RSS中的所有條目 "伊斯蘭祈禱團" 類別



At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,伊朗, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, 埃及, 印度尼西亞,約旦, 科威特, 黎巴嫩,馬來西亞, 巴基斯坦, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence



Ibrahim al-Houdaiby

Muslim Brotherhood Guide Mohamed Mahdi Akef’s decision to step down at the end of his first term in January 2009 is an important milestone for the largest opposition group in Egypt for two reasons. 第一, whoever the successor is, he will not enjoy the same historical legitimacy as Akef, who joined the Brotherhood at an early stage and worked with its founder, 哈桑·班納. All of the potential replacements belong to another generation and lack the gravitas of Akef and his predecessors, which helped them resolve or at least postpone some organizational disputes. The second reason is that Akef, who presided over a major political opening of the group in which its various intellectual orientations were clearly manifested, has the ability to manage diversity. This has been clear in his relations with leaders of the organization’s different currents and generations and his ability to bridge gaps between them. No candidate for the post seems to possess this skill, except perhaps Deputy Guide Khairat al-Shater, whose chances seem nil because he is currently imprisoned.



Since September 11, the entire world has been acutely aware of the violent, terrorist face of political Islam. the network of organizations we most frequently think of as al-Qaeda represents a serious threat to the United States, other Western countries, governments of Muslim countries, and ordinary Muslims who abhor violence and would like to pursue their lives in peace. Because of the horrors violent Islamist groups have perpetrated and are unfortunately likely to continue perpetrating, there can be no debate about how the world should deal with them. they need to be tracked down and dismantled and their members brought to justice. To be sure, this will not be easy in practice, but it is clear what the world must strive to do.It is much less obvious how the international community should deal with the other face of the Islamist movement, the nonviolent face that Mustapha Kamal Al-Sayyid discusses in this working paper. this side is represented by political movements that acknowledge that they are inspired by Islamic principles and yet claim that they want to attain their goals by peaceful means, competing for power democratically with non-Islamist political parties. this side of the Islamist movements is often ignored in current debates, but it is important and becoming ever more so. the electoral victory by the Justice and Development Party in Turkey in November 2002 is one sign of the growing importance of this face of Islamism; so is the open repudiation of violence by one of Egypt’s most important and heretofore most radical Islamist movements. the reasons for this repudiation are explained in four recently published and as yet untranslated books that Mustapha Al-Sayyid discusses in this paper.this more moderate face of the Islamist movements poses a major policy dilemma for the international community. Should the claims of nonviolence by these movements be believed and thus the movements be accepted as legitimate participants in democratic politics? Have such groups really changed their goals, abandoned the idea of building an Islamic state ruled by shari’a, and accepted democracy? Or are they simply seeking to take advantage of the democratic political space that exists in some Muslim countries to win power and then impose a political system that denies democracy and the respect of human rights? 換句話說, have such movements simply embraced democracy as a tactic for obtaining power, or are they truly willing to accept pluralism and the protection of individual human rights as a permanent feature of the political system?Like the similar questions that were once asked about Communist parties that appeared to abandon their revolutionary agenda in favor of democratic politics, these are issues that can never be settled once and for all in the abstract but can only be answered as organizations continue to evolve in response to political circumstances. Mustapha Al-Sayyid’s paper cannot tell us how far these Islamist groups now embracing nonviolence and democratic politics will go in their transformation. It does tell us, 然而, about the changes taking place in some Islamist movements and about the growing importance of the other face of Islamism.


Alex Glennie

Since the terror attacks of 11 九月 2001 there has been an explosion of interest inpolitical Islamism in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region. Until fairly recently,analysts have understandably focused on those actors that operate at the violent end of theIslamist spectrum, including Al-Qaeda, the Taliban, some of the sectarian parties in Iraq andpolitical groups with armed wings like Hamas in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT)and Hezbollah in Lebanon.However, this has obscured the fact that across the MENA region contemporary politics arebeing driven and shaped by a much more diverse collection of ‘mainstream’ Islamistmovements. We define these asgroups that engage or seek to engage in the legal political processes oftheir countries and that have publicly eschewed the use of violence tohelp realise their objectives at the national level, even where they arediscriminated against or repressed.This definition would encompass groups like the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, the Party ofJustice and Development (PJD) in Morocco and the Islamic Action Front (印度空軍) in Jordan.These non-violent Islamist movements or parties often represent the best organised andmost popular element of the opposition to the existing regimes in each country, and as suchthere has been increasing interest on the part of western policymakers in the role that theymight play in democracy promotion in the region. Yet discussions on this issue appear tohave stalled on the question of whether it would be appropriate to engage with these groupson a more systematic and formal basis, rather than on the practicalities of actually doing so.This attitude is partly linked to a justifiable unwillingness to legitimise groups that mighthold anti-democratic views on women’s rights, political pluralism and a range of other issues.It also reflects pragmatic considerations about the strategic interests of western powers inthe MENA region that are perceived to be threatened by the rising popularity and influenceof Islamists. 對於他們來說, Islamist parties and movements have shown a clear reluctance toforge closer ties with those western powers whose policies in the region they stronglyoppose, not least for fear of how the repressive regimes they operate within might react.This project’s focus on non-violent political Islamist movements should not be misinterpretedas implicit support for their political agendas. Committing to a strategy of more deliberateengagement with mainstream Islamist parties would involve significant risks and tradeoffs forNorth American and European policymakers. 然而, we do take the position that thetendency of both sides to view engagement as a zero sum ‘all or nothing’ game has beenunhelpful, and needs to change if a more constructive dialogue around reform in the MiddleEast and North Africa is to emerge.



The Global Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Europe since 1960 when SaidRamadan, the grandson of Hassan Al-Banna, founded a mosque in Munich.1 Since that time,Brotherhood organizations have been established in almost all of the EU countries, as well asnon-EU countries such as Russia and Turkey. Despite operating under other names, some ofthe organizations in the larger countries are recognized as part of the global MuslimBrotherhood. 例如, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) isgenerally regarded as part of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. The network is alsobecoming known in some of the smaller countries such as the Netherlands, where a recentNEFA Foundation report detailed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in that country.2Neighboring Belgium has also become an important center for the Muslim Brotherhood inEurope. A 2002 report by the Intelligence Committee of the Belgian Parliament explainedhow the Brotherhood operates in Belgium:“The State Security Service has been following the activities of the InternationalMuslim Brotherhood in Belgium since 1982. The International MuslimBrotherhood has had a clandestine structure for nearly 20 年份. The identityof the members is secret; they operate in the greatest discretion. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,在這種情況下, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.



This article examines the emergence and growth of the Muslim Brotherhood inEgypt from the 1930s through the 1950s. It begins by outlining and empirically evaluatingpossible explanations for the organization’s growth based on (1) theories of politicalIslam and (2) the concept of political opportunity structure in social movementtheory. An extension of these approaches is suggested based on data from organizationaldocuments and declassiŽed U.S. State Department Žles from the period. Thesuccessful mobilization of the Muslim Brotherhood was possible because of the wayin which its Islamic message was tied to its organizational structure, activities, andstrategies and the everyday lives of Egyptians. The analysis suggests that ideas areintegrated into social movements in more ways than the concept of framing allows.It also expands our understanding of how organizations can arise in highly repressiveenvironments.

庫特布主義: 伊斯蘭法西斯主義的意識形態

DALEç. Eikmeier

The recently published National Military Strategic Plan for the War onTerrorism (NMSP-WOT) is to be commended for identifying “ideology”as al Qaeda’s center of gravity.1 The identification of an ideology as thecenter of gravity rather than an individual or group is a significant shift froma“capture and kill” philosophy to a strategy focused on defeating the rootcause of Islamic terrorism. 因此, the plan’s principal focus is on attackingand countering an ideology that fuels Islamic terrorism. 很遺憾,the NMSP-WOT fails to identify the ideology or suggest ways tocounter it. The plan merely describes the ideology as “extremist.” This descriptioncontributes little to the public’s understanding of the threat or to thecapabilities of the strategist who ultimately must attack and defeat it. The intentof this article is to identify the ideology of the Islamic terrorists and recommendhow to successfully counter it.Sun Tzuwisely said, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundredbattles you will never be in peril.”2 Our success in theWar on Terrorismdepends on knowingwho the enemy is and understanding his ideology.While characterizing and labeling an enemymay serve such a purpose, it is only usefulif the labels are clearly defined and understood. Otherwise, overly broadcharacterizations obscure our ability to truly “know the enemy,” they diffuseefforts, and place potential allies and neutrals in the enemy’s camp. 很遺憾,theWar on Terrorism’s use of labels contributes a great deal to themisunderstandingsassociated with the latter. The fact is, five years after 9/11 theNMSP-WOT provides little specific guidance, other than labeling the enemyas extremist.3 This inability to focus on the specific threat and its supportingphilosophy reflects our own rigid adherence to political correctness and is beingexploited bymilitant Islamists portraying these overly broad descriptionsas a war against Islam.As David F. Forte states “Wemust not fail . . . to distinguishbetween the homicidal revolutionaries like bin Laden and mainstreamMuslim believers.



安東尼H. 科德斯曼

恐怖主義和不對稱戰爭並不是中東軍事平衡的新特徵, 和伊斯蘭教
極端主義並非極端主義暴力的唯一根源. 存在許多嚴重的種族和宗派差異
在中東, 這些長期以來導致了特定國家內的零星暴力, 有時也會向主要民事部門
衝突. 也門內戰和阿曼佐法爾叛亂就是例子, 正如悠久的民事歷史一樣
阿薩德. 巴勒斯坦解放組織的崛起 (巴解組織) 9月導致約旦內戰
1970. 伊朗革命於 1979 隨後發生了嚴重的政治鬥爭, 並努力輸出神權政治
引發兩伊戰爭的革命. 巴林和沙烏地阿拉伯之間都曾發生內戰
還有, 然而, 該地區伊斯蘭極端主義暴力活動由來已久, 有時受到鼓勵
這些政權後來成為他們最初支持的伊斯蘭主義者的目標. 薩達特試圖利用伊斯蘭教
與以色列的和平協議. 以色列認為贊助伊斯蘭運動是安全的 1967 作為對
巴解組織, 卻看到暴力反以色列團體迅速崛起. 北也門和南葉門是
1960年代初以來的政變與內戰, 最終導致也門崩潰的是南也門的內戰
其政權的推翻及其與北葉門的合併 1990.
國王的倒台導致伊斯蘭主義者在伊朗掌權, 並引發了對蘇聯入侵阿富汗的抵抗
伊斯蘭主義的反應仍然影響著中東和整個伊斯蘭世界. 沙烏地阿拉伯必須應對
麥加大清真寺發生起義 1979. 這次起義的宗教特徵有許多共同點
蘇聯從阿富汗撤軍和海灣戰爭後發生的運動 1991.
阿爾及利亞努力鎮壓伊斯蘭政黨在民主選舉中的勝利 1992 隨後是
一場從那時起就一直持續的內戰. 埃及與自己的伊斯蘭教進行了一場長期且基本上成功的戰鬥
1990年代的極端分子, 但埃及只是鎮壓了這類運動,而不是根除
他們. 在阿拉伯世界的其他地區, 科索沃和波士尼亞的內戰造就了新的伊斯蘭極端主義幹部.
沙烏地阿拉伯此前曾遭受兩次重大恐怖攻擊 2001. 這些攻擊針對國民警衛隊
胡拜爾的訓練中心和美國空軍軍營, 至少有一個似乎是伊斯蘭教的結果
極端分子. 摩洛哥, 利比亞, 突尼斯, 約旦, 巴林, 卡塔爾, 阿曼, 和葉門都看到了強硬的伊斯蘭主義者
雖然不直接屬於該地區, 蘇丹已經打了一場長達 15 年的內戰,造成的損失可能超過兩年
百萬生命, 這場戰爭得到了阿拉伯北部強硬伊斯蘭分子的支持. 索馬利亞也有
自那時以來一直是內戰現場 1991 這使得伊斯蘭組織得以在該國活動。a

恐怖主義和不對稱戰爭並不是中東軍事平衡的新特徵, 伊斯蘭極端主義並不是極端主義暴力的唯一根源. 中東地區存在著許多嚴重的民族和宗派差異, 這些長期以來導致了特定國家內的零星暴力, 有時會導致重大國內衝突. 也門內戰和阿曼佐法爾叛亂就是例子, 黎巴嫩內戰的悠久歷史以及敘利亞對反對哈菲茲·阿薩德政權的伊斯蘭政治團體的暴力鎮壓也是如此. 巴勒斯坦解放組織的崛起 (巴解組織) 1970年9月導致約旦內戰. 伊朗革命於 1979 隨後發生了嚴重的政治鬥爭, 並努力輸出導致兩伊戰爭的神權革命. 巴林和沙烏地阿拉伯的遜尼派統治菁英和敵對的什葉派之間都曾發生內戰,這些衝突導致了沙烏地阿拉伯的嚴重暴力事件。, 然而, 該地區伊斯蘭極端主義暴力活動由來已久, 有時會受到政權的鼓勵,這些政權後來成為他們最初支持的伊斯蘭主義者的目標. 薩達特試圖利用伊斯蘭運動來對抗他在埃及的世俗反對派,結果在他與以色列達成和平協議後被一場這樣的運動暗殺. 以色列認為贊助伊斯蘭運動是安全的 1967 作為巴解組織的反制, 卻看到暴力反以色列團體迅速崛起. 自 1960 年代初以來,北也門和南葉門一直是政變和內戰的發生地, 南也門的內戰最終導致其政權垮台,並於 1990 年與北也門合併。國王的倒台導致伊斯蘭主義者在伊朗掌權, 對蘇聯入侵阿富汗的抵抗引發了伊斯蘭主義的反應,至今仍影響著中東和整個伊斯蘭世界. 沙烏地阿拉伯不得不應對麥加大清真寺的起義 1979. 這次起義的宗教性質與 1991 年蘇聯從阿富汗撤軍和海灣戰爭後發生的運動有許多共同點。阿爾及利亞努力鎮壓伊斯蘭政黨在民主選舉中的勝利 1992 隨後發生了一場持續至今的內戰. 1990 年代,埃及與其本國的伊斯蘭極端分子進行了一場長期且基本成功的戰鬥, 但埃及只是壓制了這類運動,而不是根除它們. 在阿拉伯世界的其他地區, 科索沃和波斯尼亞內戰造就了新的伊斯蘭極端主義幹部。沙烏地阿拉伯此前曾遭受兩次重大恐怖攻擊 2001. 這些攻擊襲擊了胡拜爾的國民警衛隊訓練中心和美國空軍軍營, 至少其中一個似乎是伊斯蘭極端分子造成的. 摩洛哥, 利比亞, 突尼斯, 約旦, 巴林, 卡塔爾, 阿曼, 和也門都看到強硬的伊斯蘭運動成為嚴重的國家威脅。雖然不直接屬於該地區, 蘇丹經歷了長達 15 年的內戰,可能造成超過 200 萬人喪生, 這場戰爭得到了阿拉伯北部強硬伊斯蘭分子的支持. 自建國以來索馬利亞也一直處於內戰現場 1991 這使得伊斯蘭組織能夠在該國活動.




儘管最近學術界和民眾都將注意力集中在暴力跨國伊斯蘭恐怖網絡上,伊斯蘭運動眾多. 這種多樣性給學者帶來了兩個難題. 第一個難題是要理解為什麼作為對世俗民族國家建立的反應而形成的面向家庭的伊斯蘭運動將其活動和目標轉移到多層跨國空間上. 第二個難題是要理解為什麼目標和目標相似的群體在“跨國”時採用不同的使用暴力或非暴力的策略。本文將要解決的兩個主要問題是: 為什麼伊斯蘭運動走向跨國? 和, 他們為何在跨國化時採取不同的形式? 第一, 我認為,跨國層面為伊斯蘭運動提供了新的政治場所,伊斯蘭運動在國內的主張受到限制. 第二, 我認為跨國化在跨國層面上為群體帶來了關於身份和主張的不確定性. 所採用的媒介, 即. 使用暴力與非暴力, 取決於跨國化的類型, 演員在跨國層面遇到, 和領導對運動下一步走向的解釋. 回答我的問題, 我來看四種情況: (1) 土耳其伊斯蘭教, (2) 穆斯林兄弟會, (3) 伊斯蘭祈禱團, 和 (4) 塔比吉·賈瑪(Tablighi Jamaat)