中的所有條目 "Turkey’s AKP" 類別
伊斯蘭教, 民主 & 美國:
科爾多瓦基金會
阿卜杜拉Faliq
介紹 ,
伊斯蘭政治文化, 民主, 和人權
丹尼爾E·. 價錢
全球反恐戰爭中的精準:
謝裡法·祖爾
伊斯蘭反對黨和歐盟參與的潛力
托比·阿徹
海蒂Huuhtanen
中東的政治伊斯蘭教
是克努森
參與政治伊斯蘭的策略
沙迪哈米德
AMANDA卡德萊茨
伊斯蘭政黨 : 無權參與
Malika Zeghal
伊斯蘭運動和阿拉伯世界的民主進程: 探索灰色地帶
彌敦道Ĵ. 棕色, 阿穆爾·哈薩,
瑪麗娜奧特維
伊斯蘭激進化
Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.
Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.
政治伊斯蘭教和歐洲外交政策
政治伊斯蘭教和歐洲鄰國政策
邁克爾·愛默生
理查德·楊斯
自從 2001 以及隨之而來的西方與政治伊斯蘭之間關係性質的國際事件已成為外交政策的決定性問題. 近年來,對政治伊斯蘭問題進行了大量的研究和分析。. 這有助於糾正西方以前對伊斯蘭價值觀和意圖的性質的一些簡單化和危言聳聽的假設. 與此平行, 歐盟 (歐盟) 制定了許多政策舉措,主要是歐洲鄰里政策(ENP) 原則上致力於對話和更深入的參與(非暴力) 阿拉伯國家內的政治行為者和民間社會組織. 然而,許多分析家和政策制定者現在抱怨在概念辯論和政策制定中的某個獎杯. 已經確定,政治伊斯蘭教是一個不斷變化的景觀, 深受各種情況的影響, 但辯論似乎常常停留在“伊斯蘭主義者是否民主”這樣簡單的問題上?’ 許多獨立分析家仍然主張與伊斯蘭主義者接觸, 但西方政府與伊斯蘭組織之間的實際和解仍然有限 .
伊斯蘭政黨 , 他們是民主黨人嗎? 有關係嗎 ?
塔里克·馬蘇德
反對土耳其社會中心和邊緣的變革以及正義與發展黨的崛起
拉敏Ahmadov
土耳其和歐盟: 土耳其國會議員歐盟願景調查
庫德雷特鵯
Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (歐盟) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.
熱心的民主人士 : 埃及的伊斯蘭主義和民主, 印度尼西亞和土耳其
The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.
They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. 同時, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. 確實, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.
Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.
The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.
土耳其正義與發展黨的成功絕不能淡化對阿拉伯伊斯蘭主義者的擔憂
Mona Eltahawy
It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “伊斯蘭主義者” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – were always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamist’ alleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. 事實上, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhood – aside from the common faith of its members – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, 該 “西方”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.
聲稱中心: 轉型中的政治伊斯蘭
約翰大號. 埃斯波西托
1990年代的政治伊斯蘭教, 有些人叫什麼 “伊斯蘭原教旨主義,” 從北非到東南亞,在政府和反對派政治中仍然佔有重要地位. 權力和政治中的政治伊斯蘭教提出了許多問題和疑問: “伊斯蘭教與現代化對立嗎?,” “伊斯蘭教和民主不相容嗎?,” “伊斯蘭政府對多元化有何影響, 少數群體和婦女權利,” “伊斯蘭主義者的代表性有多大,” “有伊斯蘭溫和派嗎?,” “西方是否應該害怕跨國伊斯蘭威脅或文明衝突?” 當代伊斯蘭復興主義 當今穆斯林世界的景觀揭示了新的伊斯蘭共和國的出現 (伊朗, 蘇丹, 阿富汗), 在現有系統中充當主要政治和社會行為者的伊斯蘭運動的擴散, 以及激進的暴力極端分子的對抗性政治。_ 與 1980 年代政治伊斯蘭被簡單地等同於革命的伊朗或具有伊斯蘭聖戰或上帝之軍等名稱的秘密團體形成鮮明對比, 1990 年代的穆斯林世界是伊斯蘭主義者參與選舉過程並以總理身份出現的世界, 內閣官員, 國民議會議長, 議員, 和埃及等不同國家的市長, 蘇丹, 火雞, 伊朗, 黎巴嫩, 科威特, 也門, 約旦, 巴基斯坦, 孟加拉國, 馬來西亞, 印度尼西亞, 和以色列/巴勒斯坦. 在二十一世紀初, 政治伊斯蘭教仍然是全球政治秩序和混亂的主要力量, 參與政治進程但也參與恐怖主義行為的人, 對穆斯林世界和西方的挑戰. 了解當今政治伊斯蘭教的本質, 特別是從最近的經驗中出現的問題和問題, 對政府仍然至關重要, 決策者, 和國際政治的學生一樣.