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Islám a Západ

Preface

John J. DeGioia

The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, politika, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. Ve skutečnosti, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.

proč neexistují arabské demokracie ?

Larry Diamond

During democratization’s “third wave,” democracy ceased being a mostly Western phenomenon and “went global.” When the third wave began in 1974, the world had only about 40 democracies, and only a few of them lay outside the West. By the time the Journal of Democracy began publishing in 1990, there were 76 electoral democracies (accounting for slightly less than half the world’s independent states). Podle 1995, that number had shot up to 117—three in every five states. By then, a critical mass of democracies existed in every major world region save one—the Middle East.1 Moreover, every one of the world’s major cultural realms had become host to a significant democratic presence, i když opět s jedinou výjimkou — arabským světem.2 O patnáct let později, tato výjimka stále platí.
Pokračující absence byť jediného demokratického režimu v arabském světě je nápadná anomálie – hlavní výjimka z globalizace demokracie.. Proč neexistuje arabská demokracie? Vskutku, proč je tomu tak, že mezi šestnácti nezávislými arabskými státy Blízkého východu a pobřežní severní Afriky, Libanon je jediný, kdo kdy byl demokracií?
Nejčastějším předpokladem deficitu arabské demokracie je, že musí mít něco společného s náboženstvím nebo kulturou. Po všem, jediná věc, kterou všechny arabské země sdílejí, je, že jsou arabské.

Muslimské bratrstvo v Jordánsku

Islámské hnutí v Jordánsku se dostalo do mezinárodní pozornosti po dubnovém probuzení 1989 nepokojů a následného listopadu 1989 parlamentní volby. Tento vývoj zdůraznil politický vliv hnutí a vyvolal na západě přízrak islámské revoluce v íránském stylu v Jordánsku., poháněná radikálními islámskými hnutími, jako jsou Egypt a Maghrib. Zatímco různé politické trendy soupeřily o vliv během měsíců před volbami, Muslimské bratrstvo mělo jasnou výhodu; její infrastruktura v mešitách, koránské školy a univerzity mu daly hotovou politickou základnu. Levicové prorežimní skupiny, na druhou stranu, musel vytvořit de facto politické strany – dosud legálně zakázané – a vybudovat jejich organizační základnu téměř ex nihilo, nebo přeměnit tajnou infrastrukturu na otevřenou politickou. Překvapení mělo být velmi malé, proto, když Muslimské bratrstvo a další islamističtí kandidáti získali neočekávanou částku 32 z 80 křesel v parlamentu. Politizace islámu není v Jordánsku novinkou.1 Od založení Transjordánského emirátu ‘Abdalláhem, Islám sloužil jako jeden ze stavebních kamenů legitimity režimu a budování národa. Genealogie hášimovské rodiny jako potomků prorokova kmene byla důležitým zdrojem legitimity pro jeho vládu v Sýrii, Irák a Jordánsko, jako tomu bylo v Hidžázu. Ideologie „Velké arabské vzpoury“ nebyla o nic méně islámská než arabská, a poté ovládnutí Jeruzaléma 1948 byla režimem interpretována jako islámská odpovědnost a nejen arabská.2Král ‘Abdalláh a jeho vnuk Husajn, se starali o to, aby se prezentovali jako věřící muslimové, objevovat se při rituálech a modlitbách, konání pouti do Mekky a zdobí své projevy islámskými motivy.3 Postavení islámu v Království bylo také formalizováno v jordánské ústavě (1952) stanovením, že islám je náboženstvím království a že král musí být muslim a mít muslimské rodiče. islámské právo(šarí'a) je v ústavě definován jako jeden z pilířů legislativy v království, zatímco rodinné právo je ve výlučných rukou soudů šaría.

AN INQUIRY INTO A WESTERN FEAR

Dan Jahn

If one can point to an overarching characteristic of our time, concern with justice would surely be
near the top of the list. Never in the history of man has there been such a quest for justice, a quest
pursued by both individuals and groups in all walks of life and around the world. In this quest,
religions have played a vital role, while at the same time, religious movements are continually misunderstood
and mis-characterized by opposing groups. The Muslim movements which the Western
media refer to as representative of a dangerous Islamic fundamentalism with militant overtones
is one example where a misunderstanding has resulted in widespread fear and prohibited
what could potentially be a useful partnership. It is not an exaggeration to say that upon hearing
the words ‘Muslim Brotherhood’, many otherwise educated Westerners tend to think only of a
terrorist organization, and it is not inconceivable to think that some Muslims may in fact look at
the World Council of Churches as yet another example of Western imperialism. The truth is that
although Islamic fundamentalism or perhaps more appropriately ‘revivalism’ does have its extremists,
a major focal point of some Muslim movements is an attempt to balance the scales of
social justice in much the same way that the Christians of the West–through the World Council of
Churches–are attempting to rectify situations of poverty, abuse of human rights and other social
issues. This is not to dismiss the violence inherent in some Islamic fundamentalist movements,
merely to show that the terrorist like activities of these movements are emphatically not the
movements’ main program of action, and are, for instance in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood,
more a reaction to events of the time that many organizations, including the Brotherhood,
responded to in a violent manner.

Arab Reform Bulletin

group of researchers


Egypt: Regression in the Muslim Brotherhood’s Party Platform?

Amr hamzawy


The Muslim Brotherhood’s draft party platform sends mixed signals about the movement’s political views

and positions. Although it has already been widely circulated, the document does not yet have final
approval from the movement’s guidance bureau.
The platform’s detailed treatment of political, social, and economic issues marks a significant departure
from previously less developed positions, articulated inter alia in a 2004 reform initiative and the 2005
electoral platform for Brotherhood parliamentary candidates. This shift addresses one of the most
important criticisms of the Brotherhood, namely its championing of vague ideological and religious

slogans and inability to come up with specific policy prescriptions.
The document raises troubling questions, nicméně, regarding the identity of a future Brotherhood

political party as well as the group’s position on several political and social issues. Released in the
context of an ongoing stand-off between the Egyptian regime and the Brotherhood, it reveals significant
ambiguities and perhaps regression in the movement’s thinking.
za prvé, the drafters chose not to address the future relationship between the party and the movement. V

doing so, they have deliberately ignored important ideas recently discussed within the movement,
especially among members of the parliamentary bloc. Inspired by the experiences of Islamist parties in
Maroko, Jordán, and Yemen, these members advocate a functional separation between a party and
the movement, with the former focused mainly on political participation and the latter on religious
activism. In addition to its superficial treatment of the nature of the party and its internal organization, a
platform includes no clear statement on opening party membership to all Egyptians regardless of their
religion, one of the requirements for establishing a political party according to the Egyptian constitution.
Druhý, the draft Brotherhood platform identifies implementation of sharia as one of the party’s main

goals. Although this is consistent with the group’s interpretation of Article 2 of the Egyptian Constitution
(“Islam is the religion of the state, and Islamic law is the main source of legislation”), it departs from the
pragmatic spirit of various Brotherhood statements and initiatives since 2004 in which less emphasis
was given to the sharia issue. The return to a focus on sharia in the platform has led to positions
fundamentally at odds with the civil nature of the state and full citizenship rights regardless of religious
affiliation.

To Be A Muslim

Fathi Yakan

All praises to Allah, and blessings and peace to His Messenger.This book is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the characteristics that every single Muslim should portray in order to fulfill the conditions of being a Muslim in both belief and practice. Many people are Muslim by identity,because they were ”born Muslim” from Muslim parents. Theymay not know what Islam really means or its requirements, an dso may lead a very secular life. The purpose of this first partis to explain the responsibility of every Muslim to become aknowledgeable and true believer in Islam.The second part of this book discusses the responsibility to become an activist for Islam and participate in the Islamic Movement. It explains the nature of this movement and its goals, philosophy, strategy, and tactics, as well as the desirable characteristics of it members.The failure of various movements in the Islamic world, and especially in the Arab countries, result from a spiritual emptiness in these movements as well as in society generally. In sucha situation the principles and institutions of Islam are forgotten.The westernized leaders and movements collapse when they encounter serious challenges. These leaders and movements and the systems of government and economics they try to imposehave fallen because they lacked a solid base. They fell becausethey were artificial constructs copied from alien cultures anddid not represent the Muslim community. Therefore they wererejected by it. This situation is comparable to a kidney transplantin a human body. Although the body is able to tolerate it painfully for a short period of time, eventually the kidney willbe rejected and die.When the sickness of the Muslim Ummah became acute few Muslims thought of building a new society on Islamic principles.Instead many tried to import man made systems and principles, which looked good but really were grossly defectiveand so could be easily toppled and crushed.

Parting the Veil

shadi hamid

America’s post-September 11 project to promote democracy in the Middle East has proven a spectacular failure. Dnes,Arab autocrats are as emboldened as ever. Egypt, Jordán, Tunisko, and others are backsliding on reform. Opposition forces are being crushed. Three of the most democratic polities in the region, Libanon, Irák, and the Palestinian territories,are being torn apart by violence and sectarian conflict.Not long ago, it seemed an entirely different outcome was in the offing. Asrecently as late 2005, observers were hailing the “Arab spring,” an “autumn forautocrats,” and other seasonal formulations. They had cause for such optimism.On January 31, 2005, the world stood in collective awe as Iraqis braved terroristthreats to cast their ballots for the first time. That February, Egyptian PresidentHosni Mubarak announced multi-candidate presidential elections, another first.And that same month, after former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri wasshadi hamid is director of research at the Project on Middle East Democracyand an associate of the Truman National Security Project.Parting the Veil Now is no time to give up supporting democracy in the Muslim world.But to do so, the United States must embrace Islamist moderates.shadi hamiddemocracyjournal.org 39killed, Lebanon erupted in grief and then anger as nearly one million Lebanesetook to the streets of their war-torn capital, demanding self-determination. Notlong afterward, 50,000 Bahrainis—one-eighth of the country’s population—ralliedfor constitutional reform. The opposition was finally coming alive.But when the Arab spring really did come, the American response provide dample evidence that while Arabs were ready for democracy, the United States most certainly was not. Looking back, the failure of the Bush Administration’s efforts should not have been so surprising. Since the early 1990s, U.S. policymakershave had two dueling and ultimately incompatible objectives in the Middle East: promoting Arab democracy on one hand, and curbing the power and appealof Islamist groups on the other. In his second inaugural address, Prezident George W. Bush declared that in supporting Arab democracy, our “vital interests and our deepest beliefs” were now one. The reality was more complicated.When Islamist groups throughout the region began making impressive gains at the ballot box, particularly in Egypt and in the Palestinian territories, the Bush Administration stumbled. With Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza high on the agendaand a deteriorating situation in Iraq, American priorities began to shift. Friendly dictators once again became an invaluable resource for an administration that found itself increasingly embattled both at home and abroad.The reason for this divergence in policy revolves around a critical question:What should the United States do when Islamists come to power through free elections? In a region where Islamist parties represent the only viable oppositionto secular dictatorships, this is the crux of the matter. In the MiddleEastern context, the question of democracy and the question of political Islamare inseparable. Without a well-defined policy of engagement toward politicalIslam, the United States will fall victim to the same pitfalls of the past. In many ways, it already has.

Řešení amerického islamistického dilematu

Shadi Hamid

U.S. efforts to promote democracy in the Middle East have long been paralyzed by the “Islamist dilemma”: in theory, we want democracy, ale, in practice, fear that Islamist parties will be the prime beneficiaries of any political opening. The most tragic manifestation of this was the Algerian debacle of 1991 a 1992, when the United States stood silently while the staunchly secular military canceled elections after an Islamist party won a parliamentary majority. More recently, the Bush administration backed away from its “freedom agenda” after Islamists did surprisingly well in elections throughout region, including in Egypt, Saudská arábie, and the Palestinian territories.
But even our fear of Islamist parties—and the resulting refusal to engage with them—has itself been inconsistent, holding true for some countries but not others. The more that a country is seen as vital to American national security interests, the less willing the United States has been to accept Islamist groups having a prominent political role there. Nicméně, in countries seen as less strategically relevant, and where less is at stake, the United States has occasionally taken a more nuanced approach. But it is precisely where more is at stake that recognizing a role for nonviolent Islamists is most important, a, here, American policy continues to fall short.
Throughout the region, the United States has actively supported autocratic regimes and given the green light for campaigns of repression against groups such as the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood, the oldest and most influential political movement in the region. In March 2008, during what many observers consider to be the worst period of anti-Brotherhood repression since the 1960s, Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice waived a $100 million congressionally mandated reduction of military aid to Egypt.

POROVNÁNÍ tří muslimských bratrstev: SÝRIE, JORDAN, EGYPT

Barry Rubin

Banner na islamistické revoluci na Blízkém východě dnes z velké části přešel na skupiny sponzorované nebo odvozené z Muslimského bratrstva. Tento článek rozvíjí úvodní zkoušky ze tří klíčových muslimských skupin bratrstva a porovnává jejich politika, vzájemných vztahů, a metody. Každý, samozřejmě, je upraven na podmínky konkrétní country.The banner na islamistické revoluci na Blízkém východě dnes z velké části přešel na skupiny sponzorované nebo odvozené z Muslimského bratrstva. Tento článek rozvíjí úvodní zkoušky ze tří klíčových muslimských skupin bratrstva a porovnává jejich politika, vzájemných vztahů, a metody. Každý, samozřejmě, je upraven na podmínky konkrétní country.First, Je důležité pochopit, že Bratrstvo politika vůči a vztahy s oběma džihádistickými skupinami (al-Kajda, sítě Zarkávího, a jiní, jako Hizb al-Tahrir a Hamas) a teoretici (jako Abu Mus'ab al-Suri a Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi).Bratrstva nemají trvalé vztahy s Hizb al-Tahrir – který je jimi považován za malý, kultovní skupiny žádný význam. Jiná než v Jordánsku, oni měli malý kontakt s ním na al-Kajdá all.Regarding-jak jeho teoretici a teroristické infrastruktury-bratrstvi schválit obecně své bojovnosti, útoky na Ameriku, a ideologie (nebo respektovat jeho ideologové), ale na ni pohlíží jako soupeř.

Zapojení islamistů a podpora demokracie

Mona Yacoubian

Deeming democratic change to be a long-term antidote to Islamist extremism, the Bush administration coupled its military interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq with intensified efforts to promote democracy in the Arab world, underscoring the need for free and fair elections. To date, parliamentary elections of varying openness have taken place across the region, from Morocco to Kuwait. The elections ushered in a wave of Islamist victories, dubbed by many as an “Islamist tsunami.” 1The Islamists’ successes stem from their effectiveness as vehicles for popular opposition. While liberal, secular opposition parties remain largely detached from much of the population, Islamists have developed vast and easily mobilized grassroots networks through charitable organizations and mosques. The leadership is often younger and more dynamic, with strong ties to the community, and the party organizations brim with energy and ideas, attracting those who are seeking change.The U.S. government has quietly engaged a number of moderate and legal Islamist parties across the region for several years, sometimes through normal diplomatic activity, sometimes through government-funded grants to U.S. organizations. This Special Report examines U.S.-funded engagement with legal, nonviolent Islamist parties through the National Democratic Institute (NDI) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), which have the most extensive experience engaging with Islamists in the region, and focuses on Morocco, Jordán, and Yemen, because of their relative political openness and the strength and vibrancy of their Islamist political opposition.Successful Strategy. A successful Islamist engagement strategy both empowers individuals and strengthens institutions to yield greater transparency, more accountability, and shifts toward moderation. Training and empowering individuals cultivates moderates within the parties and enhances their political sophistication and influence. Mezitím, as regimes in the Arab world resist or manipulate political reforms, strengthening democracy’s infrastructure is as important as supporting individuals. Independent electoral procedures and monitoring help to establish free and fair elections. Institution building ensures appropriate checks on executive power and a strong rule of law. Strengthening parliaments is especially crucial, as Islamists participate primarily in legislatures.In assessing whether Islamist parties have moderated in response to U.S. engagement, it is difficult if not impossible to quantify or measure shifts that may themselves be relative and subjective. Directly linking greater moderation to specific U.S. engagement activities is also highly problematic. At best, this engagement should be considered a contributing factor. Nevertheless, the tentative results in Morocco, Jordán, and Yemen are promising enough that continued engagement with moderate Islamists should be encouraged, albeit with greater emphasis on institution building and an eye on the broader context of the ideological battle in the Muslim world between extremism and moderation.

Priorities of The Islamic Movement in The Coming Phase

Yusuf Al-Qardhawi

What Do We Mean By Islamic Movement?

Podle “Islámské hnutí”, I mean that organized, collective work, undertaken by thepeople, to restore Islam to the leadership of society, and to the helm of life all walksof life.Before being anything else, the Islamic Movement is work: persistent, industriouswork, not just words to be said, speeches and lectures to be delivered, or books andarticles are indeed required, they are merely parts of a movement, not themovement itself (Allah the Almighty says, Work, and Allah, His Messenger and thebelievers will see your work} [Surat al-Tawba: 1 05].The Islamic Movement is a popular work performed for Allah’s sakeThe Islamic movement is a popular work based mainly on self-motivation andpersonal conviction. It is a work performed out of faith and for nothing other thanthe sake of Allah, in the hope of being rewarded by Him, not by humans.The core of this self-motivation is that unrest which a Muslim feels when theAwakening visits him and he feels a turmoil deep inside him, as a result of thecontradiction between his faith on the one hand and the actual state of affairs of hisnation on the other. It is then that he launches himself into action, driven by his lovefor his religion, his devotion to Allah, His Messenger, the Quran and the MuslimNation, and his feeling of his, and his people’s, neglect of their duty. In so doing, heis also stimulated by his keenness to discharge his duty, eliminate deficiencies,contribute to the revival of the neglected faridas [enjoined duties] of enforcing theSharia [Islamic Law] sent down by Allah; unifying the Muslim nation around the HolyQuran; supporting Allah’s friends and fighting Allah’s foes; liberating Muslimterritories from all aggression or non-Muslim control; reinstating the Islamiccaliphate system to the leadership anew as required by Sharia, and renewing theobligation to spread the call of Islam, enjoin what is right and forbid what is wrongand strive in Allah’s cause by deed, by word or by heartthe latter being theweakest of beliefsso that the word of Allah may be exalted to the heights.

Budoucnost islámu po 9/11

Mansoor Moaddel

Mezi historiky a islamisty neexistuje shoda o povaze systému islámské víry a zkušenosti s historickým islámem., na kterém by se dalo založit definitivní úsudek o slučitelnosti islámu s modernitou. Nicméně,dostupnost historických i hodnotových dat nám umožňuje analyzovat budoucnost islámu ve světle děsivé události 9/11. Klíčovým faktorem, který by určoval úroveň společenské viditelnosti nezbytné pro předvídání budoucího vývoje kultury, je povaha a jasnost ideologických cílů, ve vztahu k nimž vznikají nové kulturní diskurzy.. Na základě tohoto předpokladu, Pokusím se objasnit povahu takových cílů, kterým čelí muslimští aktivisté v Íránu, Egypt, a Jordánsko.

Stavění mostů, ne zdí

Alex Glennie

Od teroristických útoků 11 Září 2001 došlo k explozi zájmu o politický islamismus na Blízkém východě a v severní Africe (MENA) kraj. Až poměrně nedávno,analytici se pochopitelně zaměřili na ty aktéry, kteří operují na násilném konci islamistického spektra, včetně Al-Káidy, Taliban, některé sektářské strany v Iráku a politické skupiny s ozbrojenými křídly jako Hamas na okupovaných palestinských územích (OPT)a Hizballáh v Libanonu.Nicméně, to zakrylo skutečnost, že v regionu MENA je současná politika řízena a formována mnohem rozmanitější sbírkou „mainstreamových“ islamistických hnutí.. Definujeme tyto skupiny, které se zapojují nebo se snaží zapojit do legálních politických procesů ve svých zemích a které se veřejně vyhýbají použití násilí, aby pomohly realizovat své cíle na národní úrovni., i tam, kde jsou diskriminováni nebo potlačováni. Tato definice by zahrnovala skupiny jako Muslimské bratrstvo v Egyptě, Stranou spravedlnosti a rozvoje (PJD) v Maroku a Islámská akční fronta (IAF) v Jordánsku. Tato nenásilná islamistická hnutí nebo strany často představují nejlépe organizovaný a nejpopulárnější prvek opozice vůči stávajícím režimům v každé zemi., a jako takový se zvyšuje zájem ze strany tvůrců západní politiky o roli, kterou by mohli hrát při podpoře demokracie v regionu. Zdá se však, že diskuse na toto téma se zastavily na otázce, zda by bylo vhodné zapojit se do těchto skupin na systematičtějším a formálnějším základě., Tento postoj je částečně spojen s ospravedlnitelnou neochotou legitimizovat skupiny, které by mohly zastávat antidemokratické názory na práva žen., Odráží také pragmatické úvahy o strategických zájmech západních mocností v regionu MENA, které jsou vnímány jako ohrožené rostoucí popularitou a vlivem islamistů.. Z jejich strany, Islamistické strany a hnutí projevily jasnou neochotu navázat užší vztahy s těmi západními mocnostmi, jejichž politice v regionu důrazně odporují., v neposlední řadě ze strachu, jak by mohly reagovat represivní režimy, v nichž působí. Zaměření tohoto projektu na nenásilná politická islamistická hnutí by nemělo být chybně vykládáno jako implicitní podpora jejich politických programů.. Zavázat se ke strategii promyšlenějšího jednání s mainstreamovými islamistickými stranami by pro tvůrce politik v Severní Americe a Evropě znamenalo značná rizika a kompromisy.. Nicméně, zastáváme stanovisko, že tendence obou stran pohlížet na zapojení jako na hru „všechno nebo nic“ s nulovým součtem nebyla užitečná., a potřebuje se změnit, má-li se objevit konstruktivnější dialog o reformě na Blízkém východě a v severní Africe.

ISLAMICKÁ MOBILIZACE

Ziad Munson

Tento článek zkoumá vznik a růst Muslimského bratrstva v Egyptě od 30. do 50. let. Začíná to nastíněním a empirickým hodnocením možných vysvětlení růstu organizace na základě (1) teorie politického islámu a (2) koncept struktury politických příležitostí v teorii sociálního hnutí. Navrhuje se rozšíření těchto přístupů na základě údajů z organizačních dokumentů a odtajněných USA. Státní ministerstvo z období. Úspěšná mobilizace Muslimského bratrstva byla možná kvůli způsobu, jakým byla její islámská zpráva vázána na její organizační strukturu, činnosti, strategie a každodenní život Egypťanů. Analýza naznačuje, že myšlenky jsou integrovány do sociálních hnutí více způsoby, než umožňuje koncept rámování. Také rozšiřuje naše chápání toho, jak mohou organizace vznikat ve vysoce represivním prostředí.

Demokracie a islamistické strany

Mona Yacoubian

In the immediate aftermath of the September 11th terrorist attacks, international pressure mounted for political reform in the Middle East, particularly the Arab world. For its part, the Bush administration elevated democracy promotion in the Middle East to a key strategic priority. The administration’s policy sprung from the belief that strong linkages exist between the Middle East’s long history of autocratic rule and the emergence of a transnational terrorist movement with its roots in many of those same countries. Numerous independent analyses likewise have suggested that the Middle East’s dysfunctional, autocratic political systems are helping to breed Islamist extremism.An Islamist “Tsunami”Yet, despite the critical importance assigned to political opening in the Middle East, a number of factors, including ongoing turmoil in Iraq and competing priorities of the Global War on Terror (GWOT), have intervened to complicate U.S. democracy promotion efforts. Zejména, various Islamist parties’ strong showings in recent elections have added a new layer of complexity to U.S. democracy promotion efforts in the Arab world. Vskutku, across the region, Islamist parties and organizations boast strong grassroots support. These groups represent a broad spectrum of views, ranging from moderate parties that have renounced violence to well-established terrorist organizations.Hamas’ resounding victory in the January 25, 2006 Palestinian elections, winning 74 mimo 132 sedadla, is perhaps the most dramatic example of the power Islamists wield at the ballot box. Deemed a terrorist organization by the United States and Europe, the party’s rise to power has significantly complicated U.S. policy toward the Palestinian Authority as well as efforts to help resolve the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Similar concerns characterize Hizballah’s role in Lebanon. The terrorist organization won 14 of 128 seats in the Lebanese parliament in the June 2005 volby, the first independent vote in thirty years following the withdrawal of Syrian troops. While Hizballah’s parliamentary presence is far outstripped by an anti-Syrian opposition bloc, the organization still holds significant sway over Lebanese politics and is the only political party to maintain an armed militia.

Teroristických a extremistických hnutí na Blízkém východě

Anthony H. Cordesman

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamic
extremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differences
in the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civil
conflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civil
war in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-
Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (OOP) led to a civil war in Jordan in September
1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocratic
revolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between their
Sunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.
There also, nicméně, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged by
regimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamic
movements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after his
peace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to the
OOP, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene of
coups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapse
of its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.
The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered
an Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal with
an uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elements
of the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.
Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed by
a civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamic
extremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicated
them. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.
Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National Guard
Training center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamic
extremists. Maroko, Libya, Tunisko, Jordán, Bahrain, Katar, Omán, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamist
movements become a serious national threat.
While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over two
million lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has also
been the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.a

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (OOP) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, nicméně, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. Maroko, Libya, Tunisko, Jordán, Bahrain, Katar, Omán, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.