L-Iskrizzjonijiet kollha fil- "Jemaah Islamiyah" Kategorija
L-Għarab Għarbi
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
Ottubru 6, 1981, kien maħsub li jkun jum ta’ ċelebrazzjoni fl-Eġittu. Immarka l-anniversarju tal-akbar mument ta’ rebħa tal-Eġittu fi tliet kunflitti Għarab-Iżraeljani, meta l-armata underdog tal-pajjiż imbuttat tul il-Kanal ta 'Suez fil-ġranet tal-ftuħ tal- 1973 Il-Gwerra ta’ Yom Kippur u bagħtet truppi Iżraeljani tkebbib f’irtir. Fuq jibred, filgħodu bla sħab, l-istadium tal-Kajr kien ippakkjat bil-familji Eġizzjani li kienu ġew biex jaraw il-militar jissawwab il-hardware tiegħu.Fuq l-istand tar-reviżjoni, President Anwar el-Sadat,il-perit tal-gwerra, raw b'sodisfazzjon kif irġiel u magni parad quddiemu. Kont fil-qrib, korrispondent barrani li għadu kif wasal.F’daqqa waħda, wieħed mit-trakkijiet tal-armata waqaf direttament quddiem l-istand tar-reviżjoni eżatt kif sitt ġettijiet Mirage ħarġu fuq rashom fi prestazzjoni akrobatika, pittura s-sema bi traċċi twal aħmar, isfar, vjola,u duħħan aħdar. Sadat qam bil-wieqfa, milli jidher qed jipprepara biex jiskambja tislima ma’ kontinġent ieħor ta’ truppi Eġizzjani. Huwa għamel lilu nnifsu mira perfetta għal erba’ assassini Iżlamiċi li qabżu minn fuq it-trakk, daħlet fuq il-podju, u mifni ġismu bil-balal. Hekk kif il-qattiela komplew għal dik li dehret eternità biex isprejjaw l-istand bin-nar fatali tagħhom, Jien ikkunsidrajt għal instant jekk għandux nolqot l-art u nirriskjax li niġi maqtula sal-mewt minn spettaturi ippanikjati jew jekk nibqax bil-mixi u nirriskja li nieħu balla mitlufa. L-istint qalli biex nibqa’ fuq saqajja, u s-sens ta’ dmir ġurnalistiku tiegħi ġegħluni biex immur insir naf jekk Sadat kienx ħaj jew mejjet.
Iżlam, Iżlam politiku u l-Amerika
Għarfien Għarbi
Hija "Fratellanza" ma 'l-Amerika Possibbli?
khalil al-anani
Partiti tal-Oppożizzjoni Iżlamiċi u l-Potenzjal għall-Impenn tal-UE
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Sayyid Qutb: The Karl Marx of the Islamic Revolution
Leslie Evans
għaliex m'hemmx demokraziji Għarab ?
Larry Diamond
Talba taċ-Ċentru: Islam politiku fi Transizzjoni
John L. Esposito
Fl-Islam politiku tad-disgħinijiet, dak li xi wħud isejħu “Fundamentaliżmu Iżlamiku,” jibqa’ preżenza ewlenija fil-gvern u fil-politika ta’ oppożizzjoni mill-Afrika ta’ Fuq sax-Xlokk tal-Asja. L-Iżlam politiku fil-poter u fil-politika qajjem ħafna kwistjonijiet u mistoqsijiet: “L-Islam huwa antitetiku għall-modernizzazzjoni?,” “L-Islam u d-demokrazija huma inkompatibbli?,” “X'inhuma l-implikazzjonijiet ta' gvern Iżlamiku għall-pluraliżmu, minoranzi u d-drittijiet tan-nisa,” “Kemm huma rappreżentattivi l-Iżlamisti,” “Hemm moderati Iżlamiċi?,” “Jekk il-Punent jibża' theddida Iżlamika transnazzjonali jew kunflitt taċ-ċiviltajiet?” Rivaliżmu Iżlamiku Kontemporanju Il-pajsaġġ tad-dinja Musulmana llum jiżvela l-emerġenza ta’ repubbliki Iżlamiċi ġodda (Iran, Is-Sudan, Afganistan), il-proliferazzjoni ta' movimenti Iżlamiċi li jiffunzjonaw bħala atturi politiċi u soċjali ewlenin fi ħdan is-sistemi eżistenti, u l-politika ta’ konfrontazzjoni ta’ estremisti vjolenti radikali._ B’kuntrast mas-snin tmenin meta l-Iżlam politiku kien sempliċement assimilat mal-Iran rivoluzzjonarju jew gruppi klandestini b’ismijiet bħall-Ġiħad Iżlamika jew l-Armata ta’ Alla., id-dinja Musulmana fis-snin disgħin hija waħda li fiha l-Iżlamisti pparteċipaw fil-proċess elettorali u huma viżibbli bħala Prim Ministri, uffiċjali tal-kabinett, kelliema tal-assembleji nazzjonali, parlamentari, u sindki f’pajjiżi differenti bħall-Eġittu, Is-Sudan, It-Turkija, Iran, Il-Libanu, Kuwajt, Jemen, Il-Ġordan, Pakistan, Bangladexx, Il-Malasja, L-Indoneżja, u Iżrael/Palestina. Fil-bidu tas-seklu wieħed u għoxrin, L-Iżlam politiku għadu forza ewlenija għall-ordni u d-diżordni fil-politika globali, wieħed li jipparteċipa fil-proċess politiku iżda wkoll f’atti ta’ terroriżmu, sfida għad-dinja Musulmana u għall-Punent. Nifhmu n-natura tal-Islam politiku llum, u b'mod partikolari l-kwistjonijiet u l-mistoqsijiet li ħarġu mill-esperjenza tal-passat riċenti, jibqa’ kritiku għall-gvernijiet, dawk li jfasslu l-politika, u studenti tal-politika internazzjonali bl-istess mod.
MUSLIM INSTITUTIONS AND POLITICAL MOBILIZATION
SARA SILVESTRI
In Europe, and most of the Western world, Muslim presence in the publicsphere is a recent phenomenon that characterised the last decade of the 20thcentury and has deeply marked the beginning of the 21st. This visiblepresence, which amounts to something between 15 u 20 millionindividuals, can best be analysed if dissected into a number of components.The first part of this chapter illustrates where, when and why organisedMuslim voices and institutions have emerged in Europe, and which actorshave been involved. The second part is more schematic and analytical, inthat it seeks to identify from these dynamics the process through whichMuslims become political actors and how they relate to other, often incompeting political forces and priorities. It does so by observing theobjectives and the variety of strategies that Muslims have adopted in orderto articulate their concerns vis-à-vis different contexts and interlocutors.The conclusions offer an initial evaluation of the impact and of theconsequences of Muslim mobilisation and institution-formation forEuropean society and policy-making.
Moviment Iżlamiku: Political Freedom & Demokrazija
Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi
It is the duty of the (Iżlamiku) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, demokrazija. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, L-Eġittu, Is-Sirja, Iraq, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.
Living with Democracy in Egypt
Daniel Consolatore
Hosni Mubarek was almost elected president of Egypt in September 2005. Not that the seventy-seven-year-old secular autocrat who has ruled that nationfor the past twenty-four years lost the election; by the official count, he took nearly 85 percent of the vote.His nearest competitor, Ayman Nour, the upstart headof the fledgling opposition party al-Ghad (“Tomorrow”),managed less than 8 percent. The only other candidate to take any significant tally was the aged NomanGamaa of the venerable al-Wafd (“Delegation”)party, who managed less than 3 percent. The Ikhwanal-Muslimeen (“Muslim Brotherhood”), feared by somany Westerners for its purist Islamic social and politicalagenda, didn’t even field a candidate.Mubarek’s decisive victory would seem to be reassuringto most people—particularly secular Americans—worried for the future of the few Westernfriendly,moderate Arab regimes, threatened as theyare by the Islamicization of politics in the region. The Bush administration would also seem to have reasonto be pleased, given its recent change of heart aboutArab democracy. The missing chemical weapons in Iraq and subsequent justification of the war thereas precedent for democratization have inspired theWhite House to push for as many elections as possible in the region. Fil-fatt, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke at the American University inCairo in June, she announced to some surprise that“for sixty years” the United States had been mistakenin “pursu[ing] stability at the expense of democracy”in the Middle East. For generations, L-Istati Uniti. pundits weresure that the “Arab street” couldn’t be trusted with the vote, as they might hand over power to communistsor fundamentalist Islamists. Realpolitik dictated that autocrats and dictators, like Mubarek and Saddam Hussein, had to be coddled in order to maintain “stability”in the region. If they would then stage election sor dispense with them altogether, deny free speech,and let loose secret police to terrorize the population,the White House would likely turn a blind eye. But ifMubarek could now claim a true democratic mandate,that would be the best of all worlds.
Political Transitions in the Arab World
Dina Shehata
The year 2007 marked the end of a brief interval of political liberalization in the Arab world which began shortly after the occupation of Iraq and which resulted primarily from external pressures on Arab regimes to reform and democratize. External pressures during the 2003-2006 period created a political opening which activists across the region used to press for longstanding demands for political and constitutional reform.Faced with a combination of growing external and internal pressures to reform, Arab regimes were forced to make some concessions to their challengers.In Egypt, upon the request of the President, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to allowfor direct competitive presidential elections. In September2005, Egypt witnessed its first competitive presidential election ever and as expected Mubarak was elected for a fifth term with 87%of the vote. Barra minn hekk,during the November 2005 parliamentary elections,which were freer than previous elections, il-Fratellanza Musulmana, the largest opposition movement in Egypt, won 88 seats. This was the largest number of seats won by an opposition group in Egypt since the 1952 revolution.Similarly, in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a majority of the seats.Hamas was thereby able to establish control over the Palestinian Legislative Council which had been dominated by Fatah since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1996. In Lebanon, in the wake of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri on 14th February2005, a coalition of pro-Hariri political forces was ablet hrough broad-based mass mobilization and external support to force Syrian troops to pull out from Lebanon and the pro-Syrian Government to resign. Elections were held, and the 14th February coalition was able to win a plurality of the votes and to form a new government.In Morocco, King Mohamed VI oversaw the establishment of a truth and reconciliation committee which sought to address the grievances of those who had been abused under the reign of his father.The Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) also under took some important reforms during the 2003-2006 period. Fil 2003 Qatar promulgated a written constitution for the first time in its history. In 2005,Saudi Arabia convened municipal elections for the firsttime in five decades. And in 2006, Bahrain held parliamentaryelections in which the Shiite society of AlWefaqwon 40%of the seats. Subsequently, the first Shiitedeputy prime minister in Bahrain was appointed.Theses events, which came to be known as ‘the Arab Spring,’ led some optimists to believe that the Arabworld was on the brink of a democratic transformation similar to those experienced in Latin American and Eastern and Central Europe during the 1980s and1990s. Madankollu, fi 2007, as political liberalization gave way to heightened polarization and to renewed repression,these hopes were dispelled. The failure ofthe openings of the 2003-2006 period to create a sustained momentum towards democratization can beat tributed to a number of factors. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq and the failure of the United States to create a stable and democratic regime dampened support for democracy promotion efforts within the American administration and reinforced the views ofthose who held that security and stability must come before democracy. Barra minn hekk, the electoral successes of Islamists in Egypt and in Palestine further dampened Western support for democracy promotion efforts in the region since the principals of thesemovements were perceived to be at odds with the interestsof theWest.
Islam Radikali Fl-Eġittu Tqabbil Ta 'Żewġ Gruppi
By David Zeidan
The author compares two key Egyptian radical Islamic groups, the Society of Muslims(Takfir wal-Hijra) and the Society of Struggle (Jama’at al-Jihad) and analyzes their differencesin doctrine and strategy. This study is presented in the context of a broader examination of thehistory of militant Islamic groups in Egypt. The author argues that the two societies furnishexamples of basic types of radical Islamic movements. Barra minn hekk, Jama’at al-Jihad remainsimportant in contemporary Egyptian politics and in that country’s internal struggle.The Egyptian radical groups understudy here, the Society of Muslims (Takfirwal-Hijra) and the Society of Struggle(Jama’at al-Jihad), espoused drasticallydifferent ideologies and strategies forgaining power. The Society of Muslims(Takfir) had a passive separatist andmessianic ideology, delaying activeconfrontation with the state to an indefinitepoint in the future when it could reach acertain degree of strength. In comparison,the Society of Struggle (al-Jihad) followedan activist, militant ideology that committedit to immediate and violent action againstthe regime.ISLAMIC RESURGENCEHistory reveals cyclical patterns ofIslamic revival in times of crisis.Charismatic leaders arose attempting torenew the fervor and identity of Muslims,purify the faith from accretions and corruptreligious practices, and reinstate the pristineIslam of the Prophet Muhammad’s day.Leaders of revivals tended to appear eitheras renewers of the faith promised at the startof each century (mujaddids), or as thedeliverer sent by God in the end of times toestablish the final kingdom of justice andpeace (mahdi).
The W&M Progressive
Accepting the Responsibility of Electoral Choice
The development of democratic institutions comes with negative externalities. As a political progressive, I believe that the big picture – establishing a solid democratic foundation – outweighs the possible emergence of political parties that may advocate religious or gender intolerance. I am a firm believer in the workings of the democratic process. While I have been studying in Egypt for the semester, I am reminded that despite the imperfections of the United States democratic system, it is still many times better than living under any authoritarian regime that outlaws political parties and posts military police at a variety of locations in an effort to exert control and maintain power.
Fl-Eġittu, the electoral process is not democratic. The National Political Party – the party of President Mubarak – exerts tremendous influence in the country. Its main opposition is the Muslim Brotherhood, which was created in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood is based on very strict interpretations of the Koran and the idea that secular governments are a direct violation of the teaching of the Koran. The party has a very violent past; it has been directly responsible for several assassination attempts and the assassination of the Egyptian leader Anwar-as-Sadat in 1981.
The Muslim Brotherhood is an illegal political party. Because the political party is religious, it is not allowed to participate in the public sphere under Egyptian law. Despite this technicality, the party has members in the Egyptian Parliament. Madankollu, the parliamentarians cannot officially declare their affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood but instead identify as Independents. Though the party remains illegal, it remains the most powerful opposition to the ruling National Democratic Party.
Is-soċjetà ċivili u d-Demokratizzazzjoni fid-Dinja Għarbija
il 500 l-iktar Musulmani influwenti
John Esposito
Ibrahim Kalin
Il-pubblikazzjoni li għandek f'idejk hija l-ewwel waħda minn dak li nittamaw li tkun serje annwali li tipprovdi tieqa għall-movers u shakers tad-dinja Musulmana. Aħna stinkajna biex nenfasizzaw nies li huma influwenti bħala Musulmani, thatis, nies li l-influwenza tagħhom hija derivata mill-prattika tagħhom tal-Iżlam jew mill-fatt li huma Musulmani. Aħna naħsbu li dan jagħti ħarsa siewja lejn il-modi differenti li l-Musulmani jħallu impatt fuq id-dinja, u juri wkoll id-diversità ta 'kif in-nies jgħixu bħala Musulmani llum. L-influwenza hija kunċett delikat. It-tifsira tagħha ġejja mill-kelma Latina influens li tfisser li tidħol, li tipponta lejn idea astroloġika antika li forzi li ma jidhrux (bhal themoon) jaffettwaw lill-umanità. Iċ-ċifri fuq din il-lista għandhom il-ħila li jaffettwaw ukoll lill-umanità. F’varjetà ta ’modi differenti kull persuna fuq din il-lista għandha influwenza fuq il-ħajja ta’ numru kbir ta ’nies fuq l-art. Il 50 il-figuri l-aktar influwenti huma profilati. L-influwenza tagħhom ġejja minn varjetà ta 'sorsi; madankollu huma magħqudin bil-fatt li kull wieħed jaffettwa meded kbar ta 'umanità 500 mexxejja 15 kategoriji — Akkademiku, Politiku,Amministrattiv, Nisel, Predikaturi, Nisa, Żgħażagħ, Filantropija, Żvilupp,Xjenza u Teknoloġija, Arti u Kultura, Midja, Radikali, Netwerks Iżlamiċi Internazzjonali, u Kwistjonijiet tal-Ġurnata - biex jgħinuk tifhem it-tipi differenti ta 'modi li l-Islam u l-Musulmani jħallu impatt fuq id-dinja llum. Żewġ listi komposti juru kif l-influwenza taħdem b'modi differenti: In-Netwerks Iżlamiċi Internazzjonali juri nies li huma fil-kap ta 'netwerks transnazzjonali importanti tal-Musulmani, u Kwistjonijiet tal-Ġurnata jenfasizzaw individwi li l-importanza tagħhom hija dovuta għal kwistjonijiet kurrenti li jaffettwaw lill-umanità.
Reform in the Muslim World: The Role of Islamists and Outside Powers
Shibley Telhami
The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, neither the regional discourse about theneed for political and economic reform nor the Americantalk of spreading democracy is new. Over the pasttwo decades, particularly beginning with the end of theCold War, intellectuals and governments in the MiddleEast have spoken about reform. The American policyprior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also aimedto spread democracy in the Arab world. But in that case,the first Gulf War and the need to forge alliances withautocratic regimes were one reason talk of democracydeclined. The other reason was the discovery that politicalreform provided openings to Islamist political groupsthat seemed very much at odd with American objectives.The fear that Islamist groups supported democracy onlybased on the principle of “one man, one vote, one time,”as former Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejianonce put it, led the United States to backtrack. Evenearly in the Clinton Administration, Secretary of StateWarren Christopher initially focused on democracy inhis Middle East policy but quickly sidelined the issueas the administration moved to broker Palestinian-Israelinegotiation in the shadow of militant Islamist groups,especially Hamas.
The future of Islam after 9/11
Mansoor Moaddel
There is no consensus among historians and Islamicists about the nature of theIslamic belief system and the experience of historical Islam, on which one couldbase a definitive judgment concerning Islam’s compatibility with modernity. Madankollu,the availability of both historical and value survey data allow us to analyzethe future of Islam in light of the horrific event of 9/11. The key factor that woulddetermine the level of societal visibility necessary for predicting the future developmentof a culture is the nature and clarity of the ideological targets in relation towhich new cultural discourses are produced. Based on this premise, I shall try toilluminate the nature of such targets that are confronted by Muslim activists inIran, L-Eġittu, and Jordan.