Alle Einträge in der "Jemaah Islamiyah" Kategorie
Der arabische Morgen
DAVID B. Ottaway
Oktober 6, 1981, sollte ein Festtag werden in Ägypten. Es war der Jahrestag der großartigsten Moment des Sieges Ägyptens in drei arabisch-israelischen Konflikt, wenn das Land Underdog Armee Schub über den Suezkanal in den ersten Tagen Ofthe 1973 Jom-Kippur-Krieg und schickte israelischen Truppen auf dem Rückzug Kokons. An einem kühlen, wolkenlosen Morgen, Kairo Stadion wurde mit ägyptischen Familien, die kommen um zu sehen, das Militär seine Strebe hardware.On der Tribüne hatte verpackt, Präsident Anwar el-Sadat,Architekt des Krieges, beobachtete mit Genugtuung, wie Menschen und Maschinen vorgeführt vor ihm. Ich war in der Nähe, ein neu eingetroffen ausländischen correspondent.Suddenly, einer der Armeelastwagen gestoppt direkt vor der Tribüne ebenso sechs Mirage-Jets Overhead brüllte in einer akrobatischen Leistung, Gemälde den Himmel mit langen Wegen der roten, Gelb, lila,und grüner Rauch. Sadat stand, offenbar der Vorbereitung für den Austausch grüßt mit noch einem anderen Kontingent von ägyptischen Truppen. Er machte sich ein perfektes Ziel für vier islamistische Attentäter, die aus dem LKW gesprungen, stürmten das Podium, und voller seinen Körper mit bullets.As die Mörder zur Aufrechterhaltung der, wie es schien eine Ewigkeit zu sprühen Sie den Ständer mit ihren tödlichen Feuer, Ich überlegte einen Augenblick, ob auf den Boden und Risiko betroffen zum Tod durch Panik Zuschauer oder zertrampelt bleiben im Gange und Risikobereitschaft eine verirrte Kugel. Instinkt sagte mir, mich auf meine Füße bleiben, und meinen Sinn für journalistische Pflicht trieb mich zu gehen, ob Sadat wurde lebend oder tot wo.
Islam, Der politische Islam und Amerika
Arabische Insight
Ist „Bruderschaft“ mit Amerika Mögliche?
Khalil al-Anani
Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Sayyid Qutb: The Karl Marx of the Islamic Revolution
Leslie Evans
why are there no arab democracies ?
Larry Diamond
Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition
John L. Edwards
In the 1990s political Islam, what some call “Islamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Türkei, Iran, Libanon, Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesch, Malaysia, Indonesien, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.
Muslimischen Institutionen und politische Mobilisierung
SARA SILVESTRI
In Europa, und die meisten der westlichen Welt, Muslimische Präsenz in der publicsphere ist ein junges Phänomen, dass das letzte Jahrzehnt des 20. Jahrhundert beherbergt dieses zutiefst geprägt und hat Anfang markiert das 21.. This visiblepresence, which amounts to something between 15 und 20 millionindividuals, can best be analysed if dissected into a number of components.The first part of this chapter illustrates where, when and why organisedMuslim voices and institutions have emerged in Europe, and which actorshave been involved. The second part is more schematic and analytical, inthat it seeks to identify from these dynamics the process through whichMuslims become political actors and how they relate to other, often incompeting political forces and priorities. It does so by observing theobjectives and the variety of strategies that Muslims have adopted in orderto articulate their concerns vis-à-vis different contexts and interlocutors.The conclusions offer an initial evaluation of the impact and of theconsequences of Muslim mobilisation and institution-formation forEuropean society and policy-making.
Islamic Movement: Politische Freiheit & Demokratie
Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi
Es ist die Pflicht des (Islamisch) Bewegung in der kommenden Phase tostand Unternehmen gegen totalitäre und diktatorische Herrschaft, politische Willkür und Anmaßung der Rechte der Menschen. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, democracy. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah)." [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening have never flourished or borne fruit unless in an atmosphere ofdemocracy and freedom, and have withered and become barren only at the times of oppression and tyranny that trod over the willof the peoples which clung to Islam. Such oppressive regimesimposed their secularism, socialism or communism on their peoples by force and coercion, using covert torture and publicexecutions, and employing those devilish tools that tore flesh,shed blood, crushed bone and destroyed the soul.We saw these practices in many Muslim countries, including Turkey, Ägypten, Syrien, Irak, (the former) South Yemen, Somaliaand northern African States for varying periods of time, depending on the age or reign of the dictator in each country.On the other hand, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, values, essence and very existence.
Living with Democracy in Egypt
Daniel Tröster
Hosni Mubarek was almost elected president of Egypt in September 2005. Not that the seventy-seven-year-old secular autocrat who has ruled that nationfor the past twenty-four years lost the election; by the official count, he took nearly 85 percent of the vote.His nearest competitor, Ayman Nour, the upstart headof the fledgling opposition party al-Ghad (“Tomorrow”),managed less than 8 percent. The only other candidate to take any significant tally was the aged NomanGamaa of the venerable al-Wafd (“Delegation”)party, who managed less than 3 percent. The Ikhwanal-Muslimeen (“Muslim Brotherhood”), feared by somany Westerners for its purist Islamic social and politicalagenda, didn’t even field a candidate.Mubarek’s decisive victory would seem to be reassuringto most people—particularly secular Americans—worried for the future of the few Westernfriendly,moderate Arab regimes, threatened as theyare by the Islamicization of politics in the region. The Bush administration would also seem to have reasonto be pleased, given its recent change of heart aboutArab democracy. The missing chemical weapons in Iraq and subsequent justification of the war thereas precedent for democratization have inspired theWhite House to push for as many elections as possible in the region. Tatsächlich, when Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice spoke at the American University inCairo in June, she announced to some surprise that“for sixty years” the United States had been mistakenin “pursu[ing] stability at the expense of democracy”in the Middle East. For generations, US-. pundits weresure that the “Arab street” couldn’t be trusted with the vote, as they might hand over power to communistsor fundamentalist Islamists. Realpolitik dictated that autocrats and dictators, like Mubarek and Saddam Hussein, had to be coddled in order to maintain “stability”in the region. If they would then stage election sor dispense with them altogether, deny free speech,and let loose secret police to terrorize the population,the White House would likely turn a blind eye. But ifMubarek could now claim a true democratic mandate,that would be the best of all worlds.
Politische Transitions in der arabischen Welt
Dina Shehata
Das Jahr 2007 markierte das Ende einer kurzen Pause der politischen Liberalisierung in der arabischen Welt, die kurz nach der Besetzung des Irak und die resultierten vor allem aus externen Druck auf die arabischen Regime zu reformieren und zu demokratisieren begannen. External pressures during the 2003-2006 period created a political opening which activists across the region used to press for longstanding demands for political and constitutional reform.Faced with a combination of growing external and internal pressures to reform, Arab regimes were forced to make some concessions to their challengers.In Egypt, upon the request of the President, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to allowfor direct competitive presidential elections. In September2005, Egypt witnessed its first competitive presidential election ever and as expected Mubarak was elected for a fifth term with 87%of the vote. Außerdem,during the November 2005 parliamentary elections,which were freer than previous elections, die Muslimbruderschaft, the largest opposition movement in Egypt, won 88 seats. This was the largest number of seats won by an opposition group in Egypt since the 1952 revolution.Similarly, in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a majority of the seats.Hamas was thereby able to establish control over the Palestinian Legislative Council which had been dominated by Fatah since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1996. In Lebanon, in the wake of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri on 14th February2005, a coalition of pro-Hariri political forces was ablet hrough broad-based mass mobilization and external support to force Syrian troops to pull out from Lebanon and the pro-Syrian Government to resign. Elections were held, and the 14th February coalition was able to win a plurality of the votes and to form a new government.In Morocco, King Mohamed VI oversaw the establishment of a truth and reconciliation committee which sought to address the grievances of those who had been abused under the reign of his father.The Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) also under took some important reforms during the 2003-2006 period. In 2003 Qatar promulgated a written constitution for the first time in its history. In 2005,Saudi Arabia convened municipal elections for the firsttime in five decades. And in 2006, Bahrain held parliamentaryelections in which the Shiite society of AlWefaqwon 40%of the seats. Subsequently, the first Shiitedeputy prime minister in Bahrain was appointed.Theses events, which came to be known as ‘the Arab Spring,’ led some optimists to believe that the Arabworld was on the brink of a democratic transformation similar to those experienced in Latin American and Eastern and Central Europe during the 1980s and1990s. Aber, in 2007, as political liberalization gave way to heightened polarization and to renewed repression,these hopes were dispelled. The failure ofthe openings of the 2003-2006 period to create a sustained momentum towards democratization can beat tributed to a number of factors. The deteriorating security situation in Iraq and the failure of the United States to create a stable and democratic regime dampened support for democracy promotion efforts within the American administration and reinforced the views ofthose who held that security and stability must come before democracy. Außerdem, the electoral successes of Islamists in Egypt and in Palestine further dampened Western support for democracy promotion efforts in the region since the principals of thesemovements were perceived to be at odds with the interestsof theWest.
Radical Islam in Ägypten ein Vergleich von zwei Gruppen
Von David Zeidan
Der Autor vergleicht die beiden wichtigsten ägyptischen radikalen islamischen Gruppen, der Gesellschaft der Muslime(Takfir wal-Hijra) und der Society of Struggle (Jama'at al-Jihad) und analysiert deren differencesin Doktrin und Strategie. Diese Studie ist im Kontext einer umfassenderen Prüfung der thehistory des militanten islamischen Gruppen in Ägypten präsentiert. Der Autor argumentiert, dass die beiden Gesellschaften furnishexamples der Grundtypen der radikal-islamischen Bewegungen. Außerdem, Jama'at al-Jihad remainsimportant in der zeitgenössischen ägyptischen Politik und in diesem Land internen struggle.The ägyptischen radikalen Gruppen Zweitbesetzung hier, der Gesellschaft der Muslime (Takfirwal-Hijra) und der Society of Struggle(Jama'at al-Jihad), Vermählte drasticallydifferent Ideologien und Strategien forgaining Macht. Die Gesellschaft der Muslime(Takfir) hatte eine passive separatistischen Ideologie andmessianic, verzögern activeconfrontation mit dem Staat zu einem indefinitepoint in die Zukunft, wenn sie könnten acertain Grad der Stärke zu erreichen. Im Vergleich,Die Society of Struggle (al-Jihad) followedan Aktivist, militante Ideologie, die committedit sofortige und heftige Action againstthe regime.ISLAMIC RESURGENCEHistory zyklischen Muster offenbart ofIslamic Wiederbelebung in Zeiten der crisis.Charismatic Führer entstanden versuchen torenew den Eifer und die Ident,Reinigung des Glaubens aus Beiwerk und corruptreligious Praktiken, und Wiederherstellung der pristineIslam des Propheten Muhammads day.Leaders Wiederaufnahmen tendenziell eitheras Erneuerer des Glaubens versprach bei der Fütterung erscheint jedes Jahrhundert (mujaddids), oder als thedeliverer von Gott in das Ende der Zeiten geschickt toestablish die endgültige Reich der Gerechtigkeit andpeace (Mahdi).
Der W&M Progressive
Accepting the Responsibility of Electoral Choice
The development of democratic institutions comes with negative externalities. As a political progressive, I believe that the big picture – establishing a solid democratic foundation – outweighs the possible emergence of political parties that may advocate religious or gender intolerance. I am a firm believer in the workings of the democratic process. While I have been studying in Egypt for the semester, I am reminded that despite the imperfections of the United States democratic system, it is still many times better than living under any authoritarian regime that outlaws political parties and posts military police at a variety of locations in an effort to exert control and maintain power.
In Egypt, the electoral process is not democratic. The National Political Party – the party of President Mubarak – exerts tremendous influence in the country. Its main opposition is the Muslim Brotherhood, which was created in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood is based on very strict interpretations of the Koran and the idea that secular governments are a direct violation of the teaching of the Koran. The party has a very violent past; it has been directly responsible for several assassination attempts and the assassination of the Egyptian leader Anwar-as-Sadat in 1981.
The Muslim Brotherhood is an illegal political party. Because the political party is religious, it is not allowed to participate in the public sphere under Egyptian law. Despite this technicality, the party has members in the Egyptian Parliament. Aber, the parliamentarians cannot officially declare their affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood but instead identify as Independents. Though the party remains illegal, it remains the most powerful opposition to the ruling National Democratic Party.
Zivilgesellschaft und die Demokratisierung in der arabischen Welt
das 500 most influential muslims
John Esposito
Ibrahim Kalin
The publication you have in your hands is the first of what we hope will be anannual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslimworld. We have strived to highlight people who are influential as Muslims, thatis, people whose influence is derived from their practice of Islam or from the factthat they are Muslim. We think that this gives valuable insight into the differentways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, pointing to an old astrological idea that unseen forces (like themoon) affect humanity. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. Der 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Their influence comes from a variety of sources; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leaders into 15 categories—Scholarly, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, Frauen, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, Medien, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.
Reform in the Muslim World: The Role of Islamists and Outside Powers
Shibley Telhami
The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, neither the regional discourse about theneed for political and economic reform nor the Americantalk of spreading democracy is new. Over the pasttwo decades, particularly beginning with the end of theCold War, intellectuals and governments in the MiddleEast have spoken about reform. The American policyprior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also aimedto spread democracy in the Arab world. But in that case,the first Gulf War and the need to forge alliances withautocratic regimes were one reason talk of democracydeclined. The other reason was the discovery that politicalreform provided openings to Islamist political groupsthat seemed very much at odd with American objectives.The fear that Islamist groups supported democracy onlybased on the principle of “one man, one vote, one time,”as former Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejianonce put it, led the United States to backtrack. Evenearly in the Clinton Administration, Secretary of StateWarren Christopher initially focused on democracy inhis Middle East policy but quickly sidelined the issueas the administration moved to broker Palestinian-Israelinegotiation in the shadow of militant Islamist groups,especially Hamas.
Die Zukunft des Islam nach 9/11
Mansoor Moaddel
There is no consensus among historians and Islamicists about the nature of theIslamic belief system and the experience of historical Islam, on which one couldbase a definitive judgment concerning Islam’s compatibility with modernity. Nonetheless,the availability of both historical and value survey data allow us to analyzethe future of Islam in light of the horrific event of 9/11. The key factor that woulddetermine the level of societal visibility necessary for predicting the future developmentof a culture is the nature and clarity of the ideological targets in relation towhich new cultural discourses are produced. Based on this premise, I shall try toilluminate the nature of such targets that are confronted by Muslim activists inIran, Ägypten, and Jordan.