RSSLahat ng Entries sa "Turkey’s AKP" Kategoryang

ISLAM, DEMOKRASYA & ANG USA:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq |

Intro ,


Sa kabila ng pagiging parehong pangmatagalan at kumplikadong debate, Ang Arches Quarterly ay muling nagsusuri mula sa teolohiko at praktikal na mga batayan, ang mahalagang debate tungkol sa relasyon at pagkakatugma sa pagitan ng Islam at Demokrasya, bilang echoed sa Barack Obama's agenda ng pag-asa at pagbabago. Habang marami ang nagdiriwang sa pag-akyat ni Obama sa Oval Office bilang isang pambansang catharsis para sa US, ang iba ay nananatiling hindi gaanong optimistiko sa pagbabago ng ideolohiya at diskarte sa internasyonal na arena. Habang ang karamihan sa tensyon at kawalan ng tiwala sa pagitan ng mundo ng Muslim at ng USA ay maaaring maiugnay sa diskarte ng pagtataguyod ng demokrasya, karaniwang pinapaboran ang mga diktadurya at papet na rehimen na nagbibigay ng lip-service sa mga demokratikong halaga at karapatang pantao, ang aftershock ng 9/11 ay tunay na pinatibay ang mga pag-aalinlangan sa pamamagitan ng posisyon ng Amerika sa politikal na Islam. Lumikha ito ng pader ng negatibiti gaya ng natagpuan ng worldpublicopinion.org, ayon sa kung saan 67% naniniwala ang mga taga-Ehipto na sa buong mundo ang America ay gumaganap ng isang "pangunahing negatibo" na papel.
Ang tugon ng Amerika ay naging angkop. Sa pamamagitan ng pagpili kay Obama, marami sa buong mundo ang umaasa sa pagbuo ng hindi gaanong palaaway, ngunit mas patas na patakarang panlabas patungo sa mundo ng Muslim. Ang pagsubok para kay Obama, habang tinatalakay natin, ay kung paano itaguyod ng Amerika at ng kanyang mga kaalyado ang demokrasya. Magiging facilitating ba ito o kahanga-hanga?
At saka, maaari ba itong maging isang matapat na broker sa matagal na mga lugar ng mga salungatan? Pagkuha ng kadalubhasaan at pananaw ng prolifi
c mga iskolar, akademya, mga batikang mamamahayag at pulitiko, Binibigyang liwanag ng Arches Quarterly ang ugnayan sa pagitan ng Islam at Demokrasya at ang papel ng Amerika – pati na rin ang mga pagbabagong dulot ni Obama, sa paghahanap ng karaniwang batayan. Anas Altikriti, ang CEO ng Th e Cordoba Foundation ay nagbibigay ng pambungad na sugal sa talakayang ito, kung saan siya ay sumasalamin sa mga pag-asa at hamon na nakasalalay sa landas ni Obama. Kasunod ng Altikriti, ang dating tagapayo ni Pangulong Nixon, Nag-aalok si Dr Robert Crane ng masusing pagsusuri sa prinsipyo ng Islam ng karapatan sa kalayaan. Anwar Ibrahim, dating Deputy Prime Minister ng Malaysia, pinayaman ang talakayan sa mga praktikal na katotohanan ng pagpapatupad ng demokrasya sa mga dominanteng lipunan ng Muslim, ibig sabihin, sa Indonesia at Malaysia.
Mayroon din kaming Dr Shireen Hunter, ng Georgetown University, USA, na gumagalugad sa mga bansang Muslim na nahuhuli sa demokratisasyon at modernisasyon. Ito ay kinukumpleto ng manunulat ng terorismo, Ang paliwanag ni Dr Nafeez Ahmed sa krisis ng post-modernity at ang
pagkamatay ng demokrasya. Dr. Daud Abdullah (Direktor ng Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (dating ITN at BBC Panorama correspondent; may-akda ng Zionism: Ang Tunay na Kaaway ng mga Hudyo) at Asem Sondos (Editor ng Egypt's Sawt Al Omma linggu-linggo) tumutok kay Obama at sa kanyang tungkulin vis-à-vis democracy-promote sa Muslim world, gayundin ang relasyon ng US sa Israel at sa Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Nag-isip si Ahmed Shaheed sa hinaharap ng Islam at Demokrasya; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– isang miyembro ng Sinn Féin na nagtiis ng apat na taon sa bilangguan para sa mga aktibidad ng Irish Republican at isang campaigner para sa Guildford 4 at Birmingham 6, sumasalamin sa kanyang kamakailang paglalakbay sa Gaza kung saan nasaksihan niya ang epekto ng kalupitan at kawalang-katarungang ginawa laban sa mga Palestinian; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Ang Direktor ng Center for the Study of Radicalization at Contemporary Political Violence ay tumatalakay sa mga hamon ng kritikal na pagsasaliksik ng politikal na terorismo; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, manunulat at manunulat ng dula, tinatalakay ang mga prospect ng kapayapaan sa Darfur; at sa wakas ang mamamahayag at aktibistang karapatang pantao na si Ashur Shamis ay tumitingin nang kritikal sa demokratisasyon at pamumulitika ng mga Muslim ngayon.
Inaasahan namin na ang lahat ng ito ay gumagawa para sa isang komprehensibong pagbabasa at isang mapagkukunan para sa pagmumuni-muni sa mga isyu na nakakaapekto sa ating lahat sa isang bagong bukang-liwayway ng pag-asa.
salamat po

| Sep 07, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

Kulturang Pampulitika ng Islam, Demokrasya, at Karapatang Pantao

Si Daniele. Presyo

Pinagtatalunan na pinapadali ng Islam ang authoritarianism, sumasalungat sa mga halaga ng mga lipunang Kanluranin, at makabuluhang nakakaapekto sa mahahalagang resulta ng pulitika sa mga bansang Muslim. Dahil dito, mga iskolar, mga komentarista, at ang mga opisyal ng gobyerno ay madalas na tumuturo sa ''Islamic fundamentalism'' bilang ang susunod na banta sa ideolohiya sa mga liberal na demokrasya. Ang view na ito, gayunpaman, pangunahing nakabatay sa pagsusuri ng mga teksto, teoryang pampulitika ng Islam, at ad hoc na pag-aaral ng mga indibidwal na bansa, na hindi isinasaalang-alang ang iba pang mga kadahilanan. Ito ay aking pagtatalo na ang mga teksto at tradisyon ng Islam, tulad ng sa ibang relihiyon, maaaring gamitin upang suportahan ang iba't ibang sistema at patakarang pampulitika. Ang mga partikular na bansa at mapaglarawang pag-aaral ay hindi nakakatulong sa amin na makahanap ng mga pattern na makakatulong sa aming ipaliwanag ang iba't ibang ugnayan sa pagitan ng Islam at pulitika sa mga bansa sa mundo ng Muslim. Kaya naman, isang bagong diskarte sa pag-aaral ng
Ang koneksyon sa pagitan ng Islam at pulitika ay tinatawag.
I suggest, sa pamamagitan ng mahigpit na pagsusuri ng ugnayan sa pagitan ng Islam, demokrasya, at karapatang pantao sa cross-national level, na labis na binibigyang diin ang kapangyarihan ng Islam bilang puwersang pampulitika. Gumagamit muna ako ng comparative case study, na tumutuon sa mga salik na may kaugnayan sa interplay sa pagitan ng mga grupo at rehimeng Islam, mga impluwensyang pang-ekonomiya, pagkakahati ng etniko, at pag-unlad ng lipunan, upang ipaliwanag ang pagkakaiba sa impluwensya ng Islam sa pulitika sa walong bansa. Pinagtatalunan ko na ang karamihan ng kapangyarihan
na iniuugnay sa Islam bilang ang puwersang nagtutulak sa likod ng mga patakaran at sistemang pampulitika sa mga bansang Muslim ay mas maipaliwanag ng mga naunang nabanggit na mga salik. Nahanap ko rin, salungat sa karaniwang paniniwala, na ang pagtaas ng lakas ng mga grupong pampulitika ng Islam ay madalas na nauugnay sa katamtamang pluralisasyon ng mga sistemang pampulitika.
Nakagawa ako ng index ng kulturang pampulitika ng Islam, batay sa lawak ng paggamit ng batas ng Islam at kung at, kung gayon, paano,mga ideyang Kanluranin, mga institusyon, at mga teknolohiya ay ipinatupad, upang subukan ang likas na katangian ng relasyon sa pagitan ng Islam at demokrasya at Islam at karapatang pantao. Ang indicator na ito ay ginagamit sa statistical analysis, na kinabibilangan ng sample ng dalawampu't tatlong bansang karamihan ay Muslim at isang control group ng dalawampu't tatlong hindi Muslim na umuunlad na bansa. Bilang karagdagan sa paghahambing
Mga bansang Islam sa mga hindi-Islamikong umuunlad na bansa, Ang pagsusuri sa istatistika ay nagbibigay-daan sa akin na kontrolin ang impluwensya ng iba pang mga variable na natuklasang nakakaapekto sa mga antas ng demokrasya at proteksyon ng mga indibidwal na karapatan. Ang resulta ay dapat na mas makatotohanan at tumpak na larawan ng impluwensya ng Islam sa pulitika at mga patakaran.

| Sep 06, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; at (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

| Sep 06, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

In light of the increasing importance of Islamist movements in the Muslim world and

the way that radicalisation has influenced global events since the turn of the century, it

is important for the EU to evaluate its policies towards actors within what can be loosely

termed the ‘Islamic world’. It is particularly important to ask whether and how to engage

with the various Islamist groups.

This remains controversial even within the EU. Some feel that the Islamic values that

lie behind Islamist parties are simply incompatible with western ideals of democracy and

mga karapatang pantao, while others see engagement as a realistic necessity due to the growing

domestic importance of Islamist parties and their increasing involvement in international

affairs. Another perspective is that democratisation in the Muslim world would increase

European security. The validity of these and other arguments over whether and how the

EU should engage can only be tested by studying the different Islamist movements and

their political circumstances, country by country.

Democratisation is a central theme of the EU’s common foreign policy actions, as laid

out in Article 11 of the Treaty on European Union. Many of the states considered in this

report are not democratic, or not fully democratic. In most of these countries, Islamist

parties and movements constitute a significant opposition to the prevailing regimes, at

in some they form the largest opposition bloc. European democracies have long had to

deal with governing regimes that are authoritarian, but it is a new phenomenon to press

for democratic reform in states where the most likely beneficiaries might have, from the

EU’s point of view, different and sometimes problematic approaches to democracy and its

related values, such as minority and women’s rights and the rule of law. These charges are

often laid against Islamist movements, so it is important for European policy-makers to

have an accurate picture of the policies and philosophies of potential partners.

Experiences from different countries tends to suggest that the more freedom Islamist

parties are allowed, the more moderate they are in their actions and ideas. In many

cases Islamist parties and groups have long since shifted away from their original aim

of establishing an Islamic state governed by Islamic law, and have come to accept basic

democratic principles of electoral competition for power, the existence of other political

competitors, and political pluralism.

| Aug 21, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

Political Islam in the Middle East

Si Knudsen ba

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, sa

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

pag-unawa sa mga paraan kung saan sila ay may kakayahang magamit ang mga hangarin hindi lamang

ng mga mas mahirap na seksyon ng lipunan ngunit pati na rin ng gitnang uri.

| Aug 20, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

STRATEGIYA PARA SA PAG-ENGAG NG PULITIKONG ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Ang Political Islam ay ang nag-iisang pinakaaktibo ng puwersang pampulitika sa Gitnang Silangan ngayon. Ang kinabukasan nito ay malapit na maiugnay sa rehiyon. Kung ang Estados Unidos at ang European Union ay nakatuon sa pagsuporta sa repormang pampulitika sa rehiyon, kakailanganin nilang mag-isip ng kongkreto, magkakaugnay na mga diskarte para sa paglahok ng mga Islamist na pangkat. Pa, ang Estados Unidos. sa pangkalahatan ay hindi nais na buksan ang isang dayalogo sa mga paggalaw na ito. Ganun din, Ang pakikipag-ugnayan ng EU sa mga Islamista ay naging kataliwasan, hindi ang panuntunan. Kung saan may mga contact na nasa mababang antas, pangunahin nilang nagsisilbi ang mga layunin ng pangangalap ng impormasyon, hindi mga madiskarteng layunin. Ang U.S. at EU ay may ilang mga programa na tumutugon sa pang-ekonomiya at pampulitika na pag-unlad sa rehiyon – kasama ng mga ito ang Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), ang Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), ang Union para sa Mediterranean, at ang European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – ngunit wala silang gaanong masasabi tungkol sa kung paano umaangkop ang hamon ng Islamist na pampulitikang oposisyon sa mas malawak na layunin ng rehiyon. U.S. at ang tulong at programa ng demokrasya ng EU ay halos nakadirekta sa alinman sa mga awtoritaryan na pamahalaan mismo o mga sekular na grupo ng lipunang sibil na may kaunting suporta sa kanilang sariling mga lipunan.
Ang oras ay hinog na para sa muling pagtatasa ng mga kasalukuyang patakaran. Mula noong pag-atake ng mga terorista noong Setyembre 11, 2001, ang pagsuporta sa demokrasya sa Gitnang Silangan ay nagpalagay ng mas malaking kahalagahan para sa mga gumagawa ng patakaran sa Kanluran, na nakikita ang isang link sa pagitan ng kawalan ng demokrasya at pampulitikang karahasan. Ang higit na pansin ay nakatuon sa pag-unawa sa mga pagkakaiba-iba sa loob ng politikal na Islam. Ang bagong administrasyong Amerikano ay mas bukas sa pagpapalawak ng komunikasyon sa mundo ng mga Muslim. Samantala, ang karamihan sa mga pangunahing organisasyong Islamista – kabilang ang Muslim Brotherhood sa Egypt, Islamic Action Front ng Jordan (IAF), Partido ng Hustisya at Pag-unlad ng Morocco (PJD), ang Islamic Constitutional Movement ng Kuwait, at ang Yemeni Islah Party – lalo pang ginawa ang suporta para sa repormang pampulitika at demokrasya bilang isang pangunahing bahagi sa kanilang mga pampulitikang plataporma. Bilang karagdagan, marami ang nagpahiwatig ng matinding interes sa pagbubukas ng diyalogo sa U.S. at mga pamahalaan ng EU.
Ang kinabukasan ng mga ugnayan sa pagitan ng mga bansang Kanluranin at Gitnang Silangan ay maaaring higit na natutukoy sa antas kung saan ang dating ay nakikipag-ugnayan sa mga nonviolent Islamist na partido sa isang malawak na pag-uusap tungkol sa magkabahaging interes at layunin.. Nagkaroon ng kamakailang paglaganap ng mga pag-aaral sa pakikipag-ugnayan sa mga Islamista, ngunit kakaunti ang malinaw na tumutugon kung ano ang maaaring isama nito sa pagsasanay. Ace Zoé Nautré, bisitang kapwa sa German Council on Foreign Relations, inilalagay ito, "Iniisip ng EU ang tungkol sa pakikipag-ugnayan ngunit hindi talaga alam kung paano."1 Sa pag-asang linawin ang talakayan, nakikilala natin ang tatlong antas ng “pakikipag-ugnayan,” bawat isa ay may iba't ibang paraan at layunin: mababang antas ng mga contact, estratehikong diyalogo, at pakikipagsosyo.

| Aug 19, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

Mga Partido ng Islamista : participation without power

Malika Zeghal

Over the last two decades, social and political movements grounding their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Morocco’s own Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has been legal since the mid- 1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has never been authorized to form a political party, but in spite of state repression it has successfully run candidates as nominal independents in both national and local elections.
Since the early 1990s, this trend has gone hand-in-hand with official policies of limited political liberalization. Together, the two trends have occasioned a debate about whether these movements are committed to “democracy.” A vast literature has sprung up to underline the paradoxes as well as the possible risks and benefits of including Islamist parties in the electoral process. The main paradigm found in this body of writing focuses on the consequences that might ensue when Islamists use democratic instruments, and seeks to divine the “true” intentions that Islamists will manifest if they come to power.

| Aug 19, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Si Nathan J. Kayumanggi, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, gayunpaman, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jordan, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Pulitika, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

| Aug 18, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Ang Political Islam sa rehiyon ng MENA ay nagpapakita ng walang pare-parehong kalakaran sa mga gumagawa ng patakaran sa Europa. Ang debate ng Analytical ay lumago sa paligid ng konsepto ng 'radicalization'. Ito naman ang nagbigay ng pananaliksik sa mga salik na nagtutulak ng ‘de-radicalization’, at kabaligtaran, 'Re-radicalization'. Karamihan sa pagiging kumplikado ay nagmula sa malawak na pananaw na ang lahat ng tatlong mga phenomena na ito ay nangyayari nang sabay. Kahit na ang mga tuntunin mismo ay pinaglalaban. Madalas na maituro na ang katamtaman – radikal na dichotomy ay nabigo na ganap na makuha ang mga nuances ng mga trend sa loob ng pampulitika Islam. Ang ilang mga analista ay nagreklamo din na ang pag-uusap tungkol sa 'radicalism' ay ideolohikal na na-load. Sa antas ng terminolohiya, nauunawaan namin ang radicalization na maiugnay sa ekstremismo, ngunit ang mga pananaw ay naiiba sa gitna ng sentralidad ng kanyang relihiyosong – fundamentalistiko kumpara sa nilalamang pampulitika, at higit sa kung ang pagpayag na gumamit ng karahasan ay ipinahiwatig o hindi.

Ang nasabing mga pagkakaiba ay makikita sa mga pananaw na hinawakan mismo ng mga Islamista, pati na rin sa pananaw ng mga tagalabas.

| Aug 17, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

Politikal na Islam at Patakarang Panlabas ng Europa

PULITIKONG ISLAM AT ANG PATAKARAN SA KAPWA NG EUROPEAN

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Mula noon 2001 at ang mga pang-internasyonal na kaganapan na sumunod sa likas na katangian ng ugnayan sa pagitan ng Kanluran at pampulitika na Islam ay naging isang definingissue para sa patakarang panlabas. Sa mga nagdaang taon isang malaking halaga ng pagsasaliksik at pagtatasa ang isinagawa sa isyu ng pampulitika Islam. Nakatulong ito upang maitama ang ilan sa mga simplistic at alarma na pagpapalagay na dating gaganapin sa Kanluran tungkol sa likas na katangian ng mga halaga at hangarin ng Islamista. Katulad nito, ang European Union (AKO) ay nakabuo ng isang bilang ng mga pagkukusa sa patakaran lalo na ang Patakaran sa Neighborhood ng Europa(ENP) na sa prinsipyo mangako sa diyalogo at mas malalim na pakikipag-ugnayan sa lahat(hindi marahas) mga artista sa politika at mga samahang lipunan sa loob ng mga bansang Arab. Gayunpaman maraming mga analista at gumagawa ng patakaran ngayon ang nagreklamo ng isang tiyak na isang tropeo sa parehong haka-haka na debate at pagpapaunlad ng patakaran. Naitaguyod na ang pampulitika Islam ay isang nagbabago na tanawin, lubhang apektado bya saklaw ng mga pangyayari, ngunit ang debate ay madalas na natigil sa pinapasimple na tanong ng ‘demokratiko ba ang mga Islamista?’Maraming mga independiyenteng analista ang nagpataguyod ng pakikipag-ugnayan sa mga Islamista, ngunit ang aktuwal na pakikipagtagpo sa pagitan ng mga pamahalaang Kanluranin at mga organisasyong Islamista ay nananatiling limitado .

| Aug 17, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

Mga Partido ng Islamista , ARE THEY DEMOCRATS? DOES it matter ?

Tarek Masoud

Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. At saka, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. Halimbawa, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (founded in 1928), but also Hamas, Islamic Action Front ng Jordan, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.

| Aug 17, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of Turkish Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party

Ramin Ahmadov

The election results on November 3, 2002, which brought the Justice and Development Party into power, shocked many, but for varying reasons. Afterwards, some became more hopeful about future of their country, while others became even more doubtful and anxious, since for them the “republican regime” came under threat. These opposing responses, along with the perceptions that fueled them, neatly describe the two very different worlds that currently exist within Turkish society, and so it is important to think through many of the contested issues that have arisen as a result of these shifting political winds.
The winning Justice and Development Party (JDP) was established in 2001 by a group of politicians under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, many of whom split from the religio-political movement of Necmetiin Erbakan, the National Outlook Movement, and the Welfare Party. Interestingly, in less than two years after its establishment, and at the first general election it participated in, the JDP received 34.29 % of the vote when all other established parties fell under the 10 % threshold. The only exception to this was the Republican People’s Party (19.38 %). The JDP captured 365 out of 550 seats in the parliament and therefore was given the opportunity of establishing the government alone, which is exactly what happened. Two years later, in the 2004 local elections, the JDP increased its votes to 41.46 %, while the RPP slightly decreased to 18.27 %, and the Nationalist Action Party increased to 10.10 % (from 8.35 % sa 2002). Finally, in the most recent general elections in Turkey in 2007, which was marked by intense debate over presidential elections and an online military note, the JDP won nearly half of all votes, 46.58 %, and began its second term in power.

| Aug 12, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

Turkey and the EU: A Survey on Turkish MPs’ EU Vision

Kudret Bulbul

Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (AKO) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.

| Aug 11, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

zealous democrats : ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT, INDONESIA AND TURKEY

Anthony Bubalo
Greg Fealy
Whit Mason

The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.

They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. At the same time, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. Sa totoo lang, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.

Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.

The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.

| Aug 07, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

Success of Turkey’s AK Party must not dilute worries over Arab Islamists

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “Islamist” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – were always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamist’ alleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. Sa totoo lang, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhood – aside from the common faith of its members – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, ang “Kanluran”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

| Aug 02, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa

Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition

John L. Esposito

In the 1990s political Islam, what some call “Islamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Iran, Sudan, Afghanistan), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Turkey, Iran, Lebanon, Kuwait, Yemen, Jordan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malaysia, Indonesia, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.

| Aug 01, 2010 | Mga Komento 0
Magbasa Nang Higit Pa
Mas lumang mga Entries
Susunod na pahina »