RSSAll Entries in the "Jemaah Islamiyah" Category

Yr Arab Yfory


October 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, gohebydd tramor newydd gyrraedd.Suddenly, ataliodd un o dryciau'r fyddin yn union o flaen y stondin adolygu wrth i chwe jet Mirage ruo uwchben mewn perfformiad acrobatig, paentio'r awyr gyda llwybrau hir o goch, melyn, porffor,a mwg gwyrdd. Safodd Sadat i fyny, yn paratoi i gyfnewid cyfarchion â mintai arall eto o filwyr yr Aifft. Gwnaeth ei hun yn darged perffaith ar gyfer pedwar llofrudd Islamaidd a neidiodd o'r lori, ymosododd ar y podiwm, ac yn britho ei gorff â bwledi. Wrth i'r lladdwyr barhau am yr hyn a oedd yn ymddangos yn dragwyddoldeb i chwistrellu'r eisteddle â'u tân marwol, Fe wnes i ystyried am amrantiad p’un ai i daro’r llawr ac mewn perygl o gael fy sathru i farwolaeth gan wylwyr panig neu aros ar y gweill a mentro cymryd bwled strae.. Dywedodd greddf wrthyf am aros ar fy nhraed, ac roedd fy synnwyr o ddyletswydd newyddiadurol yn fy ysgogi i fynd i ddarganfod a oedd Sadat yn fyw neu'n farw.

Islam, Islam gwleidyddol ac America

Insight Arabaidd

A yw “Brawdoliaeth” ag America yn Bosib?

khalil al-anani

“Nid oes unrhyw obaith o gyfathrebu ag unrhyw UDA. gweinyddu cyn belled â bod yr Unol Daleithiau yn cynnal ei farn hirsefydlog o Islam fel perygl gwirioneddol, golygfa sy'n rhoi'r Unol Daleithiau yn yr un cwch â'r gelyn Seionaidd. Nid oes gennym unrhyw syniadau rhagdybiedig ynghylch pobl America na'r Unol Daleithiau. cymdeithas a'i sefydliadau dinesig a'i melinau trafod. Nid oes gennym unrhyw broblem yn cyfathrebu â phobl America ond nid oes unrhyw ymdrechion digonol yn cael eu gwneud i ddod â ni yn agosach,” meddai Dr. Issam al-Iryan, pennaeth adran wleidyddol y Frawdoliaeth Fwslimaidd mewn cyfweliad ffôn.
Mae geiriau Al-Iryan yn crynhoi barn y Frawdoliaeth Fwslimaidd am bobl America a'r Unol Daleithiau. llywodraeth. Byddai aelodau eraill o'r Frawdoliaeth Fwslimaidd yn cytuno, felly hefyd y diweddar Hassan al-Banna, pwy sefydlodd y grŵp yn 1928. Al- Roedd Banna yn gweld y Gorllewin yn bennaf fel symbol o ddirywiad moesol. Mae Salafis eraill - ysgol feddwl Islamaidd sy'n dibynnu ar gyndeidiau fel modelau rhagorol - wedi cymryd yr un farn am yr Unol Daleithiau, ond nid oes ganddynt yr hyblygrwydd ideolegol a arddelir gan y Frawdoliaeth Fwslimaidd. Tra bod y Frawdoliaeth Fwslimaidd yn credu mewn ymgysylltu â'r Americanwyr mewn deialog sifil, nid yw grwpiau eithafol eraill yn gweld unrhyw bwynt mewn deialog ac yn honni mai grym yw'r unig ffordd o ddelio â'r Unol Daleithiau.

Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, it

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

hawliau Dynol, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, a

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

Sayyid Qutb: Karl Marx o'r Chwyldro Islamaidd

Leslie Evans

Sayyid Qutb (October 9, 1906-Awst 29, 1966), the Egyptian literary critic, philosopher, and theorist of the contemporary jihadist movement is only becoming a familiar name in the West in recent years, but his voluminous writings have had and continue to have enormous impact in the Muslim world. It is not an overstatement to say that it is hardly possible to understand the reasoning and goals of the Islamic militants without some familiarity with the outlook Qutb (pronounced KUH-tahb) enunciated.
A search of returns no less than seven books in English about Sayyid Qutb as well as collections of his writings and many of his own books in translation. The two works touched on here are only a random sampling of a very large literature which is again but a minute fraction of what exists in Arabic. These two are quite different in scope and attitude. Adnan Ayyub Musallam, a Palestinian native of Bethlehem, holds a doctorate from the University of Michigan
and is currently professor of history, politics, and cultural studies at Bethlehem University in the West Bank. His generally sympathetic but critical biography concentrates on the evolving politics of Qutb’s affiliations and thought. The quite brief and more critical piece by Paul Berman for the New York Times looks at Qutb’s theology and helps to clarify his argument with Christianity and Western secularism.
Brilliant from his earliest youth, Sayyid Qutb was an unlikely figure to serve as the inspiration for a global revolutionary movement. Although for a brief period he was a member of the militant Muslim Brothers, where he served as an editor not as an organizer, he spent most of his life as a lone intellectual. Where Marx, the theorist of world communism, labored in the British Museum, Sayyid Qutb wrote his most influential works in an Egyptian prison, where he spent most of the last eleven years of his life, until his execution by the Nasser government in 1966. Even his turn to Islam in any serious way did not take place until he was past forty, yet in prison in his fifties he produced a controversial rethinking of the religion that reverberates around the world.
Qutb was born in the village of Musha, between Cairo and Aswan into a family of small landowners. He was sent to the local madrasa, the government school, rather than the still more religious kuttab, the Islamic school, but he won a contest between the two schools for the best memorization of the Qur’an. He recalled his life there in his only biographical work, “Child from the Village,” recording local customs and superstitions. From that period he acquired a belief in the world of spirits that he carried with him all his life

pam nad oes unrhyw ddemocratiaethau Arabaidd ?

Larry Diamond

During democratization’s “third wave,” democracy ceased being a mostly Western phenomenon and “went global.” When the third wave began in 1974, the world had only about 40 democracies, and only a few of them lay outside the West. By the time the Journal of Democracy began publishing in 1990, there were 76 electoral democracies (accounting for slightly less than half the world’s independent states). By 1995, that number had shot up to 117—three in every five states. By then, a critical mass of democracies existed in every major world region save one—the Middle East.1 Moreover, every one of the world’s major cultural realms had become host to a significant democratic presence, er gydag un eithriad eto—y byd Arabaidd.2 Pymtheg mlynedd yn ddiweddarach, mae'r eithriad hwn yn dal i sefyll.
Mae absenoldeb parhaus hyd yn oed un gyfundrefn ddemocrataidd yn y byd Arabaidd yn anghysondeb trawiadol—y prif eithriad i globaleiddio democratiaeth.. Pam nad oes democratiaeth Arabaidd? Yn wir, pam fod hyn yn wir ymhlith un ar bymtheg o daleithiau Arabaidd annibynnol y Dwyrain Canol ac arfordir Gogledd Affrica, Libanus yw'r unig un sydd erioed wedi bod yn ddemocratiaeth?
Y dybiaeth fwyaf cyffredin am y diffyg democratiaeth Arabaidd yw bod yn rhaid iddo fod â rhywbeth i'w wneud â chrefydd neu ddiwylliant. Wedi'r cyfan, yr un peth y mae pob gwlad Arabaidd yn ei rannu yw eu bod yn Arabaidd.

Hawlio'r Ganolfan: Islam gwleidyddol yn y cyfnod pontio

John L. Esposito

In the 1990s political Islam, what some callIslamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Twrci, Iran, Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Deall natur Islam gwleidyddol heddiw, ac yn enwedig y materion a'r cwestiynau sydd wedi codi o brofiad y gorffennol diweddar, yn parhau i fod yn hollbwysig i lywodraethau, llunwyr polisi, a myfyrwyr gwleidyddiaeth ryngwladol fel ei gilydd.


SARA Silvestri

Yn Ewrop, a'r rhan fwyaf o'r byd Gorllewinol, Mae presenoldeb Mwslimaidd yn y byd cyhoeddus yn ffenomen ddiweddar a nodweddodd ddegawd olaf yr 20fed ganrif ac sydd wedi nodi dechrau'r 21ain ganrif yn ddwfn.. Y presenoldeb gweladwy hwn, sy'n gyfystyr â rhywbeth rhwng 15 a 20 miliwn o unigolion, gellir ei ddadansoddi orau os caiff ei rannu'n nifer o gydrannau. Mae rhan gyntaf y bennod hon yn dangos ble, pryd a pham mae lleisiau a sefydliadau Mwslimaidd cyfundrefnol wedi dod i'r amlwg yn Ewrop, and which actorshave been involved. The second part is more schematic and analytical, inthat it seeks to identify from these dynamics the process through whichMuslims become political actors and how they relate to other, often incompeting political forces and priorities. It does so by observing theobjectives and the variety of strategies that Muslims have adopted in orderto articulate their concerns vis-à-vis different contexts and interlocutors.The conclusions offer an initial evaluation of the impact and of theconsequences of Muslim mobilisation and institution-formation forEuropean society and policy-making.

Symud Islamaidd: Rhyddid Gwleidyddol & Democratiaeth

Dr.Yusuf al-Qaradawi

It is the duty of the (Islamaidd) Movement in the coming phase tostand firm against totalitarian and dictatorial rule, political despotism and usurpation of people’s rights. The Movement should always stand by political freedom, as represented by true,not false, democracy. It should flatly declare it refusal of tyrantsand steer clear of all dictators, even if some tyrant appears to havegood intentions towards it for some gain and for a time that is usually short, as has been shown by experience.The Prophet (SAWS) said, “ When you see my Nation fall victim to fear and does not say to a wrong –doer, “You are wrong”, thenyou may lose hope in them.” So how about a regime that forces people to say to a conceited wrongdoer, “How just, how great you are. O our hero, our savior and our liberator!”The Quran denounces tyrants such as Numrudh, Pharaoh, Haman and others, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah). [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, nid yw'r Mudiad Islamaidd a'r Deffroad Islamaidd erioed wedi ffynnu na dwyn ffrwyth oni bai mewn awyrgylch o ddemocratiaeth a rhyddid, ac wedi gwywo a mynd yn ddiffrwyth yn unig ar adegau o ormes a gormes a sathrodd dros ewyllys y bobloedd oedd yn glynu wrth Islam. Roedd cyfundrefnau gormesol o'r fath yn gosod eu seciwlariaeth, sosialaeth neu gomiwnyddiaeth ar eu pobloedd trwy rym a gorfodaeth, defnyddio artaith gudd a dienyddiadau cyhoeddus, a defnyddio'r arfau cythreulig hynny a rwygodd gnawd,tywallt gwaed, malu asgwrn a dinistrio'r enaid. Gwelsom yr arferion hyn mewn llawer o wledydd Mwslemaidd, gan gynnwys Twrci, Yr Aifft, Syria, Irac, (y cyntaf) De Yemen, Somalia a gwladwriaethau gogledd Affrica am gyfnodau amrywiol o amser, yn dibynnu ar oedran neu deyrnasiad yr unben ym mhob gwlad.Ar y llaw arall, we saw the Islamic Movement and the Islamic Awakening bear fruit and flourish at the times of freedom and democracy, and in the wake of the collapse of imperial regimes that ruled peoples with fear and oppression.Therefore, I would not imagine that the Islamic Movement could support anything other than political freedom and democracy.The tyrants allowed every voice to be raised, except the voice ofIslam, and let every trend express itself in the form of a politicalparty or body of some sort, except the Islamic current which is theonly trend that actually speaks for this Nation and expresses it screed, gwerthoedd, essence and very existence.

Byw gyda Democratiaeth yn yr Aifft

daniel Consolatore

Bu bron i Hosni Mubarek gael ei ethol yn arlywydd yr Aifft ym mis Medi 2005. Nid bod yr awtocrat seciwlar saith deg saith oed sydd wedi dyfarnu'r genedl honno am y pedair blynedd ar hugain diwethaf wedi colli'r etholiad; gan y cyfrif swyddogol, cymerodd bron 85 y cant o'r bleidlais. Y cystadleuydd agosaf hwn, Ayman Nour, pen uwch ben yr wrthblaid newydd al-Ghad (“Yfory”),rheoli llai na 8 y cant. Yr unig ymgeisydd arall i gymryd unrhyw gyfatebiaeth arwyddocaol oedd NomanGamaa oed yr hybarch al-Wafd (“Dirprwyo”)parti, a reolodd lai na 3 y cant. Yr Ikhwanal-Muslimeen (“Brawdoliaeth Fwslimaidd”), yn cael ei ofni gan somany Westerners am ei gymdeithasu cymdeithasol a gwleidyddol Islamaidd pur, doedden nhw ddim hyd yn oed yn ymgeisydd. Ymddengys bod buddugoliaeth bendantMarearek yn galonogol i'r mwyafrif o bobl - yn enwedig Americanwyr seciwlar - yn poeni am ddyfodol yr ychydig Westernfriendly,cyfundrefnau Arabaidd cymedrol, dan fygythiad gan Islamization gwleidyddiaeth yn y rhanbarth. Mae'n ymddangos bod gweinyddiaeth Bush hefyd yn falch o gael reasonto, o ystyried ei newid calon diweddar am ddemocratiaeth Arabaidd. Mae'r arfau cemegol sydd ar goll yn Irac a'r cyfiawnhad dilynol o'r rhyfel yn y cynsail ar gyfer democrateiddio wedi ysbrydoli'r Tŷ i wthio am gynifer o etholiadau â phosib yn y rhanbarth. Mewn gwirionedd, pan siaradodd yr Ysgrifennydd Gwladol Condoleezza Rice ym Mhrifysgol America ynCairo ym mis Mehefin, cyhoeddodd i syndod bod yr Unol Daleithiau “ers trigain mlynedd” wedi cael eu camgymryd “pursu[ing] sefydlogrwydd ar draul democratiaeth ”yn y Dwyrain Canol. Am genedlaethau, U.S. mae pundits yn pwyso na ellid ymddiried yn y “stryd Arabaidd” yn y bleidlais, gan y gallent drosglwyddo pŵer i Islamiaethwyr ffwndamentalaidd comiwnyddol. Roedd Realpolitik yn mynnu bod awtocratiaid ac unbeniaid, fel Mubarek a Saddam Hussein, bu’n rhaid bachu plant er mwyn cynnal “sefydlogrwydd” yn y rhanbarth. Pe byddent wedyn yn llwyfannu hepgor sor etholiad yn gyfan gwbl, gwadu lleferydd rhydd,a gadael i heddlu cudd rhydd ddychryn y boblogaeth,byddai'r Tŷ Gwyn yn debygol o droi llygad dall. Ond gallai ifMubarek nawr hawlio gwir fandad democrataidd,dyna fyddai'r gorau o bob byd.

Trawsnewidiadau Gwleidyddol yn y Byd Arabaidd

yn Shehata

The year 2007 marked the end of a brief interval of political liberalization in the Arab world which began shortly after the occupation of Iraq and which resulted primarily from external pressures on Arab regimes to reform and democratize. External pressures during the 2003-2006 period created a political opening which activists across the region used to press for longstanding demands for political and constitutional reform.Faced with a combination of growing external and internal pressures to reform, Arab regimes were forced to make some concessions to their challengers.In Egypt, upon the request of the President, Parliament passed a constitutional amendment to allowfor direct competitive presidential elections. In September2005, Egypt witnessed its first competitive presidential election ever and as expected Mubarak was elected for a fifth term with 87%of the vote. Moreover,during the November 2005 parliamentary elections,which were freer than previous elections, y Frawdoliaeth Fwslimaidd, the largest opposition movement in Egypt, won 88 seats. This was the largest number of seats won by an opposition group in Egypt since the 1952 revolution.Similarly, in the January 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections, Hamas won a majority of the seats.Hamas was thereby able to establish control over the Palestinian Legislative Council which had been dominated by Fatah since the establishment of the Palestinian Authority in 1996. In Lebanon, in the wake of the assassination of Rafiq Hariri on 14th February2005, a coalition of pro-Hariri political forces was ablet hrough broad-based mass mobilization and external support to force Syrian troops to pull out from Lebanon and the pro-Syrian Government to resign. Elections were held, and the 14th February coalition was able to win a plurality of the votes and to form a new government.In Morocco, King Mohamed VI oversaw the establishment of a truth and reconciliation committee which sought to address the grievances of those who had been abused under the reign of his father.The Gulf Cooperation Council countries (GCC) also under took some important reforms during the 2003-2006 period. In 2003 Qatar promulgated a written constitution for the first time in its history. In 2005,Saudi Arabia convened municipal elections for the firsttime in five decades. And in 2006, Bahrain held parliamentaryelections in which the Shiite society of AlWefaqwon 40%of the seats. Subsequently, the first Shiitedeputy prime minister in Bahrain was appointed.Theses events, which came to be known as ‘the Arab Spring,’ led some optimists to believe that the Arabworld was on the brink of a democratic transformation similar to those experienced in Latin American and Eastern and Central Europe during the 1980s and1990s. However, in 2007, as political liberalization gave way to heightened polarization and to renewed repression,these hopes were dispelled. The failure ofthe openings of the 2003-2006 period to create a sustained momentum towards democratization can beat tributed to a number of factors. Fe wnaeth y dirywiad yn y sefyllfa o ran diogelwch yn Irac a methiant yr Unol Daleithiau i greu trefn sefydlog a democrataidd leihau’r gefnogaeth i ymdrechion hybu democratiaeth o fewn gweinyddiaeth America ac atgyfnerthu barn y rhai oedd yn honni bod yn rhaid i ddiogelwch a sefydlogrwydd ddod o flaen democratiaeth.. Moreover, roedd llwyddiannau etholiadol Islamwyr yn yr Aifft ac ym Mhalestina wedi lleihau ymhellach gefnogaeth y Gorllewin i ymdrechion hyrwyddo democratiaeth yn y rhanbarth oherwydd y canfyddwyd bod egwyddorion y symudiadau hyn yn groes i fuddiannau’r Gorllewin.

Islam Radical Yn Yr Aifft Cymhariaeth O Ddau Grŵp

Gan David Zeidan

Mae'r awdur yn cymharu dau grŵp Islamaidd radical allweddol o'r Aifft, Cymdeithas y Mwslemiaid(Takfir wal-Hijra) and the Society of Struggle (Jama’at al-Jihad) and analyzes their differencesin doctrine and strategy. This study is presented in the context of a broader examination of thehistory of militant Islamic groups in Egypt. The author argues that the two societies furnishexamples of basic types of radical Islamic movements. In addition, Jama’at al-Jihad remainsimportant in contemporary Egyptian politics and in that country’s internal struggle.The Egyptian radical groups understudy here, Cymdeithas y Mwslemiaid (Takfirwal-Hijra) and the Society of Struggle(Jama’at al-Jihad), espoused drasticallydifferent ideologies and strategies forgaining power. The Society of Muslims(Takfir) had a passive separatist andmessianic ideology, delaying activeconfrontation with the state to an indefinitepoint in the future when it could reach acertain degree of strength. In comparison,the Society of Struggle (al-Jihad) followedan activist, militant ideology that committedit to immediate and violent action againstthe regime.ISLAMIC RESURGENCEHistory reveals cyclical patterns ofIslamic revival in times of crisis.Charismatic leaders arose attempting torenew the fervor and identity of Muslims,purify the faith from accretions and corruptreligious practices, and reinstate the pristineIslam of the Prophet Muhammad’s day.Leaders of revivals tended to appear eitheras renewers of the faith promised at the startof each century (mujaddids), or as thedeliverer sent by God in the end of times toestablish the final kingdom of justice andpeace (mahdi).

The W&M Progressive

Julian Carr
Richael ffyddlon
Ethan Forrest

Accepting the Responsibility of Electoral Choice

The development of democratic institutions comes with negative externalities. As a political progressive, I believe that the big picture – establishing a solid democratic foundation – outweighs the possible emergence of political parties that may advocate religious or gender intolerance. I am a firm believer in the workings of the democratic process. While I have been studying in Egypt for the semester, I am reminded that despite the imperfections of the United States democratic system, it is still many times better than living under any authoritarian regime that outlaws political parties and posts military police at a variety of locations in an effort to exert control and maintain power.

In Egypt, the electoral process is not democratic. The National Political Party – the party of President Mubarak – exerts tremendous influence in the country. Its main opposition is the Muslim Brotherhood, which was created in 1928 by Hassan al-Banna. The Muslim Brotherhood is based on very strict interpretations of the Koran and the idea that secular governments are a direct violation of the teaching of the Koran. The party has a very violent past; it has been directly responsible for several assassination attempts and the assassination of the Egyptian leader Anwar-as-Sadat in 1981.

The Muslim Brotherhood is an illegal political party. Because the political party is religious, it is not allowed to participate in the public sphere under Egyptian law. Despite this technicality, the party has members in the Egyptian Parliament. However, the parliamentarians cannot officially declare their affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood but instead identify as Independents. Though the party remains illegal, it remains the most powerful opposition to the ruling National Democratic Party.

Civil society and Democratization in the Arab World

Saad Eddin Ibrahim
Even if Islam is the Answer, Arab Muslims are the Problem

In May 2008, the Arab nation experienced a number of fires, or rather, armed conflictsin

Lebanon, Irac, Palesteina, Yemen, and Somalia. In these conflicts,

the warring parties used Islam as the instrument for mobilization

and amassing support. Collectively, Muslims are

waging war against Muslims.

After some Muslims raised the slogan of “Islam is the solution,


became apparent “their Islam is the problem.” No sooner have some of them acquired weapons,

than they raised it against the state and its ruling regime regardless of

whether that regime was ruling in the name of Islam or not.

We have

seen this in recent years between the followers of Osama bin Laden

and the Al-Qaeda organization on the one hand, and the authorities in

the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, on the other. We have also seen an

explosive example of this phenomenon in Morocco, whose king rules in the name of Islam and

whose title is the ‘Prince of the Faithful.Thus each Muslim faction kills other Muslims in the

name of Islam.
A quick glance at the contents of the media confirms how the

term Islam and its associated symbols have become mere tools in the hands of these Muslims.

Prominent examples of these Islam-exploiting factions are:
The Muslim Brotherhood, Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and Jamiat al-Islamiyya, in Egypt

Hamas and the Islamic Jihad Movement, in Palestine Hezbollah, Fatah al-Islam,

and Jamiat al-Islammiyya, in Lebanon The Houthi Zayadi rebels and the Islamic Reform Grouping

(Islah), inYemen The Islamic courts, in Somalia The Islamic Front ,

yr 500 Mwslimiaid mwyaf dylanwadol

John Esposito

Ibrahim Kalin

The publication you have in your hands is the first of what we hope will be anannual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslimworld. We have strived to highlight people who are influential as Muslims, thatis, people whose influence is derived from their practice of Islam or from the factthat they are Muslim. We think that this gives valuable insight into the differentways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how peopleare living as Muslims today.Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influensmeaning to flow-in, pointing to an old astrological idea that unseen forces (like themoon) affect humanity. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanitytoo. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over thelives of a large number of people on the earth. Mae'r 50 most influential figuresare profiled. Their influence comes from a variety of sources; however they areunified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.We have then broken up the 500 leaders into 15 categories—Scholarly, Political,Administrative, Lineage, Preachers, Merched, Youth, Philanthropy, Development,Science and Technology, Arts and Culture, cyfryngau, Radicals, International IslamicNetworks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds ofways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: InternationalIslamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnationalnetworks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whoseimportance is due to current issues affecting humanity.

Reform in the Muslim World: The Role of Islamists and Outside Powers

Shibley Telhami

The Bush Administration’s focus on spreading democracyin the Middle East has been much discussed over the past several years, not only in the United Statesand Arab and Muslim countries but also around theworld. In truth, neither the regional discourse about theneed for political and economic reform nor the Americantalk of spreading democracy is new. Over the pasttwo decades, particularly beginning with the end of theCold War, intellectuals and governments in the MiddleEast have spoken about reform. The American policyprior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990 also aimedto spread democracy in the Arab world. But in that case,the first Gulf War and the need to forge alliances withautocratic regimes were one reason talk of democracydeclined. The other reason was the discovery that politicalreform provided openings to Islamist political groupsthat seemed very much at odd with American objectives.The fear that Islamist groups supported democracy onlybased on the principle of “one man, one vote, one time,”as former Assistant Secretary of State Edward Djerejianonce put it, led the United States to backtrack. Evenearly in the Clinton Administration, Secretary of StateWarren Christopher initially focused on democracy inhis Middle East policy but quickly sidelined the issueas the administration moved to broker Palestinian-Israelinegotiation in the shadow of militant Islamist groups,especially Hamas.

The future of Islam after 9/11

Mansoor Moaddel

There is no consensus among historians and Islamicists about the nature of theIslamic belief system and the experience of historical Islam, on which one couldbase a definitive judgment concerning Islam’s compatibility with modernity. Nonetheless,the availability of both historical and value survey data allow us to analyzethe future of Islam in light of the horrific event of 9/11. The key factor that woulddetermine the level of societal visibility necessary for predicting the future developmentof a culture is the nature and clarity of the ideological targets in relation towhich new cultural discourses are produced. Based on this premise, I shall try toilluminate the nature of such targets that are confronted by Muslim activists inIran, Yr Aifft, and Jordan.