RSSهمه ورودی ها در "جماعت اسلامی" دسته بندی

POLITICAL ISLAM and the West

JOHN L.ESPOSITO


At the dawn of the 21st centurypolitical Islam, ormore commonly Islamicfundamentalism, remainsa major presence in governments andoppositional politics from North Africato Southeast Asia. New Islamic republicshave emerged in Afghanistan,ایران, and Sudan. Islamists have beenelected to parliaments, served in cabinets,and been presidents, prime ministers,and deputy prime ministers innations as diverse as Algeria, مصر, اندونزی,اردن, Kuwait, لبنان,مالزی, پاکستان, and Yemen. At thesame time opposition movements andradical extremist groups have sought todestabilize regimes in Muslim countriesand the West. Americans have witnessedattacks on their embassies fromKenya to Pakistan. Terrorism abroadhas been accompanied by strikes ondomestic targets such as the WorldTrade Center in New York. In recentyears, Saudi millionaire Osama binLaden has become emblematic of effortsto spread international violence

Arab reform bulletin

Arab reform bulletin

Ibrahim al-Houdaiby

Muslim Brotherhood Guide Mohamed Mahdi Akef’s decision to step down at the end of his first term in January 2009 is an important milestone for the largest opposition group in Egypt for two reasons. First, whoever the successor is, he will not enjoy the same historical legitimacy as Akef, who joined the Brotherhood at an early stage and worked with its founder, حسن البنا. All of the potential replacements belong to another generation and lack the gravitas of Akef and his predecessors, which helped them resolve or at least postpone some organizational disputes. The second reason is that Akef, who presided over a major political opening of the group in which its various intellectual orientations were clearly manifested, has the ability to manage diversity. This has been clear in his relations with leaders of the organization’s different currents and generations and his ability to bridge gaps between them. No candidate for the post seems to possess this skill, except perhaps Deputy Guide Khairat al-Shater, whose chances seem nil because he is currently imprisoned.

WORKING PAPERS

مصطفی کامل السید

Since September 11, the entire world has been acutely aware of the violent, terrorist face of political Islam. the network of organizations we most frequently think of as al-Qaeda represents a serious threat to the United States, other Western countries, governments of Muslim countries, and ordinary Muslims who abhor violence and would like to pursue their lives in peace. Because of the horrors violent Islamist groups have perpetrated and are unfortunately likely to continue perpetrating, there can be no debate about how the world should deal with them. they need to be tracked down and dismantled and their members brought to justice. To be sure, this will not be easy in practice, but it is clear what the world must strive to do.It is much less obvious how the international community should deal with the other face of the Islamist movement, the nonviolent face that Mustapha Kamal Al-Sayyid discusses in this working paper. this side is represented by political movements that acknowledge that they are inspired by Islamic principles and yet claim that they want to attain their goals by peaceful means, competing for power democratically with non-Islamist political parties. this side of the Islamist movements is often ignored in current debates, but it is important and becoming ever more so. the electoral victory by the Justice and Development Party in Turkey in November 2002 is one sign of the growing importance of this face of Islamism; so is the open repudiation of violence by one of Egypt’s most important and heretofore most radical Islamist movements. the reasons for this repudiation are explained in four recently published and as yet untranslated books that Mustapha Al-Sayyid discusses in this paper.this more moderate face of the Islamist movements poses a major policy dilemma for the international community. Should the claims of nonviolence by these movements be believed and thus the movements be accepted as legitimate participants in democratic politics? Have such groups really changed their goals, abandoned the idea of building an Islamic state ruled by shari’a, and accepted democracy? Or are they simply seeking to take advantage of the democratic political space that exists in some Muslim countries to win power and then impose a political system that denies democracy and the respect of human rights? به عبارت دیگر, have such movements simply embraced democracy as a tactic for obtaining power, or are they truly willing to accept pluralism and the protection of individual human rights as a permanent feature of the political system?Like the similar questions that were once asked about Communist parties that appeared to abandon their revolutionary agenda in favor of democratic politics, these are issues that can never be settled once and for all in the abstract but can only be answered as organizations continue to evolve in response to political circumstances. Mustapha Al-Sayyid’s paper cannot tell us how far these Islamist groups now embracing nonviolence and democratic politics will go in their transformation. It does tell us, با این حال, about the changes taking place in some Islamist movements and about the growing importance of the other face of Islamism.

پل ساختمان دیوار

الکس گلنی

از زمان حملات تروریستی 11 سپتامبر 2001 در خاورمیانه و شمال آفریقا انفجار مورد علاقه اسلام گرایی غیرمذهبی رخ داده است (منا) منطقه. تا همین اواخر,تحلیلگران به طور واضح روی آن دسته از بازیگرانی که در پایان خشونت طیف اسلام گرایی فعالیت می کنند متمرکز شده اند, از جمله القاعده, طالبان, برخی از احزاب فرقه ای در عراق و گروه های سیاسی با بال های مسلح مانند حماس در سرزمین های اشغالی فلسطین (OPT)و حزب الله در لبنان, این واقعیت را مبهم کرده است که سیاست های معاصر در سراسر منطقه MENA توسط مجموعه ای بسیار متنوع تر از جریانات "جریان اصلی" اسلامی هدایت و شکل گرفته است.. ما این گروه ها را تعریف می کنیم که درگیر مشارکت و یا درگیری برای مشارکت در پروسه های سیاسی قانونی کشور های آنها هستند و در استفاده عموم از خشونت ها از اهداف خود در سطح ملی آگاه شده اند., حتی در مواردی که آنها بر علیه یا سرکوب شده تبعیض قائل هستند. این تعریف شامل گروه هایی مانند اخوان المسلمین در مصر می شود, حزب عدالت و توسعه (حزب عدالت و توسعه) در مراکش و جبهه اقدام اسلامی (IAF) در اردن. این جنبش ها یا احزاب غیر خشونت آمیز اسلامی اغلب نمایانگر بهترین سازمان یافته ترین و محبوب ترین عنصر مخالفت با رژیم های موجود در هر کشور هستند, و از آنجا که موجبات توجه سیاستگذاران غربی به نقشی که آنها می توانند در ارتقاء دموکراسی در منطقه بازی کنند ، افزایش یافته است.. با این حال ، به نظر می رسد که بحث در مورد این موضوع در مورد این سوال که آیا مناسب است با این گروه ها ارتباط مستقیمی و رسمی تر برقرار شود ، متوقف شده است, این نگرش تا حدودی با عدم تمایل به توجیه مشروعیت گروه هایی که ممکن است دیدگاه های ضد دموکراتیک در مورد حقوق زنان داشته باشند مرتبط است., کثرت گرایی سیاسی و طیف وسیعی از موضوعات دیگر. این همچنین ملاحظات عمل گرایانه در مورد منافع استراتژیک قدرت های غربی در منطقه منا را منعکس می کند که به نظر می رسد با افزایش محبوبیت و نفوذ اسلامگرایان مورد تهدید قرار می گیرند.. از طرف آنها, احزاب و جنبش های اسلام گرایانه ، نسبت به روابط نزدیک با آن دسته از قدرت های غربی که سیاست هایشان را در منطقه به شدت محاصره می کنند ، تمایلی آشکار نشان داده اند., نه تنها از ترس از چگونگی واکنش رژیمهای سرکوبگرانه در درون آنها. این تمرکز پروژه بر جنبشهای سیاسی غیر خشونت آمیز اسلامی نباید به غلط تفسیر شود بلکه حمایت ضمنی از برنامه های سیاسی آنها. تعهد به استراتژی مناسب تر برای تعامل با احزاب اصلی اسلامگرایانه ، خطرات و مبادلات قابل توجهی را برای سیاستگذاران آمریکایی و اروپایی شمالی دربر خواهد داشت.. با این حال, ما این موضع را اتخاذ می کنیم که تمایل هر دو طرف برای مشاهده تعامل به عنوان مبلغ صفر "همه یا هیچ چیز" بازی کمکی بوده است, و در صورت بروز گفتگوی سازنده تر در مورد اصلاحات در خاورمیانه و شمال آفریقا ، باید تغییر یابد.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Belgium

استیو Merley,
تحلیلگر ارشد


The Global Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Europe since 1960 when SaidRamadan, the grandson of Hassan Al-Banna, founded a mosque in Munich.1 Since that time,Brotherhood organizations have been established in almost all of the EU countries, as well asnon-EU countries such as Russia and Turkey. Despite operating under other names, some ofthe organizations in the larger countries are recognized as part of the global MuslimBrotherhood. For example, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) isgenerally regarded as part of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. The network is alsobecoming known in some of the smaller countries such as the Netherlands, where a recentNEFA Foundation report detailed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in that country.2Neighboring Belgium has also become an important center for the Muslim Brotherhood inEurope. A 2002 report by the Intelligence Committee of the Belgian Parliament explainedhow the Brotherhood operates in Belgium:“The State Security Service has been following the activities of the InternationalMuslim Brotherhood in Belgium since 1982. The International MuslimBrotherhood has had a clandestine structure for nearly 20 years. The identityof the members is secret; they operate in the greatest discretion. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, اجتماعی, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,in this context, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

بسیج اسلامی

زیاد مانسون

این مقاله به بررسی ظهور و رشد اخوان المسلمین در مصر از دهه 1930 تا 1950 می پردازد.. با ترسیم و ارزیابی تجربی توضیحات ممکن برای رشد سازمان بر اساس (1) نظریه های اسلام سیاسی و (2) مفهوم ساختار فرصت سیاسی در نظریه جنبش اجتماعی. گسترش این رویکردها بر اساس داده های اسناد سازمانی و طبقه بندی شده ایالات متحده پیشنهاد شده است.. وزارت امور خارجه از این دوره. بسیج موفق اخوان المسلمین به دلیل پیوند پیام اسلامی آن با ساختار سازمانی آن امکان پذیر شد., فعالیت ها, و استراتژی ها و زندگی روزمره مصری ها. این تحلیل نشان می‌دهد که ایده‌ها به روش‌هایی بیشتر از آنچه که مفهوم چارچوب‌بندی اجازه می‌دهد در جنبش‌های اجتماعی ادغام می‌شوند. همچنین درک ما را از اینکه چگونه سازمان‌ها می‌توانند در محیط‌های به شدت سرکوب‌گر پدید آیند را گسترش می‌دهد..

Qutbism: An Ideology of Islamic-Fascism

DALE C. Eikmeier

The recently published National Military Strategic Plan for the War onTerrorism (NMSP-WOT) is to be commended for identifying “ideology”as al Qaeda’s center of gravity.1 The identification of an ideology as thecenter of gravity rather than an individual or group is a significant shift froma“capture and kill” philosophy to a strategy focused on defeating the rootcause of Islamic terrorism. Accordingly, the plan’s principal focus is on attackingand countering an ideology that fuels Islamic terrorism. Unfortunately,the NMSP-WOT fails to identify the ideology or suggest ways tocounter it. The plan merely describes the ideology as “extremist.” This descriptioncontributes little to the public’s understanding of the threat or to thecapabilities of the strategist who ultimately must attack and defeat it. The intentof this article is to identify the ideology of the Islamic terrorists and recommendhow to successfully counter it.Sun Tzuwisely said, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundredbattles you will never be in peril.”2 Our success in theWar on Terrorismdepends on knowingwho the enemy is and understanding his ideology.While characterizing and labeling an enemymay serve such a purpose, it is only usefulif the labels are clearly defined and understood. Otherwise, overly broadcharacterizations obscure our ability to truly “know the enemy,” they diffuseefforts, and place potential allies and neutrals in the enemy’s camp. Unfortunately,theWar on Terrorism’s use of labels contributes a great deal to themisunderstandingsassociated with the latter. The fact is, five years after 9/11 theNMSP-WOT provides little specific guidance, other than labeling the enemyas extremist.3 This inability to focus on the specific threat and its supportingphilosophy reflects our own rigid adherence to political correctness and is beingexploited bymilitant Islamists portraying these overly broad descriptionsas a war against Islam.As David F. Forte states “Wemust not fail . . . to distinguishbetween the homicidal revolutionaries like bin Laden and mainstreamMuslim believers.

The Muslim Brotherhood

Terrorist and Extremist Movements in the Middle East

Anthony H. Cordesman

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamic
extremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differences
in the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civil
conflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civil
war in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-
Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (سازمان آزادی بخش فلسطین) led to a civil war in Jordan in September
1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocratic
revolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between their
Sunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.
There also, با این حال, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged by
regimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamic
movements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after his
peace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to the
سازمان آزادی بخش فلسطین, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene of
coups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapse
of its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.
The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered
an Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal with
an uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elements
of the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.
Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed by
a civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamic
extremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicated
them. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.
Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National Guard
Training center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamic
extremists. مراکش, Libya, تونس, اردن, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamist
movements become a serious national threat.
While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over two
million lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has also
been the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.a

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (سازمان آزادی بخش فلسطین) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, با این حال, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. مراکش, Libya, تونس, اردن, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.

Islamic Movements and the Use of Violence:

اسن Kirdis

.


Despite recent academic and popular focus on violent transnational Islamic terrorist networks,there is a multiplicity of Islamic movements. This multiplicity presents scholars with two puzzles. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? First, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Second, I argue that transnationalization creates uncertainty for groups about their identity and claims at the transnational level. The medium adopted, i.e. use of violence versus non-violence, is dependent on type of transnationalization, the actors encounter at the transnational level, and leadership’s interpretations on where the movement should go next. To answer my questions, I will look at four cases: (1) Turkish Islam, (2) اخوان المسلمین, (3) جماعت اسلامی, و (4) Tablighi Jamaat