All Entries in the "„Hamas“" Category
Arabų rytoj
DAVIDAS B. OTAVEJUS
Spalio mėn 6, 1981, turėjo būti švenčiama Egipte. Ji pažymėjo didžiausios Egipto pergalės trijuose arabų ir Izraelio konfliktuose metines, kai šalies nepalankioji armija veržėsi per Sueco kanalą atidarymo dienomis 1973 Jom Kipuro karas ir išsiuntė Izraelio karius besitraukiančius. Ant vėsaus, debesuotas rytas, Kairo stadionas buvo sausakimšas egiptiečių šeimų, atvykusių pažiūrėti kariškių. Ant apžvalgos stendo, Prezidentas Anwaras el-Sadatas,karo architektas, su pasitenkinimu stebėjo, kaip prieš jį demonstruoja vyrai ir mašinos. Aš buvau šalia, ką tik atvykęs užsienio korespondentas.Staiga, vienas iš armijos sunkvežimių sustojo tiesiai prieš apžvalgos stendą, kai šeši „Mirage“ reaktyviniai lėktuvai riaumoja virš galvos ir atliko akrobatinį pasirodymą., dangų nudažius ilgais raudonos spalvos takais, geltona, violetinė,ir žali dūmai. Sadatas atsistojo, matyt, ruošiasi keistis sveikinimais su dar vienu egiptiečių karių kontingentu. Jis tapo puikiu taikiniu keturiems islamistams, iššokusiems iš sunkvežimio, šturmavo podiumą, ir apipylė jo kūną kulkomis.Kai žudikai tęsė, atrodytų, amžinybę, apipurškę stovą mirtina ugnimi., Akimirksniu svarsčiau, ar atsitrenkti į žemę ir rizikuoti, kad panikuoti žiūrovai mane mirtinai sutryps, ar likti toliau ir rizikuoti paimti užklydusią kulką. Instinktas liepė man stovėti ant kojų, ir mano žurnalistinės pareigos jausmas paskatino mane eiti išsiaiškinti, ar Sadatas gyvas, ar miręs.
| Rugsėjo mėn 26, 2010 | Komentarai 0
FEMINIZMAS TARP SEKULARIZMO IR ISLAMISMO: PALESTINOS ATVEJIS
Dr, Islah Jad
Vakarų Krante ir Gazos Ruože įvyko įstatymų leidžiamosios valdžios rinkimai 2006 atvedė į valdžią islamistų judėjimą „Hamas“., vėliau suformavo daugumą Palestinos įstatymų leidžiamosios tarybos ir pirmąją daugumos Hamas vyriausybę. Per šiuos rinkimus buvo paskirta pirmoji Hamas ministrė moteris, kuri tapo moterų reikalų ministre. Tarp kovo mėn 2006 ir birželį 2007, šias pareigas užėmė dvi skirtingos „Hamas“ ministrės, tačiau abiem buvo sunku valdyti ministeriją, nes dauguma jos darbuotojų nebuvo Hamas nariai, bet priklausė kitoms politinėms partijoms, ir dauguma buvo Fatah nariai, dominuojantis judėjimas, kontroliuojantis daugumą Palestinos valdžios institucijų. Įtempta kova tarp Hamas moterų Moterų reikalų ministerijoje ir Fatah narių baigėsi po to, kai Hamas perėmė valdžią Gazos Ruože ir dėl to žlugo jos vyriausybė Vakarų Krante – kova. kuri kartais pasisukdavo žiauriai. Viena iš priežasčių, nurodyta vėliau paaiškinti šią kovą, buvo skirtumas tarp pasaulietinio feministinio diskurso ir islamistų diskurso moterų klausimais.. Palestinos kontekste šis nesutarimas įgavo pavojingą pobūdį, nes buvo panaudotas kruvinos politinės kovos įamžinimui., Hamas moterų pašalinimas iš jų pareigų ar postų, ir tuo metu Vakarų Krante ir okupuotame Gazos ruože vyravusių politinių ir geografinių skirtumų.
Ši kova kelia daug svarbių klausimų: ar turėtume nubausti į valdžią atėjusį islamistų judėjimą, ar turėtume apsvarstyti priežastis, lėmusias Fateh nesėkmę politinėje arenoje? Ar feminizmas gali pasiūlyti moterims visapusišką sistemą, neatsižvelgiant į jų socialinę ir ideologinę priklausomybę? Ar bendro bendro pagrindo diskursas moterims gali padėti joms suvokti ir susitarti dėl bendrų tikslų?? Ar paternalizmas yra tik islamistinėje ideologijoje?, o ne nacionalizme ir patriotizme? Ką turime omenyje sakydami feminizmą? Ar yra tik vienas feminizmas, ar keli feminizmai? Ką turime omenyje sakydami islamą – ar tai šiuo vardu žinomas judėjimas, ar religija, filosofija, arba teisinė sistema? Turime eiti į šių klausimų esmę ir atidžiai juos apsvarstyti, ir mes turime dėl jų susitarti, kad vėliau galėtume nuspręsti, kaip feministės, jei mūsų paternalizmo kritika turėtų būti nukreipta į religiją (tikėjimas), kuri turėtų apsiriboti tikinčiojo širdimi ir neleisti valdyti viso pasaulio, arba jurisprudencija, kuri yra susijusi su skirtingomis tikėjimo mokyklomis, kurios paaiškina Korane esančią teisinę sistemą ir pranašo posakius – Suna.
| Rugsėjo mėn 19, 2010 | Komentarai 0
ISLAMISTINIS MOTERŲ AKTYVIZMAS OKUPUOTOJE PALESTINOJE
Khaledo Amayreho interviu
Interviu su Sameera Al-Halayka
Sameera Al-Halayka yra išrinkta Palestinos įstatymų leidžiamosios tarybos narė. Ji buvo
gimė Shoyoukh kaime netoli Hebrono m 1964. Ji turi šariato bakalauro laipsnį (Islamo
Jurisprudencija) iš Hebrono universiteto. Ji dirbo žurnaliste nuo 1996 į 2006 kada
ji pateko į Palestinos įstatymų leidžiamąją tarybą kaip išrinkta narė 2006 rinkimai.
Ji ištekėjusi ir turi septynis vaikus.
K: Kai kuriose Vakarų šalyse susidaro bendras įspūdis, kad moterys gauna
islamo pasipriešinimo grupėse, tokių kaip Hamas. Ar tai tiesa?
Kaip „Hamas“ elgiamasi su moterimis aktyvistėmis?
Musulmonių moterų teisės ir pareigos pirmiausia kyla iš islamo šariato arba įstatymų.
Tai nėra savanoriški ar labdaringi veiksmai ar gestai, kuriuos gauname iš Hamas ar kieno nors kito
Kitas. Taigi, kiek tai susiję su politiniu įsitraukimu ir aktyvumu, moterys paprastai turi
tos pačios teisės ir pareigos kaip ir vyrų. Po visko, moterų sudaro bent 50 procentų
visuomenė. Tam tikra prasme, jie yra visa visuomenė, nes jie gimdo, ir pakelti,
naujoji karta.
Todėl, Galiu pasakyti, kad moterų statusas „Hamas“ ją visiškai atitinka
statusas pačiame islame. Tai reiškia, kad ji yra visavertė partnerė visais lygiais. Iš tikrųjų, tai būtų
nesąžininga ir neteisinga islamo atžvilgiu (arba islamistas, jei norite) moteris turi būti partnerė kančiose
while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in
Hamas has always been pioneering.
K: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is
a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts
regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to
pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued
Israeli occupation?
There is no text in Islamic jurisprudence nor in Hamas’ charter which impedes women from
political participation. I believe the opposite is true — there are numerous Quranic verses
and sayings of the Prophet Muhammed urging women to be active in politics and public
issues affecting Muslims. But it is also true that for women, as it is for men, political activism
is not compulsory but voluntary, and is largely decided in light of each woman’s abilities,
qualifications and individual circumstances. None the less, showing concern for public
matters is mandatory upon each and every Muslim man and woman. The Prophet
Muhammed said: “He who doesn’t show concern for the affairs of Muslims is not a Muslim.”
Moreover, Palestinian Islamist women have to take all objective factors on the ground into
account when deciding whether to join politics or get involved in political activism.
| Rugsėjo mėn 19, 2010 | Komentarai 0
tepimasis: How Islamophobes spread fear, bigotry and misinformation
FAIR
Julie Hollar
Jimas Naureckas
Making Islamophobia Mainstream:
How Muslim-bashers broadcast their bigotry
A remarkable thing happened at the National Book Critics Circle (NBCC) nominations in February 2007: The normally highbrow and tolerant group nominated for best book in the field of criticism a book widely viewed as denigrating an entire religious group.
The nomination of Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (Niujorko laikas, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, bigotry and misinformation. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. Ir ne kitaip, kaip klasikiniame antisemitizmo dokumente pateikti kaltinimai, Siono vyresniųjų protokolai, kai kurios žiauresnės islamofobijos išraiškos–kaip Kol Europa miegojo–apima islamo dizaino, dominuojančio Vakaruose, prisiminimus.
Islamo institucijos ir musulmonai, žinoma, turėtų būti vertinamas ir kritikuojamas taip pat, kaip ir bet kas kitas. Pavyzdžiui, kai Norvegijos islamo taryba diskutuoja, ar gėjams ir lesbietėms turi būti įvykdyta mirties bausmė, galima griežtai pasmerkti asmenis ar grupes, kurios laikosi tokios nuomonės, neįtraukiant visų Europos musulmonų, kaip ir Bawer's Pajamas Media įrašas (8/7/08),
„Europos musulmonų debatai: Ar gėjai turėtų būti įvykdyti mirties bausme?“
Panašiai, ekstremistai, kurie pateisina savo smurtinius veiksmus remdamiesi tam tikra islamo interpretacija, gali būti kritikuojami, neįtraukiant į labai skirtingą musulmonų populiaciją visame pasaulyje.. Po visko, žurnalistams pavyko nušviesti Oklahomos miesto sprogdinimą, kurį surengė Timothy McVeigh–rasistinės krikščioniškos tapatybės sektos šalininkas–nesiimant apibendrintų teiginių apie „krikščionišką terorizmą“. taip pat, žiniasklaida nušvietė žydų fanatikų teroro aktus–pavyzdžiui, Hebrono žudynės, kurias įvykdė Baruchas Goldsteinas (Papildomai!, 5/6/94)–neįtraukiant judaizmo visumos.
| Rugsėjo mėn 16, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Islamas, Politinis islamas ir Amerika
Arabų įžvalga
Ar įmanoma „brolystė“ su Amerika?
chalilas al-anani
„nėra jokios galimybės bendrauti su jokiu JAV. administracija tol, kol Jungtinės Valstijos išlaikys savo ilgalaikį požiūrį į islamą kaip į realų pavojų, požiūrio, pagal kurį JAV atsiduria vienoje valtyje su sionistų priešu. Mes neturime jokių išankstinių nuomonių apie Amerikos žmones ar JAV. visuomenė ir jos pilietinės organizacijos bei ekspertų grupės. Mums nėra problemų bendrauti su Amerikos žmonėmis, tačiau nėra dedamos tinkamos pastangos mus suartinti,“, – sakė dr. Issamas al-Iryanas, Musulmonų brolijos politinio skyriaus vadovas interviu telefonu.
Al-Iryano žodžiai apibendrina Musulmonų brolijos požiūrį į Amerikos žmones ir JAV. vyriausybė. Kiti Musulmonų brolijos nariai sutiktų, kaip ir velionis Hassanas al-Banna, kas įkūrė grupę 1928. Al- Banna į Vakarus žiūrėjo kaip į moralinio nuosmukio simbolį. Kiti salafiai – islamo mąstymo mokykla, kuri remiasi protėviais kaip pavyzdiniais modeliais – laikosi to paties požiūrio į JAV., tačiau trūksta ideologinio lankstumo, kurio palaiko Musulmonų brolija. Nors Musulmonų brolija tiki įtraukti amerikiečius į pilietinį dialogą, kitos ekstremistų grupės nemato prasmės dialogui ir teigia, kad jėga yra vienintelis būdas susidoroti su Jungtinėmis Valstijomis.
| Rugsėjo mėn 15, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Okupacija, Kolonializmas, Apartheidas?
The Human Sciences Research Council
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (būtent, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, ir
Gazoje, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. Tuo pačiu metu, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, ir, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. Tuo pačiu metu, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.
| Rugsėjo mėn 07, 2010 | Komentarai 0
ISLAMAS, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq |
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Moreover, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Prolifi patirties ir įžvalgos panaudojimas
c mokslininkai, akademikai, patyrę žurnalistai ir politikai, Arches Quarterly atskleidžia islamo ir demokratijos santykius bei Amerikos vaidmenį, taip pat Obamos sukeltus pokyčius., ieškant bendros kalbos. Anas Altikriti, Th e Cordoba Foundation generalinis direktorius pateikia šios diskusijos pradžią, kur jis apmąsto Obamos kelyje esančias viltis ir iššūkius. Sekant Altikriti, buvęs prezidento Niksono patarėjas, Daktaras Robertas Crane'as siūlo išsamią islamo teisės į laisvę principo analizę. Anvaras Ibrahimas, buvęs Malaizijos ministro pirmininko pavaduotojas, praturtina diskusiją praktine demokratijos įgyvendinimo musulmonų dominuojančiose visuomenėse realijomis, būtent, Indonezijoje ir Malaizijoje.
Taip pat turime daktarę Shireen Hunter, Džordžtauno universitete, JAV, kuris tyrinėja musulmoniškas šalis, atsilikusias demokratizacijos ir modernizavimo srityje. Ją papildo terorizmo rašytojas, Dr Nafeez Ahmed paaiškino postmodernybės krizę ir
demokratijos žlugimas. Daktaras Daudas Abdullah (Vidurio Rytų žiniasklaidos monitoriaus direktorius), Alanas Hartas (buvęs ITN ir BBC Panoramos korespondentas; sionizmo autorius: Tikrasis žydų priešas) ir Asemas Sondosas (Egipto savaitraščio Sawt Al Omma redaktorius) sutelkti dėmesį į Obamą ir jo vaidmenį skatinant demokratiją musulmonų pasaulyje, taip pat JAV santykius su Izraeliu ir Musulmonų brolija.
Užsienio reikalų ministras, Maldyvai, Ahmedas Shaheedas spėlioja apie islamo ir demokratijos ateitį; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
Tikimės, kad visa tai suteiks išsamų skaitymą ir šaltinį apmąstymams apie problemas, kurios liečia mus visus naujoje vilties aušroje.
Ačiū
| Rugsėjo mėn 07, 2010 | Komentarai 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Henris Siegmanas
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| Rugsėjo mėn 07, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Islamism revisited
MAHA AZZAMAS
There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Liepos mėn 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.
| Rugsėjo mėn 06, 2010 | Komentarai 0
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
Sherifa zuhur
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Artimųjų Rytų, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; ir (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| Rugsėjo mėn 06, 2010 | Komentarai 0
EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?
Research
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 rinkimai. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Tuo pačiu metu, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.
| Rugsėjo mėn 05, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Iraq and the Future of Political Islam
Jamesas Piscatori
Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?“, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(a) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.
| Rugsėjo mėn 04, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Islam and Democracy
ITAC
If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s
| Rugsėjo mėn 04, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood
Tess Lee Eisenhart
As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of
Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (Brolija) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, tačiau, the Brotherhood has
dabbled with partisanship in the formal political realm. This experiment culminated in
the election of the eighty-eight Brothers to the People’s Assembly in 2005—the largest
oppositional bloc in modern Egyptian history—and the subsequent arrests of nearly
1,000 Brothers.2 The electoral advance into mainstream politics provides ample fodder
for scholars to test theories and make predictions about the future of the Egyptian
regime: will it fall to the Islamist opposition or remain a beacon of secularism in the
Arab world?
This thesis shies away from making such broad speculations. Instead, it explores
the extent to which the Muslim Brotherhood has adapted as an organization in the past
decade.
| Rugsėjo mėn 01, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009
Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become a “western expanding strategy” that turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .
| Rugpjūčio mėn 27, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Islamistų opozicijos partijos ir ES įsitraukimo potencialas
Toby Archer
Heidi Huuhtanen
Atsižvelgiant į didėjančią islamistinių judėjimų svarbą musulmonų pasaulyje ir
radikalėjimas nuo amžių pradžios paveikė pasaulinius įvykius, tai
Svarbu, kad ES įvertintų savo politiką, susijusią su veikėjais, kurie gali būti laisvi
vadinamas „islamo pasauliu“. Ypač svarbu paklausti, ar ir kaip užsiimti
su įvairiomis islamistų grupuotėmis.
Tai tebėra prieštaringa net ES viduje. Kai kurie mano, kad islamas tai vertina
gulėti už islamistų partijų yra tiesiog nesuderinami su vakarietiškais demokratijos idealais ir
Žmonių teisės, o kiti mano, kad įsitraukimas yra reali būtinybė dėl augančio
domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international
affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase
European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the
EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and
their political circumstances, country by country.
Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid
out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this
report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist
parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, ir
in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to
spręsti valdančius režimus, kurie yra autoritariniai, bet tai naujas reiškinys, kurį reikia spausti
demokratinėms reformoms tose valstybėse, kuriose naudos gali gauti labiausiai tikėtini asmenys, nuo
ES požiūriu, skirtingi ir kartais problemiški požiūriai į demokratiją ir ją
susijusios vertybės, mažumų ir moterų teisės bei teisinės valstybės principai. Šie mokesčiai yra
dažnai prieštarauja islamistiniams judėjimams, todėl Europos politikos formuotojams svarbu tai padaryti
turėti tikslų potencialių partnerių politikos ir filosofijos vaizdą.
Įvairių šalių patirtis rodo, kad kuo daugiau laisvės yra islamistų
vakarėliai leidžiami, tuo jie nuosaikesni savo veiksmuose ir idėjomis. Daugelyje
islamistų partijos ir grupės jau seniai nukrypo nuo savo pirminio tikslo
islamo valstybės, valdomos pagal islamo teisę, įkūrimo, ir atėjo priimti pagrindinius
demokratiniai rinkiminės konkurencijos dėl valdžios principai, kitų politinių egzistavimą
konkurentai, ir politinis pliuralizmas.
| Rugpjūčio mėn 21, 2010 | Komentarai 0
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