All Entries in the "Хамас" Category
Арапско сутра
ДАВИД Б. ОТТАВАИ
октобар 6, 1981, требало је да буде дан прославе у Египту. Обиљежена је годишњица највећег тренутка египатске побједе у три арапско-израелска сукоба, када је неуспешна војска земље прешла преко Суецког канала у првим данима 1973 Јом Кипурски рат и послао израелске трупе да се повлаче у повлачењу. На хладном, јутро без облака, стадион у Каиру био је препун египатских породица које су дошле да виде како војни стуб поставља свој хардвер. На трибини за смотре, председник Анвар ел Садат,ратни архитекта, са задовољством посматрао како људи и машине парадирају пред њим. Био сам у близини, новопридошли страни дописник.Одједном, one of the army trucks halted directly in front of the reviewing stand just as six Mirage jets roared overhead in an acrobatic performance, painting the sky with long trails of red, yellow, purple,and green smoke. Sadat stood up, apparently preparing to exchange salutes with yet another contingent of Egyptian troops. He made himself a perfect target for four Islamist assassins who jumped from the truck, stormed the podium, and riddled his body with bullets.As the killers continued for what seemed an eternity to spray the stand with their deadly fire, I considered for an instant whether to hit the ground and risk being trampled to death by panicked spectators or remain afoot and risk taking a stray bullet. Instinct told me to stay on my feet, а осећај новинарске дужности ме је натерао да одем да сазнам да ли је Садат жив или мртав.
| Сеп 26, 2010 | Коментари 0
ФЕМИНИЗАМ ИЗМЕЂУ СЕКУЛАРИЗМА И ИСЛАМИЗМА: СЛУЧАЈ ПАЛЕСТИНЕ
др, Ислах Јад
Законодавни избори одржани на Западној обали и у Појасу Газе године 2006 довео на власт исламистички покрет Хамас, који је потом формирао већину Палестинског законодавног већа и такође прву већинску Хамасову владу. Ови избори су резултирали именовањем прве жене министра Хамаса, која је постала министарка за женска питања. Између марта 2006 и јун 2007, две различите министрице Хамаса преузеле су ову функцију, али и једнима и другима је било тешко да управљају Министарством јер већина његових запослених нису били чланови Хамаса већ су припадали другим политичким партијама, а већина су били чланови Фатаха, доминантни покрет који контролише већину институција Палестинске управе. Напет период борбе између жена Хамаса у Министарству за женска питања и чланица Фатаха завршио се након Хамасовог преузимања власти у Појасу Газе и последичног пада његове владе на Западној обали – борба која је понекад добијала насилан обрт. Један од разлога који је касније наведен да објасни ову борбу била је разлика између секуларног феминистичког дискурса и исламистичког дискурса о женским питањима. У палестинском контексту ово неслагање је попримило опасну природу јер је коришћено да се оправда продубљивање крваве политичке борбе, уклањање жена Хамаса са њихових позиција или позиција, и политичке и географске поделе које су у то време преовладавале и на Западној обали и на окупираном Појасу Газе.
Ова борба отвара низ важних питања: треба ли казнити исламистички покрет који је дошао на власт, или треба да размотримо разлоге који су довели до Фатеховог неуспеха у политичкој арени? Може ли феминизам понудити свеобухватан оквир за жене, без обзира на њихова друштвена и идеолошка опредељења? Може ли им дискурс о заједничкој основи за жене помоћи да схвате и договоре своје заједничке циљеве? Да ли је патернализам присутан само у исламистичкој идеологији, а не у национализму и патриотизму? Шта подразумевамо под феминизмом? Постоји ли само један феминизам, или неколико феминизама? Шта подразумевамо под исламом – да ли је то покрет познат под овим именом или религија, филозофија, или правни систем? Морамо ићи до дна ових питања и пажљиво их размотрити, и морамо да се договоримо о њима да бисмо касније могли да одлучимо, као феминисткиње, ако наша критика патернализма треба да буде усмерена на религију (вера), који треба да буде ограничен на срце верника и да му се не дозволи да преузме контролу над светом у целини, или јуриспруденција, који се односи на различите школе вере које објашњавају правни систем садржан у Курану и изрекама Посланика – суннет.
| Сеп 19, 2010 | Коментари 0
ИСЛАМИСТИЧКИ ЖЕНСКИ АКТИВИЗАМ У ОКУПИРАНОЈ ПАЛЕСТИНИ
Интервјуи Кхаледа Амаиреха
Интервју са Самиром Ал-Халајка
Самеера Ал-Халаика је изабрани члан Палестинског законодавног већа. Она је била
године рођен у селу Шојух код Хеброна 1964. Дипломирала је шеријат (Исламске
Право) са Универзитета Хеброн. Радила је као новинар из 1996 до 2006 када
ушла је у Палестинско законодавно веће као изабрани члан 2006 избори.
Удата је и има седморо деце.
П: У неким западним земљама постоји општи утисак да жене добијају
инфериорног третмана унутар исламских група отпора, као што је Хамас. Да ли је ово истина?
Како се поступа са активисткињама у Хамасу?
Права и дужности муслиманки потичу пре свега из исламског шеријата или закона.
То нису добровољна или добротворна дела или гестови које добијамо од Хамаса или било кога
друго. Тако, што се тиче политичког ангажмана и активизма, жене генерално имају
иста права и дужности као и мушкарци. После свега, жене чине барем 50 посто од
друштво. У извесном смислу, они су читаво друштво јер рађају, и подићи,
нова генерација.
Стога, Могу рећи да је статус жена у Хамасу у потпуности у складу са њом
статус у самом исламу. То значи да је она пуноправни партнер на свим нивоима. Заиста, било би
неправедно и неправедно за ислама (или исламиста ако желите) жена да буде партнер у патњи
док је она искључена из процеса одлучивања. Због тога је улога жене у
Хамас је увек био пионир.
П: Да ли сматрате да је појава женског политичког активизма унутар Хамаса
природни развој који је компатибилан са класичним исламским концептима
у погледу статуса и улоге жене, или је то само неопходан одговор на
притисци модерности и захтеви политичког деловања и наставка
Израелска окупација?
Не постоји текст у исламској јуриспруденцији нити у Хамасовој повељи који спречава жене
политичко учешће. Верујем да је супротно истина — постоје бројни кур'ански стихови
и изреке пророка Мухамеда који позива жене да буду активне у политици и јавности
питања која утичу на муслимане. Али то је тачно и за жене, као што је то за мушкарце, политички активизам
није обавезно већ добровољно, и углавном се одлучује у светлу способности сваке жене,
квалификације и индивидуалне околности. Ипак, показујући бригу за јавност
питања су обавезна за сваког муслимана и муслиманку. Пророк
рекао је Мухамед: „Онај ко не показује бригу за питања муслимана није муслиман.
Штавише, Палестинске исламисткиње морају узети у обзир све објективне факторе на терену
рачуна када одлучује да ли да се укључи у политику или да се укључи у политички активизам.
| Сеп 19, 2010 | Коментари 0
размазивање: Како исламофоби шире страх, нетрпељивост и дезинформације
ФАИР
Јулие Холлар
Јим Наурецкас
Претварање исламофобије у мејнстрим:
Како муслимански башари емитују своју нетрпељивост
Невероватна ствар се догодила у Националном кругу критичара књиге (НБЦЦ) номинације у фебруару 2007: Обично високооштра и толерантна група номинована је за најбољу књигу у области критике, књига за коју се нашироко сматра да оцрњује читаву верску групу.
Номинација Бруцеа Бавера Док је Европа спавала: Како радикални ислам уништава Запад изнутра није прошло без контроверзи. Бивши кандидат Елиот Вајнбергер осудио је књигу на годишњем скупу НБЦЦ-а, називајући то „расизмом као критиком“ (Нев Иорк Тимес, 2/8/07). Председник одбора НБЦЦ-а Џон Фриман написао је на блогу групе (Критична маса, 2/4/07): ''Ја никада нисам био
више посрамљен избором него што сам био са филмом Док је Европа спавала Бруса Бавера…. Њена хипервентилирана реторика упућује од стварне критике до исламофобије.''
Иако на крају није освојио награду, Док је Европа спавала признање у највишим књижевним круговима било је амблематично за интеграцију исламофобије, не само у америчком издаваштву већ иу ширим медијима. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, нетрпељивост и дезинформације. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. И не за разлику од оптужби изнетих у класичном документу антисемитизма, Протоколи сионских мудраца, неки од најопаснијих израза исламофобије–као Док је Европа спавала–укључују евокације исламских дизајна да доминирају Западом.
Исламске институције и муслимани, наравно, треба да буде подвргнут истој врсти испитивања и критике као и било ко други. На пример, када Норвешки исламски савет расправља о томе да ли геј мушкарце и лезбејке треба погубити, неко може насилно осудити појединце или групе које деле то мишљење без увлачења свих европских муслимана у то, као што је објавила Баверова пиџама медија (8/7/08),
„Дебата о европским муслиманима: Треба ли погубити гејеве?”
Слично томе, екстремисти који своје насилне акције оправдавају позивањем на неку посебну интерпретацију ислама могу бити критиковани без имплицирања енормно разнолике популације муслимана широм света. После свега, Новинари су успели да прате бомбашки напад Тимотија Меквеја у Оклахома Ситију–присталица расистичке секте хришћанског идентитета–без прибегавања генерализованим изјавама о „хришћанском тероризму“. исто тако, медији су пратили терористичке акте фанатика који су Јевреји–на пример масакр у Хеброну који је извршио Барух Голдштајн (Ектра!, 5/6/94)–без имплицирања целине јудаизма.
| Сеп 16, 2010 | Коментари 0
Ислам, Политички ислам и Америка
Араб Инсигхт
Да ли је могуће „братство“ са Америком?
халил ал-анани
„Нема шансе да комуницирамо са било којом САД. администрацију све док Сједињене Државе задрже своје дугогодишње виђење ислама као стварне опасности, гледиште које Сједињене Државе ставља у исти чамац као и ционистички непријатељ. Немамо унапред створене идеје о америчком народу или САД. друштво и његове грађанске организације и трустови мозгова. Немамо проблема у комуникацији са америчким народом, али се не улажу адекватни напори да нас зближе,“, рекао је др. Иссам ал-Ириан, шеф политичког одељења Муслиманске браће у телефонском интервјуу.
Ал-Ирианове речи сумирају ставове Муслиманског братства о америчком народу и САД. влада. Остали чланови Муслиманског братства би се сложили, као што би покојни Хасан ал-Бана, који је основао групу у 1928. Ал- Бана је Запад посматрао углавном као симбол моралног пропадања. Друге селефије – исламска школа мишљења која се ослања на претке као узорне моделе – заузели су исти став о Сједињеним Државама, али недостаје идеолошка флексибилност коју заступају Муслиманска браћа. Док Муслиманска браћа верују у укључивање Американаца у грађански дијалог, друге екстремистичке групе не виде смисао у дијалогу и тврде да је сила једини начин да се изборе са Сједињеним Државама.
| Сеп 15, 2010 | Коментари 0
Занимање, Колонијализам, Апартхеид?
The Human Sciences Research Council
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (Наиме, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, и
Газа, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. Истовремено, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, и, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. Истовремено, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.
| Сеп 07, 2010 | Коментари 0
ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Абдуллах Фалик |
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Штавише, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, Наиме, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, сад, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you
| Сеп 07, 2010 | Коментари 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Хенри Сиегман
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| Сеп 07, 2010 | Коментари 0
Islamism revisited
МАХА АЗЗАМ
There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 године, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Јул 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.
| Сеп 06, 2010 | Коментари 0
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
Схерифа зухур
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (ГВОТ)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; и (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| Сеп 06, 2010 | Коментари 0
EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?
Research
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (НДП) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Иако ће ово вероватно бити продужено, постепени процес, режим треба да предузме прелиминарне кораке да нормализује учешће браће Муслимана у политичком животу. Муслиманска браћа, чије су друштвене активности дуго биле толерисане али је улога у формалној политици строго ограничена, освојио невиђено 20 одсто посланичких места у 2005 избори. Они су то урадили упркос томе што су се такмичили за само трећину расположивих места и упркос значајним препрекама, укључујући полицијску репресију и изборну превару. Овај успех је потврдио њихову позицију као изузетно добро организоване и дубоко укорењене политичке снаге. Истовремено, наглашавала је слабости и легалне опозиције и владајуће странке. Режим би се могао кладити да би скромно повећање парламентарне заступљености браће Муслимана могло бити искоришћено за подстицање страха од исламистичког преузимања власти и тиме послужити као разлог за одуговлачење реформи. Ако је тако, стратегија је у великом ризику од повратних резултата.
| Сеп 05, 2010 | Коментари 0
Iraq and the Future of Political Islam
Јамес Писцатори
Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.
| Сеп 04, 2010 | Коментари 0
Islam and Democracy
ИТАЦ
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
| Сеп 04, 2010 | Коментари 0
Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
Тесс Лее Еисенхарт
As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of
Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Братство) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, however, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores
the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.
| Сеп 01, 2010 | Коментари 0
Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009
Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become a “western expanding strategy” that turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .
| Авг 27, 2010 | Коментари 0
Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement
Тоби Арцхер
Хеиди Хуухтанен
In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and
the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, it
is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely
termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage
with the various Islamist groups.
This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that
lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and
људска права, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing
domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international
affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase
European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the
EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and
their political circumstances, country by country.
Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid
out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this
report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist
parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, и
in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to
deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press
for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the
EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its
related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are
often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to
have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.
Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist
parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many
cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim
of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic
democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political
competitors, and political pluralism.
| Авг 21, 2010 | Коментари 0
ИкхванСцопе На Фејсбуку
ИкхванСцопе Он Сцрибд
ИкхванСцопе На Твиттеру