中的所有条目 "哈马斯" 类别
中东的政治伊斯兰教
是努森
This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly
referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, 在
particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may
be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report
回顾一些用来解释中东伊斯兰复兴的主要理论
(数字 1). 简单来说, 报告表明，伊斯兰教不必与民主和
有一种趋势是忽视许多中东国家已经
参与了对伊斯兰运动的残酷镇压, 导致他们, 有人争辩, 占用
反对国家的武器, 更罕见的是, 外国. 使用政治暴力是
广泛分布于中东, 但既不不合逻辑也不非理性. 在很多情况下甚至
以使用暴力而闻名的伊斯兰团体已转变为和平的政治组织
政党成功参加市政和全国选举. 尽管如此, 伊斯兰主义者
尽管有许多理论试图
说明它的增长和受欢迎的吸引力. 一般来说, 大多数理论认为伊斯兰主义是
对相对剥夺的反应, 尤其是社会不平等和政治压迫. 选择
理论在宗教本身和宗教的范围内寻求伊斯兰复兴的答案
强大的, 宗教象征的唤起潜力.
结论主张超越“悲观与厄运”的方法，即
将伊斯兰主义描绘成一种非法的政治表达和对西方的潜在威胁 (“老的
伊斯兰主义”), 以及对当前伊斯兰主义民主化的更细致入微的理解
现在正在整个中东发生的运动 (“新伊斯兰主义”). 这个
importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded
along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their
adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on
understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only
社会中较贫穷的阶层，但也属于中产阶级.伊斯兰政党 : 为什么他们不能民主
Bassam Tibi
Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many
Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take
an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, 它有
become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on
clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam
and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate
consequences.
Intelligent discussion of Islamism, 民主, and Islam requires
clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into
confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after
thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and
democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious
reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what
I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-
Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment
of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.
In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds
this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is
that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty
because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.
Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment
upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of
all practical wisdom.
参与政治伊斯兰的策略
沙迪哈米德
阿曼达·卡德莱克（AMANDA KADLEC）
政治伊斯兰教是当今中东地区最活跃的政治力量. 它的未来与该地区的未来密切相关. 如果美国和欧盟致力于支持该地区的政治改革, 他们需要设计具体的, 参与伊斯兰团体的连贯战略. 然而, 美国. 普遍不愿意与这些运动展开对话. 相似地, 欧盟与伊斯兰主义者的接触是个例外, 不是规则. 存在低级联系人的地方, 它们主要用于信息收集目的, 不是战略目标. 美国. 和欧盟有许多解决该地区经济和政治发展的计划——其中包括中东伙伴关系倡议 (美皮), 千年挑战公司 (中冶), 地中海联盟, 和欧洲睦邻政策 (ENP) - 然而，他们对伊斯兰政治反对派的挑战如何适应更广泛的区域目标几乎没有什么可说的. 我们. 和欧盟的民主援助和规划几乎完全针对威权政府本身或世俗的民间社会团体，在他们自己的社会中得到的支持很少.
重新评估现行政策的时机已经成熟. 自九月恐怖袭击以来 11, 2001, 支持中东民主对西方政策制定者来说具有更大的重要性, 谁看到了缺乏民主和政治暴力之间的联系. 人们更加关注理解政治伊斯兰内部的变化. 美国新政府更愿意扩大与穆斯林世界的交流. 同时, 绝大多数主流伊斯兰组织——包括埃及的穆斯林兄弟会, 约旦的伊斯兰行动阵线 (印度空军), 摩洛哥正义与发展党 (PJD), 科威特伊斯兰立宪运动, 和也门伊斯兰党——越来越多地将支持政治改革和民主作为其政治纲领的核心组成部分. 此外, 许多人表示有兴趣与美国展开对话. 和欧盟政府.
西方国家与中东关系的未来可能在很大程度上取决于前者与非暴力伊斯兰政党就共同利益和目标进行广泛对话的程度. 最近有大量关于与伊斯兰主义者接触的研究, 但很少有人清楚地说明它在实践中可能需要什么. 佐伊·诺特, 德国外交关系委员会访问学者, 把它, “欧盟正在考虑参与，但并不真正知道如何参与。”1 希望澄清讨论, 我们区分了三个级别的“参与度”,”每个都有不同的手段和目的: 低级接触, 战略对话, 和伙伴关系.
伊斯兰政党 : 三种动作
塔玛拉·科夫曼（Tamara Cofman）
Between 1991 和 2001, the world of political Islam became significantly more diverse. Today, the term “Islamist”—used to describe a political perspective centrally informed by a set of religious interpretations and commitments—can be applied to such a wide array of groups as to be almost meaningless. It encompasses everyone from the terrorists who flew planes into the World Trade Center to peacefully elected legislators in Kuwait who have voted in favor of women’s suffrage.
尽管如此, the prominence of Islamist movements—legal and illegal, violent and peaceful—in the ranks of political oppositions across the Arab world makes the necessity of drawing relevant distinctions obvious. The religious discourse of the Islamists is now unavoidably central to Arab politics. Conventional policy discussions label Islamists either “moderate” or “radical,” generally categorizing them according to two rather loose and unhelpful criteria. The first is violence: Radicals use it and moderates do not. This begs the question of how to classify groups that do not themselves engage in violence but who condone, justify, or even actively support the violence of others. A second, only somewhat more restrictive criterion is whether the groups or individuals in question
accept the rules of the democratic electoral game. Popular sovereignty is no small concession for traditional Islamists, many of whom reject democratically elected governments as usurpers of God’s sovereignty.
Yet commitment to the procedural rules of democratic elections is not the same as commitment to democratic politics or governance.
伊斯兰政党 : 民主的福音或祸害?
阿姆·哈姆扎维（Amr Hamzawy）
内森J. 棕色
What role do Islamist movements play in Arab politics? With their popular messages and broad followings within Arab societies, would their incorporation as normal political actors be a boon for democratization or democracy’s bane? For too long, we have tried to answer such questions solely by speculating about the true intentions of these movements and their leaders. Islamist political movements in the Arab world are increasingly asked—both by outside observers and by members of their own societies—about their true intentions.
But to hear them tell it, leaders of mainstream Arab Islamist movements are not the problem. They see themselves as democrats in nondemocratic lands, firmly committed to clean and fair electoral processes, whatever outcomes these may bring. It is rulers and regimes that should be pressed to commit to democracy, say the Islamists, not their oppositions. We need not take such Islamist leaders at their word. 的确, we should realize that there is only so much that any of their words can do to answer the question of the relationship between these movements and the prospects for democracy.
While their words are increasingly numerous (Islamist movements tend to be quite loquacious) and their answers about democracy increasingly specific, their ability to resolve all ambiguities is limited. First, as long as they are out of power—as most of them are, and are likely to remain for some time—they will never fully prove themselves. Many Islamist leaders themselves probably do not know how they would act were they to come to power.
政治伊斯兰教: 准备好订婚?
埃马德·埃尔丁·沙欣
The voluminous literature on reform and democratization in the Middle East region reveals a number of facts: a main obstacle to reform is the incumbent regimes that have been trying to resist and circumvent genuine democratic transformations; political reform cannot be credible without integrating moderate Islamists in the process; and external actors (mainly the US and the EU) have not yet formulated a coherent approach to reform that could simultaneously achieve stability and democracy in the region. This paper explores the possibilities and implications of a European engagement with moderate Islamists on democracy promotion in the region. It argues that the EU approach to political reform in the Middle East region needs to be enhanced and linked to realities on the ground. Political reform cannot be effective without the integration of non-violent Islamic groups in a gradual, multifaceted process. It should be highlighted that the process of engagement is a risky one for both the EU and the Islamists, yet both stand to gain from a systematic dialogue on democracy. To reduce the risks, the engagement with political Islam should come within a broader EU strategy for democracy promotion in the region. 实际上, what the Islamists would expect from Europe is to maintain a
consistent and assertive stand on political reforms that would allow for a genuine representation of the popular will through peaceful means.
In this regard, a number of questions seem pertinent. Does the EU really need to engage political Islam in democratic reforms? Is political Islam ready for engagement and will it be willing to engage? How can an engagement policy be formulated on the basis of plausible implementation with minimal risks to the interests of the parties involved?
伊斯兰运动和阿拉伯世界的民主进程: 探索灰色地带
内森J. 棕色, 阿姆·哈姆扎维（Amr Hamzawy）,
玛丽娜·奥特韦（Marina Ottaway）
在过去的十年中, 伊斯兰运动已成为中东地区的主要政治参与者. 与政府一起, 伊斯兰运动, 温和的和激进的, 将决定该地区的政治在可预见的未来如何展开. 他们不仅展示了制作具有广泛大众吸引力的信息的能力，而且, 最重要的是, 创建具有真正社会基础的组织并制定连贯的政治战略. 其他方,
总的来说, 所有帐户都失败了.
西方公众和, 尤其是, 美国, 在发生戏剧性事件后才意识到伊斯兰运动的重要性, 例如伊朗革命和埃及总统安瓦尔·萨达特被暗杀. 自 9 月的恐怖袭击以来，注意力更加持久 11, 2001. 因此, 伊斯兰运动被广泛认为是危险和敌对的. 虽然这种描述对于伊斯兰极端组织的组织来说是准确的, 这很危险，因为他们愿意在追求目标时不分青红皂白地使用暴力, 这不是对许多放弃或避免暴力的群体的准确描述. 因为恐怖组织构成了直接
威胁, 然而, 所有国家的政策制定者都对暴力组织给予了不成比例的关注.
它是主流的伊斯兰组织, 不是激进的, 这将对中东未来的政治演变产生最大的影响. 激进分子重建统一整个阿拉伯世界的哈里发的宏伟目标, 甚至将受伊斯兰教原教旨主义解释启发的法律和社会习俗强加于个别阿拉伯国家，这与今天的现实相去甚远，无法实现. 这并不意味着恐怖组织没有危险——即使在追求不可能的目标时，它们也可能造成巨大的生命损失——但它们不太可能改变中东的面貌. 主流伊斯兰组织通常是另一回事. 他们已经对许多国家的社会习俗产生了强大的影响, 制止和扭转世俗主义趋势，改变许多阿拉伯人的着装和行为方式. 以及他们直接的政治目标, 通过参与本国的正常政治而成为强大的力量, 不是不可能的. 它已经在摩洛哥等国家实现, 约旦, 甚至埃及, 仍然禁止所有伊斯兰政治组织，但现在议会中有八十八名穆斯林兄弟. 政治, 不是暴力, 是什么赋予了主流伊斯兰主义者影响力.
伊斯兰教, 伊斯兰主义者, 和中东的选举原则
詹姆斯·皮斯卡托里
对于一个时间应该已经到来的想法, ÒdemocracyÓ 掩盖了一个惊人的
未回答的问题数量和, 在穆斯林世界, 产生了
大量的热量. 这是一个文化特定的术语, 反映西方
几个世纪以来的欧洲经验? 非西方社会是否拥有
他们自己的参与和问责标准——实际上是他们自己的
需要注意的发展节奏, 如果不尊重? 伊斯兰教,
强调圣经权威和神圣律法的中心地位, 允许
灵活的政治和参与式政府?
这些问题的答案构成了叙述和反叙述的一部分
他们自己是有争议的话语的一个组成部分. 更大的故事
关注 ÒIslamÓ 是否对西方构成威胁, 和补充
故事涉及伊斯兰教与民主的相容性. 知识分子
行李, 改变比喻, 几乎不中立. 讨论本身有
变得尖锐政治化, 陷入有关东方主义的相关争议,
尤其是中东和整个穆斯林世界的例外论,
和宗教“原教旨主义”运动的现代主义.
伊斯兰政党 , 他们是民主党人吗? 有关系吗 ?
塔雷克·马苏德（Tarek Masoud）
受“伊斯兰主义者来袭”的感觉驱使,” 记者和政策制定者最近一直在激烈猜测埃及穆斯林兄弟会等伊斯兰政党是否 (兆字节) 或者巴勒斯坦的哈马斯真的相信民主. 虽然我试图勾勒出伊斯兰民主承诺的界限, 我认为凝视伊斯兰灵魂是对能量的滥用. 伊斯兰主义者不来. 而且, 正如 Adam Przeworski 和其他人所争论的那样, 对民主的承诺更多地源于环境限制而不是真正的信仰. 而不是担心伊斯兰主义者是否是真正的民主主义者,
我们的目标应该是帮助加强民主和自由的机构和行动者，这样任何团体——无论是伊斯兰主义者还是其他人——都无法颠覆它们.
但是我们担心这场运动的民主善意是什么？? 伊斯兰主义是一个狡猾的概念. 例如, 如果我们将那些要求应用伊斯兰教法的政党称为伊斯兰主义者, 我们必须排除土耳其的正义与发展党 (这被广泛认为是伊斯兰主义者) 包括埃及执政的民族民主党 (积极镇压伊斯兰主义者). 而不是陷入定义问题, 我们会更好地专注于从相同的历史根源发展起来的一组政党, 他们的许多目标和立场来自同一个思想体系, 并保持彼此之间的组织联系——也就是说, 那些来自国际 MB 的政党. 其中包括埃及母亲组织 (成立于 1928), 还有哈马斯, 约旦的伊斯兰行动阵线, 阿尔及利亚和平社会运动, 伊拉克伊斯兰党, 黎巴嫩伊斯兰组织, 和别的.
伊斯兰战争规则
优素福H. 艾布尔·埃宁
Sherifa Zuhur
The United States no doubt will be involved in the Middle East for many decades. To be sure, settling the Israeli–Palestinian dispute or alleviating poverty could help to stem the tides of Islamic radicalism and anti-American sentiment. But on an ideological level, we must confront a specific interpretation of Islamic law, history,and scripture that is a danger to both the United States and its allies. To win that ideological war, we must understand the sources of both Islamic radicalism and liberalism. We need to comprehend more thoroughly the ways in which militants misinterpret and pervert Islamic scripture. Al-Qaeda has produced its own group of spokespersons who attempt to provide religious legitimacy to the nihilism they preach. Many frequently quote from the Quran and hadith (the Prophet Muhammad’s sayings and deeds) in a biased manner to draw justification for their cause. Lieutenant Commander Youssef Aboul-Enein and Dr. Sherifa Zuhur delve into the Quran and hadith to articulate a means by which Islamic militancy can be countered ideologically, drawing many of their insights from these and other classical Islamic texts. In so doing, they expose contradictions and alternative approaches in the core principles that groups like al-Qaeda espouse. The authors have found that proper use of Islamic scripture actually discredits the tactics of al-Qaeda and other jihadist organizations. This monograph provides a basis for encouraging our Muslim allies to challenge the theology supported by Islamic militants. Seeds of doubt planted in the minds of suicide bombers might dissuade them from carrying out their missions. The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study of Islamic rulings on warfare to the national defense community as an effort to contribute to the ongoing debate over how to defeat Islamic militancy.
伊斯兰教与西方
Preface
约翰·J. 德乔亚
The remarkable feeling of proximity between people and nations is the unmistakable reality of our globalized world. Encounters with other peoples’ ways oflife, current affairs, 政治, welfare and faithsare more frequent than ever. We are not onlyable to see other cultures more clearly, butalso to see our differences more sharply. The information intensity of modern life has madethis diversity of nations part of our every dayconsciousness and has led to the centrality ofculture in discerning our individual and collectiveviews of the world.Our challenges have also become global.The destinies of nations have become deeply interconnected. No matter where in the world we live, we are touched by the successes and failures of today’s global order. Yet our responses to global problems remain vastly different, not only as a result of rivalry and competing interests,but largely because our cultural difference is the lens through which we see these global challenges.Cultural diversity is not necessarily a source of clashes and conflict. 实际上, the proximity and cross-cultural encounters very often bring about creative change – a change that is made possible by well-organized social collaboration.Collaboration across borders is growing primarily in the area of business and economic activity. Collaborative networks for innovation,production and distribution are emerging as the single most powerful shaper of the global economy.
为什么没有阿拉伯民主国家 ?
拉里·戴蒙德（Larry Diamond）
在民主化的“第三波,”民主不再是一种主要是西方现象，而是“走向全球”。当第三波开始时 1974, 世界只有大约 40 民主国家, 他们中只有少数位于西方之外. 当《民主杂志》开始在 1990, 曾经有 76 选举民主国家 (占世界独立国家的不到一半). 经过 1995, 这个数字飙升至 117 个——每五个州就有三个. 到时, 除了中东以外，世界上每个主要地区都存在大量民主国家。 1 此外, 世界上每一个主要的文化领域都成为了重要的民主存在的东道国, 尽管再次出现了一个例外——阿拉伯世界。 2 十五年后, 这个例外仍然存在.
阿拉伯世界甚至没有一个单一的民主政权是一个惊人的反常现象——民主全球化的主要例外. 为什么没有阿拉伯民主? 的确, 为什么中东和北非沿海的十六个独立的阿拉伯国家中, 黎巴嫩是唯一一个曾经是民主国家的国家?
关于阿拉伯民主赤字的最常见假设是它一定与宗教或文化有关. 毕竟, 所有阿拉伯国家共有的一件事是他们是阿拉伯人.
城市公共空间中的穆斯林公民社会: 全球化, 话语转变, 和社会运动
保罗·M. 吕贝克
布里亚纳·布里兹（Bryana Britts）
Cities are processes, not products. The three Islamic elements that set in motion the processes that give rise to Islamic cities were: a distinction between the members of the Umma and the outsiders, which led to juridical and spatial distinction by neighborhoods; the segregation of the sexes which gave rise to a particular solution to the question of spatial organization; and a legal system which, rather than imposing general regulations over land uses of various types in various places, left to the litigation of the neighbors the detailed adjudication of mutual rights over space and use. (Janet Abu Lughod 1987: 173)
Framing: Muslim Movements in Urban Situations We live in an intellectual moment when the complexity of the global Islamic
revival renders it difficult to generalize about Muslim institutions, social movements, and discursive practices. While diversity and locality remain paramount features of Muslim cities, globalization has inadvertently nurtured transnational Muslim networks from the homeland of Islam and extended them into the web of interconnected world cities. Quite opportunistically, urban-based
Muslim networks and insurrectionist movements now thrive in the interstitial spaces created by the new global communication and transportation infrastructures. What, then, are the long-term patterns for Muslims in cities? Since the last millennium, as Janet Abu-Lughod reminds us, “the Islamic city” has been the primary site for: defining power relations between ruler and subject, specifying the rights and identities of spatial communities, and regulating urban social relations between genders. Today’s Muslim city remains the epicenter of a burgeoning public sphere in which informed publics debate highly contested Islamic discourses regarding social justice,
民主, 恐怖主义与美国在阿拉伯世界的政策
F. 格雷戈里·高斯
The United States has embarked upon what President Bush and Secretary of State Rice has called a “generational challenge” to encourage political reform and democracy in the Arab world. The Bush Administration and other defenders of the democracy campaign contend that the push for Arab democracy is not only about spreading American values, but also about insuring American security. They hypothesize that as democracy grows in the Arab world, anti-American terrorism from the Arab world will decline. 所以, the promotion of democracy inthe Arab world is not only consistent with American security goals in the area, but necessary to achieve those goals.
Two questions present themselves in considering this element of the “Bush Doctrine” in the Arab world: 1) Is there a relationship between terrorism and democracy such that the more democratic a country becomes, the less likely it is to produce terrorists and terrorist groups? 换句话说, is the security rationale for democracy promotion in the Arab world based on a sound premise?; 和 2) What kind of governments would likely be generated by democratic elections in Arab countries? Would they be willing to cooperate with the United States on important policy objectives in the Middle East, not only in maintaining democracy but also on
Arab-Israeli, Gulf security and oil issues?
This paper will consider these two questions. It finds that there is little empirical evidence linking democracy with an absence of or reduction in terrorism. It questions whether democracy would reduce the motives and opportunities of groups like al-Qa’ida, which oppose democracy on both religious and practical grounds. It examines recent trends in Arab public opinion and elections, concluding that while Arab publics are very supportive of democracy, democratic elections in Arab states are likely to produce Islamist governments which would be much less likely to cooperate with the United States than their authoritarian predecessors.
哈马斯可以树立榜样
卡德（Khader）
Perhaps the single most important aspect of Hamas’ overwhelming victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections last month is that it was the first time in the contemporary history of the Middle East that democracy was exercised for real without any direct external or internal interference. The ramifications of such free elections may well reverberate around the region for years to come and might mark a new phase in the geopolitical map of the Middle East.
这个, 然而, was not the first time an Islamic political party showed its popularity at the ballot box. Algeria’s Islamic Front appeared headed to certain victory in elections in the mid-1990s before external intervention on the part of the “民主的” West and its allies in Algiers nipped that experience in the bud. In Algeria, the result of burying democracy has been an extremely bloody conflict that still drags on, much to the embarrassment of western countries, which prefer not to comment. For the ordinary citizen in the Arab world, it was an experience that only added to the sense of oppression and frustration felt in every corner of the region.
Thus Hamas’ electoral victory has sparked widespread hope among the Arab masses that they have another chance to find out if an Islamic party can rule better than the current regimes in the Arab world. 哈马斯, in this sense, carries the hopes of millions of Arabs and Muslims all over the world.
But with such expectations comes a time fraught with danger. Hamas and the way it runs matters in the Palestinian territories can set a very interesting example: if it succeeds; if it proves it can run Palestinian affairs more transparently and to the benefit of more ordinary Palestinians than previously, while at the same time managing tough negotiations with Israel, the experience will encourage other Islamic movements in the Arab world to use it as an example to convince their citizens that Islamic political movements are a viable alternative.
But if Hamas fails in its difficult and challenging task, the setback will strike a devastating blow to all Islamic movements and parties in the region. A Hamas failure could perhaps send the entire region into another period of political wilderness akin to the era after the failure of the pan-Arabists.
因此, Hamas in power is an interesting and illuminating phenomenon, and one that will be followed closely by all concerned parties. According to a leading Hamas figure in Khan Yunis, 博士. Younis al-Astal, the International Muslim Brotherhood has already expressed its readiness to assist Hamas with all the needed expertise to make it succeed in its mission. The Brotherhood will of course be the principal benefactor of any Hamas success.
By the same token, 然而, the West may feel itself forced now to exert all possible efforts to make Hamas fail even if the movement proves successful in meeting the needs of the people. The issue in question here is not how efficient a government is but how loyal a government shows itself to be to the West. This is the measure the West has generally used to assess the Middle East, where billions of US dollars have been spent on keeping Arab regimes “moderate and realistic”, especially in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
There is a curious parallel to the Cold War now in the dynamic that is developing between the West and the Muslim world. During the Cold War, the West was confident that democracy would bring the Eastern Bloc to its knees and forcefully spread the message that individual freedom and the right to vote were human rights par excellence.
Now, 然而, that same message is likely to backfire on the West. If real elections were held in Egypt and Jordan, it is highly likely that Muslim Brotherhood movements would come to power and cast into doubt the peace treaties between those countries and Israel, in which the West has invested so much effort.
Everyone knows that democracy comes at a cost in the Middle East. Is the world ready to engage in this game? The key is likely to be the success or otherwise of Hamas, which is operating under extremely adverse conditions. Arabs and Muslims across the region, so often let down by political promise from various quarters, may well be disappointed again. But in the meantime their hopes are with a political movement that is posing the first serious challenge in decades to Arab regimes everywhere.
欧洲与温和的伊斯兰主义者的接触
克里斯蒂娜·考斯（Kristina Kausch）
Direct engagement1 with Islamist political movements has typically been a no-go for European governments. In recent years, 然而, the limits of the European Union’s (欧盟) stability-oriented approach towards cooperation with authoritarian rulers in the Middle East and North Africa (中东和北非) to defend EU strategic interests in the region have become increasingly obvious. Incumbent MENA rulers’ attempts to portray the European choice of interlocutors in the region as either stabilising governments or de-stabilising Islamists are increasingly perceived as short-sighted and contradictory. Recent debates suggest that the search for viable alternative policy approaches is leading to a shift in European policy makers’ attitude towards moderate2 Islamist actors.
There is no shortage of incentives to redirect the course of EU policies in the region. Preventing the
radicalisation of Islamist movements in the region is an integral part of the EU’s counter-terrorism strategy. It
has become common wisdom that substantial political reform will only happen through effective pressure from
within. Non-violent, non-revolutionary Islamist parties that aspire to take power by means of a democratic
process have therefore often been portrayed as potential reform actors that carry the hopes of a volatile region
for genuine democratic development and long-term stability
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