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Islam, Islam polític i Amèrica
Insight àrab
És possible la "Fraternitat" amb Amèrica?
Khalil al-anani
"No hi ha cap possibilitat de comunicar-se amb cap dels Estats Units. l'administració sempre que els Estats Units mantinguin la seva visió de llarga data de l'islam com un perill real, una visió que posa els Estats Units en el mateix vaixell que l'enemic sionista. No tenim idees preconcebudes sobre el poble nord-americà o els EUA. societat i les seves organitzacions cíviques i grups de reflexió. No tenim cap problema per comunicar-nos amb el poble nord-americà, però no s'estan fent els esforços adequats per apropar-nos,” va dir el Dr. Issam al-Iryan, cap del departament polític dels Germans Musulmans en una entrevista telefònica.
Les paraules d'Al-Iryan resumeixen les opinions dels Germans Musulmans sobre el poble nord-americà i els EUA. govern. Altres membres dels Germans Musulmans hi estarien d'acord, com ho faria el difunt Hassan al-Banna, qui va fundar el grup a 1928. Al- Banna va veure Occident principalment com un símbol de decadència moral. Altres salafis, una escola de pensament islàmica que es basa en els avantpassats com a models exemplars, han pres la mateixa visió dels Estats Units., però no tenen la flexibilitat ideològica defensada pels Germans Musulmans. Mentre que els Germans Musulmans creuen en comprometre els nord-americans en el diàleg civil, altres grups extremistes no veuen sentit al diàleg i sostenen que la força és l'única manera de tractar amb els Estats Units.
| setembre 15, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Islamism revisited
MAHA Azzam
There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 anys, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 juliol 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.
| setembre 06, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Islam and Democracy
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
| setembre 04, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Islamic Political Culture, democràcia, and Human Rights
Daniel I. preu
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the
values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. conseqüentment, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, malgrat això, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democràcia, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, influències econòmiques, clivages ètnics,
i desenvolupament de la societat, to explain the variance in the influence of
Islam on politics across eight nations.
| agost 24, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Islamic Political Culture, democràcia, and Human Rights
Daniel I. preu
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the
values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes
in Muslim nations. conseqüentment, scholars, commentators, and government
officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next
ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, malgrat això, is based primarily
on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies
of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention
that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions,
can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country
specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help
us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the
countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam,
democràcia, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much
emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first
use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay
between Islamic groups and regimes, influències econòmiques, clivages ètnics,
i desenvolupament de la societat, to explain the variance in the influence of
Islam on politics across eight nations.
| agost 22, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Political Islam in the Middle East
són Knudsen
This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly
referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, en
particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may
be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report
reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East
(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and
that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been
engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up
arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is
widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even
Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political
parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. No obstant això, the Islamist
revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to
account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a
reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative
theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the
powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.
The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that
portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old
Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist
movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This
importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded
along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their
adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on
understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only
of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.
| agost 20, 2010 | Comentaris 0
STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM
SHADI HAMID
AMANDA ECOM
Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, Els EUA. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarly, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. i la UE tenen una sèrie de programes que aborden el desenvolupament econòmic i polític a la regió, entre ells la Iniciativa d'Associació per a l'Orient Mitjà. (MEPI), la Corporació del Desafiament del Mil·lenni (MCC), la Unió per la Mediterrània, i la Política Europea de Veïnatge (ENP) No obstant això, tenen poc a dir sobre com el repte de l'oposició política islamista s'ajusta als objectius regionals més amplis. nosaltres. i l'assistència i la programació de la democràcia de la UE es dirigeixen gairebé completament als propis governs autoritaris o a grups laics de la societat civil amb un suport mínim a les seves pròpies societats..
És el moment d'una reavaluació de les polítiques actuals. Des dels atemptats terroristes de setembre 11, 2001, el suport a la democràcia de l'Orient Mitjà ha assumit una importància més gran per als responsables polítics occidentals, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Mentrestant, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. A més, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
El futur de les relacions entre les nacions occidentals i l'Orient Mitjà pot estar determinat en gran mesura pel grau en què els primers impliquen els partits islamistes noviolents en un ampli diàleg sobre interessos i objectius compartits.. Hi ha hagut una proliferació recent d'estudis sobre el compromís amb els islamistes, però pocs aborden clarament el que pot suposar a la pràctica. Com Zoe Nautre, becari visitant al Consell Alemany de Relacions Exteriors, ho posa, "La UE està pensant en el compromís, però realment no sap com."1 Amb l'esperança d'aclarir la discussió, distingim entre tres nivells de “complicació,” cadascun amb diferents mitjans i finalitats: contactes de baix nivell, diàleg estratègic, i col·laboració.
| agost 19, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Islamist parties : Three kinds of movements
Tamara Cofman
Between 1991 i 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. avui, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
No obstant això, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.
| agost 18, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Partits islamistes : A boon or a bane for democracy?
Amr Hamzawy
Nathan J. marró
What role do Islamist movements play in Arab politics? With their popular messages and broad followings within Arab societies, would their incorporation as normal political actors be a boon for democratization or democracy’s bane? For too long, we have tried to answer such questions solely by speculating about the true intentions of these movements and their leaders. Islamist political movements in the Arab world are increasingly asked—both by outside observers and by members of their own societies—about their true intentions.
But to hear them tell it, leaders of mainstream Arab Islamist movements are not the problem. They see themselves as democrats in nondemocratic lands, firmly committed to clean and fair electoral processes, whatever outcomes these may bring. It is rulers and regimes that should be pressed to commit to democracy, say the Islamists, not their oppositions. We need not take such Islamist leaders at their word. Indeed, we should realize that there is only so much that any of their words can do to answer the question of the relationship between these movements and the prospects for democracy.
While their words are increasingly numerous (Islamist movements tend to be quite loquacious) and their answers about democracy increasingly specific, their ability to resolve all ambiguities is limited. Primer, as long as they are out of power—as most of them are, and are likely to remain for some time—they will never fully prove themselves. Many Islamist leaders themselves probably do not know how they would act were they to come to power.
| agost 18, 2010 | Comentaris 0
ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones
Nathan J. marró, Amr Hamzawy,
Marina Ottaway
During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Com a resultat, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, malgrat això, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, que tindrà el major impacte en la futura evolució política de l'Orient Mitjà. Els grandiosos objectius dels radicals de restablir un califat que uneixi tot el món àrab, o fins i tot d'imposar als països àrabs individuals lleis i costums socials inspirats en una interpretació fonamentalista de l'islam estan simplement massa allunyats de la realitat actual per ser realitzats.. Això no vol dir que els grups terroristes no siguin perillosos —podrien causar grans pèrdues de vides fins i tot en la recerca d'objectius impossibles—, sinó que és poc probable que canviïn la cara de l'Orient Mitjà.. Les organitzacions islamistes principals són generalment una qüestió diferent. Ja han tingut un impacte poderós en els costums socials de molts països, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordània, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. política, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.
| agost 18, 2010 | Comentaris 0
RADICALITZACIÓ ISLAMISTA
PREFACIO
RICHARD JOVES
MICHAEL EMERSON
Les qüestions relacionades amb l'islam polític continuen presentant reptes a les polítiques exteriors europees a l'Orient Mitjà i al nord d'Àfrica (MENA). A mesura que la política de la UE ha intentat fer front a aquests reptes durant l'última dècada aproximadament, l'islam polític mateix ha evolucionat. Els experts assenyalen la creixent complexitat i varietat de tendències dins de l'islam polític. Algunes organitzacions islamistes han reforçat el seu compromís amb les normes democràtiques i s'han compromès plenament a la pau, política nacional dominant. Altres continuen casats amb mitjans violents. I encara d'altres han derivat cap a una forma més quietista de l'islam, desvinculat de l'activitat política. L'islam polític a la regió MENA no presenta cap tendència uniforme per als responsables polítics europeus. El debat analític ha crescut al voltant del concepte de "radicalització". Això, al seu torn, ha generat investigacions sobre els factors que impulsen la "desradicalització", i a la inversa, 're-radicalització'. Gran part de la complexitat deriva de la visió generalitzada que aquests tres fenòmens es produeixen al mateix temps.. Fins i tot els termes en si són impugnats. Sovint s'ha assenyalat que la dicotomia moderat-radical no aconsegueix captar completament els matisos de les tendències dins de l'islam polític.. Alguns analistes també es queixen que parlar de "radicalisme" està carregat ideològicament. A nivell de terminologia, entenem que la radicalització s'associa a l'extremisme, però les opinions difereixen sobre la centralitat del seu contingut religiós-fundamentalista versus polític, i sobre si la voluntat de recórrer a la violència està implícita o no.
Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.
| agost 17, 2010 | Comentaris 0
ISLAM, ISLAMISTS, AND THE ELECTORAL PRINCIPLE I N THE MIDDLE EAST
James Piscatori
For an idea whose time has supposedly come, ÒdemocracyÓ masks an astonishing
number of unanswered questions and, in the Muslim world, has generated
a remarkable amount of heat. Is it a culturally specific term, reflecting Western
European experiences over several centuries? Do non-Western societies possess
their own standards of participation and accountabilityÑand indeed their own
rhythms of developmentÑwhich command attention, if not respect? Does Islam,
with its emphasis on scriptural authority and the centrality of sacred law, allow
for flexible politics and participatory government?
The answers to these questions form part of a narrative and counter-narrative
that themselves are an integral part of a contested discourse. The larger story
concerns whether or not ÒIslamÓ constitutes a threat to the West, and the supplementary
story involves IslamÕs compatibility with democracy. The intellectual
baggage, to change the metaphor, is scarcely neutral. The discussion itself has
become acutely politicised, caught in the related controversies over Orientalism,
the exceptionalism of the Middle East in particular and the Muslim world in general,
and the modernism of religious ÒfundamentalistÓ movements.
| agost 17, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Political Islam and European Foreign Policy
POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY
MICHAEL EMERSON
RICHARD JOVES
Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) ha desenvolupat una sèrie d'iniciatives polítiques, principalment la Política Europea de Veïnatge(ENP) que en principi es comprometen amb el diàleg i un compromís més profund de tots(no violent) actors polítics i organitzacions de la societat civil dels països àrabs. No obstant això, molts analistes i responsables polítics es queixen ara d'un cert trofeu tant en el debat conceptual com en el desenvolupament de polítiques. S'ha establert que l'islam polític és un panorama canviant, profundament afectat per una sèrie de circumstàncies, però el debat sovint sembla que s'ha quedat en la qüestió simplista de "els islamistes són democràtics".?No obstant això, molts analistes independents han defensat el compromís amb els islamistes, però l'acostament real entre els governs occidentals i les organitzacions islamistes segueix sent limitat .
| agost 17, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Els Germans Musulmans Moderats
Robert S. aspecte
Steven Brooke
Els Germans Musulmans són els més antics del món, més gran, i l'organització islamista més influent. També és el més polèmic,
condemnat tant per l'opinió convencional a Occident com per l'opinió radical a l'Orient Mitjà. Els comentaristes nord-americans han anomenat els Germans Musulmans "islamistes radicals" i "un component vital de la força d'assalt de l'enemic". … profundament hostil als Estats Units". Ayman al-Zawahiri d'Al Qaeda els burla per "lur[ing] milers de joves musulmans en files per a les eleccions … en lloc de cap a les línies de la gihad". Els gihadistes odien els Germans Musulmans (conegut en àrab com al-Ikhwan al-Muslimeen) per rebutjar la gihad global i abraçar la democràcia. Aquestes posicions semblen fer-los moderats, el mateix dels Estats Units, curt d'aliats al món musulmà, busca.
Però l'Ikhwan també ataca els EUA. política exterior, especialment el suport de Washington a Israel, i persisteixen preguntes sobre el seu compromís real amb el procés democràtic. Durant l'any passat, ens hem reunit amb desenes de líders i activistes de la Germandat d'Egipte, França, Jordània, Espanya, Síria,Tunísia, i el Regne Unit.
| agost 16, 2010 | Comentaris 0
The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, The Muslim Brotherhood, and State Power in Jordan
Faisal Ghori
In his first book, The Management of Islamic Activism, Quintan Wiktorowicz examines the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis through the lens of social movement theory. Unlike some political scientists who dismiss Islamic movements because of their informal networks, Wiktorowicz contends that social movement theory is an apt framework through which Islamic movements can be examined and studied. In this regard, his work leads the field. Yet for all its promise, this book largely fails to deliver.
The book is divided into four primary sections, through which he tries to construct his conclusion: Jordanian political liberalization has occurred because of structural necessities, not because of its commitment to democratization. A més, the state has been masterful in what he dubs the “management of collective action,” (p. 3) which has, for all practical purposes, stifled any real opposition. While his conclusion is certainly tenable, given his extensive fieldwork, the book is poorly organized and much of the evidence examined earlier in the work leaves many questions unanswered.
| agost 14, 2010 | Comentaris 0
What Leads Voters to Support the Opposition under Authoritarianism ?
Michael D.H.. Robbins
Elections have become commonplace in most authoritarian states. While this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in reality elections play an important role in these regimes. While elections for positions of real power tend to be non-competitive, many
elections—including those for seemingly toothless parliaments—can be strongly contested.
The existing literature has focused on the role that elections play in supporting the regime. Per exemple, they can help let off steam, help the regime take the temperature of society, or can be used to help a dominant party know which individuals it should promote (Schedler 2002; Blaydes 2006). Yet, while the literature has focused on the supply-side of elections in authoritarian states, there are relatively few systematic studies of voter behavior in these elections (see Lust-Okar 2006 for an exception). Rather, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995). While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. De fet, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to
significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. Yet, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the
regime.
| agost 14, 2010 | Comentaris 0
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