Kõik kanded "Maroko islamistide" Kategooria

Islamistlikud opositsiooniparteid ja ELi kaasamise potentsiaal

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

STRATEEGIATE tegelemise poliitilise islami

SHADI HAMID

Amanda Kadlec

Islamiliikumistega ning demokraatliku araabia maailmas: Avastades Gray tsoonid

Nathan J. Pruun, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

islami RADIKALISEERUMINE

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Politiseerunud islamiga ja Euroopa Välispoliitika

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (USA) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Miks ei ole Araabia demokraatiate ?

Larry Diamond

Edu Türgi AK lepinguosaline ei tohi lahjendada mure Araabia islamistide

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “Islamist” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – were always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamist’ alleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. In fact, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhood – aside from the common faith of its members – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, the “Läände”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy

Mona Yacoubian

Deeming democratic change to be a long-term antidote to Islamist extremism, the Bush administration coupled its military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq with intensified efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world, underscoring the need for free and fair elections. To date, parliamentary elections of varying openness have taken place across the region, from Morocco to Kuwait. The elections ushered in a wave of Islamist victories, dubbed by many as an “Islamist tsunami.” 1The Islamists’ successes stem from their effectiveness as vehicles for popular opposition. While liberal, secular opposition parties remain largely detached from much of the population, Islamists have developed vast and easily mobilized grassroots networks through charitable organizations and mosques. The leadership is often younger and more dynamic, with strong ties to the community, and the party organizations brim with energy and ideas, attracting those who are seeking change.The U.S. government has quietly engaged a number of moderate and legal Islamist parties across the region for several years, sometimes through normal diplomatic activity, sometimes through government-funded grants to U.S. organizations. This Special Report examines U.S.-funded engagement with legal, nonviolent Islamist parties through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which have the most extensive experience engaging with Islamists in the region, and focuses on Morocco, Jordaania, and Yemen, because of their relative political openness and the strength and vibrancy of their Islamist political opposition.Successful Strategy. A successful Islamist engagement strategy both empowers individuals and strengthens institutions to yield greater transparency, more accountability, and shifts toward moderation. Training and empowering individuals cultivates moderates within the parties and enhances their political sophistication and influence. Meanwhile, as regimes in the Arab world resist or manipulate political reforms, strengthening democracy’s infrastructure is as important as supporting individuals. Independent electoral procedures and monitoring help to establish free and fair elections. Institution building ensures appropriate checks on executive power and a strong rule of law. Strengthening parliaments is especially crucial, as Islamists participate primarily in legislatures.In assessing whether Islamist parties have moderated in response to U.S. engagement, it is difficult if not impossible to quantify or measure shifts that may themselves be relative and subjective. Directly linking greater moderation to specific U.S. engagement activities is also highly problematic. At best, this engagement should be considered a contributing factor. Nevertheless, the tentative results in Morocco, Jordaania, and Yemen are promising enough that continued engagement with moderate Islamists should be encouraged, albeit with greater emphasis on institution building and an eye on the broader context of the ideological battle in the Muslim world between extremism and moderation.

POLITICAL ISLAM and the West

JOHN L.ESPOSITO

At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Iraan, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Egiptus, Indoneesia,Jordaania, Kuwait, Liibanon,Malaisia, Pakistan, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Sildu ehitades ei seinte

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 September 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Kuid, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

Terroristide ja äärmuslike liikumiste kohta Lähis-Idas

Terrorism ja asümmeetriline sõjapidamine on vaevalt uusi omadusi Lähis-Ida sõjalist tasakaalu, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, siiski, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. Maroko, Libya, Tuneesia, Jordaania, Bahrain, Katar, Omaan, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.

Surm politiseerunud islamiga

Jon B. Alterman

Surmakuulutused poliitilise islami hakanud olema kirjutatud. Pärast aastaid kestnud näiliselt unstoppablegrowth, Islami pooled on hakanud komistama. Marokos, Õigluse ja Arengu Partei (või PJD) mullu septembris toimunud valimistel läks oodatust palju kehvemini, ja Jordaania Islami Action Front kaotas eelmise kuu küsitluses enam kui pooled oma kohtadest. Egiptuse Moslemivennaskonna pikisilmi oodatud manifest, mille mustand ilmus mullu septembris,ei näidanud ei jõudu ega julgust. Selle asemel, see viitas sellele, et rühmitus on olnud intellektuaalsetest vastuoludest ja sisetülidest ahvatlev. Poliitilise islami surma on liiga vara kuulutada, aastal oli ennatlik kuulutada liberalismi sündi araabia maailmas 2003-04, kuid selle väljavaated tunduvad märgatavalt nõrgemad kui isegi aasta tagasi.Mõnedele, armust langemine oli vältimatu; poliitiline islam on oma vastuolude tõttu kokku varisenud, nad ütlesid. Nad vaidlevad selle vastu, objektiivses mõttes, poliitiline islam ei olnud kunagi midagi muud kui suits ja peeglid. Religioon on seotud usu ja tõega, ja poliitika seisneb kompromissides ja leppimises. Sedasi vaadatuna, poliitiline islam ei olnud kunagi püha ettevõtmine, vaid pingutus ühe poole poliitilisi väljavaateid poliitilises arutelus suurendada. Toetatud religioosse autoriteedi ja legitiimsuse poolt, vastuseis islamistide tahtele lakkas olemast pelgalt poliitiline – sellest sai ketserlus – ja islamistid said sellest kasu. Need skeptikud peavad poliitilist islamit kasulikuks viisiks poliitiliste liikumiste kaitsmiseks.,lehma poliitilised vaenlased, ja ralli toetus. Juhtiva strateegiana, siiski, nad väidavad, et poliitiline islam ei ole toonud edu. Kahes piirkonnas, kus see hiljuti võimule tõusis, Palestiina omavalitsus ja Iraak, valitsemine on olnud aneemia. Iraanis, kus themullad on võimul olnud peaaegu kolm aastakümmet, vaimulikud võitlevad austuse pärast ja riik hemorraagib raha Dubaisse ja teistele ülemereturgudele prognoositavamate reeglite ja positiivsema tuluga. Kõige tõenäolisemalt religioosne riik Lähis-Idas, SaudiArabia, tal on tunduvalt vähem intellektuaalset vabadust kui paljudel tema naabritel, ja sealsed õigeusu eestkostjad piiravad hoolikalt religioosset mõtlemist. Nagu prantsuse islamiuurija,Olivier Roy, meeldejäävalt enam kui kümme aastat tagasi, religiooni ja poliitika kokkusulamine ei pühitsenud poliitikat, see politiseeris religiooni.Kuid kuigi islam ei ole pakkunud ühtset valitsemisteooriat, rääkimata üldtunnustatud lähenemisest inimkonna probleemidele, religiooni esiletõstmine kasvab paljude moslemite seas. See silmapaistvus ulatub palju kaugemale riietumisküsimustest, mis on viimastel aastatel muutunud nii naiste kui ka meeste jaoks konservatiivsemaks, ja väljaspool keelt, mis kutsub Jumala nime palju rohkem esile kui kümme aastat tagasi. See ulatub ka kaugemale islami igapäevasest praktikast – palvest heategevuseni ja paastumiseni –, mis kõik on tõusuteel. Muutunud on midagi veelgi põhjapanevamat kui füüsiline välimus või rituaalpraktika, ja see on see: Üha suurem hulk moslemeid lähtub väitest, et islam on oluline nende igapäevaelu kõigi aspektide jaoks, mitte ainult teoloogia või isiklike veendumuste provints. Mõned peavad seda Lähis-Ida traditsionalismi juurde naasmiseks., kui ebausk ja vaimsus valitsesid igapäevast elu. Täpsemalt, kuigi, mida me näeme, on "uustraditsionalismi" tõus,“, kus on üles pandud mineviku sümbolid ja loosungid, et kiirendada tulevikku sisenemist. Islami rahandus – see tähendab, rahandus, mis tugineb aktsiatele ja tuludele, mitte intressidele, õitseb, ja klanitud pangakontorites on eraldi sissepääsud meestele ja naistele. Libedad noored televangelistid toetuvad igapäevase pühitsemise ja andestuse otsimise hoobile, meelitades oma koosolekutele kümneid tuhandeid inimesi ja televisiooni vaatajaid miljoneid. YouTube'is vaadatavad muusikavideod anuvad noortele vaatajatele usku omaks võtta ja mõttetust ilmalikust elust ära pöörata. Paljud läänes näevad ilmalikkust ja relativismi modernsuse konkreetsete märkidena.. Lähis-Idas, paljud peavad neid pankrotistunud ilmaliku natsionalistliku mineviku sümboliks, mis ei suutnud tagada õiglust ega arengut, vabadus või progress. Sekularismi kannatused on mõttetud, kuid islami distsipliin on täis tähendust. Just sel põhjusel on ennatlik kuulutada poliitilise islami surma. Islam, järjest enam, ei saa ohjeldada. See levib kõikidesse eluvaldkondadesse, ja see on tugev Lähis-Ida kõige dünaamilisemate jõudude hulgas. See naudib kindlasti riigitoetusi,kuid osariikidel on religioossel alal toimuva loovusega vähe pistmist. Oht on, et avaliku elu islamiseerimine jätab kõrvale selle vähese sallivuse, mis Lähis-Idas on alles jäänud., pärast sajandeid asa-põhimõtteliselt islami-multikultuuriline entrepôt. On raske ette kujutada, kuidas islamiseerivad ühiskonnad saavad õitseda, kui nad ei võta omaks innovatsiooni ja loovust, mitmekesisus ja erinevus. "Islam" ei ole iseenesestmõistetav mõiste, nagu mu sõber Mustapha Kamal Pasha kunagi täheldas, kuid see ei saa olla tänapäeva ühiskondade tugevuse allikaks, kui see on seotud luustunud ja kihelkondlike arusaamadega oma olemusest. Erinevuste käsitlemine on põhimõtteliselt poliitiline ülesanne, ja just siin seisab poliitiline islam silmitsi oma tõelise proovikiviga. Lähis-Ida ametlikud valitsusstruktuurid on osutunud vastupidavaks, ja tõenäoliselt ei lagune nad islamiaktivismi laine all. Et poliitiline islam õnnestuks, see peab leidma viisi, kuidas ühendada erineva usu ja erineva usuastmega koalitsioone, mitte ainult rääkida selle baasiga. Seda pole veel leidnud, aga see ei tähenda, et ei saaks.

Internet ja islami Poliitika Jordaanias, Maroko ja Egiptus.

Andrew Helms

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and commerce.

The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, and administrative papers through their sites. Similarly, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues.

Fusing the two, Islamistlike poliitiliste organisatsioonide teinud oma kohalolekut teada läbi kogenud veebilehekülgede üksikasjalikult nende poliitilised platvormid, asjakohaseid uudiseid, ja usuliselt orienteeritud materjali arutame oma teoloogilised seisukohad. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Maroko ja Egiptus.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes.

First, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.

Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

lõpuks, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; siiski, each goal targets a different actor: the public, meedia, and the regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.