RSSУсе запісы ў "Мараканскі ісламістаў" Катэгорыя

Апазіцыйныя партыі ісламістаў і патэнцыял для ўдзелу ў ЕС

Тобі Арчер

Хайдзі Huuhtanen

У святле ўсё большага значэння ісламісцкіх рухаў у мусульманскім свеце і

тое, як радыкалізацыя паўплывала на глабальныя падзеі з пачатку стагоддзя, гэта

для ЕС важна ацаніць сваю палітыку ў дачыненні да суб'ектаў у межах таго, што можа быць свабодна

называюць "ісламскім светам". Асабліва важна спытаць, ці трэба і як удзельнічаць

з рознымі ісламісцкімі групамі.

Гэта застаецца спрэчным нават унутры ЕС. Некаторыя лічаць, што іслам гэта цэніць

ляжаць за ісламісцкімі партыямі проста несумяшчальныя з заходнімі ідэаламі дэмакратыі і

правы чалавека, у той час як іншыя разглядаюць удзел як рэальную неабходнасць у сувязі з ростам

унутранае значэнне ісламісцкіх партый і іх павелічэнне ўдзелу ў міжнародных

спраў. Іншая перспектыва - павелічэнне дэмакратызацыі ў мусульманскім свеце

Еўрапейская бяспека. Абгрунтаванасць гэтых і іншых аргументаў наконт таго, як і як

ЕС павінен удзельнічаць можа быць правераны толькі шляхам вывучэння розных ісламісцкіх рухаў і

іх палітычныя абставіны, краіна за краінай.

Дэмакратызацыя з'яўляецца цэнтральнай тэмай агульных знешнепалітычных дзеянняў ЕС, як паклаў

з артыкула 11 Дагавора аб Еўрапейскім Саюзе. У гэтым разглядаліся многія дзяржавы

справаздачы не дэмакратычныя, альбо не цалкам дэмакратычны. У большасці гэтых краін, Ісламіст

партыі і рухі складаюць значную апазіцыю пануючым рэжымам, і

у некаторых яны складаюць найбуйнейшы апазіцыйны блок. Еўрапейскія дэмакратыі даўно павінны былі

мець справу з рэжымамі кіравання, якія з'яўляюцца аўтарытарнымі, але гэта новая з'ява для прэсы

за дэмакратычныя рэформы ў дзяржавах, дзе найбольш верагодныя бенефіцыяры могуць мець, ад

Пункт гледжання ЕС, розныя і часам праблемныя падыходы да дэмакратыі і яе

звязаныя значэнні, такія як правы меншасцей і жанчын і вяршэнства закона. Гэтыя абвінавачванні ёсць

часта выступаў супраць ісламісцкіх рухаў, таму для еўрапейскіх палітыкаў важна

мець дакладнае ўяўленне пра палітыку і філасофію патэнцыяльных партнёраў.

Вопыт розных краін, як правіла, мяркуе, што тым больш свабоды ісламіст

вечарыны дазволены, тым больш умераныя яны ў сваіх дзеяннях і ідэях. У многіх

справы ісламісцкія партыі і групы даўно адышлі ад сваёй першапачатковай мэты

стварэння ісламскай дзяржавы, якая рэгулюецца ісламскім заканадаўствам, і прынялі асноўнае

дэмакратычныя прынцыпы выбарчай канкурэнцыі за ўладу, існаванне іншых паліт

канкурэнты, і палітычны плюралізм.

СТРАТЭГІІ ДЛЯ УПРАЎЛЕННЯ ПАЛІТЫЧНЫХ ІСЛАМ

ШАДЗІ ХАМІД

AMANDA KADLEC

Палітычны іслам - самая актыўная сёння палітычная сіла на Блізкім Усходзе. Яго будучыня цесна звязана з будучыняй рэгіёну. Калі ЗША і Еўрапейскі Саюз абавязаны падтрымліваць палітычныя рэформы ў рэгіёне, ім трэба будзе прыдумаць бетон, узгодненыя стратэгіі ўцягвання ісламісцкіх груповак. Усё ж, ЗША. Звычайна не хоча адкрываць дыялог з гэтымі рухамі. Дакладна, Выключэнне ЕС з ісламістамі стала выключэннем, не правіла. Там, дзе існуюць кантакты нізкага ўзроўню, у асноўным яны служаць мэтам збору інфармацыі, не стратэгічныя мэты. U.S. і ЕС маюць шэраг праграм, прысвечаных эканамічнаму і палітычнаму развіццю ў рэгіёне - сярод іх Блізка-Усходняя ініцыятыва партнёрства (MEPI), карпарацыя "тысячагоддзе" (МКК), Саюз для Міжземнамор'я, і Еўрапейская палітыка добрасуседства (ЕПС) - але яны мала што могуць сказаць пра тое, як выклік ісламісцкай палітычнай апазіцыі ўпісваецца ў больш шырокія рэгіянальныя задачы. U.S. а таксама дапамога і праграмаванне дэмакратыі ў ЕС амаль цалкам накіраваны альбо на аўтарытарныя ўрады, альбо на свецкія групы грамадзянскай супольнасці з мінімальнай падтрымкай у іх уласных грамадствах.
Надышоў час для пераацэнкі цяперашняй палітыкі. З верасня тэрактаў 11, 2001, падтрымка дэмакратыі на Блізкім Усходзе набыла большае значэнне для заходніх палітыкаў, якія бачаць сувязь паміж адсутнасцю дэмакратыі і палітычным гвалтам. Большая ўвага была ўдзелена разуменню варыяцый палітычнага ісламу. Новая амерыканская адміністрацыя больш адкрыта для пашырэння сувязі з мусульманскім светам. Тым часам, пераважная большасць асноўных ісламісцкіх арганізацый - у тым ліку Браты-мусульмане ў Егіпце, Ісламскі фронт дзеянняў Іарданіі (IAF), Партыя Справядлівасці і развіцця Марока (ПСР), ісламскі канстытуцыйны рух Кувейце, і Еменская партыя - усё часцей падтрымліваюць палітычныя рэформы і дэмакратыю як цэнтральны кампанент у іх палітычных платформах. У дадатак, шмат хто выказаў вялікую зацікаўленасць у адкрыцці дыялогу з ЗША. і ўрады ЕС.
Будучыня адносін паміж заходнімі краінамі і на Блізкім Усходзе можа ў значнай ступені вызначацца ступенню, у якім былыя ўдзельнічаюць ісламісцкім партыям, якія не гвалтуюць у шырокім дыялогу пра агульныя інтарэсы і мэты. У апошні час было распаўсюджана даследаванне, звязанае з сувяззю з ісламістамі, але мала хто выразна разглядае тое, што можа пацягнуць на практыцы. Ace Zoé Nautré, наведвальны супрацоўнік Нямецкай рады па замежных сувязях, ставіць, "ЕС думае пра ўзаемадзеянне, але не ведае, як". 1 У надзеі ўдакладніць дыскусію, мы адрозніваем тры ўзроўні "ўзаемадзеяння","Кожны з рознымі сродкамі і заканчваецца: кантакты нізкага ўзроўню, стратэгічны дыялог, і партнёрства.

ІСЛАМІСТСКІЯ РУХІ І ДЭМАКРАТЫЧНЫ ПРАЦЭС У АРАБСКІМ СВЕЦЕ: Вывучэнне шэрых зон

Натан Дж. карычневы, Амр Hamzawy,

Марына Ottaway

На працягу апошняга дзесяцігоддзя, Ісламісцкія рухі зарэкамендавалі сябе як асноўныя палітычныя гульцы на Блізкім Усходзе. Разам з урадамі, Ісламісцкія руху, умераны, а таксама радыкальны, вызначыць, як будзе развівацца палітыка рэгіёну ў агляднай будучыні. Яны прадэманстравалі здольнасць не толькі распрацоўваць паведамленні з шырока распаўсюджанай папулярнасцю, але і, і самае галоўнае, ствараць арганізацыі з сапраўднай сацыяльнай базай і распрацоўваць узгодненыя палітычныя стратэгіі. Іншыя партыі,
па вялікім рахунку, праваліліся па ўсіх рахунках.
Грамадскасць на Захадзе і, у прыватнасці, ЗША, усвядоміў важнасць ісламісцкіх рухаў толькі пасля драматычных падзей, такія як рэвалюцыя ў Іране і забойства прэзідэнта Анвара аль-Садата ў Егіпце. Увага была значна больш прыцягнутай пасля тэрактаў у верасні 11, 2001. У выніку, Ісламісцкія рухі шырока разглядаюцца як небяспечныя і варожыя. У той час як такая характарыстыка дакладная ў дачыненні да арганізацый, якія знаходзяцца ў радыкальным канцы ісламісцкага спектру, якія небяспечныя сваёй гатоўнасцю звяртацца да неразборлівага гвалту ў дасягненні сваіх мэтаў, гэта не дакладная характарыстыка многіх груп, якія адмовіліся ад гвалту альбо пазбягалі яго. Таму што тэрарыстычныя арганізацыі ствараюць неадкладную дапамогу
пагроза, Аднак, палітыкі ва ўсіх краінах звярнулі непрапарцыйную ўвагу на гвалтоўныя арганізацыі.
Гэта асноўныя ісламісцкія арганізацыі, не радыкальныя, што акажа найбольшы ўплыў на будучую палітычную эвалюцыю Блізкага Усходу. Грандыёзныя мэты радыкалаў - узнавіць халіфат, які аб'ядноўвае ўвесь арабскі свет, ці нават навязванне асобным арабскім краінам законаў і сацыяльных звычаяў, натхнёных фундаменталісцкай інтэрпрэтацыяй ісламу, проста занадта далёка ад сённяшняй рэальнасці, каб быць рэалізаваным. Гэта не азначае, што тэрарыстычныя групоўкі не небяспечныя - яны могуць прывесці да вялікай гібелі людзей нават у дасягненні немагчымых мэтаў, - але наўрад ці яны зменяць аблічча Блізкага Усходу. Агульныя ісламісцкія арганізацыі, як правіла, розныя пытанні. Яны ўжо моцна паўплывалі на сацыяльныя звычаі многіх краін, спыненне і зварот секулярысцкіх тэндэнцый і змяненне спосабу адзення і паводзін многіх арабаў. І іх непасрэдная палітычная мэта, стаць магутнай сілай, удзельнічаючы ў нармальнай палітыцы сваёй краіны, не з'яўляецца немагчымым. Гэта ўжо рэалізуецца ў такіх краінах, як Марока, Іарданія, і нават Егіпет, які па-ранейшаму забараняе ўсе палітычныя арганізацыі ісламістаў, але цяпер у парламенце восемдзесят восем братоў-мусульман. палітыка, не гвалт, гэта тое, што дае ўплыў асноўных ісламістаў.

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
РЫЧАРД МАЛАДЫ
МІХАЙЛ ЭМЕРСАН

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Палітычны іслам і еўрапейская знешняя палітыка

ПАЛІТЫЧНЫ ІСЛАМ І ЕЎРАПЕЙСКАЯ ПАЛІТЫКА ПАСУСЛІСТВА

МІХАЙЛ ЭМЕРСАН

РЫЧАРД МАЛАДЫ

Паколькі 2001 і міжнародныя падзеі, якія высветлілі характар ​​адносін паміж Захадам і палітычным ісламам, сталі вызначальным пытаннем для знешняй палітыкі. У апошнія гады было праведзена значная колькасць даследаванняў і аналізаў па праблеме палітычнага ісламу. Гэта дапамагло выправіць некаторыя спрошчаныя і трывожныя здагадкі, якія раней існавалі на Захадзе, пра прыроду ісламісцкіх каштоўнасцей і намераў. Паралельна з гэтым, Еўрапейскі Саюз (Я) распрацаваў шэраг палітычных ініцыятыў, у першую чаргу Еўрапейскую палітыку добрасуседства(ЕПС) якія ў прынцыпе імкнуцца да дыялогу і больш глыбокага ўзаемадзеяння(не гвалтоўны) палітычныя суб'екты і арганізацыі грамадзянскай супольнасці ў арабскіх краінах. Тым не менш многія аналітыкі і палітыкі цяпер скардзяцца на пэўны трафей як у канцэптуальных дэбатах, так і ў распрацоўцы палітыкі. Устаноўлена, што палітычны іслам - гэта зменлівы ландшафт, глыбока закрануты шэрагам абставін, але, здаецца, дыскусія часта спыняецца на спрошчаным пытанні "ці дэмакратычныя ісламісты?'Тым не менш многія незалежныя аналітыкі выступаюць за ўзаемадзеянне з ісламістамі, але фактычнае збліжэнне паміж заходнімі ўрадамі і ісламісцкімі арганізацыямі застаецца абмежаваным .

why are there no arab democracies ?

Лары Дайманд

During democratization’s “third wave,” democracy ceased being a mostly Western phenomenon and “went global.” When the third wave began in 1974, the world had only about 40 democracies, and only a few of them lay outside the West. By the time the Journal of Democracy began publishing in 1990, there were 76 electoral democracies (accounting for slightly less than half the world’s independent states). By 1995, that number had shot up to 117—three in every five states. By then, a critical mass of democracies existed in every major world region save one—the Middle East.1 Moreover, every one of the world’s major cultural realms had become host to a significant democratic presence, albeit again with a single exception—the Arab world.2 Fifteen years later, this exception still stands.
The continuing absence of even a single democratic regime in the Arab world is a striking anomaly—the principal exception to the globalization of democracy. Why is there no Arab democracy? Сапраўды, why is it the case that among the sixteen independent Arab states of the Middle East and coastal North Africa, Lebanon is the only one to have ever been a democracy?
The most common assumption about the Arab democracy deficit is that it must have something to do with religion or culture. After all, the one thing that all Arab countries share is that they are Arab.

Success of Turkey’s AK Party must not dilute worries over Arab Islamists

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on howIslamistscan pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “Ісламіст” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamistsin the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenderswere always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamistalleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. На самай справе, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhoodaside from the common faith of its membersthat it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, the “Захад”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy

Mona Yacoubian

Deeming democratic change to be a long-term antidote to Islamist extremism, the Bush administration coupled its military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq with intensified efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world, underscoring the need for free and fair elections. To date, parliamentary elections of varying openness have taken place across the region, from Morocco to Kuwait. The elections ushered in a wave of Islamist victories, dubbed by many as an “Islamist tsunami.” 1The Islamists’ successes stem from their effectiveness as vehicles for popular opposition. While liberal, secular opposition parties remain largely detached from much of the population, Islamists have developed vast and easily mobilized grassroots networks through charitable organizations and mosques. The leadership is often younger and more dynamic, with strong ties to the community, and the party organizations brim with energy and ideas, attracting those who are seeking change.The U.S. government has quietly engaged a number of moderate and legal Islamist parties across the region for several years, sometimes through normal diplomatic activity, sometimes through government-funded grants to U.S. organizations. This Special Report examines U.S.-funded engagement with legal, nonviolent Islamist parties through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which have the most extensive experience engaging with Islamists in the region, and focuses on Morocco, Іарданія, і Емен, because of their relative political openness and the strength and vibrancy of their Islamist political opposition.Successful Strategy. A successful Islamist engagement strategy both empowers individuals and strengthens institutions to yield greater transparency, more accountability, and shifts toward moderation. Training and empowering individuals cultivates moderates within the parties and enhances their political sophistication and influence. Тым часам, as regimes in the Arab world resist or manipulate political reforms, strengthening democracy’s infrastructure is as important as supporting individuals. Independent electoral procedures and monitoring help to establish free and fair elections. Institution building ensures appropriate checks on executive power and a strong rule of law. Strengthening parliaments is especially crucial, as Islamists participate primarily in legislatures.In assessing whether Islamist parties have moderated in response to U.S. engagement, it is difficult if not impossible to quantify or measure shifts that may themselves be relative and subjective. Directly linking greater moderation to specific U.S. engagement activities is also highly problematic. At best, this engagement should be considered a contributing factor. Тым не менш, the tentative results in Morocco, Іарданія, and Yemen are promising enough that continued engagement with moderate Islamists should be encouraged, albeit with greater emphasis on institution building and an eye on the broader context of the ideological battle in the Muslim world between extremism and moderation.

POLITICAL ISLAM and the West

JOHN L.ESPOSITO


At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,Іран, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, Егіпет, Інданезія,Іарданія, Kuwait, Ліван,Малайзія, Пакістан, і Емен. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Building bridges not walls

Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 Верасень 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (ПСР) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (IAF) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. For their part, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. Аднак, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.

Terrorist and Extremist Movements in the Middle East

Anthony H. Cordesman

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamic
extremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differences
in the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civil
conflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civil
war in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-
Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (пло) led to a civil war in Jordan in September
1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocratic
revolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between their
Sunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.
There also, Аднак, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged by
regimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamic
movements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after his
peace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to the
пло, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene of
coups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapse
of its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.
The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered
an Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal with
an uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elements
of the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.
Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed by
a civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamic
extremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicated
them. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.
Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National Guard
Training center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamic
extremists. Марока, Libya, Туніс, Іарданія, Bahrain, Катар, Аман, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamist
movements become a serious national threat.
While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over two
million lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has also
been the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.a

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (пло) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, Аднак, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. Марока, Libya, Туніс, Іарданія, Bahrain, Катар, Аман, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.

The Death of Political Islam

Jon B. Алтермэн

The obituaries for political Islam have begun to be written. After years of seemingly unstoppablegrowth, Islamic parties have begun to stumble. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. Замест гэтага, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, Аднак, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, Сірыя, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. In the Middle East, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. Іслам, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.

The Internet and Islamist Politics in Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a
dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and
commerce. The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the
researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the
Bedouin in Egypt. Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches
across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously
silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites. Political organizations
across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future,
and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, і
administrative papers through their sites. Дакладна, religious groups display their beliefs online
through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of
eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues. Fusing the two, Ісламіст
political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing
their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their
theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by
Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and
Егіпет.
Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to
publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions
of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization. This paper will
examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in
2
Іарданія, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt.
As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home
and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes. Па-першае, Ісламіст
organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere
through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.
Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which
officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media
restrictions imposed by the state. Нарэшце, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a
counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an
international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim
Братэрства, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western
style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists. The MB
has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties
attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies
between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section
on the Muslim Brotherhood. These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and
desired outcomes; Аднак, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the
рэжым. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study
analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.
1

Эндру Хэлмс

Ikhwanweb

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and commerce.

The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, and administrative papers through their sites. Дакладна, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues.

Fusing the two, Islamist political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Morocco and Egypt.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes.

Па-першае, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.

Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

Нарэшце, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; Аднак, each goal targets a different actor: the public, the media, and the regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.