud läänes näevad ilmalikkust ja relativismi modernsuse konkreetsete märkidena.. Lähis-Idas, paljud peavad neid pankrotistunud ilmaliku natsionalistliku mineviku sümboliks, mis ei suutnud tagada õiglust ega arengut, vabadus või progress. Sekularismi kannatused on mõttetud, kuid islami distsipliin on täis tähendust. Just sel põhjusel on ennatlik kuulutada poliitilise islami surma. Islam, järjest enam, ei saa ohjeldada. See levib kõikidesse eluvaldkondadesse, ja see on tugev Lähis-Ida kõige dünaamilisemate jõudude hulgas. See naudib kindlasti riigitoetusi,kuid osariikidel on religioossel alal toimuva loovusega vähe pistmist. Oht on, et avaliku elu islamiseerimine jätab kõrvale selle vähese sallivuse, mis Lähis-Idas on alles jäänud., pärast sajandeid asa-põhimõtteliselt islami-multikultuuriline entrepôt. On raske ette kujutada, kuidas islamiseerivad ühiskonnad saavad õitseda, kui nad ei võta omaks innovatsiooni ja loovust, mitmekesisus ja erinevus. "Islam" ei ole iseenesestmõistetav mõiste, nagu mu sõber Mustapha Kamal Pasha kunagi täheldas, kuid see ei saa olla tänapäeva ühiskondade tugevuse allikaks, kui see on seotud luustunud ja kihelkondlike arusaamadega oma olemusest. Erinevuste käsitlemine on põhimõtteliselt poliitiline ülesanne, ja just siin seisab poliitiline islam silmitsi oma tõelise proovikiviga. Lähis-Ida ametlikud valitsusstruktuurid on osutunud vastupidavaks, ja tõenäoliselt ei lagune nad islamiaktivismi laine all. Et poliitiline islam õnnestuks, see peab leidma viisi, kuidas ühendada erineva usu ja erineva usuastmega koalitsioone, mitte ainult rääkida selle baasiga. Seda pole veel leidnud, aga see ei tähenda, et ei saaks.

Internet ja islami Poliitika Jordaanias, Maroko ja Egiptus.

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a
dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and
commerce. The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the
researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the
Bedouin in Egypt. Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches
across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously
silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites. Political organizations
across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future,
and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, ja
administrative papers through their sites. Similarly, religious groups display their beliefs online
through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of
eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues. Fusing the two, Islamist
political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing
their political platforms, asjakohaseid uudiseid, and religiously oriented material discussing their
theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by
Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and
Egiptus.
Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to
publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions
of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization. This paper will
examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in
2
Jordaania, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home
and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes. First, Islamist
organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere
through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.
Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which
officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media
restrictions imposed by the state. lõpuks, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a
counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an
international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim
Vendlus, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western
style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists. The MB
has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties
attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies
between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section
on the Muslim Brotherhood. These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and
desired outcomes; siiski, each goal targets a different actor: the public, meedia, and the
regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study
analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.
1

Andrew Helms

Ikhwanweb

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and commerce.

The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, and administrative papers through their sites. Similarly, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues.

Fusing the two, Islamistlike poliitiliste organisatsioonide teinud oma kohalolekut teada läbi kogenud veebilehekülgede üksikasjalikult nende poliitilised platvormid, asjakohaseid uudiseid, ja usuliselt orienteeritud materjali arutame oma teoloogilised seisukohad. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Maroko ja Egiptus.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes.

First, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.

Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

lõpuks, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; siiski, each goal targets a different actor: the public, meedia, and the regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.