Allar Færslur í "Jemaah Islamiyah" Flokkur

The Arab Tomorrow

DAVID B. ÚTTAKA

október 6, 1981, átti að vera hátíðardagur í Egyptalandi. Það markaði afmæli stórkostlegustu sigurstundar Egyptalands í þremur átökum araba og Ísraela., þegar fátækur her landsins lagðist yfir Súez-skurðinn á opnunardögum landsins 1973 Yom Kippur-stríðið og sendi ísraelska hermenn að hörfa. Á svala, skýlaus morgun, Kaíró leikvangurinn var troðfullur af egypskum fjölskyldum sem höfðu komið til að sjá herinn stinga vélbúnaði sínum., Anwar el-Sadat forseti,arkitekt stríðsins, horfði með ánægju þegar menn og vélar gengu fram fyrir hann. Ég var nálægt, nýkominn erlendur fréttaritari.Skyndilega, einn af herflutningabílunum stöðvaði beint fyrir framan yfirlitssýninguna rétt þegar sex Mirage þotur öskruðu yfir höfuð í loftfimleikum, að mála himininn með löngum rauðum slóðum, gulur, fjólublár,og grænan reyk. Sadat stóð upp, að því er virðist að búa sig undir að skiptast á kveðjum við enn einn lið egypskra hermanna. Hann gerði sig að fullkomnu skotmarki fyrir fjóra íslamista morðingja sem stukku úr vörubílnum, ruddist inn á pallinn, og þeytti líkama hans með byssukúlum. Þegar morðingjarnir héldu áfram í það sem virtist heila eilífð að úða stallinum með banvænum eldi sínum, Ég velti því fyrir mér í augnabliki hvort ég ætti að lenda í jörðu og eiga á hættu að verða troðinn til bana af skelfingu lostnum áhorfendum eða halda áfram og eiga á hættu að taka villandi byssukúlu. Eðlishvöt sagði mér að halda mér á fætur, og blaðamannaskylda mín varð til þess að ég fór að komast að því hvort Sadat væri á lífi eða dáinn.

Íslam, Stjórnmála Íslam og Ameríku

Arab Insight

Er „Bræðralag“ með Ameríku mögulegt?

khalil al-anani

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Sayyid Qutb: The Karl Marx of the Islamic Revolution

Leslie Evans

hvers vegna eru engar Arab lýðræðisríki ?

Larry Diamond

Tilkall til Miðstöðvarinnar: Pólitískt íslam í umskiptum

John L. Edwards

In the 1990s political Islam, what some call “Islamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Íran, Sudan, Afganistan), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Tyrkland, Íran, Líbanon, Kuwait, Yemen, Jórdanía, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malasía, Indónesía, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.

Múslima stofnanir og POLITICAL MOBILIZATION

Sara Silvestri

Í Evrópu, og flestir á Vesturlöndum, Muslim presence in the publicsphere is a recent phenomenon that characterised the last decade of the 20thcentury and has deeply marked the beginning of the 21st. This visiblepresence, which amounts to something between 15 og 20 millionindividuals, can best be analysed if dissected into a number of components.The first part of this chapter illustrates where, when and why organisedMuslim voices and institutions have emerged in Europe, and which actorshave been involved. The second part is more schematic and analytical, inthat it seeks to identify from these dynamics the process through whichMuslims become political actors and how they relate to other, often incompeting political forces and priorities. It does so by observing theobjectives and the variety of strategies that Muslims have adopted in orderto articulate their concerns vis-à-vis different contexts and interlocutors.The conclusions offer an initial evaluation of the impact and of theconsequences of Muslim mobilisation and institution-formation forEuropean society and policy-making.

Islamic Movement: Political Freedom & Lýðræði

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

Það er skylda að (Íslamskt) Hreyfing á næstu áfanga tostand fyrirtæki gegn totalitarian og dictatorial regla, pólitísk despotism og usurpation um réttindi fólks. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, lýðræði. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah)." [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Egyptaland, Sýrland, Írak, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.

Líf með lýðræði í Egyptalandi

Daniel huggara

Hosni Mubarek was almost elected president of Egypt in September 2005. Not that the seventy-seven-year-old secular autocrat who has ruled that nationfor the past twenty-four years lost the election; by the official count, he took nearly 85 percent of the vote.His nearest competitor, Ayman Nour, the upstart headof the fledgling opposition party al-Ghad (“Tomorrow”),managed less than 8 percent. The only other candidate to take any significant tally was the aged NomanGamaa of the venerable al-Wafd (“Delegation”)party, who managed less than 3 percent. The Ikhwanal-Muslimeen (“Muslim Brotherhood”), feared by somany Westerners for its purist Islamic social and politicalagenda, didn’t even field a candidate.Mubarek’s decisive victory would seem to be reassuringto most people—particularly secular Americans—worried for the future of the few Westernfriendly,moderate Arab regimes, threatened as theyare by the Islamicization of politics in the region. The Bush administration would also seem to have reasonto be pleased, given its recent change of heart aboutArab democracy. The missing chemical weapons in Iraq and subsequent justification of the war thereas precedent for democratization have inspired theWhite House to push for as many elections as possible in the region. Reyndar, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke at the American University inCairo in June, she announced to some surprise that“for sixty years” the United States had been mistakenin “pursu[ing] stability at the expense of democracy”in the Middle East. For generations, US. pundits weresure that the “Arab street” couldn’t be trusted with the vote, as they might hand over power to communistsor fundamentalist Islamists. Realpolitik dictated that autocrats and dictators, like Mubarek and Saddam Hussein, had to be coddled in order to maintain “stability”in the region. If they would then stage election sor dispense with them altogether, deny free speech,and let loose secret police to terrorize the population,the White House would likely turn a blind eye. But ifMubarek could now claim a true democratic mandate,that would be the best of all worlds.

Stjórnmála Skiptingar á arabísku World

Dina Shehata

Árið 2007 markaði lok á stuttu millibili pólitísks frelsis í arabaheiminum sem hófst skömmu eftir hernám Íraks og stafaði fyrst og fremst af ytri þrýstingi á arabísk stjórnvöld til umbóta og lýðræðisvæðingar. Ytri þrýstingur meðan á 2003-2006 tímabil skapaði pólitískt opnun sem aðgerðarsinnar um allt svæðið notuðu til að þrýsta á langvarandi kröfur um pólitískar og stjórnarskrárbreytingar., Arabísk stjórnvöld neyddust til að gera áskoranir til áskorenda sinna.Í Egyptalandi, að beiðni forseta, Alþingi samþykkti stjórnarskrárbreytingu til að heimila beinar samkeppnishæfar forsetakosningar. Í september 2005, Egyptar urðu vitni að fyrstu forsetakosningum sínum í samkeppninni nokkru sinni og eins og búist var við var Mubarak kosinn til fimmta kjörtímabils með 87%atkvæða.. Ennfremur,í nóvember 2005 þingkosningar,sem voru frjálsari en fyrri kosningar, múslimska bræðralagið, stærsta stjórnarandstöðuhreyfing í Egyptalandi, vann 88 sæti. Þetta var mesti fjöldi þingsæta sem stjórnarandstæðingar í Egyptalandi hafa unnið síðan 1952 bylting.Sömuleiðis, í janúar 2006 Þingkosningar í Palestínu, Hamas vann þar með meirihluta þingsæta. Hamas gat þar með komið á stjórn á löggjafarráði Palestínumanna sem Fatah hafði stjórnað frá stofnun palestínskra yfirvalda í 1996. Í Líbanon, í kjölfar morðsins á Rafiq Hariri 14. febrúar 2005, Samsteypa stjórnmálaafla sem styðja Hariri var hægt með mikilli fjöldavæðingu og utanaðkomandi stuðningi til að þvinga sýrlenska hermenn til að draga sig út úr Líbanon og stjórnvöld í Sýrlandi að segja af sér. Kosningar fóru fram, og 14. febrúar bandalagið gat unnið til fjölda atkvæða og myndað nýja ríkisstjórn. Í Marokkó, Mohamed VI konungur hafði umsjón með stofnun sannleiks- og sáttanefndar sem leitaðist við að taka á kvörtunum þeirra sem höfðu orðið fyrir ofbeldi á valdatíma föður síns. (GCC) einnig undir tók nokkrar mikilvægar umbætur á meðan 2003-2006 tímabil. Í 2003 Katar gaf út skriflega stjórnarskrá í fyrsta skipti í sögu sinni. Árið 2005 boðaði Sádi -Arabía til borgarstjórnarkosninga í fyrsta sinn í fimm áratugi. Og í 2006, Barein hélt þingkosningar þar sem sjía samfélag AlWefaqwon 40%sæta. Í framhaldinu, fyrsti forsætisráðherra sjíta í Barein var skipaður, sem kallaðist „arabíska vorið“,"Leiddi til þess að sumir bjartsýnismenn töldu að arabaheimurinn væri á barmi lýðræðislegrar umbreytingar svipað og gerðist í Suður -Ameríku og Austur- og Mið -Evrópu á níunda og tíunda áratugnum. Hins vegar, í 2007, þar sem pólitískt frelsi vék fyrir aukinni skautun og endurnýjaðri kúgun,þessum vonum var eytt. Bilun í opnunum á 2003-2006 tímabil til að skapa viðvarandi skriðþunga í átt að lýðræðisvæðingu getur slegið þökk sé mörgum þáttum. Versnandi ástand öryggismála í Írak og vanefnd Bandaríkjanna á að búa til stöðugt og lýðræðislegt stjórn dempaði stuðning við lýðræðisþróun innan bandarískrar stjórnsýslu og styrkti sjónarmið þeirra sem töldu að öryggi og stöðugleiki hlyti að koma á undan lýðræðinu. Ennfremur, kosningaárangur íslamista í Egyptalandi og í Palestínu dró enn frekar úr stuðningi Vesturlanda við lýðræðisþróun á svæðinu þar sem litið var á að forystumenn þessara hreyfinga væru á skjön við hagsmuni vestursins..

Róttækt íslam í Egyptalandi Samanburður á tveimur hópum

By David Zeidan

The author compares two key Egyptian radical Islamic groups, the Society of Muslims(Takfir Wal-Hijra) and the Society of Struggle (Jama’at al-Jihad) and analyzes their differencesin doctrine and strategy. This study is presented in the context of a broader examination of thehistory of militant Islamic groups in Egypt. The author argues that the two societies furnishexamples of basic types of radical Islamic movements. Auk, Jama’at al-Jihad remainsimportant in contemporary Egyptian politics and in that country’s internal struggle.The Egyptian radical groups understudy here, the Society of Muslims (Takfirwal-Hijra) and the Society of Struggle(Jama’at al-Jihad), espoused drasticallydifferent ideologies and strategies forgaining power. The Society of Muslims(Takfir) had a passive separatist andmessianic ideology, delaying activeconfrontation with the state to an indefinitepoint in the future when it could reach acertain degree of strength. In comparison,the Society of Struggle (al-Jihad) followedan activist, militant ideology that committedit to immediate and violent action againstthe regime.ISLAMIC RESURGENCEHistory reveals cyclical patterns ofIslamic revival in times of crisis.Charismatic leaders arose attempting torenew the fervor and identity of Muslims,purify the faith from accretions and corruptreligious practices, and reinstate the pristineIslam of the Prophet Muhammad’s day.Leaders of revivals tended to appear eitheras renewers of the faith promised at the startof each century (mujaddids), or as thedeliverer sent by God in the end of times toestablish the final kingdom of justice andpeace (mahdi).

The W&M Framsóknarmaður

Accepting the Responsibility of Electoral Choice

The development of democratic institutions comes with negative externalities. As a political progressive, I believe that the big picture – establishing a solid democratic foundation – outweighs the possible emergence of political parties that may advocate religious or gender intolerance. I am a firm believer in the workings of the democratic process. While I have been studying in Egypt for the semester, I am reminded that despite the imperfections of the United States democratic system, it is still many times better than living under any authoritarian regime that outlaws political parties and posts military police at a variety of locations in an effort to exert control and maintain power.

In Egypt, the electoral process is not democratic. The National Political Party – the party of President Mubarak – exerts tremendous influence in the country. Its main opposition is the Muslim Brotherhood, which was created in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood is based on very strict interpretations of the Koran and the idea that secular governments are a direct violation of the teaching of the Koran. The party has a very violent past; it has been directly responsible for several assassination attempts and the assassination of the Egyptian leader Anwar-as-Sadat in 1981.

The Muslim Brotherhood is an illegal political party. Because the political party is religious, it is not allowed to participate in the public sphere under Egyptian law. Despite this technicality, the party has members in the Egyptian Parliament. Hins vegar, the parliamentarians cannot officially declare their affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood but instead identify as Independents. Though the party remains illegal, it remains the most powerful opposition to the ruling National Democratic Party.

Borgaralegt samfélag og lýðræðisþróun í Arabaheiminum

Saad Eddin Ibrahim

Even if Islam is the Answer, Arab Muslims are the Problem

In May 2008, the Arab nation experienced a number of fires, or rather, armed conflicts—í

Líbanon, Írak, Palestine, Yemen, and Somalia. In these conflicts,

the warring parties used Islam as the instrument for mobilization

and amassing support. Collectively, Muslims are

waging war against Muslims.

After some Muslims raised the slogan of “Islam is the solution,"

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

became apparent “their Islam is the problem.” No sooner have some of them acquired weapons,

than they raised it against the state and its ruling regime regardless of

whether that regime was ruling in the name of Islam or not.

We have

seen this in recent years between the followers of Osama bin Laden

and the Al-Qaeda organization on the one hand, and the authorities in

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on the other. We have also seen an

explosive example of this phenomenon in Morocco, whose king rules in the name of Islam and

whose title is the ‘Prince of the Faithful.’ Thus each Muslim faction kills other Muslims in the

name of Islam.

A quick glance at the contents of the media confirms how the

term Islam and its associated symbols have become mere tools in the hands of these Muslims.

Prominent examples of these Islam-exploiting factions are:

The Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Jamiat al-Islamiyya, in Egypt

Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement, in Palestine Hezbollah, Fatah al-Islam,

and Jamiat al-Islammiyya, in Lebanon The Houthi Zayadi rebels and the Islamic Reform Grouping

(Islah), inYemen The Islamic courts, in Somalia The Islamic Front ,

ZD Scribd iPaper

the 500 áhrifamestu múslima

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

Í riti sem þú hefur í höndum þínum er sú fyrsta sem við vonum að verða anannual röð sem veitir glugga í movers og shakers af Muslimworld. Við höfum strived að benda á fólk sem eru áhrifamiklar og múslima, thatis, fólk sem hafa áhrif er dregið úr starfi sínu á íslam eða frá factthat þeir eru múslimar. Við teljum að þetta gefi dýrmæta innsýn í mismunandi leiðir sem múslimar hafa áhrif á heiminn, og sýnir einnig fjölbreytileikann í því hvernig fólk lifir sem múslimar í dag. Áhrif er flókið hugtak. Merking þess kemur frá latneska orðinu áhrif sem þýðir að flæða inn, sem bendir á gamla stjörnuspeki sem óséður afl (eins og tunglið) hafa áhrif á mannkynið. Tölurnar á þessum lista hafa einnig getu til að hafa áhrif á mannkynið. Á margvíslegan hátt hefur hver einstaklingur á þessum lista áhrif á líf fjölda fólks á jörðinni. The 50 áhrifamestu persónurnar eru kynntar. Áhrif þeirra koma úr ýmsum áttum; þó sameinast þau af þeirri staðreynd að þau hafa hver um sig áhrif á gríðarstór hluta mannkyns. Við höfum þá brotið upp 500 leiðtogar inn í 15 flokkar — Fræðileg, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, Konur, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, Media, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

Umbætur í íslömskum World: Hlutverk Íslamistar og Utan Powers

Shibley Telhami

The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, neither the regional discourse about theneed for political and economic reform nor the Americantalk of spreading democracy is new. Over the pasttwo decades, particularly beginning with the end of theCold War, intellectuals and governments in the MiddleEast have spoken about reform. The American policyprior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also aimedto spread democracy in the Arab world. But in that case,the first Gulf War and the need to forge alliances withautocratic regimes were one reason talk of democracydeclined. The other reason was the discovery that politicalreform provided openings to Islamist political groupsthat seemed very much at odd with American objectives.The fear that Islamist groups supported democracy onlybased on the principle of “one man, one vote, one time,”as former Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejianonce put it, led the United States to backtrack. Evenearly in the Clinton Administration, Secretary of StateWarren Christopher initially focused on democracy inhis Middle East policy but quickly sidelined the issueas the administration moved to broker Palestinian-Israelinegotiation in the shadow of militant Islamist groups,especially Hamas.

Framtíð Íslams eftir 9/11

Mansoor Moaddel

Það er engin samstaða meðal sagnfræðingar og Islamicists um eðli theIslamic trú kerfi og reynslan af sögulegum Íslam, sem einn couldbase endanlega dóm um samhæfni íslams við nútímavæðingu. Engu að síður,the availability of both historical and value survey data allow us to analyzethe future of Islam in light of the horrific event of 9/11. The key factor that woulddetermine the level of societal visibility necessary for predicting the future developmentof a culture is the nature and clarity of the ideological targets in relation towhich new cultural discourses are produced. Based on this premise, I shall try toilluminate the nature of such targets that are confronted by Muslim activists inIran, Egyptaland, and Jordan.