RSSهمه ورودی ها در "حماس" دسته بندی

عرب فردا

دیوید بی. خارج از کشور

اکتبر 6, 1981, قرار بود روز جشن در مصر باشد. این سالگرد بزرگ ترین لحظه پیروزی مصر در سه درگیری اعراب و اسرائیل بود, زمانی که ارتش مستضعف این کشور در روزهای افتتاحیه کانال سوئز را عبور داد 1973 جنگ یوم کیپور و فرستادن سربازان اسرائیلی در حال عقب نشینی. در خنک, صبح بی ابر, استادیوم قاهره مملو از خانواده‌های مصری بود که برای دیدن تجهیزات نظامی ارتش آمده بودند. در جایگاه بازبینی, رئیس جمهور انور السادات,معمار جنگ, با رضایت به تماشای رژه مردان و ماشین آلات مقابل او نشست. من همین نزدیکی بودم, یک خبرنگار خارجی تازه وارد. ناگهان, یکی از کامیون‌های ارتش درست در مقابل جایگاه بازبینی متوقف شد، درست زمانی که شش جت میراژ در یک نمایش آکروباتیک از بالای سرشان غرش می‌کردند., رنگ آمیزی آسمان با مسیرهای طولانی قرمز, رنگ زرد, رنگ بنفش,و دود سبز. سادات برخاست, ظاهراً برای تبادل سلام با گروه دیگری از نیروهای مصری آماده می شود. او خود را به یک هدف عالی برای چهار قاتل اسلام گرا تبدیل کرد که از کامیون پریدند, به تریبون یورش بردند, و بدن او را با گلوله پر کرد. در حالی که قاتلان برای چیزی که به نظر می رسید برای ابدیت ادامه می دادند تا جایگاه را با آتش مرگبار خود بپاشند., من برای یک لحظه فکر کردم که آیا باید به زمین بخورم و خطر زیر پا گذاشتن توسط تماشاگران وحشت زده را به جان بخرم یا در راه بمانم و خطر گلوله سرگردان را بگیرم.. غریزه به من گفت که روی پاهایم بمان, and my sense of journalistic duty impelled me to go find out whether Sadat was alive or dead.

فمینیسم بین سکولاریسم و ​​اسلامیسم: قضیه فلسطین

دکتر, اصلاح جاد

انتخابات پارلمانی در کرانه باختری و نوار غزه برگزار شد 2006 جنبش اسلامگرای حماس را به قدرت رساند, که در ادامه اکثریت شورای قانونگذاری فلسطین و همچنین دولت اکثریت اول حماس را تشکیل داد. این انتخابات منجر به انتصاب اولین وزیر زن حماس شد, که وزیر امور زنان شد. بین اسفند 2006 و ژوئن 2007, دو وزیر زن مختلف حماس این سمت را بر عهده گرفتند, اما مدیریت وزارتخانه برای هر دو مشکل بود زیرا اکثر کارمندان آن از اعضای حماس نبودند بلکه به احزاب سیاسی دیگر تعلق داشتند, و بیشتر اعضای فتح بودند, جنبش مسلطی که اکثر نهادهای تشکیلات خودگردان فلسطین را کنترل می کند. یک دوره پرتنش مبارزه بین زنان حماس در وزارت امور زنان و اعضای زن فتح پس از به دست گرفتن قدرت توسط حماس در نوار غزه و در نتیجه سقوط دولت آن در کرانه باختری به پایان رسید - یک مبارزه. که گاه حالت خشونت آمیزی به خود می گرفت. یکی از دلایلی که بعداً برای توضیح این مبارزه ذکر شد، تفاوت بین گفتمان فمینیستی سکولار و گفتمان اسلام گرایانه در مورد مسائل زنان بود.. در زمینه فلسطین، این اختلاف ماهیت خطرناکی به خود گرفت، زیرا از آن برای توجیه تداوم مبارزه سیاسی خونین استفاده شد., حذف زنان حماس از مناصب یا مناصب خود, و شکاف های سیاسی و جغرافیایی حاکم در آن زمان هم در کرانه باختری و هم در نوار غزه اشغالی.
این مبارزه چندین سؤال مهم را به وجود می آورد: آیا باید جنبش اسلامی را که به قدرت رسیده مجازات کنیم؟, یا باید دلایلی را که منجر به شکست فاتح در عرصه سیاسی شد در نظر گرفت? آیا فمینیسم می تواند چارچوبی جامع برای زنان ارائه دهد؟, صرف نظر از تعلقات اجتماعی و ایدئولوژیک آنها? آیا گفتمان یک زمینه مشترک برای زنان می تواند به آنها کمک کند تا اهداف مشترک خود را تحقق بخشند و بر سر آنها توافق کنند؟? آیا پدرگرایی فقط در ایدئولوژی اسلام گرایی وجود دارد؟, و نه در ناسیونالیسم و ​​میهن پرستی? منظور ما از فمینیسم چیست؟? آیا تنها یک فمینیسم وجود دارد؟, یا چندین فمینیسم? منظور ما از اسلام چیست؟ – جنبشی است که با این نام شناخته می شود یا دین, فلسفه, یا سیستم حقوقی? ما باید به عمق این مسائل برویم و آنها را با دقت بررسی کنیم, و ما باید روی آنها توافق کنیم تا بعداً بتوانیم تصمیم بگیریم, به عنوان فمینیست, اگر انتقاد ما از پدرگرایی باید متوجه دین باشد (ایمان), که باید در قلب مؤمن محصور شود و اجازه داده نشود که جهان را به طور کلی در اختیار بگیرد, یا فقه, که مربوط به مکاتب مختلف اعتقادی است که نظام حقوقی مندرج در قرآن و سخنان پیامبر را توضیح می دهد. – سنت.

فعالیت زنان اسلامگرا در فلسطین اشغالی

مصاحبه های خالد آمیره

مصاحبه با سمیرا الحلیکا

سمیرا الحلیکا یکی از اعضای منتخب شورای قانونگذاری فلسطین است. او بود

در روستای شویخ در حومه الخلیل متولد شد 1964. او لیسانس شریعت دارد (اسلامی

فقه) از دانشگاه هبرون. او به عنوان روزنامه نگار از 1996 به 2006 چه زمانی

او به عنوان یک عضو منتخب در شورای قانونگذاری فلسطین وارد شد 2006 انتخابات.

او متاهل است و هفت فرزند دارد.

س: در برخی از کشورهای غربی تصور کلی وجود دارد که زنان از آن برخوردار هستند

رفتار حقارت در گروه های مقاومت اسلامی, مانند حماس. آیا این درست است?

رفتار با فعالان زن در حماس چگونه است؟?
حقوق و تکالیف زنان مسلمان قبل از هر چیز از شریعت یا قوانین اسلامی سرچشمه می گیرد.

آنها اعمال یا حرکات داوطلبانه یا خیریه ای نیستند که ما از حماس یا کسی دریافت می کنیم

دیگر. بدین ترتیب, تا آنجا که به دخالت و کنشگری سیاسی مربوط می شود, زنان به طور کلی دارند

همان حقوق و وظایفی که مردان دارند. گذشته از همه اینها, زنان حداقل آرایش می کنند 50 درصد از

جامعه. به یک معنا, آنها کل جامعه هستند زیرا آنها به دنیا می آیند, و بالا بردن,

نسل جدید.

از این رو, می توانم بگویم که وضعیت زنان در حماس کاملاً با او مطابقت دارد

جایگاه در خود اسلام. این بدان معنی است که او یک شریک کامل در تمام سطوح است. در واقع, خواهد بود

برای یک اسلامی ناعادلانه و ناعادلانه است (یا اسلام گرا در صورت تمایل) زن شریک رنج باشد

در حالی که او از فرآیند تصمیم گیری کنار گذاشته شده است. به همین دلیل است که نقش زن در

حماس همیشه پیشگام بوده است.

س: آیا احساس می کنید که ظهور فعالیت سیاسی زنان در داخل حماس است؟

توسعه طبیعی که با مفاهیم کلاسیک اسلامی سازگار است

در مورد جایگاه و نقش زنان, یا صرفاً پاسخی ضروری به آن است

فشارهای مدرنیته و الزامات کنش سیاسی و تداوم آن

اشغال اسرائیل?

هیچ نصی در فقه اسلامی و منشور حماس وجود ندارد که زنان را از این امر بازدارد

مشارکت سیاسی. من معتقدم برعکس است — آیات قرآن فراوان است

و سخنان حضرت محمد (ص) که زنان را به حضور فعال در عرصه سیاسی و عمومی تشویق می کند

مسائلی که مسلمانان را تحت تأثیر قرار می دهد. اما این در مورد زنان نیز صادق است, همانطور که برای مردان است, فعالیت سیاسی

اجباری نیست بلکه اختیاری است, و تا حد زیادی با توجه به توانایی های هر زن تصمیم گیری می شود,

شرایط و شرایط فردی. با این حال کمتر, نشان دادن نگرانی برای عموم

امور بر هر زن و مرد مسلمان واجب است. پیامبر

محمد گفت: «کسی که به امور مسلمین توجهی نداشته باشد، مسلمان نیست».

علاوه بر این, زنان اسلام گرا فلسطینی باید همه عوامل عینی را در میدان وارد کنند

هنگام تصمیم گیری در مورد پیوستن به سیاست یا درگیر شدن در فعالیت های سیاسی حساب کنید.


smearcasting: اسلام هراسان چگونه ترس را گسترش می دهند, تعصب و اطلاعات غلط

نمایشگاه

جولی Hollar

جیم Naureckas

تبدیل اسلام هراسی به جریان اصلی:
چگونه مسلمانان مسلمان تعصب خود را پخش می کنند
اتفاق قابل توجهی در حلقه ملی منتقدان کتاب رخ داد (NBCC) نامزدها در ماه فوریه 2007: گروهی که معمولاً سرسخت و بردبار بود، نامزد بهترین کتاب در زمینه نقد شد، کتابی که به طور گسترده به عنوان تحقیرکننده کل یک گروه مذهبی شناخته می‌شود..
نامزدی بروس باور در حالی که اروپا خواب بود: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (نیویورک تایمز, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. این گزارش نگاهی تازه به اسلام هراسی در رسانه های امروزی و عاملان آن دارد, تشریح برخی از ارتباطات پشت صحنه که به ندرت در رسانه ها مورد بررسی قرار می گیرند. این گزارش همچنین چهار عکس فوری ارائه می دهد, یا «مطالعات موردی,توصیف می کند که چگونه اسلام هراسان به دستکاری رسانه ها ادامه می دهند تا مسلمانان را به شکل گسترده ای ترسیم کنند, برس نفرت انگیز. هدف ما مستندسازی لکه گیری است: نوشته ها و ظواهر علنی فعالان و صاحب نظران اسلام هراس که به طور عمدی و منظم ترس را منتشر می کنند., تعصب و اطلاعات غلط. اصطلاح «اسلام هراسی» به دشمنی با اسلام و مسلمانان اشاره دارد که می‌خواهد کل یک دین را غیرانسانی کند., آن را اساساً بیگانه نشان می دهد و به آن امری ذاتی نسبت می دهد, مجموعه ای ضروری از صفات منفی مانند غیرمنطقی بودن, عدم تحمل و خشونت. و نه بی شباهت به اتهاماتی که در سند کلاسیک یهودستیزی مطرح شده است, پروتکل های بزرگان صهیون, برخی از عبارات خشونت بارتر اسلام هراسی–مثل وقتی اروپا خواب بود–شامل تداعی طرح های اسلامی برای تسلط بر غرب است.
نهادهای اسلامی و مسلمانان, البته, باید مانند دیگران مورد بررسی و انتقاد قرار گیرد. برای مثال, زمانی که شورای اسلامی نروژ در مورد اینکه آیا مردان و همجنس‌گرایان همجنس‌گرا باید اعدام شوند، بحث می‌کند, می‌توان افراد یا گروه‌هایی را که در این عقیده سهیم هستند، بدون کشاندن همه مسلمانان اروپایی به آن، به شدت محکوم کرد, همانطور که در پست رسانه پیژامه باور (8/7/08),
مناظره مسلمانان اروپا: آیا همجنسگرایان باید اعدام شوند?”
به همین ترتیب, extremists who justify their violent actions by invoking some particular interpretation of Islam can be criticized without implicating the enormously diverse population of Muslims around the world. گذشته از همه اینها, reporters managed to cover the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeighan adherent of the racist Christian Identity sectwithout resorting to generalized statements about “Christian terrorism.” Likewise, media have covered acts of terrorism by fanatics who are Jewishfor instance the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–without implicating the entirety of Judaism.

اسلام, اسلام سیاسی و آمریکا

بینش عرب

آیا "برادری" با آمریکا امکان پذیر است؟?

خلیل الانانی

هیچ شانسی برای برقراری ارتباط با هیچ یک از ایالات متحده وجود ندارد. تا زمانی که ایالات متحده دیدگاه دیرینه خود را نسبت به اسلام به عنوان یک خطر واقعی حفظ کند, دیدگاهی که آمریکا را در قایق دشمن صهیونیستی قرار می دهد. ما هیچ تصور قبلی در مورد مردم آمریکا یا ایالات متحده نداریم. جامعه و سازمان های مدنی و اتاق های فکر آن. ما مشکلی در ارتباط با مردم آمریکا نداریم، اما هیچ تلاش کافی برای نزدیک‌تر کردن ما انجام نمی‌شود,گفت: دکتر. عصام العیریان, رئیس بخش سیاسی اخوان المسلمین در یک مصاحبه تلفنی.
سخنان العریان خلاصه ای از دیدگاه اخوان المسلمین نسبت به مردم آمریکا و ایالات متحده است.. دولت. سایر اعضای اخوان المسلمین با این موضوع موافق هستند, همان طور که مرحوم حسن البنا, که این گروه را در 1928. ال- بانا غرب را بیشتر به عنوان نمادی از زوال اخلاقی می دید. سایر سلفی ها - یک مکتب فکری اسلامی که به اجداد به عنوان الگوهای نمونه متکی است - همین دیدگاه را نسبت به ایالات متحده داشته اند., اما فاقد انعطاف ایدئولوژیک مورد حمایت اخوان المسلمین است. در حالی که اخوان المسلمین به مشارکت آمریکایی ها در گفتگوهای مدنی معتقد است, دیگر گروه های افراطی هیچ فایده ای در گفتگو نمی بینند و معتقدند که زور تنها راه مقابله با ایالات متحده است.

اشتغال, استعمار, آپارتاید?

The Human Sciences Research Council

The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (برای مثال, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, و
غزه, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. همزمان, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, و, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, مشاوره, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. همزمان, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.

ISLAM, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:

Cordoba Foundation

عبدالله Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
علاوه بر این, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, برای مثال, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, ایالات متحده آمریکا, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace

هنری Siegman


Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.

Islamism revisited

ماها اعظم

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 جولای 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (سهمیه)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; و (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?

Research

The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 انتخابات. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. همزمان, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.

Iraq and the Future of Political Islam

جیمز Piscatori

Sixty-five years ago one of the greatest scholars of modern Islam asked the simple question, “whither Islam?”, where was the Islamic world going? It was a time of intense turmoil in both the Western and Muslim worlds – the demise of imperialism and crystallisation of a new state system outside Europe; the creation and testing of the neo- Wilsonian world order in the League of Nations; the emergence of European Fascism. Sir Hamilton Gibb recognised that Muslim societies, unable to avoid such world trends, were also faced with the equally inescapable penetration of nationalism, secularism, and Westernisation. While he prudently warned against making predictions – hazards for all of us interested in Middle Eastern and Islamic politics – he felt sure of two things:
(آ) the Islamic world would move between the ideal of solidarity and the realities of division;
(b) the key to the future lay in leadership, or who speaks authoritatively for Islam.
Today Gibb’s prognostications may well have renewed relevance as we face a deepening crisis over Iraq, the unfolding of an expansive and controversial war on terror, and the continuing Palestinian problem. In this lecture I would like to look at the factors that may affect the course of Muslim politics in the present period and near-term future. Although the points I will raise are likely to have broader relevance, I will draw mainly on the case of the Arab world.
Assumptions about Political Islam There is no lack of predictions when it comes to a politicised Islam or Islamism. ‘Islamism’ is best understood as a sense that something has gone wrong with contemporary Muslim societies and that the solution must lie in a range of political action. Often used interchangeably with ‘fundamentalism’, Islamism is better equated with ‘political Islam’. Several commentators have proclaimed its demise and the advent of the post-Islamist era. They argue that the repressive apparatus of the state has proven more durable than the Islamic opposition and that the ideological incoherence of the Islamists has made them unsuitable to modern political competition. The events of September 11th seemed to contradict this prediction, yet, unshaken, they have argued that such spectacular, virtually anarchic acts only prove the bankruptcy of Islamist ideas and suggest that the radicals have abandoned any real hope of seizing power.

Islam and Democracy

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

Organizational Continuity in Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood

تس لی آیزنهارت

As Egypt’s oldest and most prominent opposition movement, the Society of

Muslim Brothers, al-ikhwan al-muslimeen, has long posed a challenge to successive secular
regimes by offering a comprehensive vision of an Islamic state and extensive social
welfare services. Since its founding in 1928, the Brotherhood (برادر) has thrived in a
parallel religious and social services sector, generally avoiding direct confrontation with
ruling regimes.1 More recently over the past two decades, با این حال, the Brotherhood has
با تحزب در قلمرو رسمی سیاسی. این آزمایش به اوج خود رسید
انتخاب هشتاد و هشت برادران به مجلس خلق در سال 2005 - بزرگترین
بلوک اپوزیسیون در تاریخ مدرن مصر - و دستگیری های بعدی تقریباً
1,000 برادران. 2 پیشروی انتخاباتی در جریان اصلی سیاست خوراک فراوانی را فراهم می کند
برای دانشمندان تا نظریه ها را آزمایش کنند و در مورد آینده مصری ها پیش بینی کنند
رژیم: آیا به دست اپوزیسیون اسلامگرا خواهد افتاد یا چراغ راه سکولاریسم در جهان باقی خواهد ماند
جهان عرب?
این تز از طرح چنین حدس و گمان های گسترده ای خودداری می کند. بجای, آن را بررسی می کند

میزان سازگاری اخوان المسلمین به عنوان یک سازمان در گذشته
دهه.

Hizbollah’s Political Manifesto 2009

Following World War II, the United States became the centre of polarization and hegemony in the world; as such a project witnessed tremendous development on the levels of domination and subjugation that is unprecedented in history, making use and taking advantage of the multifaceted achievements on the several levels of knowledge, culture, technology, economy as well as the military level- that are supported by an economic-political system that only views the world as markets that have to abide by the American view.
The most dangerous aspect in the western hegemony-the American one precisely- is that they consider themselves as owners of the world and therefore, this expandin strategy along with the economic-capitalist project has become awestern expanding strategythat turned to be an international scheme of limitless greed. Savage capitalism forces- embodied mainly in international monopoly networks o fcompanies that cross the nations and continents, networks of various international establishments especially the financial ones backed by superior military force have led to more contradictions and conflicts of which not less important are the conflicts of identities, cultures, civilizations, in addition to the conflicts of poverty and wealth. These savage capitalism forces have turned into mechanisms of sowing dissension and destroying identities as well as imposing the most dangerous type of cultural,
national, economic as well as social theft .

Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

توبی آرچر

هایدی Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, it

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

حقوق بشر, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

اهمیت داخلی احزاب اسلام گرا و مشارکت فزاینده آنها در عرصه بین الملل

امور. دیدگاه دیگر این است که دموکراتیک شدن در جهان اسلام افزایش خواهد یافت

امنیت اروپا. اعتبار این استدلال ها و دلایل دیگر در مورد اینکه آیا و چگونه

اتحادیه اروپا باید درگیر شود تنها با مطالعه جنبش‌های اسلام‌گرای مختلف قابل آزمایش است

شرایط سیاسی آنها, کشور به کشور.

دموکراتیک شدن موضوع اصلی اقدامات مشترک سیاست خارجی اتحادیه اروپا است, همانطور که گذاشته شد

در مقاله 11 معاهده اتحادیه اروپا. بسیاری از ایالات در نظر گرفته شده در این

گزارش ها دموکراتیک نیستند, یا کاملاً دموکراتیک نیست. در اکثر این کشورها, اسلام گرا

احزاب و جنبش‌ها اپوزیسیون قابل توجهی با رژیم‌های حاکم تشکیل می‌دهند, و

در برخی آنها بزرگترین بلوک مخالف را تشکیل می دهند. دموکراسی های اروپایی مدت هاست که مجبور بوده اند

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.