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исламот, Политичкиот ислам и Америка

Арапски Insight

Is “Brotherhood” with America Possible?

khalil al-anani

"Не постои можност за комуникација со било U.S. administration so long as the United States maintains its long-standing view of Islam as a real danger, a view that puts the United States in the same boat as the Zionist enemy. We have no pre-conceived notions concerning the American people or the U.S. society and its civic organizations and think tanks. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, chief of the political department of the Muslim Brotherhood in a phone interview.
Зборовите на Ал-Иријан ги сумираат ставовите на Муслиманското братство за американскиот народ и САД. влада. Другите членови на Муслиманското братство ќе се согласат, како што би починал Хасан ал Бана, кој ја основал групата во 1928. Ал- Бана гледаше на Западот претежно како симбол на моралното распаѓање. Другите салафи - исламска школа на мислата што се потпира на предците како примерни модели - го зазедоа истиот став за, но немаат идеолошка флексибилност што ја поддржува Муслиманското братство. Додека Муслиманското братство верува во ангажирање на Американците во граѓански дијалог, другите екстремистички групи не гледаат смисла во дијалогот и тврдат дека силата е единствениот начин за справување со Соединетите држави.

Исламизмот повторно се разгледа

МАХА Азам

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 години, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 јули 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

Исламот и Демократијата

ITAC

Ако некој чита печат или слуша коментатори за меѓународни прашања, често се вели - а уште почесто се подразбира, но не се вели - дека исламот не е компатибилен со демократијата. Во деведесеттите, Семјуел Хантингтон предизвика интелектуална бура кога го објави Судирот на цивилизациите и повторното создавање на светскиот поредок, во кој ги прикажува своите прогнози за светот – напишано големо. Во политичката сфера, тој забележува дека додека Турција и Пакистан може да имаат некое мало тврдење за „демократски легитимитет“, сите други „... муслиманските земји беа претежно недемократски: монархии, еднопартиски системи, воени режими, лични диктатури или некоја комбинација од нив, обично почива на ограничено семејство, клан, или племенска база“. Премисата на која се заснова неговиот аргумент е дека тие не само што „не се како нас“, тие всушност се спротивставени на нашите суштински демократски вредности. Тој верува, како и другите, дека додека на идејата за западна демократизација се пружа отпор во другите делови на светот, конфронтацијата е најзабележителна во оние региони каде што исламот е доминантна вера.
Расправијата е изнесена и од другата страна. Ирански религиозен научник, размислувајќи за уставната криза од почетокот на дваесеттиот век во неговата земја, изјави дека исламот и демократијата не се компатибилни затоа што луѓето не се еднакви и дека законодавното тело е непотребно поради инклузивната природа на исламскиот верски закон. Сличен став неодамна зазеде и Али Белхаџ, професор во средно училиште во Алжир, проповедник и (во овој контекст) лидер на ФИС, кога изјави дека „демократијата не е исламски концепт“. Можеби најдраматичната изјава за овој ефект беше онаа на Абу Мусаб ал-Заркави, лидер на сунитските бунтовници во Ирак кој, кога ќе се соочи со изгледите за избори, ја осуди демократијата како „зловен принцип“.
Но, според некои муслимански научници, демократијата останува важен идеал во исламот, со предупредување дека секогаш подлежи на верскиот закон. Акцентот на најважното место на шеријатот е елемент на речиси секој исламски коментар за управувањето, умерена или екстремистичка. Само ако владетелот, кој ја прима својата власт од Бога, ги ограничува неговите постапки на „надзор на управата на шеријатот“ дали тој треба да биде послушен. Ако прави поинаку од ова, тој е неверник и посветените муслимани треба да се побунат против него. Тука лежи оправдувањето за голем дел од насилството што го измачуваше муслиманскиот свет во такви борби како што преовладуваа во Алжир во текот на 90-тите

Исламска политичка култура, демократија, и Човекови права

Даниел Е. цена

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes

in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government

officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next

ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, сепак, is based primarily

on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies

of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention

that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,

can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country

specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help

us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the

countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the

connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,

democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much

emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first

use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay

between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Исламска политичка култура, демократија, и Човекови права

Даниел Е. цена

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the

values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, сепак, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages,

and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of

Islam on politics across eight nations.

Политичкиот ислам на Блискиот Исток

се Кнудсен

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, во

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. сепак, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

СТРАТЕГИИ ЗА ВКЛУЧУВАЊЕ НА ПОЛИТИЧКИОТ ИСЛАМ

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA Kadlec

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Сепак, САД. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Слично на тоа, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. U.S. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Јорданскиот исламски фронт за акција (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. Покрај тоа, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

исламистички партии : Три вида движења

Тамара Cofman

Помеѓу 1991 и 2001, светот на политичкиот ислам стана значително поразновиден. Денес, терминот „исламист“ - што се користи за да се опише политичка перспектива централно информирана од збир на религиозни толкувања и заложби - може да се примени на толку широк спектар на групи што е речиси бесмислено. Ги опфаќа сите, од терористите кои летаа со авиони во Светскиот трговски центар до мирно избраните законодавци во Кувајт кои гласаа за правото на глас на жените.
сепак, истакнатоста на исламистичките движења - легални и нелегални, насилни и мирни - во редовите на политичките опозиции низ арапскиот свет ја прави очигледна потребата од извлекување релевантни разлики. Религиозниот дискурс на исламистите сега е неизбежно централен во арапската политика. Конвенционалните политички дискусии ги означуваат исламистите или „умерени“ или „радикални“.,” генерално категоризирајќи ги според два прилично лабави и некорисни критериуми. Првиот е насилството: Радикалите го користат, а умерените не. Овде се поставува прашањето како да се класифицираат групите кои самите не се впуштаат во насилство, но кои одобруваат, оправда, или дури активно го поддржуваат насилството на другите. Секунда, само нешто порестриктивен критериум е дали станува збор за групи или поединци
прифатете ги правилата на демократската изборна игра. Народниот суверенитет не е мала отстапка за традиционалните исламисти, од кои многумина ги отфрлаат демократски избраните влади како узурпатори на Божјиот суверенитет.
Сепак, посветеноста на процедуралните правила на демократските избори не е исто што и посветеноста на демократската политика или владеење.

исламистички партии : Благодет или пропаст за демократијата?

Амр Hamzawy

Натан J. Браун

What role do Islamist movements play in Arab politics? With their popular messages and broad followings within Arab societies, would their incorporation as normal political actors be a boon for democratization or democracy’s bane? For too long, we have tried to answer such questions solely by speculating about the true intentions of these movements and their leaders. Islamist political movements in the Arab world are increasingly asked—both by outside observers and by members of their own societies—about their true intentions.
But to hear them tell it, leaders of mainstream Arab Islamist movements are not the problem. They see themselves as democrats in nondemocratic lands, firmly committed to clean and fair electoral processes, whatever outcomes these may bring. It is rulers and regimes that should be pressed to commit to democracy, say the Islamists, not their oppositions. We need not take such Islamist leaders at their word. Навистина, we should realize that there is only so much that any of their words can do to answer the question of the relationship between these movements and the prospects for democracy.
While their words are increasingly numerous (Islamist movements tend to be quite loquacious) and their answers about democracy increasingly specific, their ability to resolve all ambiguities is limited. прво, as long as they are out of power—as most of them are, and are likely to remain for some time—they will never fully prove themselves. Many Islamist leaders themselves probably do not know how they would act were they to come to power.

ИСЛАМИСТИЧКИ ДВИЖЕЊА И ДЕМОКРАТСКИ ПРОЦЕС ВО АРАПСКИОТ СВЕТ: Истражување на сивите зони

Натан J. Браун, Амр Hamzawy,

Марина Ottaway

Во текот на последната деценија, Исламистичките движења се етаблираа како главни политички играчи на Блискиот Исток. Заедно со владите, исламистички движења, умерено како и радикално, ќе определи како ќе се одвива политиката на регионот во догледна иднина. Тие покажаа способност не само да креираат пораки со широко распространета популарна привлечност, туку и, и што е најважно, да се создадат организации со вистински социјални основи и да се развијат кохерентни политички стратегии. Други партии,
во голема мера, не успеаја на сите сметки.
Јавноста на Запад и, особено, Соединетите држави, стана свесен за важноста на исламистичките движења дури по драматични настани, како што се револуцијата во Иран и атентатот на претседателот Анвар ал Садат во Египет. Вниманието е многу поодржливо по терористичките напади во септември 11, 2001. Како резултат, Исламистичките движења нашироко се сметаат за опасни и непријателски. Додека таквата карактеризација е точна во однос на организациите на радикалниот крај на исламистичкиот спектар, кои се опасни поради нивната подготвеност да прибегнуваат кон неселективно насилство во остварувањето на своите цели, тоа не е точна карактеризација на многуте групи кои се откажале или избегнале насилство. Бидејќи терористичките организации претставуваат непосредна
закана, сепак, креаторите на политиките во сите земји посветуваа непропорционално внимание на насилните организации.
Тоа се главните исламистички организации, не оние радикалните, што ќе има најголемо влијание врз идната политичка еволуција на Блискиот Исток. Грандиозните цели на радикалите за повторно воспоставување калифат кој ќе го обедини целиот арапски свет, или дури и наметнувањето на поединечни арапски земји закони и општествени обичаи инспирирани од фундаменталистичкото толкување на исламот едноставно се премногу далеку од денешната реалност за да се реализираат. Тоа не значи дека терористичките групи не се опасни - тие би можеле да предизвикаат голема загуба на животи дури и при извршување на невозможни цели - туку дека веројатно нема да го сменат лицето на Блискиот Исток. Главните исламистички организации се генерално поинаква работа. Тие веќе имаа силно влијание врз општествените обичаи во многу земји, запирање и менување на секуларистичките трендови и менување на начинот на кој многу Арапи се облекуваат и се однесуваат. И нивната непосредна политичка цел, да станат моќна сила со учество во нормалната политика на својата земја, не е невозможно. Веќе се реализира во земји како Мароко, Џордан, па дури и Египет, кој сè уште ги забранува сите исламистички политички организации, но сега има осумдесет и осум Муслимански браќа во Парламентот. Политика, не насилство, е она што им дава влијание на главните исламисти.

ИСЛАМИСТИЧКА РАДИКАЛИЗАЦИЈА

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

ИСЛАМ, ИСЛАМИСТИ, И ИЗБОРНИОТ ПРИНЦИП I НА БЛИСКИОТ ИСТОК

Џејмс Piscatori

For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing

number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated

a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western

European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess

their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own

rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,

with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow

for flexible politics and participatory government?

The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative

that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story

concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary

story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual

baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has

become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,

the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,

and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.

Политички ислам и европска надворешна политика

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Умерено муслиманско братство

Роберт S. аспект

Стивен Брук

The Muslim Brotherhood is the world’s oldest, largest, and most influential Islamist organization. It is also the most controversial,
condemned by both conventional opinion in the West and radical opinion in the Middle East. American commentators have called the Muslim Brothers “radical Islamists” and “a vital component of the enemy’s assault forcedeeply hostile to the United States.” Al Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri sneers at them for “lur[ing] thousands of young Muslim men into lines for electionsinstead of into the lines of jihad.” Jihadists loathe the Muslim Brotherhood (known in Arabic as al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) for rejecting global jihad and embracing democracy. These positions seem to make them moderates, the very thing the United States, short on allies in the Muslim world, seeks.
But the Ikhwan also assails U.S. надворешната политика, especially Washington’s support for Israel, and questions linger about its actual commitment to the democratic process. Over the past year, we have met with dozens of Brotherhood leaders and activists from Egypt, Франција, Џордан, Шпанија, Сирија,Тунис, and the United Kingdom.

Управување со исламскиот активизам: салафити, Муслиманското братство, и државната власт во Јордан

Фајсал Ghori

In his first book, Управување со исламскиот активизам, Quintan Wiktorowicz examines the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis through the lens of social movement theory. Unlike some political scientists who dismiss Islamic movements because of their informal networks, Wiktorowicz contends that social movement theory is an apt framework through which Islamic movements can be examined and studied. Во таа смисла, his work leads the field. Yet for all its promise, this book largely fails to deliver.
The book is divided into four primary sections, through which he tries to construct his conclusion: Jordanian political liberalization has occurred because of structural necessities, not because of its commitment to democratization. Покрај тоа, the state has been masterful in what he dubs the “management of collective action,” (p. 3) which has, for all practical purposes, stifled any real opposition. While his conclusion is certainly tenable, given his extensive fieldwork, the book is poorly organized and much of the evidence examined earlier in the work leaves many questions unanswered.

Што ги наведува гласачите да ја поддржат опозицијата под авторитаризам ?

Мајкл D.H. Робинс

Elections have become commonplace in most authoritarian states. While this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in reality elections play an important role in these regimes. While elections for positions of real power tend to be non-competitive, many
elections—including those for seemingly toothless parliaments—can be strongly contested.
The existing literature has focused on the role that elections play in supporting the regime. На пример, they can help let off steam, help the regime take the temperature of society, or can be used to help a dominant party know which individuals it should promote (Schedler 2002; Blaydes 2006). Сепак, while the literature has focused on the supply-side of elections in authoritarian states, there are relatively few systematic studies of voter behavior in these elections (see Lust-Okar 2006 for an exception). наместо, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995). While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. Всушност, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to
significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. Сепак, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the
режим.