Vsi vnosi v "muslimanska bratovščina" Kategorija
Arabska Jutri
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
Oktober 6, 1981, je bil v Egiptu mišljen kot dan praznovanja. Obeležili so obletnico največjega trenutka zmage Egipta v treh arabsko-izraelskih konfliktih, ko je podcenjena državna vojska v prvih dneh vdrla čez Sueški prekop 1973 Jomkipurska vojna in poslala izraelske čete v umik. Na hladnem, jutro brez oblačka, stadion v Kairu je bil nabito poln egipčanskih družin, ki so si prišle ogledat vojsko, kako postavlja svojo opremo. Na stojnici za pregled, Predsednik Anwar el-Sadat,vojni arhitekt, z zadovoljstvom gledal, kako pred njim paradirajo ljudje in stroji. Bil sem v bližini, novoprispeli tuji dopisnik.Nenadoma, eden od vojaških tovornjakov se je ustavil neposredno pred pregledovalno stojnico ravno v trenutku, ko je nad glavami v akrobatski izvedbi zarjovelo šest letal Mirage, slikanje neba z dolgimi sledmi rdeče barve, rumena, vijolična,in zeleni dim. Sadat je vstal, očitno se pripravlja na izmenjavo pozdravov s še enim kontingentom egiptovskih vojakov. Postal je odlična tarča za štiri islamistične atentatorje, ki so skočili s tovornjaka, vdrl na stopničke, in njegovo telo prerešetali s kroglami. Ko so morilci nadaljevali, kar se je zdelo večnost, škropili tribuno s svojim smrtonosnim ognjem, Za trenutek sem premišljeval, ali naj udarim ob tla in tvegam, da me panični gledalci poteptajo do smrti, ali pa ostanem na nogah in tvegam, da me bo zadela zalutala krogla.. Instinkt mi je govoril, naj ostanem na nogah, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.
| sep 26, 2010 | Komentarji 0
smearcasting: Kako Islamophobes širijo strah, fanatizma in dezinformacije
POŠTENO
Julie Hollar
Jim Naureckas
Narediti islamofobijo mainstream:
Kako napadalci muslimanov oddajajo svojo nestrpnost
Izjemen je zgodilo na National Book Critics Circle, (NBCC) nominacije v februarju 2007: Običajno Prefinjenega okusa in tolerantni skupina nominirana za najboljšo knjigo na področju kritike knjiga pogosto razumemo kot diskreditirati celotno versko skupino.
Nominacija filma Medtem ko je Evropa spala Brucea Bawerja: Kako radikalni islam uničuje Zahod od znotraj, ni minilo brez polemik. Prejšnji nominiranec Eliot Weinberger je knjigo obsodil na letnem srečanju NBCC, to imenujemo "rasizem kot kritika" (New York Times, 2/8/07). Predsednik uprave NBCC John Freeman je zapisal na blogu skupine (Kritična masa, 2/4/07): ''Nikoli nisem bil
bolj osramočen zaradi izbire, kot sem bil z Bruceom Bawerjem Medtem ko je Evropa spala…. Njegova hiperventilirana retorika prehaja iz dejanske kritike v islamofobijo.''
Čeprav na koncu ni dobil nagrade, Medtem ko je bilo priznanje Europe Slept v najvišjih literarnih krogih simbolično za vključevanje islamofobije, ne samo v ameriškem založništvu, ampak v širših medijih. To poročilo ponuja nov pogled na islamofobijo v današnjih medijih in njene povzročitelje, oris nekaterih zakulisnih povezav, ki jih mediji redko raziskujejo. Poročilo vsebuje tudi štiri posnetke, ali »študije primerov,«, ki opisuje, kako islamofobi še naprej manipulirajo z mediji, da bi muslimane slikali s široko, sovražna krtača. Naš cilj je dokumentirati razvajanje: javna pisanja in nastopi islamofobnih aktivistov in strokovnjakov, ki namerno in redno širijo strah, fanatizma in dezinformacije. Izraz "islamofobija" se nanaša na sovražnost do islama in muslimanov, ki teži k dehumanizaciji celotne vere., ki ga prikazujejo kot bistveno tujega in mu pripisujejo inherentno, bistveni niz negativnih lastnosti, kot je iracionalnost, nestrpnost in nasilje. In ne drugače kot obtožbe v klasičnem dokumentu o antisemitizmu, Protokoli sionskih starešin, nekaj bolj virulentnih izrazov islamofobije–kot Medtem ko je Evropa spala–vključujejo spomine na islamske načrte za prevlado nad Zahodom.
Islamske institucije in muslimani, seveda, bi morali biti predmet enakega nadzora in kritike kot vsi drugi. Na primer, ko norveški islamski svet razpravlja o tem, ali je treba homoseksualce in lezbijke usmrtiti, posameznike ali skupine, ki delijo to mnenje, je mogoče odločno obsoditi, ne da bi vanj potegnili vse evropske muslimane, tako kot objava Bawer's Pyjamas Media (8/7/08),
»Razprava o evropskih muslimanih: Ali je treba homoseksualce usmrtiti?”
podobno, skrajneže, ki svoja nasilna dejanja opravičujejo s sklicevanjem na določeno razlago islama, je mogoče kritizirati, ne da bi vpletali v to izjemno raznoliko populacijo muslimanov po vsem svetu.. Konec koncev, novinarjem je uspelo pokriti bombni napad v Oklahoma Cityju Timothyja McVeigha–pripadnik rasistične sekte krščanske identitete–brez zatekanja k posplošenim izjavam o »krščanskem terorizmu«. Prav tako, mediji so poročali o terorističnih dejanjih fanatikov, ki so Judje–na primer pokol v Hebronu, ki ga je izvedel Baruch Goldstein (Dodatno!, 5/6/94)–brez impliciranja celotnega judovstva.
| sep 16, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Totalitarizem Džihadski islamizma in njegov izziv za Evropo in islamom
Basso tibi
Pri branju večino besedil, ki sestavljajo veliko literature, ki je bila s samooklicane poznavalci objavljen na politični islam, je enostaven za miss, da je nastalo novo gibanje. Nadalje, ta literatura ne razloži na zadovoljiv način dejstva, da ideologija, ki jo poganja, temelji na določeni interpretaciji islama, in da gre torej za politizirano versko vero,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, vendar, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty
v zgodovini politike, saj ima svoje korenine v dveh vzporednih in sorodnih pojavih: prvi, kulturalizacija politike, ki vodi v konceptualizacijo politike kot kulturnega sistema (pogled, ki ga je uvedel Clifford Geertz); in drugič vrnitev svetega, ali "ponovno začaranje" sveta, kot odziv na njeno intenzivno sekularizacijo, ki je posledica globalizacije.
Analiza političnih ideologij, ki temeljijo na religijah, in to lahko kot posledica tega postane privlačno kot politična religija, vključuje družboslovno razumevanje vloge religije v svetovni politiki, zlasti po tem, ko se je bipolarni sistem hladne vojne umaknil večpolarnemu svetu. V projektu, ki se izvaja na Inštitutu Hannah Arendt za uporabo totalitarizma pri preučevanju političnih religij, Predlagal sem razlikovanje med sekularnimi ideologijami, ki delujejo kot nadomestek za religijo, in verske ideologije, ki temeljijo na pristni verski veri, kar je v verskem fundamentalizmu (glej opombo
24). Še en projekt o "politični veri", izvedel na Univerzi v Baslu, je pojasnil, da novi pristopi k politiki postanejo potrebni, ko se verska vera odene v politično obleko. Sklicevanje na verodostojne vire političnega islama, ta članek nakazuje, da je treba veliko različnih organizacij, ki jih navdihuje islamistična ideologija, konceptualizirati kot politične religije in kot politična gibanja. Edinstvena kakovost laži političnega islama je dejstvo, da temelji na transnacionalni veri (glej opombo 26).
| sep 15, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islam, Politični islam in America
Arabska Insight
Ali je »bratstvo« z Ameriko možno?
khalil al-anani
"Ni nobene možnosti komuniciranja z vsemi zunaj ZDA. administracije, dokler ZDA ohranjajo svoj dolgoletni pogled na islam kot resnično nevarnost, pogled, ki Združene države postavlja v isti čoln kot cionistični sovražnik. Nimamo nobenih vnaprejšnjih predstav o ameriških ljudeh ali ZDA. družbe ter njenih civilnih organizacij in možganskih trustov. Nimamo težav pri komuniciranju z ameriškim ljudstvom, vendar ni vloženih ustreznih naporov, da bi nas zbližali,” je dejal dr. Issam al-Iryan, vodja političnega oddelka Muslimanske bratovščine v telefonskem intervjuju.
Al-Iryanove besede povzemajo poglede Muslimanske bratovščine na Američane in ZDA. vlada. Drugi člani Muslimanske bratovščine bi se strinjali, tako kot pokojni Hassan al-Banna, ki je skupino ustanovil v 1928. Al- Banna je na Zahod gledal predvsem kot na simbol moralnega propada. Drugi salafisti – islamska miselna šola, ki se opira na prednike kot vzorne modele – so zavzeli enako stališče do ZDA, vendar nimajo ideološke prožnosti, ki jo zagovarja Muslimanska bratovščina. Medtem ko Muslimanska bratovščina verjame v vključitev Američanov v civilni dialog, druge skrajne skupine ne vidijo smisla v dialogu in trdijo, da je sila edini način za obravnavo Združenih držav.
| sep 15, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islam in novo politično ozadje
Back, Michael Keith, Azra Khan,
Kalbir Shukra in John Solomos
PO napadu na Svetovni trgovinski center na 11 september 2001, ter bombni napad v Madridu in Londonu 2004 in 2005, literatura, ki obravnava oblike in modalitete verskega izražanja – zlasti islamskega verskega izražanja – je cvetela v polsenčnih regijah, ki povezujejo mainstream družboslovje z oblikovanjem socialne politike, think tanki in novinarstvo. Veliko dela je poskušalo opredeliti stališča ali predispozicije muslimanskega prebivalstva na določenem območju napetosti, kot sta London ali Združeno kraljestvo. (Barnes, 2006; Etno svetovanje, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), ali kritiziral posamezne oblike posredovanja socialne politike (Svetlo, 2006a; Mirza idr., 2007). Študije islamizma in džihadizma so ustvarile poseben poudarek na sinkretičnih in kompleksnih povezavah med islamsko versko vero ter oblikami družbenih gibanj in politične mobilizacije. (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Konvencionalno, analitični fokus je osvetlil kulturo islama, sistemi verovanja vernikov, ter zgodovinske in geografske poti muslimanskega prebivalstva po vsem svetu na splošno in še posebej na "Zahodu". (Abas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade in Garbin, 2002; Husein, 2006; Načini, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). V tem članku je poudarek drugačen. Trdimo, da je treba študije islamske politične udeležbe skrbno kontekstualizirati brez zatekanja k velikim splošnostim o kulturi in veri. To je zato, ker sta tako kultura kot vera strukturirani in posledično strukturirani kulturi, institucionalne in deliberativne krajine, skozi katere so artikulirane. Na primeru britanskih izkušenj, skrite sledi krščanstva v nastajanju socialne države v prejšnjem stoletju, hitro spreminjajoča se kartografija prostorov političnega in vloga "verskih organizacij" pri prestrukturiranju zagotavljanja blaginje ustvarja materialni družbeni kontekst, ki določa priložnosti in obrise novih oblik politične participacije..
| sep 08, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islamska reformacije
Adnan Khan
Italijanski premier, Silvio Berlusconi se je po dogodkih v 9/11:
»...zavedati se moramo superiornosti naše civilizacije, sistem, ki ima zagotovljeno
dobro počutje, spoštovanje človekovih pravic in – v nasprotju z islamskimi državami – spoštovanje
za verske in politične pravice, sistem, ki ima svoje vrednote razumevanje različnosti
in strpnost ... Zahod bo osvojil ljudi, kot bi premagala komunizem, tudi če je
pomeni spopad z drugo civilizacijo, tisti islamski, obtičal, kjer je bil
1,400 pred leti ...« 1
In v a 2007 poroča inštitut RAND:
»Boj, ki poteka v večjem delu muslimanskega sveta, je v bistvu vojna
ideje. Njegov izid bo določil prihodnjo usmeritev muslimanskega sveta.«
Gradnja zmernih muslimanskih mrež, Inštitut RAND
Koncept "islah" (reforma) je pojem neznan muslimanom. Nikoli ni obstajal vseskozi
zgodovino islamske civilizacije; nikoli se ni razpravljalo ali celo upoštevalo. Bežen pogled na klasiko
Islamska literatura nam kaže, da ko so klasični učenjaki postavili temelje usul, in kodificirano
njihove islamske odločitve (fiqh) gledali so le na razumevanje islamskih pravil, da bi
jih uporabite. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the
Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time
understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined
principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of
study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Those who became
smitten by Greek philosophy such as the Muslim philosophers and some from amongst the Mut’azilah
were considered to have left the fold of Islam as the Qur’an ceased to be their basis of study. Thus for
vsak musliman, ki poskuša izpeljati pravila ali razumeti, kakšno stališče je treba zavzeti do določenega
vprašanje Kur'ana je osnova te študije.
Prvi poskus reforme islama se je zgodil na prelomu 19. stoletja. Na prelomu
stoletju je bil Ummah v dolgotrajnem obdobju zatona, kjer se je globalno razmerje moči premaknilo
iz kalifata v Britanijo. Vse večje težave so zajele Khilafet, medtem ko je bila Zahodna Evropa notri
sredi industrijske revolucije. Ummet je izgubil svoje prvotno razumevanje islama, in
v poskusu, da bi obrnil upad, ki je zajel Uthmanijeve (Otomani) nekaj muslimanov je bilo poslanih v
West, in posledično postali navdušeni nad tem, kar so videli. Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi iz Egipta (1801-1873),
ob vrnitvi iz Pariza, napisal biografsko knjigo z naslovom Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The
Pridobivanje zlata, ali Pregled Pariza, 1834), hvalijo njihovo čistočo, ljubezen do dela, in zgoraj
vso družbeno moralo. Izjavil je, da moramo posnemati to, kar se počne v Parizu, zavzemanje za spremembe v
islamske družbe od liberalizacije žensk do sistemov vladanja. Ta misel, in drugim všeč,
je zaznamovala začetek trenda ponovnega odkrivanja islama.
| sep 07, 2010 | Komentarji 0
ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION
IBRAHIM KALIN
In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.
| sep 07, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islam na Zahodu
Jocelyne Cesari
The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.
| sep 07, 2010 | Komentarji 0
ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Še več, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, namreč, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, ZDA, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you
| sep 07, 2010 | Komentarji 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Henry Siegman
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Na žalost, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| sep 07, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islamism revisited
MAHA AZZAM
There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 leta, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 julij 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.
| sep 06, 2010 | Komentarji 0
ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW
Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld
In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. Ob istem času, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.
| sep 06, 2010 | Komentarji 0
Islamska politična kultura, demokracija, in človekove pravice
Daniel E. Cena
Trdimo, da islam olajša avtoritarnost, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Posledično, učenjaki, komentatorji, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. Ta pogled, vendar, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamska politična teorija, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, ki ne upoštevajo drugih dejavnikov. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, kot druge religije, se lahko uporablja za podporo različnih političnih sistemov in politik. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Od tod tudi, nov pristop k preučevanju
zahteva se povezava med islamom in politiko.
predlagam, s strogo oceno odnosa med islamom, demokracija, in človekove pravice na mednarodni ravni, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, ekonomski vplivi, etnične razcepe, in družbeni razvoj, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institucije, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| sep 06, 2010 | Komentarji 0
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
Sherifa Zuhur
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (kvota)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; in (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| sep 06, 2010 | Komentarji 0
DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD
Ibtisam Ibrahim
What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, vera, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracy — in addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participation — contains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Vendar pa, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Vendar pa, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elements – accountability, competition, and some degree of participation – which have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.
| sep 05, 2010 | Komentarji 0
demokracija, Volitve in egipčanska Muslimanska bratovščina
Izrael Elad-Altman
Kampanja za reforme in demokratizacijo Bližnjega vzhoda, ki so jo vodili ZDA v zadnjih dveh letih, je pomagala oblikovati novo politično realnost v Egiptu. Odprle so se možnosti za nestrinjanje. Z ZDA. in evropsko podporo, lokalne opozicijske skupine so lahko prevzele pobudo, pospešujejo svoje cilje in izvabljajo koncesije od države. Egiptovsko gibanje Muslimanska bratovščina (MB), ki je uradno prepovedana kot politična organizacija, je zdaj med skupinami, ki se soočajo z obema novima priložnostma
in nova tveganja.
zahodne vlade, vključno z vlado Združenih držav, obravnavajo MB in druge »zmerne islamistične« skupine kot potencialne partnerje pri pomoči pri napredovanju demokracije v svojih državah, in morda tudi pri izkoreninjenju islamističnega terorizma. Ali bi lahko egiptovski MB izpolnil to vlogo? Ali bi lahko sledil turški stranki za pravičnost in razvoj (AKP) in indonezijska uspešna stranka pravičnosti (PKS), dve islamistični stranki, ki, po mnenju nekaterih analitikov, se uspešno prilagajajo pravilom liberalne demokracije in vodijo svoje države k večji integraciji z, oz, Evropa in »poganska« Azija?
Ta članek preučuje, kako se je MB odzval na novo realnost, kako se je spoprijela z ideološkimi in praktičnimi izzivi in dilemami, ki so se pojavile v zadnjih dveh letih. V kolikšni meri se je gibanje prilagodilo svojim pogledom na nove okoliščine? Kakšni so njeni cilji in njena vizija politične ureditve? Kako se je odzval na U.S. reforme in kampanje za demokratizacijo?
Kako je na eni strani vodil svoje odnose z egiptovskim režimom, in druge opozicijske sile na drugi, ko se je država bližala dvema dramatičnim jesenskim volitvam 2005? V kolikšni meri lahko MB velja za silo, ki bi lahko vodila Egipt?
proti liberalni demokraciji?
| sep 05, 2010 | Komentarji 0
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