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Islamistiske oppositionspartier og potentialet for EU-engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

I lyset af den stigende betydning af islamistiske bevægelser i den muslimske verden og

den måde, som radikalisering har påvirket globale begivenheder siden århundredeskiftet, det

er vigtigt for EU at evaluere sine politikker over for aktører inden for hvad der kan være løst

kaldet den 'islamiske verden'. Det er især vigtigt at spørge, om og hvordan man engagerer sig

med de forskellige islamistiske grupper.

Dette er fortsat kontroversielt selv inden for EU. Nogle føler, at islam værdsætter det

ligger bag islamistiske partier er simpelthen uforenelige med vestlige idealer om demokrati og

menneskerettigheder, mens andre ser engagement som en realistisk nødvendighed på grund af væksten

islamistiske partiers indenlandske betydning og deres stigende engagement i internationale

anliggender. Et andet perspektiv er, at demokratiseringen i den muslimske verden ville øges

europæisk sikkerhed. Gyldigheden af ​​disse og andre argumenter om, hvorvidt og hvordan

EU bør engagere sig kan kun testes ved at studere de forskellige islamistiske bevægelser og

deres politiske forhold, land for land.

Demokratisering er et centralt tema i EU's fælles udenrigspolitiske handlinger, som lagt

ud i artikel 11 i traktaten om Den Europæiske Union. Mange af staterne overvejede i dette

betænkningen er ikke demokratisk, eller ikke fuldt ud demokratisk. I de fleste af disse lande, islamist

partier og bevægelser udgør en væsentlig opposition til de fremherskende regimer, og

i nogle udgør de den største oppositionsblok. Europæiske demokratier har længe været nødt til det

beskæftige sig med regeringsregimer, der er autoritære, men det er et nyt fænomen at trykke på

for demokratisk reform i stater, hvor de mest sandsynlige modtagere kan have, fra

EU's synspunkt, forskellige og til tider problematiske tilgange til demokrati og dets

relaterede værdier, såsom minoritets- og kvinders rettigheder og retsstatsprincippet. Disse afgifter er

ofte lagt imod islamistiske bevægelser, så det er vigtigt for europæiske politiske beslutningstagere at gøre det

have et præcist billede af potentielle partneres politikker og filosofier.

Erfaringer fra forskellige lande har en tendens til at tyde på, at jo mere frihed islamistiske

fester er tilladt, jo mere moderate er de i deres handlinger og ideer. I mange

tilfælde islamistiske partier og grupper er for længst flyttet væk fra deres oprindelige mål

at etablere en islamisk stat styret af islamisk lov, og er kommet til at acceptere grundlæggende

demokratiske principper for valgkamp om magten, eksistensen af ​​andre politiske

konkurrenter, og politisk pluralisme.

STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Politisk islam er den mest aktive politiske kraft i Mellemøsten i dag. Dens fremtid er tæt knyttet til regionens. Hvis USA og EU er forpligtet til at støtte politiske reformer i regionen, de bliver nødt til at udtænke beton, sammenhængende strategier for at engagere islamistiske grupper. Endnu, USA. har generelt været uvillig til at åbne en dialog med disse bevægelser. Tilsvarende, EU's engagement med islamister har været undtagelsen, ikke reglen. Hvor der findes kontakter på lavt niveau, de tjener hovedsageligt informationsindsamlingsformål, ikke strategiske mål. USA. og EU har en række programmer, der omhandler økonomisk og politisk udvikling i regionen – blandt dem Mellemøstens partnerskabsinitiativ (MEPI), Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Middelhavsunionen, og den europæiske naboskabspolitik (ENP) – alligevel har de lidt at sige om, hvordan udfordringen fra islamistisk politisk opposition passer ind i bredere regionale mål. OS. og EU's demokratibistand og programmering er næsten udelukkende rettet mod enten autoritære regeringer selv eller sekulære civilsamfundsgrupper med minimal støtte i deres egne samfund.
Tiden er moden til en revurdering af de nuværende politikker. Siden terrorangrebene i september 11, 2001, støtte til Mellemøstens demokrati har fået større betydning for vestlige politiske beslutningstagere, der ser en sammenhæng mellem mangel på demokrati og politisk vold. Større opmærksomhed er blevet viet til at forstå variationerne inden for politisk islam. Den nye amerikanske administration er mere åben over for at udvide kommunikationen med den muslimske verden. I mellemtiden, langt de fleste mainstream islamistiske organisationer – herunder Det Muslimske Broderskab i Egypten, Jordans Islamiske Handlingsfront (IAF), Marokkos Retfærdigheds- og Udviklingsparti (PJD), den islamiske konstitutionelle bevægelse i Kuwait, og Yemeni Islah Party - har i stigende grad gjort støtte til politiske reformer og demokrati til en central komponent i deres politiske platforme. Ud over, mange har signaleret stor interesse for at åbne dialog med U.S. og EU's regeringer.
Fremtiden for forholdet mellem vestlige nationer og Mellemøsten kan i høj grad bestemmes af, i hvilken grad de tidligere involverer ikke-voldelige islamistiske partier i en bred dialog om fælles interesser og mål.. Der har for nylig været en udbredelse af undersøgelser om engagement med islamister, men få forholder sig klart til, hvad det kan indebære i praksis. Ace Zoé Nautré, gæstestipendiat ved det tyske råd for udenrigsrelationer, sætter det, "EU tænker på engagement, men ved ikke rigtig hvordan."1 I håbet om at afklare diskussionen, vi skelner mellem tre niveauer af "engagement,” hver med forskellige midler og mål: kontakter på lavt niveau, strategisk dialog, og partnerskab.

ISLAMISKE BEVÆGELSER OG DEMOKRATISK PROCESS I DEN ARABISKE VERDEN: Udforskning af de grå zoner

Nathan J. Brun, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

I løbet af det sidste årti, Islamistiske bevægelser har etableret sig som store politiske aktører i Mellemøsten. Sammen med regeringerne, Islamistiske bevægelser, moderat såvel som radikal, vil bestemme, hvordan regionens politik udfolder sig i overskuelig fremtid. De har vist evnen til ikke kun at skabe meddelelser med udbredt populær appel, men også, og vigtigst af alt, at skabe organisationer med ægte sociale baser og udvikle sammenhængende politiske strategier. Andre parter,
i det store hele, har fejlet på alle konti.
Offentligheden i Vesten og, i særdeleshed, De Forenede Stater, er kun blevet opmærksom på vigtigheden af ​​islamistiske bevægelser efter dramatiske begivenheder, såsom revolutionen i Iran og mordet på præsident Anwar al-Sadat i Egypten. Opmærksomheden er blevet langt mere vedvarende siden terrorangrebene i september 11, 2001. Som resultat, Islamistiske bevægelser betragtes bredt som farlige og fjendtlige. Mens en sådan karakterisering er nøjagtig med hensyn til organisationer i den radikale ende af det islamistiske spektrum, som er farlige på grund af deres vilje til at ty til vilkårlig vold i forfølgelsen af ​​deres mål, det er ikke en nøjagtig karakterisering af de mange grupper, der har givet afkald på eller undgået vold. Fordi terrororganisationer udgør en øjeblikkelig
trussel, imidlertid, politikere i alle lande har lagt uforholdsmæssig stor vægt på de voldelige organisationer.
Det er de almindelige islamistiske organisationer, ikke de radikale, det vil have størst indflydelse på den fremtidige politiske udvikling i Mellemøsten. Radikalernes storslåede mål om at genoprette et kalifat, der forener hele den arabiske verden, eller endda at pålægge enkelte arabiske lande love og sociale skikke inspireret af en fundamentalistisk fortolkning af islam er simpelthen for langt væk fra nutidens virkelighed til at blive realiseret. Dette betyder ikke, at terrorgrupper ikke er farlige - de kan medføre stort tab af menneskeliv selv i forfølgelsen af ​​umulige mål - men at det er usandsynligt, at de vil ændre Midtøsten.. Almindelige islamistiske organisationer er generelt en anden sag. De har allerede haft en stærk indflydelse på sociale skikke i mange lande, standse og vende sekularistiske tendenser og ændre den måde, som mange arabere klæder sig og opfører sig på. Og deres umiddelbare politiske mål, at blive en magtfuld styrke ved at deltage i deres lands normale politik, er ikke en umulig. Det er allerede ved at blive realiseret i lande som Marokko, Jordan, og endda Egypten, der stadig forbyder alle islamistiske politiske organisationer, men nu har otteogtredive muslimske brødre i parlamentet. Politik, ikke vold, er det, der giver almindelige islamister deres indflydelse.

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Siden 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

hvorfor er der ingen arabiske demokratier ?

Larry Diamond

Under demokratiseringens "tredje bølge,” demokrati holdt op med at være et overvejende vestligt fænomen og ”gik globalt”. Da den tredje bølge begyndte i 1974, verden havde kun ca 40 demokratier, og kun få af dem lå uden for Vesten. På det tidspunkt, hvor Journal of Democracy begyndte at udgive i 1990, der var 76 valgdemokratier (tegner sig for lidt mindre end halvdelen af ​​verdens uafhængige stater). Ved 1995, det tal var steget til 117 - tre ud af hver femte stat. Inden da, en kritisk masse af demokratier eksisterede i alle større verdensregioner undtagen én – Mellemøsten.1 Desuden, hver eneste af verdens store kulturelle riger var blevet vært for en betydelig demokratisk tilstedeværelse, omend igen med en enkelt undtagelse – den arabiske verden.2 Femten år senere, denne undtagelse gælder stadig.
Det fortsatte fravær af selv et enkelt demokratisk styre i den arabiske verden er en slående anomali - den vigtigste undtagelse fra demokratiets globalisering. Hvorfor er der ikke noget arabisk demokrati? Ja, hvorfor er det sådan, at blandt de seksten uafhængige arabiske stater i Mellemøsten og kystnære Nordafrika, Libanon er det eneste, der nogensinde har været et demokrati?
Den mest almindelige antagelse om det arabiske demokratiunderskud er, at det må have noget at gøre med religion eller kultur. Trods alt, den ene ting, som alle arabiske lande deler, er, at de er arabiske.

Succes for Tyrkiets AK-parti må ikke udvande bekymringer over arabiske islamister

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on howIslamistscan pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “islamist” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamistsin the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenderswere always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamistalleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. Faktisk, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhoodaside from the common faith of its membersthat it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, det “Vest”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy

Mona Yacoubian

Deeming democratic change to be a long-term antidote to Islamist extremism, the Bush administration coupled its military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq with intensified efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world, underscoring the need for free and fair elections. To date, parliamentary elections of varying openness have taken place across the region, from Morocco to Kuwait. The elections ushered in a wave of Islamist victories, dubbed by many as an “Islamist tsunami.” 1The Islamists’ successes stem from their effectiveness as vehicles for popular opposition. While liberal, secular opposition parties remain largely detached from much of the population, Islamists have developed vast and easily mobilized grassroots networks through charitable organizations and mosques. The leadership is often younger and more dynamic, with strong ties to the community, and the party organizations brim with energy and ideas, attracting those who are seeking change.The U.S. government has quietly engaged a number of moderate and legal Islamist parties across the region for several years, sometimes through normal diplomatic activity, sometimes through government-funded grants to U.S. organizations. This Special Report examines U.S.-funded engagement with legal, nonviolent Islamist parties through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which have the most extensive experience engaging with Islamists in the region, and focuses on Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen, because of their relative political openness and the strength and vibrancy of their Islamist political opposition.Successful Strategy. A successful Islamist engagement strategy both empowers individuals and strengthens institutions to yield greater transparency, more accountability, and shifts toward moderation. Training and empowering individuals cultivates moderates within the parties and enhances their political sophistication and influence. I mellemtiden, as regimes in the Arab world resist or manipulate political reforms, strengthening democracy’s infrastructure is as important as supporting individuals. Independent electoral procedures and monitoring help to establish free and fair elections. Institution building ensures appropriate checks on executive power and a strong rule of law. Strengthening parliaments is especially crucial, as Islamists participate primarily in legislatures.In assessing whether Islamist parties have moderated in response to U.S. engagement, it is difficult if not impossible to quantify or measure shifts that may themselves be relative and subjective. Directly linking greater moderation to specific U.S. engagement activities is also highly problematic. At best, this engagement should be considered a contributing factor. Nevertheless, the tentative results in Morocco, Jordan, and Yemen are promising enough that continued engagement with moderate Islamists should be encouraged, albeit with greater emphasis on institution building and an eye on the broader context of the ideological battle in the Muslim world between extremism and moderation.

POLITICAL ISLAM and the West

JOHN L.ESPOSITO


At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Iran, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Egypten, Indonesien,Jordan, Kuwait, Libanon,Malaysia, Pakistan, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Building bridges not walls

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 september 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Imidlertid, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

Terroristiske og ekstremistiske bevægelser i Mellemøsten

Anthony H. Cordesman

Terrorisme og asymmetrisk krigsførelse er næppe nye træk ved den mellemøstlige militære balance, og islamisk
ekstremisme er næppe den eneste kilde til ekstremistisk vold. Der er mange alvorlige etniske og sekteriske forskelle
i Mellemøsten, og disse har længe ført til sporadisk vold inden for givne stater, og undertiden til større borgerlige
konflikter. Borgerkrigene i Yemen og Dhofar-oprøret i Oman er eksempler, ligesom civils lange historie
krig i Libanon og Syriens voldelige undertrykkelse af islamiske politiske grupper, der var imod Hafez al-
Asad. Den stigende magt i den palæstinensiske befrielsesorganisation (PLO) førte til en borgerkrig i Jordan i september
1970. Den iranske revolution i 1979 blev efterfulgt af alvorlig politisk kamp, og et forsøg på at eksportere en teokratisk
revolution, der var med til at udløse Iran-Irak-krigen. Bahrain og Saudi-Arabien har begge haft civile sammenstød mellem deres
Sunni-herskende eliter og fjendtlige shiitter og disse sammenstød førte til betydelig vold i Saudi-Arabiens tilfælde.
Der også, imidlertid, har været en lang historie med voldelig islamisk ekstremisme i regionen, undertiden opmuntret af
regimer, der senere blev målet for de meget islamister, de oprindeligt støttede. Sadat forsøgte at bruge islam
bevægelser som en modvirker mod hans verdslige opposition i Egypten kun for at blive myrdet af en sådan bevægelse efter hans
fredsaftale med Israel. Israel troede, at det var sikkert at sponsorere islamiske bevægelser efter 1967 som en tæller mod
PLO, kun for at se den hurtige fremkomst af voldeligt anti-israelske grupper. Nord- og Syd Yemen var stedet for
kup og borgerkrige siden begyndelsen af ​​1960'erne, og det var en borgerkrig i Syd Yemen, der i sidste ende førte til sammenbruddet
af dets regime og dets fusion med Nord Yemen i 1990.
Shahs fald førte til en islamistisk overtagelse i Iran, og modstand mod den sovjetiske invasion af Afghanistan udløst
en islamistisk reaktion, der stadig påvirker Mellemøsten og hele den islamiske verden. Saudi-Arabien havde at gøre med
et oprør ved den store moske i Mekka i 1979. Denne opstands religiøse karakter delte mange elementer
af de bevægelser, der opstod efter den sovjetiske tilbagetrækning fra Afghanistan og Golfkrigen i 1991.
Algeriets bestræbelser på at undertrykke de islamiske politiske partiers sejr i et demokratisk valg i 1992 blev efterfulgt af
en borgerkrig, der har varet lige siden. Egypten kæmpede en lang og stort set vellykket kamp med sin egen islam
ekstremister i 1990'erne, men Egypten har kun formået at have undertrykt sådanne bevægelser snarere end udryddet
dem. I resten af ​​den arabiske verden, borgerkrigene i Kosovo og Bosnien var med til at skabe nye islamiske ekstremistiske kadre.
Saudi-Arabien led før af to store terrorangreb 2001. Disse angreb ramte på en nationalgarde
Træningscenter og USAF kaserne i Al Khobar, og mindst én ser ud til at have været resultatet af islam
ekstremister. Marokko, Libyen, Tunesien, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, og Yemen har alle set hårde islamister
bevægelser bliver en alvorlig national trussel.
Mens det ikke direkte er en del af regionen, Sudan har kæmpet en 15 år lang borgerkrig, der sandsynligvis har kostet over to
millioner liv, og denne krig var blevet understøttet af hårde islamistiske elementer i det arabiske nord. Somalia har også
har været stedet for en borgerkrig siden 1991 der har gjort det muligt for islamistiske celler at operere i det land. a

Terrorisme og asymmetrisk krigsførelse er næppe nye træk ved den mellemøstlige militære balance, og Islamicextremism er næppe den eneste kilde til ekstremistisk vold. Der er mange alvorlige etniske og sekteriske forskelle i Mellemøsten, og disse har længe ført til sporadisk vold inden for givne stater, og nogle gange til større civile konflikter. Borgerkrigene i Yemen og Dhofar-oprøret i Oman er eksempler, ligesom den lange historie med borgerkrig i Libanon og Syriens voldelige undertrykkelse af islamiske politiske grupper, der var imod Hafez al-Asads regime. Den stigende magt i den palæstinensiske befrielsesorganisation (PLO) førte til en borgerkrig i Jordan i september1970. Den iranske revolution i 1979 blev efterfulgt af alvorlig politisk kamp, og et forsøg på at eksportere en teokratisk revolution, der var med til at udløse krigen mellem Iran og Irak. Bahrain og Saudi-Arabien har begge haft civile sammenstød mellem deres sunnitiske herskende eliter og fjendtlige shi'itter, og disse sammenstød førte til betydelig vold i Saudi-Arabiens tilfælde., imidlertid, har været en lang historie med voldelig islamisk ekstremisme i regionen, undertiden opmuntret af regimer, der senere blev målet for de islamister, de oprindeligt støttede. Sadat forsøgte at bruge islamiske bevægelser som en modvirker mod sin verdslige opposition i Egypten for kun at blive myrdet af en sådan bevægelse efter hans fredsaftale med Israel. Israel troede, at det var sikkert at sponsorere islamiske bevægelser efter 1967 som en tæller mod PLO, kun for at se den hurtige fremkomst af voldeligt anti-israelske grupper. Nord- og Syd Yemen var stedet for grupper og borgerkrige siden begyndelsen af ​​1960'erne, og det var en borgerkrig i Syd Yemen, der i sidste ende førte til sammenbruddet af dets regime og dets fusion med Nord Yemen i 1990. Shahens fald førte til en islamistisk overtagelse i Iran, og modstand mod den sovjetiske invasion af Afghanistan udløste en islamistisk reaktion, der stadig påvirker Mellemøsten og hele den islamiske verden. Saudi-Arabien måtte håndtere et oprør ved den store moske i Mekka i 1979. Denne opstands religiøse karakter delte mange elementer i de bevægelser, der opstod efter den sovjetiske tilbagetrækning fra Afghanistan og Golfkrigen i 1991. Algeriets bestræbelser på at undertrykke sejren for islamiske politiske partier i et demokratisk valg i 1992 blev efterfulgt af en borgerkrig, der har varet lige siden. Egypten kæmpede en lang og stort set vellykket kamp med sine egne Islamice-ekstremister i 1990'erne, men Egypten har kun formået at have undertrykt sådanne bevægelser snarere end udryddet dem. I resten af ​​den arabiske verden, borgerkrigene i Kosovo og Bosnien var med til at skabe nye islamiske ekstremistiske kadre. Saudi-Arabien led af to store terrorangreb før 2001. Disse angreb ramte på et National GuardTraining center og USAF kaserne i Al Khobar, og mindst én ser ud til at have været resultatet af Islamicextremists. Marokko, Libyen, Tunesien, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, og Yemen har alle set hårde islamistiske bevægelser blive en alvorlig national trussel. Mens de ikke direkte er en del af regionen, Sudan har kæmpet en 15 år lang borgerkrig, der sandsynligvis har kostet over to millioner menneskeliv, og denne krig var blevet understøttet af hårde islamistiske elementer i det arabiske nord. Somalia har siden dengang været borgerkrig 1991 der har gjort det muligt for islamistiske celler at operere i dette land.

Den politiske islams død

Jon B. Alterman

The obituaries for political Islam have begun to be written. After years of seemingly unstoppablegrowth, Islamic parties have begun to stumble. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. I stedet, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, imidlertid, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, Saudi Arabien, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. I Mellemøsten, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. islam, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.

The Internet and Islamist Politics in Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a
dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and
commerce. The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the
researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the
Bedouin in Egypt. Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches
across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously
silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites. Political organizations
across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future,
and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, og
administrative papers through their sites. Tilsvarende, religious groups display their beliefs online
through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of
eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues. Fusing the two, islamist
political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing
their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their
theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by
Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and
Egypten.
Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to
publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions
of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization. This paper will
examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in
2
Jordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home
and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes. Først, islamist
organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere
through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.
Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which
officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media
restrictions imposed by the state. Langt om længe, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a
counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an
international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim
Broderskab, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western
style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists. The MB
has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties
attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies
between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section
on the Muslim Brotherhood. These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and
desired outcomes; imidlertid, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the
regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study
analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.
1

Andrew Helms

Ikhwanweb

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and commerce.

The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, and administrative papers through their sites. Tilsvarende, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues.

Fusing the two, Islamist political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes.

Først, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.

Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

Langt om længe, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; imidlertid, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.