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Islam and the West

Preface

جان J. DeGioia

The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, politics, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. در حقیقت, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

why are there no arab democracies ?

لری دایموند

During democratization’s “third wave,” democracy ceased being a mostly Western phenomenon and “went global.” When the third wave began in 1974, the world had only about 40 democracies, and only a few of them lay outside the West. By the time the Journal of Democracy began publishing in 1990, there were 76 electoral democracies (accounting for slightly less than half the world’s independent states). By 1995, that number had shot up to 117—three in every five states. By then, a critical mass of democracies existed in every major world region save one—the Middle East.1 Moreover, every one of the world’s major cultural realms had become host to a significant democratic presence, albeit again with a single exception—the Arab world.2 Fifteen years later, this exception still stands.
The continuing absence of even a single democratic regime in the Arab world is a striking anomaly—the principal exception to the globalization of democracy. Why is there no Arab democracy? در واقع, why is it the case that among the sixteen independent Arab states of the Middle East and coastal North Africa, Lebanon is the only one to have ever been a democracy?
The most common assumption about the Arab democracy deficit is that it must have something to do with religion or culture. گذشته از همه اینها, the one thing that all Arab countries share is that they are Arab.

Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan

The Islamic movement in Jordan came to international attention in thewake of the April 1989 disturbances and the subsequent November 1989 parliamentary elections. These developments highlighted the movement’s political clout and raised the spectre in the West of an Iranian-style Islamic revolution in Jordan, fuelled by radical Islamic movements such as those of Egypt and the Maghrib. While various political trends competed for influence during the months prior to the elections, the Muslim Brotherhood had a clear advantage; its infrastructure in the mosques, the Qur’anicschools and the universities gave it a ready-made political base. The leftistand pro-regime groups, on the other hand, had to create de facto politicalparties—still legally banned—and to build their organizational base almostex nihilo, or to transform a clandestine infrastructure into an overt politicalone. There should have been very little surprise, therefore, when the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist candidates won a windfall of 32 of the 80seats in Parliament.Politicization of Islam is not new in Jordan.1 Since the foundation of the Emirate of Trans jordan by ‘Abdallah, Islam has served as one of the building blocks of regime legitimacy and of nation-building. The genealogy of the Hashemite family as scions of the Prophet’s tribe was an important source of legitimacy for its rule in Syria, Iraq and Jordan, as it had been inthe Hijaz. The ideology of the “Great Arab Revolt” was no less Islamic than it was Arab, and the control of Jerusalem after 1948 was interpretedby the regime as an Islamic responsibility and not only an Arab one.2King ‘Abdallah and his grandson Hussein, took care to present themselvesas believing Muslims, appearing at rituals and prayers, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca and embellishing their speeches with Islamic motifs.3The status of Islam in the Kingdom was also formalized in the Jordanian constitution (1952) by stipulating that Islam is the religion of the kingdom and that the king must be a Muslim and of Muslim parents. Islamic law(Shari‘a) is defined in the constitution as one of the pillars of legislation in the kingdom, while family law is in the exclusive hands of the Shari‘a courts.

AN INQUIRY INTO A WESTERN FEAR

و جان

If one can point to an overarching characteristic of our time, concern with justice would surely be
near the top of the list. Never in the history of man has there been such a quest for justice, a quest
pursued by both individuals and groups in all walks of life and around the world. In this quest,
religions have played a vital role, while at the same time, religious movements are continually misunderstood
and mis-characterized by opposing groups. The Muslim movements which the Western
media refer to as representative of a dangerous Islamic fundamentalism with militant overtones
is one example where a misunderstanding has resulted in widespread fear and prohibited
what could potentially be a useful partnership. It is not an exaggeration to say that upon hearing
the words ‘Muslim Brotherhood’, many otherwise educated Westerners tend to think only of a
terrorist organization, and it is not inconceivable to think that some Muslims may in fact look at
the World Council of Churches as yet another example of Western imperialism. The truth is that
although Islamic fundamentalism or perhaps more appropriately ‘revivalism’ does have its extremists,
a major focal point of some Muslim movements is an attempt to balance the scales of
social justice in much the same way that the Christians of the West–through the World Council of
Churches–are attempting to rectify situations of poverty, abuse of human rights and other social
issues. This is not to dismiss the violence inherent in some Islamic fundamentalist movements,
merely to show that the terrorist like activities of these movements are emphatically not the
movements’ main program of action, and are, for instance in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood,
more a reaction to events of the time that many organizations, including the Brotherhood,
responded to in a violent manner.

Arab Reform Bulletin

group of researchers


مصر: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?

Amr hamzawy


The Muslim Brotherhood’s draft party platform sends mixed signals about the movement’s political views

and positions. Although it has already been widely circulated, the document does not yet have final
approval from the movement’s guidance bureau.
The platform’s detailed treatment of political, اجتماعی, and economic issues marks a significant departure
from previously less developed positions, articulated inter alia in a 2004 reform initiative and the 2005
electoral platform for Brotherhood parliamentary candidates. This shift addresses one of the most
important criticisms of the Brotherhood, namely its championing of vague ideological and religious

slogans and inability to come up with specific policy prescriptions.
The document raises troubling questions, با این حال, regarding the identity of a future Brotherhood

political party as well as the group’s position on several political and social issues. Released in the
context of an ongoing stand-off between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood, it reveals significant
ambiguities and perhaps regression in the movement’s thinking.
First, the drafters chose not to address the future relationship between the party and the movement. In

doing so, they have deliberately ignored important ideas recently discussed within the movement,
especially among members of the parliamentary bloc. Inspired by the experiences of Islamist parties in
مراکش, اردن, and Yemen, these members advocate a functional separation between a party and
the movement, with the former focused mainly on political participation and the latter on religious
activism. In addition to its superficial treatment of the nature of the party and its internal organization, the
platform includes no clear statement on opening party membership to all Egyptians regardless of their
religion, one of the requirements for establishing a political party according to the Egyptian constitution.
Second, the draft Brotherhood platform identifies implementation of sharia as one of the party’s main

goals. Although this is consistent with the group’s interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution
(“Islam is the religion of the state, and Islamic law is the main source of legislation”), it departs from the
pragmatic spirit of various Brotherhood statements and initiatives since 2004 in which less emphasis
was given to the sharia issue. The return to a focus on sharia in the platform has led to positions
fundamentally at odds with the civil nature of the state and full citizenship rights regardless of religious
affiliation.

To Be A Muslim

فتح Yakan

All praises to Allah, and blessings and peace to His Messenger.This book is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the characteristics that every single Muslim should portray in order to fulfill the conditions of being a Muslim in both belief and practice. Many people are Muslim by identity,because they were ”born Muslim” from Muslim parents. Theymay not know what Islam really means or its requirements, an dso may lead a very secular life. The purpose of this first partis to explain the responsibility of every Muslim to become aknowledgeable and true believer in Islam.The second part of this book discusses the responsibility to become an activist for Islam and participate in the Islamic Movement. It explains the nature of this movement and its goals, philosophy, strategy, and tactics, as well as the desirable characteristics of it members.The failure of various movements in the Islamic world, and especially in the Arab countries, result from a spiritual emptiness in these movements as well as in society generally. In sucha situation the principles and institutions of Islam are forgotten.The westernized leaders and movements collapse when they encounter serious challenges. These leaders and movements and the systems of government and economics they try to imposehave fallen because they lacked a solid base. They fell becausethey were artificial constructs copied from alien cultures anddid not represent the Muslim community. Therefore they wererejected by it. This situation is comparable to a kidney transplantin a human body. Although the body is able to tolerate it painfully for a short period of time, eventually the kidney willbe rejected and die.When the sickness of the Muslim Ummah became acute few Muslims thought of building a new society on Islamic principles.Instead many tried to import man made systems and principles, which looked good but really were grossly defectiveand so could be easily toppled and crushed.

Parting the Veil

shadi hamid

America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Today,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. مصر, اردن, تونس, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, لبنان, عراق, و سرزمین های فلسطینی,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Since the early 1990s, ایالات متحده قرار گرفت. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, President George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.

حل معضل اسلام گرای آمریکا

شادی حمید

ایالات متحده قرار گرفت. تلاش‌ها برای ترویج دموکراسی در خاورمیانه مدت‌هاست که به دلیل «معضل اسلام‌گرایی» فلج شده است.: در تئوری, ما دموکراسی می خواهیم, ولی, در عمل, بیم آن است که احزاب اسلام گرا ذینفعان اصلی هر گشایش سیاسی باشند. غم انگیزترین جلوه آن، ناکامی الجزایر بود 1991 و 1992, زمانی که ایالات متحده در سکوت ایستاده بود در حالی که ارتش سکولار سرسخت انتخابات را پس از کسب اکثریت پارلمانی یک حزب اسلامگرا لغو کرد.. اخیرا, دولت بوش پس از اینکه اسلامگرایان در انتخابات در سراسر منطقه به طرز شگفت انگیزی خوب عمل کردند، از "برنامه آزادی" خود عقب نشینی کرد., از جمله در مصر, عربستان سعودی, و سرزمین های فلسطینی.
اما حتی ترس ما از احزاب اسلام‌گرا - و در نتیجه امتناع از تعامل با آنها - به خودی خود ناسازگار بوده است., برای برخی از کشورها صادق است اما برای برخی دیگر نه. هر چه بیشتر یک کشور برای منافع امنیت ملی آمریکا حیاتی تلقی شود, ایالات متحده تمایل کمتری به پذیرش گروه های اسلام گرا داشته است که نقش سیاسی برجسته ای در آنجا داشته باشند. با این حال, در کشورهایی که از نظر استراتژیک کمتر مرتبط هستند, و جایی که کمتر در خطر است, ایالات متحده گاهی رویکرد ظریف تری را در پیش گرفته است. اما این دقیقا همان جایی است که به رسمیت شناختن نقش اسلامگرایان غیرخشونت طلب مهمتر است., و, اینجا, سیاست آمریکا همچنان کوتاه است.
در سراسر منطقه, ایالات متحده به طور فعال از رژیم های خودکامه حمایت کرده و برای کمپین های سرکوب گروه هایی مانند اخوان المسلمین مصر چراغ سبز نشان داده است., قدیمی ترین و تاثیرگذارترین جنبش سیاسی در منطقه. در ماه مارس 2008, در دورانی که بسیاری از ناظران آن را بدترین دوره سرکوب ضد اخوان از دهه 1960 می دانند., کاندولیزا رایس، وزیر امور خارجه، از الف $100 کاهش کمک های نظامی به مصر توسط کنگره به میلیون ها نفر محکوم شد.

COMPARING THREE MUSLIM BROTHERHOODS: SYRIA, JORDAN, EGYPT

باری روبین

The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, البته, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.The banner of the Islamist revolution in the Middle East today has largely passed to groups sponsored by or derived from the Muslim Brotherhood. This article develops an introductory examination of three key Muslim Brotherhood groups and compares their politics, interrelations, and methods. Each, البته, is adapted to the conditions of a particular country.First, it is important to understand the Brotherhood’s policy toward and relations with both jihadist groups (القاعده, the Zarqawi network, and others such as Hizb al-Tahrir and Hamas) and theorists (such as Abu Mus’ab al-Suri and Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).The Brotherhoods do not have ongoing relationships with Hizb al-Tahrir—which is regarded by them as a small, cultish group of no importance. Other than in Jordan, they have had little contact with it at all.Regarding al-Qa’ida—both its theorists and its terrorist infrastructure—the Brotherhoods approve generally of its militancy, attacks on America, and ideology (or respect its ideologues), but view it as a rival.

Engaging Islamists and Promoting Democracy

مونا یعقوبیان

Deeming democratic change to be a long-term antidote to Islamist extremism, the Bush administration coupled its military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq with intensified efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world, underscoring the need for free and fair elections. To date, parliamentary elections of varying openness have taken place across the region, from Morocco to Kuwait. The elections ushered in a wave of Islamist victories, dubbed by many as an “Islamist tsunami.” 1The Islamists’ successes stem from their effectiveness as vehicles for popular opposition. While liberal, secular opposition parties remain largely detached from much of the population, Islamists have developed vast and easily mobilized grassroots networks through charitable organizations and mosques. The leadership is often younger and more dynamic, with strong ties to the community, and the party organizations brim with energy and ideas, attracting those who are seeking change.The U.S. government has quietly engaged a number of moderate and legal Islamist parties across the region for several years, sometimes through normal diplomatic activity, sometimes through government-funded grants to U.S. organizations. This Special Report examines U.S.-funded engagement with legal, nonviolent Islamist parties through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which have the most extensive experience engaging with Islamists in the region, and focuses on Morocco, اردن, and Yemen, because of their relative political openness and the strength and vibrancy of their Islamist political opposition.Successful Strategy. A successful Islamist engagement strategy both empowers individuals and strengthens institutions to yield greater transparency, more accountability, and shifts toward moderation. Training and empowering individuals cultivates moderates within the parties and enhances their political sophistication and influence. Meanwhile, as regimes in the Arab world resist or manipulate political reforms, strengthening democracy’s infrastructure is as important as supporting individuals. Independent electoral procedures and monitoring help to establish free and fair elections. Institution building ensures appropriate checks on executive power and a strong rule of law. Strengthening parliaments is especially crucial, as Islamists participate primarily in legislatures.In assessing whether Islamist parties have moderated in response to U.S. engagement, it is difficult if not impossible to quantify or measure shifts that may themselves be relative and subjective. Directly linking greater moderation to specific U.S. engagement activities is also highly problematic. At best, this engagement should be considered a contributing factor. Nevertheless, the tentative results in Morocco, اردن, and Yemen are promising enough that continued engagement with moderate Islamists should be encouraged, albeit with greater emphasis on institution building and an eye on the broader context of the ideological battle in the Muslim world between extremism and moderation.

Priorities of The Islamic Movement in The Coming Phase

یوسف القرضاوی

What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?

By “جنبش اسلامی”, I mean that organized, collective work, undertaken by thepeople, to restore Islam to the leadership of society, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heartthe latter being theweakest of beliefsso that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.

The future of Islam after 9/11

منصور Moaddel

There is no consensus among historians and Islamicists about the nature of theIslamic belief system and the experience of historical Islam, on which one couldbase a definitive judgment concerning Islam’s compatibility with modernity. Nonetheless,the availability of both historical and value survey data allow us to analyzethe future of Islam in light of the horrific event of 9/11. The key factor that woulddetermine the level of societal visibility necessary for predicting the future developmentof a culture is the nature and clarity of the ideological targets in relation towhich new cultural discourses are produced. Based on this premise, I shall try toilluminate the nature of such targets that are confronted by Muslim activists inIran, مصر, and Jordan.

پل ساختمان دیوار

الکس گلنی

از زمان حملات تروریستی 11 سپتامبر 2001 در خاورمیانه و شمال آفریقا انفجار مورد علاقه اسلام گرایی غیرمذهبی رخ داده است (منا) منطقه. تا همین اواخر,تحلیلگران به طور واضح روی آن دسته از بازیگرانی که در پایان خشونت طیف اسلام گرایی فعالیت می کنند متمرکز شده اند, از جمله القاعده, طالبان, برخی از احزاب فرقه ای در عراق و گروه های سیاسی با بال های مسلح مانند حماس در سرزمین های اشغالی فلسطین (OPT)و حزب الله در لبنان, این واقعیت را مبهم کرده است که سیاست های معاصر در سراسر منطقه MENA توسط مجموعه ای بسیار متنوع تر از جریانات "جریان اصلی" اسلامی هدایت و شکل گرفته است.. ما این گروه ها را تعریف می کنیم که درگیر مشارکت و یا درگیری برای مشارکت در پروسه های سیاسی قانونی کشور های آنها هستند و در استفاده عموم از خشونت ها از اهداف خود در سطح ملی آگاه شده اند., حتی در مواردی که آنها بر علیه یا سرکوب شده تبعیض قائل هستند. این تعریف شامل گروه هایی مانند اخوان المسلمین در مصر می شود, حزب عدالت و توسعه (حزب عدالت و توسعه) در مراکش و جبهه اقدام اسلامی (IAF) در اردن. این جنبش ها یا احزاب غیر خشونت آمیز اسلامی اغلب نمایانگر بهترین سازمان یافته ترین و محبوب ترین عنصر مخالفت با رژیم های موجود در هر کشور هستند, و از آنجا که موجبات توجه سیاستگذاران غربی به نقشی که آنها می توانند در ارتقاء دموکراسی در منطقه بازی کنند ، افزایش یافته است.. با این حال ، به نظر می رسد که بحث در مورد این موضوع در مورد این سوال که آیا مناسب است با این گروه ها ارتباط مستقیمی و رسمی تر برقرار شود ، متوقف شده است, این نگرش تا حدودی با عدم تمایل به توجیه مشروعیت گروه هایی که ممکن است دیدگاه های ضد دموکراتیک در مورد حقوق زنان داشته باشند مرتبط است., کثرت گرایی سیاسی و طیف وسیعی از موضوعات دیگر. این همچنین ملاحظات عمل گرایانه در مورد منافع استراتژیک قدرت های غربی در منطقه منا را منعکس می کند که به نظر می رسد با افزایش محبوبیت و نفوذ اسلامگرایان مورد تهدید قرار می گیرند.. از طرف آنها, احزاب و جنبش های اسلام گرایانه ، نسبت به روابط نزدیک با آن دسته از قدرت های غربی که سیاست هایشان را در منطقه به شدت محاصره می کنند ، تمایلی آشکار نشان داده اند., نه تنها از ترس از چگونگی واکنش رژیمهای سرکوبگرانه در درون آنها. این تمرکز پروژه بر جنبشهای سیاسی غیر خشونت آمیز اسلامی نباید به غلط تفسیر شود بلکه حمایت ضمنی از برنامه های سیاسی آنها. تعهد به استراتژی مناسب تر برای تعامل با احزاب اصلی اسلامگرایانه ، خطرات و مبادلات قابل توجهی را برای سیاستگذاران آمریکایی و اروپایی شمالی دربر خواهد داشت.. با این حال, ما این موضع را اتخاذ می کنیم که تمایل هر دو طرف برای مشاهده تعامل به عنوان مبلغ صفر "همه یا هیچ چیز" بازی کمکی بوده است, و در صورت بروز گفتگوی سازنده تر در مورد اصلاحات در خاورمیانه و شمال آفریقا ، باید تغییر یابد.

بسیج اسلامی

زیاد مانسون

این مقاله به بررسی ظهور و رشد اخوان المسلمین در مصر از دهه 1930 تا 1950 می پردازد.. با ترسیم و ارزیابی تجربی توضیحات ممکن برای رشد سازمان بر اساس (1) نظریه های اسلام سیاسی و (2) مفهوم ساختار فرصت سیاسی در نظریه جنبش اجتماعی. گسترش این رویکردها بر اساس داده های اسناد سازمانی و طبقه بندی شده ایالات متحده پیشنهاد شده است.. وزارت امور خارجه از این دوره. بسیج موفق اخوان المسلمین به دلیل پیوند پیام اسلامی آن با ساختار سازمانی آن امکان پذیر شد., فعالیت ها, و استراتژی ها و زندگی روزمره مصری ها. این تحلیل نشان می‌دهد که ایده‌ها به روش‌هایی بیشتر از آنچه که مفهوم چارچوب‌بندی اجازه می‌دهد در جنبش‌های اجتماعی ادغام می‌شوند. همچنین درک ما را از اینکه چگونه سازمان‌ها می‌توانند در محیط‌های به شدت سرکوب‌گر پدید آیند را گسترش می‌دهد..

Democracy and Islamist Parties

مونا یعقوبیان

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, international pressure mounted for political reform in the Middle East, particularly the Arab world. For its part, the Bush administration elevated democracy promotion in the Middle East to a key strategic priority. The administration’s policy sprung from the belief that strong linkages exist between the Middle East’s long history of autocratic rule and the emergence of a transnational terrorist movement with its roots in many of those same countries. Numerous independent analyses likewise have suggested that the Middle East’s dysfunctional, autocratic political systems are helping to breed Islamist extremism.An Islamist “Tsunami”Yet, despite the critical importance assigned to political opening in the Middle East, a number of factors, including ongoing turmoil in Iraq and competing priorities of the Global War on Terror (سهمیه), have intervened to complicate U.S. democracy promotion efforts. به خصوص, various Islamist parties’ strong showings in recent elections have added a new layer of complexity to U.S. democracy promotion efforts in the Arab world. در واقع, across the region, Islamist parties and organizations boast strong grassroots support. These groups represent a broad spectrum of views, ranging from moderate parties that have renounced violence to well-established terrorist organizations.Hamas’ resounding victory in the January 25, 2006 Palestinian elections, winning 74 out of 132 seats, is perhaps the most dramatic example of the power Islamists wield at the ballot box. Deemed a terrorist organization by the United States and Europe, the party’s rise to power has significantly complicated U.S. policy toward the Palestinian Authority as well as efforts to help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Similar concerns characterize Hizballah’s role in Lebanon. The terrorist organization won 14 of 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament in the June 2005 انتخابات, the first independent vote in thirty years following the withdrawal of Syrian troops. While Hizballah’s parliamentary presence is far outstripped by an anti-Syrian opposition bloc, the organization still holds significant sway over Lebanese politics and is the only political party to maintain an armed militia.

Terrorist and Extremist Movements in the Middle East

Anthony H. Cordesman

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamic
extremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differences
in the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civil
conflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civil
war in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-
Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (سازمان آزادی بخش فلسطین) led to a civil war in Jordan in September
1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocratic
revolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between their
Sunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.
There also, با این حال, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged by
regimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamic
movements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after his
peace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to the
سازمان آزادی بخش فلسطین, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene of
coups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapse
of its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.
The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered
an Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal with
an uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elements
of the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.
Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed by
a civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamic
extremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicated
them. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.
Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National Guard
Training center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamic
extremists. مراکش, Libya, تونس, اردن, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamist
movements become a serious national threat.
While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over two
million lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has also
been the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.a

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (سازمان آزادی بخش فلسطین) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, با این حال, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. مراکش, Libya, تونس, اردن, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.