Visi ieraksti "Jemaah Islamiyah" Kategorija

Arābu rītdiena

DEIVIDS B. OTAVEJA

Oktobris 6, 1981, bija paredzēta kā svinību diena Ēģiptē. Tā atzīmēja gadadienu kopš Ēģiptes grandiozākā uzvaras brīža trīs arābu un Izraēlas konfliktos, kad valsts zemākā armija šķērsoja Suecas kanālu tā atklāšanas dienās 1973 Jomkipuras karā un nosūtīja Izraēlas karaspēku atkāpjoties. Uz vēsuma, bez mākoņiem rīts, Kairas stadions bija pārpildīts ar ēģiptiešu ģimenēm, kas bija ieradušās, lai apskatītu militāros spēkus. Uz apskates stenda, prezidents Anvars el-Sadats,kara arhitekts, ar gandarījumu vēroja, kā viņa priekšā defilēja vīri un mašīnas. Es biju tuvumā, tikko ieradies ārzemju korespondents.Pēkšņi, viena no armijas kravas automašīnām apstājās tieši pretī apskates stendam, kamēr sešas Mirage lidmašīnas rūca virs galvas akrobātiskā priekšnesumā, krāsojot debesis ar garām sarkanām takām, dzeltens, violets,un zaļie dūmi. Sadats piecēlās, acīmredzot gatavojas apmainīties salūtam ar vēl vienu Ēģiptes karaspēka kontingentu. Viņš padarīja sevi par ideālu mērķi četriem islāmistu slepkavām, kas izlēca no kravas automašīnas, iebruka tribīnē, un apbēra viņa ķermeni ar lodēm.Kamēr slepkavas turpināja kādu mūžību apsmidzināt stendu ar savu nāvējošo uguni., Uz mirkli apsvēru, vai trāpīt zemē un riskēt, ka panikā esošie skatītāji mani samīdīs līdz nāvei, vai arī palikt kājās un riskēt saņemt nomaldījušos lodi. Instinkts lika man palikt uz kājām, un mana žurnālista pienākuma apziņa mudināja mani doties noskaidrot, vai Sadats ir dzīvs vai miris.

Islāms, Politiskais islāms un Amerika

Arābu ieskats

Vai ir iespējama “brālība” ar Ameriku?

halils al-anani

Islāmistu opozīcijas partijas un ES iesaistīšanās potenciāls

Tobijs Ārčers

Heidija Huuhtanena

Sayyid Qutb: Islāma revolūcijas Kārlis Markss

Leslija Evansa

why are there no arab democracies ?

Lerijs Deimants

Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition

Džons L. Esposito

90. gadu politiskais islāms, ko daži sauc “Islāma fundamentālisms,” joprojām ir liela klātbūtne valdībā un opozīcijas politikā no Ziemeļāfrikas līdz Dienvidaustrumāzijai. Politiskais islāms pie varas un politikā ir radījis daudz jautājumu un jautājumu: “Vai islāms ir pretrunā ar modernizāciju?,” “Vai islāms un demokrātija nav savienojami?,” “Kāda ir islāma valdības ietekme uz plurālismu?, minoritāšu un sieviešu tiesības,” “Cik reprezentatīvi ir islāmisti,” “Vai ir islāma mērenie?,” “Vai Rietumiem jābaidās no transnacionāliem islāma draudiem vai civilizāciju sadursmes?” Mūsdienu islāma atdzimšana Musulmaņu pasaules ainava šodien atklāj jaunu islāma republiku rašanos (Irāna, Sudāna, Afganistāna), islāma kustību izplatība, kas darbojas kā galvenie politiskie un sociālie dalībnieki esošajās sistēmās, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudāna, Turcija, Irāna, Libāna, Kuwait, Yemen, Džordana, Pakistāna, Bangladesh, Malaizija, Indonēzija, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.

MUSULMAŅU INSTITŪCIJAS UN POLITISKĀ MOBILIZĀCIJA

SARA SILVESTRI

Eiropā, un lielākā daļa Rietumu pasaules, Musulmaņu klātbūtne publiskajā telpā ir nesena parādība, kas raksturoja 20. gadsimta pēdējo desmitgadi un ir dziļi iezīmējusi 21. gadsimta sākumu.. Šī redzamā klātbūtne, kas ir kaut kas starp 15 un 20 miljoniem indivīdu, vislabāk var analizēt, ja to sadala vairākos komponentos.Šīs nodaļas pirmajā daļā ir parādīts, kur, kad un kāpēc Eiropā ir parādījušās organizētas musulmaņu balsis un institūcijas, un kuri aktieri ir bijuši iesaistīti. Otrā daļa ir shematiskāka un analītiskāka, ka tā cenšas no šīs dinamikas identificēt procesu, kurā musulmaņi kļūst par politiskiem dalībniekiem un kā viņi ir saistīti ar citiem., bieži vien nekonkurējoši politiskie spēki un prioritātes. Tas tiek darīts, ievērojot mērķus un dažādas stratēģijas, ko musulmaņi ir pieņēmuši, lai izteiktu savas bažas dažādiem kontekstiem un sarunu partneriem. Secinājumos ir sniegts sākotnējais novērtējums par musulmaņu mobilizācijas un institūciju izveides ietekmi un sekām Eiropai. sabiedrība un politikas veidošana.

Islāma kustība: Political Freedom & Demokrātija

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (Islāma) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, democracy. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Ēģipte, Sīrija, Irāka, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.

Living with Democracy in Egypt

Daniels Consolatore

Hosni Mubarek was almost elected president of Egypt in September 2005. Not that the seventy-seven-year-old secular autocrat who has ruled that nationfor the past twenty-four years lost the election; by the official count, he took nearly 85 percent of the vote.His nearest competitor, Aimans Nūrs, the upstart headof the fledgling opposition party al-Ghad (“Tomorrow”),managed less than 8 percent. The only other candidate to take any significant tally was the aged NomanGamaa of the venerable al-Wafd (“Delegation”)party, who managed less than 3 percent. The Ikhwanal-Muslimeen (“Muslim Brotherhood”), feared by somany Westerners for its purist Islamic social and politicalagenda, didn’t even field a candidate.Mubarek’s decisive victory would seem to be reassuringto most people—particularly secular Americans—worried for the future of the few Westernfriendly,moderate Arab regimes, kā tos apdraud reģiona politikas islamizācija. Šķiet, ka arī Buša administrācijai ir iemesls būt apmierinātai, ņemot vērā tās neseno uzskatu maiņu par arābu demokrātiju. Irākā pazudušie ķīmiskie ieroči un tam sekojošais kara attaisnojums kā demokratizācijas precedents ir iedvesmojis Balto namu virzīt pēc iespējas vairāk vēlēšanu reģionā.. Patiesībā, jūnijā, kad ASV valsts sekretāre Kondolīza Raisa runāja Amerikas Universitātē Kairā, viņa ar kādu pārsteigumu paziņoja, ka “sešdesmit gadus” ASV ir maldījušās “pursu”.[ing] stabilitāte uz demokrātijas rēķina”Tuvajos Austrumos. Jau paaudzēm, ASV. Zinātnieki bija pārliecināti, ka "Arābu ielai" nevar uzticēt balsojumu, jo viņi varētu nodot varu komunistiem vai fundamentālistiem islāmistiem. Reālpolitika diktēja, ka autokrāti un diktatori, kā Mubareks un Sadams Huseins, bija jāmīļo, lai saglabātu “stabilitāti” reģionā. Ja viņi pēc tam rīkotu vēlēšanas vai vispār no tiem iztiktu, liegt vārda brīvību,un atlaist slepenpoliciju, lai terorizētu iedzīvotājus,Baltais nams, visticamāk, pievērs acis. Bet ja Mubareks tagad varētu pretendēt uz patiesu demokrātisku mandātu,tas būtu labākais no visām pasaulēm.

Politiskās pārejas arābu pasaulē

Dina Šehata

Gads 2007 iezīmēja beigas īsam politiskās liberalizācijas pārtraukumam arābu pasaulē, kas sākās neilgi pēc Irākas okupācijas un ko galvenokārt izraisīja ārējs spiediens uz arābu režīmiem veikt reformas un demokratizāciju.. Ārējais spiediens laikā 2003-2006 periods radīja politisko atvēršanos, ko aktīvisti visā reģionā izmantoja, lai pieprasītu ilgstošas ​​politiskās un konstitucionālās reformas. Saskaroties ar pieaugošo ārējo un iekšējo spiedienu veikt reformas, Arābu režīmi bija spiesti piekāpties saviem izaicinātājiem.Ēģiptē, pēc Valsts prezidenta lūguma, Parlaments pieņēma konstitūcijas grozījumus, kas ļauj rīkot prezidenta vēlēšanas tiešās konkurences apstākļos. 2005. gada septembrī, Egypt witnessed its first competitive presidential election ever and as expected Mubarak was elected for a fifth term with 87%of the vote. Turklāt,during the November 2005 parliamentary elections,which were freer than previous elections, musulmaņu brālība, the largest opposition movement in Egypt, won 88 seats. This was the largest number of seats won by an opposition group in Egypt since the 1952 revolution.Similarly, in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a majority of the seats.Hamas was thereby able to establish control over the Palestinian Legislative Council which had been dominated by Fatah since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1996. In Lebanon, in the wake of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri on 14th February2005, Hariri atbalstošo politisko spēku koalīcija ar plašu masu mobilizāciju un ārēju atbalstu spēja piespiest Sīrijas karaspēku izvest no Libānas un prosīrijas valdību atkāpties.. Notika vēlēšanas, un 14. februāra koalīcija spēja iegūt daudzu balsu skaitu un izveidot jaunu valdību. Marokā, Karalis Muhameds VI pārraudzīja patiesības un izlīguma komitejas izveidi, kuras mērķis bija risināt to cilvēku sūdzības, kuri tika cietuši no vardarbības viņa tēva valdīšanas laikā. Persijas līča sadarbības padomes valstis (GCC) gadā arī veica dažas svarīgas reformas 2003-2006 periodā. In 2003 Katara pirmo reizi savā vēsturē izsludināja rakstisku konstitūciju. 2005. gadā Saūda Arābija pirmo reizi pēdējo piecu gadu desmitu laikā sasauca pašvaldību vēlēšanas. Un iekšā 2006, Bahrain held parliamentaryelections in which the Shiite society of AlWefaqwon 40%of the seats. Subsequently, the first Shiitedeputy prime minister in Bahrain was appointed.Theses events, which came to be known as ‘the Arab Spring,’ led some optimists to believe that the Arabworld was on the brink of a democratic transformation similar to those experienced in Latin American and Eastern and Central Europe during the 1980s and1990s. Tomēr, iekšā 2007, as political liberalization gave way to heightened polarization and to renewed repression,these hopes were dispelled. The failure ofthe openings of the 2003-2006 period to create a sustained momentum towards democratization can beat tributed to a number of factors. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq and the failure of the United States to create a stable and democratic regime dampened support for democracy promotion efforts within the American administration and reinforced the views ofthose who held that security and stability must come before democracy. Turklāt, the electoral successes of Islamists in Egypt and in Palestine further dampened Western support for democracy promotion efforts in the region since the principals of thesemovements were perceived to be at odds with the interestsof theWest.

Radical Islam In Egypt A Comparison Of Two Groups

By David Zeidan

The author compares two key Egyptian radical Islamic groups, the Society of Muslims(Takfir wal-Hidžra) and the Society of Struggle (Jama’at al-Jihad) and analyzes their differencesin doctrine and strategy. This study is presented in the context of a broader examination of thehistory of militant Islamic groups in Egypt. The author argues that the two societies furnishexamples of basic types of radical Islamic movements. In addition, Jama’at al-Jihad remainsimportant in contemporary Egyptian politics and in that country’s internal struggle.The Egyptian radical groups understudy here, the Society of Muslims (Takfirwal-Hijra) and the Society of Struggle(Jama’at al-Jihad), espoused drasticallydifferent ideologies and strategies forgaining power. The Society of Muslims(Takfir) had a passive separatist andmessianic ideology, delaying activeconfrontation with the state to an indefinitepoint in the future when it could reach acertain degree of strength. In comparison,the Society of Struggle (al-Jihad) followedan activist, militant ideology that committedit to immediate and violent action againstthe regime.ISLAMIC RESURGENCEHistory reveals cyclical patterns ofIslamic revival in times of crisis.Charismatic leaders arose attempting torenew the fervor and identity of Muslims,purify the faith from accretions and corruptreligious practices, and reinstate the pristineIslam of the Prophet Muhammad’s day.Leaders of revivals tended to appear eitheras renewers of the faith promised at the startof each century (mujaddids), or as thedeliverer sent by God in the end of times toestablish the final kingdom of justice andpeace (mahdi).

The W&M Progressive

Accepting the Responsibility of Electoral Choice

The development of democratic institutions comes with negative externalities. As a political progressive, I believe that the big picture – establishing a solid democratic foundation – outweighs the possible emergence of political parties that may advocate religious or gender intolerance. I am a firm believer in the workings of the democratic process. While I have been studying in Egypt for the semester, I am reminded that despite the imperfections of the United States democratic system, it is still many times better than living under any authoritarian regime that outlaws political parties and posts military police at a variety of locations in an effort to exert control and maintain power.

Ēģiptē, the electoral process is not democratic. The National Political Party – the party of President Mubarak – exerts tremendous influence in the country. Its main opposition is the Muslim Brotherhood, which was created in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood is based on very strict interpretations of the Koran and the idea that secular governments are a direct violation of the teaching of the Koran. The party has a very violent past; it has been directly responsible for several assassination attempts and the assassination of the Egyptian leader Anwar-as-Sadat in 1981.

The Muslim Brotherhood is an illegal political party. Because the political party is religious, it is not allowed to participate in the public sphere under Egyptian law. Despite this technicality, the party has members in the Egyptian Parliament. Tomēr, the parliamentarians cannot officially declare their affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood but instead identify as Independents. Though the party remains illegal, it remains the most powerful opposition to the ruling National Democratic Party.

Civil society and Democratization in the Arab World

Saad Eddin Ibrahim

Even if Islam is the Answer, Arab Muslims are the Problem

In May 2008, the Arab nation experienced a number of fires, or rather, armed conflicts—iekšā

Libāna, Irāka, Palestīna, Yemen, and Somalia. In these conflicts,

the warring parties used Islam as the instrument for mobilization

and amassing support. Collectively, Muslims are

waging war against Muslims.

After some Muslims raised the slogan of “Islam is the solution,”

to

became apparent “their Islam is the problem.” No sooner have some of them acquired weapons,

than they raised it against the state and its ruling regime regardless of

whether that regime was ruling in the name of Islam or not.

We have

seen this in recent years between the followers of Osama bin Laden

and the Al-Qaeda organization on the one hand, and the authorities in

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on the other. We have also seen an

explosive example of this phenomenon in Morocco, whose king rules in the name of Islam and

whose title is the ‘Prince of the Faithful.’ Thus each Muslim faction kills other Muslims in the

name of Islam.

A quick glance at the contents of the media confirms how the

term Islam and its associated symbols have become mere tools in the hands of these Muslims.

Prominent examples of these Islam-exploiting factions are:

The Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Jamiat al-Islamiyya, in Egypt

Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement, in Palestine Hezbollah, Fatah al-Islam,

and Jamiat al-Islammiyya, in Lebanon The Houthi Zayadi rebels and the Islamic Reform Grouping

(Islah), inYemen The Islamic courts, in Somalia The Islamic Front ,

ZD Scribd iPaper

the 500 most influential muslims

Džons Esposito

Ibrahims Kaļins

The publication you have in your hands is the first of what we hope will be anannual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslimworld. We have strived to highlight people who are influential as Muslims, thatis, people whose influence is derived from their practice of Islam or from the factthat they are Muslim. We think that this gives valuable insight into the differentways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, pointing to an old astrological idea that unseen forces (like themoon) affect humanity. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. The 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Their influence comes from a variety of sources; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leaders into 15 categories—Scholarly, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, Sievietes, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, Mediji, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

Reform in the Muslim World: The Role of Islamists and Outside Powers

Shibley Telhami

The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, neither the regional discourse about theneed for political and economic reform nor the Americantalk of spreading democracy is new. Over the pasttwo decades, particularly beginning with the end of theCold War, intellectuals and governments in the MiddleEast have spoken about reform. The American policyprior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also aimedto spread democracy in the Arab world. But in that case,the first Gulf War and the need to forge alliances withautocratic regimes were one reason talk of democracydeclined. The other reason was the discovery that politicalreform provided openings to Islamist political groupsthat seemed very much at odd with American objectives.The fear that Islamist groups supported democracy onlybased on the principle of “one man, one vote, one time,”as former Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejianonce put it, led the United States to backtrack. Evenearly in the Clinton Administration, Secretary of StateWarren Christopher initially focused on democracy inhis Middle East policy but quickly sidelined the issueas the administration moved to broker Palestinian-Israelinegotiation in the shadow of militant Islamist groups,especially Hamas.

The future of Islam after 9/11

Mansoor Moaddel

There is no consensus among historians and Islamicists about the nature of theIslamic belief system and the experience of historical Islam, on which one couldbase a definitive judgment concerning Islam’s compatibility with modernity. Nonetheless,the availability of both historical and value survey data allow us to analyzethe future of Islam in light of the horrific event of 9/11. The key factor that woulddetermine the level of societal visibility necessary for predicting the future developmentof a culture is the nature and clarity of the ideological targets in relation towhich new cultural discourses are produced. Based on this premise, I shall try toilluminate the nature of such targets that are confronted by Muslim activists inIran, Ēģipte, and Jordan.