RSSهمه ورودی ها در "اخوان المسلمین" دسته بندی

عرب فردا

دیوید بی. خارج از کشور

اکتبر 6, 1981, قرار بود روز جشن در مصر باشد. این سالگرد بزرگ ترین لحظه پیروزی مصر در سه درگیری اعراب و اسرائیل بود, زمانی که ارتش مستضعف این کشور در روزهای افتتاحیه کانال سوئز را عبور داد 1973 جنگ یوم کیپور و فرستادن سربازان اسرائیلی در حال عقب نشینی. در خنک, صبح بی ابر, استادیوم قاهره مملو از خانواده‌های مصری بود که برای دیدن تجهیزات نظامی ارتش آمده بودند. در جایگاه بازبینی, رئیس جمهور انور السادات,معمار جنگ, با رضایت به تماشای رژه مردان و ماشین آلات مقابل او نشست. من همین نزدیکی بودم, یک خبرنگار خارجی تازه وارد. ناگهان, یکی از کامیون‌های ارتش درست در مقابل جایگاه بازبینی متوقف شد، درست زمانی که شش جت میراژ در یک نمایش آکروباتیک از بالای سرشان غرش می‌کردند., رنگ آمیزی آسمان با مسیرهای طولانی قرمز, رنگ زرد, رنگ بنفش,و دود سبز. سادات برخاست, ظاهراً برای تبادل سلام با گروه دیگری از نیروهای مصری آماده می شود. او خود را به یک هدف عالی برای چهار قاتل اسلام گرا تبدیل کرد که از کامیون پریدند, به تریبون یورش بردند, و بدن او را با گلوله پر کرد. در حالی که قاتلان برای چیزی که به نظر می رسید برای ابدیت ادامه می دادند تا جایگاه را با آتش مرگبار خود بپاشند., من برای یک لحظه فکر کردم که آیا باید به زمین بخورم و خطر زیر پا گذاشتن توسط تماشاگران وحشت زده را به جان بخرم یا در راه بمانم و خطر گلوله سرگردان را بگیرم.. غریزه به من گفت که روی پاهایم بمان, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

smearcasting: اسلام هراسان چگونه ترس را گسترش می دهند, تعصب و اطلاعات غلط

نمایشگاه

جولی Hollar

جیم Naureckas

تبدیل اسلام هراسی به جریان اصلی:
چگونه مسلمانان مسلمان تعصب خود را پخش می کنند
اتفاق قابل توجهی در حلقه ملی منتقدان کتاب رخ داد (NBCC) نامزدها در ماه فوریه 2007: گروهی که معمولاً سرسخت و بردبار بود، نامزد بهترین کتاب در زمینه نقد شد، کتابی که به طور گسترده به عنوان تحقیرکننده کل یک گروه مذهبی شناخته می‌شود..
نامزدی بروس باور در حالی که اروپا خواب بود: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (نیویورک تایمز, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. این گزارش نگاهی تازه به اسلام هراسی در رسانه های امروزی و عاملان آن دارد, تشریح برخی از ارتباطات پشت صحنه که به ندرت در رسانه ها مورد بررسی قرار می گیرند. این گزارش همچنین چهار عکس فوری ارائه می دهد, یا «مطالعات موردی,توصیف می کند که چگونه اسلام هراسان به دستکاری رسانه ها ادامه می دهند تا مسلمانان را به شکل گسترده ای ترسیم کنند, برس نفرت انگیز. هدف ما مستندسازی لکه گیری است: نوشته ها و ظواهر علنی فعالان و صاحب نظران اسلام هراس که به طور عمدی و منظم ترس را منتشر می کنند., تعصب و اطلاعات غلط. اصطلاح «اسلام هراسی» به دشمنی با اسلام و مسلمانان اشاره دارد که می‌خواهد کل یک دین را غیرانسانی کند., آن را اساساً بیگانه نشان می دهد و به آن امری ذاتی نسبت می دهد, مجموعه ای ضروری از صفات منفی مانند غیرمنطقی بودن, عدم تحمل و خشونت. و نه بی شباهت به اتهاماتی که در سند کلاسیک یهودستیزی مطرح شده است, پروتکل های بزرگان صهیون, برخی از عبارات خشونت بارتر اسلام هراسی–مثل وقتی اروپا خواب بود–شامل تداعی طرح های اسلامی برای تسلط بر غرب است.
نهادهای اسلامی و مسلمانان, البته, باید مانند دیگران مورد بررسی و انتقاد قرار گیرد. برای مثال, زمانی که شورای اسلامی نروژ در مورد اینکه آیا مردان و همجنس‌گرایان همجنس‌گرا باید اعدام شوند، بحث می‌کند, می‌توان افراد یا گروه‌هایی را که در این عقیده سهیم هستند، بدون کشاندن همه مسلمانان اروپایی به آن، به شدت محکوم کرد, همانطور که در پست رسانه پیژامه باور (8/7/08),
مناظره مسلمانان اروپا: آیا همجنسگرایان باید اعدام شوند?”
به همین ترتیب, extremists who justify their violent actions by invoking some particular interpretation of Islam can be criticized without implicating the enormously diverse population of Muslims around the world. گذشته از همه اینها, reporters managed to cover the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeighan adherent of the racist Christian Identity sectwithout resorting to generalized statements about “Christian terrorism.” Likewise, media have covered acts of terrorism by fanatics who are Jewishfor instance the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–without implicating the entirety of Judaism.

توتالیتاریسم اسلام گرایی جهادی و چالش آن با اروپا و اسلام

باسو تیبی

When reading the majority of texts that comprise the vast literature that has been published by self-proclaimed pundits on political Islam, it is easy to miss the fact that a new movement has arisen. Further, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, با این حال, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty
in the history of politics since it has its roots in two parallel and related phenomena: first, the culturalisation of politics which leads to politics being conceptualised as a cultural system (a view pioneered by Clifford Geertz); and second the return of the sacred, or ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, به عنوان واکنشی به سکولاریزاسیون شدید آن ناشی از جهانی شدن.
تحلیل ایدئولوژی های سیاسی مبتنی بر ادیان, و در نتیجه این امر می تواند به عنوان یک دین سیاسی جذابیت داشته باشد, شامل درک علوم اجتماعی از نقش دین توسط سیاست جهانی است, به ویژه پس از اینکه سیستم دو قطبی جنگ سرد جای خود را به دنیای چند قطبی داد. در پروژه ای که در موسسه هانا آرنت برای کاربرد توتالیتاریسم در مطالعه ادیان سیاسی انجام شد., من تمایز بین ایدئولوژی های سکولار را پیشنهاد کردم که به عنوان جانشین دین عمل می کنند, و ایدئولوژی های دینی مبتنی بر ایمان واقعی دینی, که در بنیادگرایی دینی وجود دارد (یادداشت را ببینید
24). پروژه دیگری با موضوع «مذهب سیاسی», در دانشگاه بازل انجام شد, این نکته را روشن‌تر کرده است که وقتی دین دینی در لباس سیاسی پوشیده شد، رویکردهای جدید به سیاست ضروری می‌شود. با استفاده از منابع معتبر اسلام سیاسی., این مقاله پیشنهاد می‌کند که طیف وسیعی از سازمان‌های الهام‌گرفته از ایدئولوژی اسلام‌گرا هم به عنوان ادیان سیاسی و هم به عنوان جنبش‌های سیاسی مفهوم‌سازی شوند.. ویژگی منحصر به فرد اسلام سیاسی در این واقعیت است که مبتنی بر یک دین فراملی است (یادداشت را ببینید 26).

اسلام, اسلام سیاسی و آمریکا

بینش عرب

آیا "برادری" با آمریکا امکان پذیر است؟?

خلیل الانانی

هیچ شانسی برای برقراری ارتباط با هیچ یک از ایالات متحده وجود ندارد. تا زمانی که ایالات متحده دیدگاه دیرینه خود را نسبت به اسلام به عنوان یک خطر واقعی حفظ کند, دیدگاهی که آمریکا را در قایق دشمن صهیونیستی قرار می دهد. ما هیچ تصور قبلی در مورد مردم آمریکا یا ایالات متحده نداریم. جامعه و سازمان های مدنی و اتاق های فکر آن. ما مشکلی در ارتباط با مردم آمریکا نداریم، اما هیچ تلاش کافی برای نزدیک‌تر کردن ما انجام نمی‌شود,گفت: دکتر. عصام العیریان, رئیس بخش سیاسی اخوان المسلمین در یک مصاحبه تلفنی.
سخنان العریان خلاصه ای از دیدگاه اخوان المسلمین نسبت به مردم آمریکا و ایالات متحده است.. دولت. سایر اعضای اخوان المسلمین با این موضوع موافق هستند, همان طور که مرحوم حسن البنا, که این گروه را در 1928. ال- بانا غرب را بیشتر به عنوان نمادی از زوال اخلاقی می دید. سایر سلفی ها - یک مکتب فکری اسلامی که به اجداد به عنوان الگوهای نمونه متکی است - همین دیدگاه را نسبت به ایالات متحده داشته اند., اما فاقد انعطاف ایدئولوژیک مورد حمایت اخوان المسلمین است. در حالی که اخوان المسلمین به مشارکت آمریکایی ها در گفتگوهای مدنی معتقد است, دیگر گروه های افراطی هیچ فایده ای در گفتگو نمی بینند و معتقدند که زور تنها راه مقابله با ایالات متحده است.

اسلام و چشم انداز سیاسی جدید

بازگشت, مایکل کیت, عذرا خان,
کلبیر شکرا و جان سولوموس

در پی حمله به مرکز تجارت جهانی در 11 سپتامبر 2001, و بمباران مادرید و لندن 2004 و 2005, ادبیاتی که به اشکال و روش‌های بیان دینی – به‌ویژه بیان دینی اسلامی – می‌پردازد، در مناطق نیمه‌جمعی که جریان اصلی علوم اجتماعی را به طراحی سیاست‌های اجتماعی مرتبط می‌کند، شکوفا شده است., اتاق های فکر و روزنامه نگاری. بسیاری از کارها تلاش کرده اند نگرش ها یا استعدادهای یک جمعیت مسلمان را در یک مکان خاص تنش مانند لندن یا بریتانیا تعریف کنند. (بارنز, 2006; مشاوره اتنوس, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; پوپولوس, 2006), یا اشکال خاصی از مداخله در سیاست اجتماعی را نقد کرد (روشن, 2006آ; میرزا و همکاران, 2007). مطالعات اسلام گرایی و جهادگرایی تمرکز ویژه ای بر پیوندهای ترکیبی و پیچیده بین ایمان دینی اسلامی و اشکال جنبش اجتماعی و بسیج سیاسی ایجاد کرده است. (حسین, 2007; کپل, 2004, 2006; مک روی, 2006; نویل جونز و همکاران, 2006, 2007; فیلیپس, 2006; روی, 2004, 2006). به صورت متعارف, تمرکز تحلیلی، فرهنگ اسلام را مورد توجه قرار داده است, سیستم های اعتقادی مؤمنان, و سیر تاریخی و جغرافیایی جمعیت های مسلمان در سراسر جهان به طور کلی و در غرب به طور خاص. (عباس, 2005; انصاری, 2002; ایاد و گاربین, 2002; حسین, 2006; حالت ها, 2005; رمضان, 1999, 2005). در این مقاله تاکید متفاوت است. ما استدلال می‌کنیم که مطالعات مشارکت سیاسی اسلامی بدون توسل به کلیات کلان در مورد فرهنگ و ایمان باید با دقت زمینه‌سازی شود.. این به این دلیل است که فرهنگ و ایمان هر دو توسط فرهنگ ساخته شده اند و به نوبه خود ساختار فرهنگی دارند, مناظر نهادی و مشورتی که از طریق آنها بیان می شوند. در مورد تجربه بریتانیا, ردپای پنهان مسیحیت در شکل گیری دولت رفاه در قرن گذشته, the rapidly changing cartography of spaces of the political and the role of ‘faith organizations’ in the restructuring of welfare provision generate the material social context determining the opportunities and the outlines of new forms of political participation.

اصلاحات در جهان اسلام

عدنان خان

نخست وزیر ایتالیا, سیلویو برلوسکونی پس از حوادث 9/11:
ما باید از برتری تمدن خود آگاه باشیم, سیستمی که تضمین کرده است

تندرستی, احترام به حقوق بشر و – برخلاف کشورهای اسلامی – توجه

برای حقوق دینی و سیاسی, سیستمی که دارای درک ارزشی از تنوع است

و مدارا... غرب مردم را تسخیر خواهد کرد, like it conquered communism, even if it

means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was

1,400 years ago…”1

And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of

ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”

Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute

The concept of ‘islah’ (reform) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the

history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical

Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified

their Islamic rulings (fiqh) آنها فقط به دنبال درک احکام اسلامی بودند تا بتوانند

آنها را اعمال کنید. زمانی که احکامی برای حدیث وضع شد، وضعیت مشابهی رخ داد, تفسیر و

زبان عربی. عالمان, متفکران و روشنفکران در طول تاریخ اسلام زمان زیادی را صرف کردند

درک وحی خداوند - قرآن و تطبیق آیات بر حقایق و ابداع

اصول و رشته ها به منظور تسهیل درک. از این رو قرآن اساس آن باقی ماند

مطالعه و همه رشته‌های تکاملی همیشه بر اساس قرآن بوده است. کسانی که شدند

مورد ضرب و شتم فلسفه یونانی مانند فیلسوفان مسلمان و برخی از معتزله ها

در نظر گرفته می‌شدند که اسلام را ترک کرده‌اند، زیرا قرآن پایه‌ی مطالعه‌ی آنها نبود. بنابراین برای

هر مسلمانی که تلاش می کند قوانینی را استنباط کند یا بفهمد که چه موضعی باید در قبال یک موضوع خاص اتخاذ کند

موضوع قرآن اساس این پژوهش است.

اولین تلاش برای اصلاح اسلام در اواخر قرن نوزدهم صورت گرفت. با نوبت از

قرن، امت در یک دوره طولانی افول قرار داشت که در آن موازنه جهانی قدرت تغییر کرد

از خلافت تا انگلیس. در حالی که اروپای غربی در آن حضور داشت، مشکلات فزاینده ای دامنگیر خلافت شد

در بحبوحه انقلاب صنعتی. امت، درک بکر خود از اسلام را از دست داد, و

در تلاش برای معکوس کردن انحطاط عثمانیان (عثمانی ها) عده ای از مسلمانان به این کشور اعزام شدند

غرب, و در نتیجه از آنچه دیدند متأثر شدند. رفاع رفیع الطحطاوی مصری (1801-1873),

در بازگشت از پاریس, کتاب زندگینامه ای به نام تخلص العبریز اله صحبت بریز نوشت (The

استخراج طلا, یا مروری بر پاریس, 1834), ستایش پاکیزگی آنها, عشق به کار, و بالاتر

تمام اخلاق اجتماعی. او اعلام کرد که باید از آنچه در پاریس انجام می شود تقلید کنیم, حمایت از تغییرات در

جامعه اسلامی از آزادسازی زنان تا نظام های حاکمیتی. این فکر, و دیگران مانند آن,

آغاز روند ابداع مجدد در اسلام بود.

ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION

IBRAHIM KALIN

In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, academics, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.

Islam in the West

جوسلین سزاری

The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

عبدالله Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
علاوه بر این, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, برای مثال, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, ایالات متحده آمریکا, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

هنری Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Islamism revisited

ماها اعظم

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 جولای 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW

بریجیت Krawietz
هلموت Reifeld

In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. همزمان, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.

Islamic Political Culture, دموکراسی, and Human Rights

دانیل E. قیمت

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. در نتیجه, عالمان, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, با این حال, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (سهمیه)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; و (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD

ابتسام ابراهیم

What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, ایمان, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracyin addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participationcontains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. سعد الدین ابراهیم (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. با این حال, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. با این حال, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elementsaccountability, competition, and some degree of participationwhich have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.

دموکراسی, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood

Israel Elad-Altman

The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?