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ISLAMS, DEMOKRĀTIJA & AMERIKAS SAVIENOTĀS VALSTIS:

Kordovas fonds

Abdullah Faliq |

Ievads ,


Neskatoties uz to, ka tā ir gan daudzgadīga, gan sarežģīta diskusija, Arkas ceturkšņa izdevums atkārtoti pārbauda no teoloģijas un praktiskā viedokļa, svarīgās debates par islāma un demokrātijas attiecībām un savietojamību, kā tas atskanēja Baraka Obamas cerību un pārmaiņu programmā. Lai gan daudzi atzīmē Obamas ieņemšanu Ovālajā kabinetā kā nacionālo katarsi ASV, citi joprojām ir mazāk optimistiski par ideoloģijas un pieejas maiņu starptautiskajā arēnā. Lai gan lielu daļu spriedzes un neuzticības starp musulmaņu pasauli un ASV var saistīt ar demokrātijas veicināšanas pieeju., parasti dod priekšroku diktatūrām un marionešu režīmiem, kas runā par demokrātiskām vērtībām un cilvēktiesībām, gada pēcgrūdiens 9/11 ir patiesi nostiprinājis bažas, izmantojot Amerikas nostāju pret politisko islāmu. Tas ir izveidojis negatīvisma sienu, kā to atklāja worldpublicopinion.org, saskaņā ar kuru 67% ēģiptiešu uzskata, ka Amerika globāli spēlē “galvenokārt negatīvu” lomu.
Tādējādi Amerikas reakcija ir bijusi piemērota. Ievēlot Obamu, daudzi visā pasaulē saista savas cerības attīstīt mazāk kareivīgu, bet godīgāka ārpolitika pret musulmaņu pasauli. Pārbaudījums Obamam, kā mēs apspriežam, ir tas, kā Amerika un viņas sabiedrotie veicina demokrātiju. Vai tas atvieglos vai uzspiež?
Turklāt, vai tas var būt godīgs brokeris ilgstošās konfliktu zonās? Prolifi pieredzes un ieskatu piesaistīšana
c zinātnieki, akadēmiķi, pieredzējuši žurnālisti un politiķi, Arches Quarterly atklāj islāma un demokrātijas attiecības un Amerikas lomu, kā arī Obamas radītās izmaiņas., meklējot kopīgu valodu. Anas Altikriti, Th e Cordoba Foundation izpilddirektors nodrošina šīs diskusijas ievadu, kur viņš pārdomā cerības un izaicinājumus, kas ir Obamas ceļā. Sekojot Altikriti, bijušais prezidenta Niksona padomnieks, Dr Robert Crane piedāvā rūpīgu analīzi par islāma principu par tiesībām uz brīvību. Anvars Ibrahims, bijušais Malaizijas premjerministra vietnieks, bagātina diskusiju ar demokrātijas īstenošanas praktisko realitāti musulmaņu dominējošās sabiedrībās, proti, Indonēzijā un Malaizijā.
Mums ir arī Dr Shireen Hunter, Džordžtaunas universitātē, ASV, kurš pēta musulmaņu valstis, kas atpaliek demokratizācijas un modernizācijas jomā. To papildina rakstnieks par terorismu, Dr Nafeez Ahmed skaidrojums par postmodernitātes krīzi un
demokrātijas bojāeja. Doktors Dauds Abdulla (Tuvo Austrumu mediju monitora direktors), Alans Hārts (bijušais ITN un BBC Panorama korespondents; cionisma autors: Īstais ebreju ienaidnieks) un Asem Sondos (Ēģiptes iknedēļas Sawt Al Omma redaktors) koncentrēties uz Obamu un viņa lomu demokrātijas veicināšanā musulmaņu pasaulē, kā arī ASV attiecības ar Izraēlu un Musulmaņu brālību.
Ārlietu ministrs airē, Maldīvija, Ahmeds Šahīds spekulē par islāma un demokrātijas nākotni; Cllr. Gerijs Makločlains
– Sinn Féin biedrs, kurš izturēja četrus gadus cietumā par Īrijas republikāņu aktivitātēm un Gildfordas aizstāvis 4 un Birmingema 6, atspoguļo viņa neseno braucienu uz Gazu, kur viņš bija liecinieks pret palestīniešiem vērstās brutalitātes un netaisnības ietekmei; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Radikalizācijas un mūsdienu politiskās vardarbības pētījumu centra direktore apspriež izaicinājumus kritiski pētot politisko teroru; Dr Halids al Mubaraks, rakstnieks un dramaturgs, apspriež miera izredzes Darfūrā; un visbeidzot žurnālists un cilvēktiesību aktīvists Ašurs Šamiss kritiski skatās uz musulmaņu demokratizāciju un politizāciju mūsdienās.
Mēs ceram, ka tas viss radīs visaptverošu lasījumu un pārdomu avotu par jautājumiem, kas skar mūs visus jaunā cerību rītausmā.
Paldies

| sept 07, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Islamic Political Culture, Demokrātija, and Human Rights

Daniele. Cena

It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. sekojoši, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, tomēr, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.

| sept 06, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; un (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

| sept 06, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Islāmistu opozīcijas partijas un ES iesaistīšanās potenciāls

Tobijs Ārčers

Heidija Huuhtanena

Ņemot vērā islāmistu kustību pieaugošo nozīmi musulmaņu pasaulē un

veids, kā radikalizācija ir ietekmējusi globālos notikumus kopš gadsimta sākuma, to

ir svarīgi, lai ES izvērtētu savu politiku attiecībā uz dalībniekiem, kas var būt brīvi

saukta par "islāma pasauli". Īpaši svarīgi ir jautāt, vai un kā iesaistīties

ar dažādām islāmistu grupām.

Tas joprojām ir pretrunīgs pat ES ietvaros. Daži uzskata, ka islāmi to vērtē

guļ aiz islāmistu partijām ir vienkārši nesavienojami ar rietumu demokrātijas ideāliem un

cilvēktiesības, savukārt citi uzskata, ka iesaistīšanās ir reāla nepieciešamība pieaugošā pieauguma dēļ

islāmistu partiju vietējā nozīme un to pieaugošā iesaiste starptautiskajā

lietas. Vēl viena perspektīva ir tāda, ka musulmaņu pasaulē palielināsies demokratizācija

Eiropas drošība. Šo un citu argumentu derīgums par to, vai un kā

ES vajadzētu iesaistīties var pārbaudīt tikai, pētot dažādas islāmistu kustības un

viņu politiskie apstākļi, valsts pēc valsts.

Demokratizācija ir ES kopējās ārpolitikas pasākumu galvenā tēma, kā likts

pantā 11 Līgumam par Eiropas Savienību. Daudzi no štatiem, kas ņemti vērā šajā

ziņojumi nav demokrātiski, vai nav pilnībā demokrātiska. Lielākajā daļā šo valstu, islāmists

partijas un kustības veido būtisku opozīciju valdošajiem režīmiem, un

dažos veidos lielāko opozīcijas bloku. Eiropas demokrātijām jau sen ir bijis

tikt galā ar autoritāriem režīmiem, bet tā ir jauna parādība, kas jāspiež

demokrātiskām reformām valstīs, kurās varētu būt vislielākie ieguvēji, no

ES viedoklis, dažādas un dažkārt problemātiskas pieejas demokrātijai un tai

saistītās vērtības, mazākumtautību un sieviešu tiesības un tiesiskums. Šīs maksas ir

bieži vērsta pret islāmistu kustībām, tāpēc Eiropas politikas veidotājiem tas ir svarīgi

ir precīzs priekšstats par potenciālo partneru politiku un filozofiju.

Dažādu valstu pieredze liecina, ka jo vairāk brīvības ir islāmists

ballītes ir atļautas, jo mērenāki viņi ir savā rīcībā un idejās. Daudzos

gadījumos islāmistu partijas un grupas jau sen ir novirzījušās no sava sākotnējā mērķa

par islāma valsts nodibināšanu saskaņā ar islāma likumiem, un ir sākuši pieņemt pamata

demokrātiskie principi vēlēšanu konkurencei par varu, citu politisko esamību

konkurentiem, un politiskais plurālisms.

| augusts 21, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Political Islam in the Middle East

Vai Knudsens

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, iekšā

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Figure 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, to take up

arms against the state, and more rarely, foreign countries. The use of political violence is

widespread in the Middle East, but is neither illogical nor irrational. In many cases even

Islamist groups known for their use of violence have been transformed into peaceful political

parties successfully contesting municipal and national elections. Nonetheless, the Islamist

revival in the Middle East remains in part unexplained despite a number of theories seeking to

account for its growth and popular appeal. In general, most theories hold that Islamism is a

reaction to relative deprivation, especially social inequality and political oppression. Alternative

theories seek the answer to the Islamist revival within the confines of religion itself and the

powerful, evocative potential of religious symbolism.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

of the poorer sections of society but also of the middle class.

| augusts 20, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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STRATEGIES FOR ENGAGING POLITICAL ISLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Similarly, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. ASV. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. In addition, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

| augusts 19, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Islāmistu partijas : līdzdalība bez varas

Malika Zeghal

Pēdējo divu desmitgažu laikā, sociālās un politiskās kustības, kas savu ideoloģiju pamato ar atsaucēm uz islāmu, ir centušās kļūt par likumīgām politiskām partijām daudzās Tuvo Austrumu un Ziemeļāfrikas valstīs.. Dažām no šīm islāmistu kustībām ir atļauts likumīgi piedalīties vēlēšanu sacensībās. Viena no pazīstamākajām ir Turcijas Taisnīguma un attīstības partija (AKP), gadā ieguva parlamenta vairākumu 2002 un kopš tā laika ir vadījis valdību. Marokas Taisnīguma un attīstības partija (PJD) ir likumīga kopš vidus- 1990s un komandē ievērojamu vietu bloku parlamentā. Ēģiptē, musulmaņu brālība (MB) nekad nav bijis pilnvarots dibināt politisko partiju, taču, neskatoties uz valsts represijām, tā veiksmīgi startējusi kā nomināli neatkarīgie kandidāti gan valsts, gan pašvaldību vēlēšanās.
Kopš 90. gadu sākuma, šī tendence ir gājusi roku rokā ar oficiālu ierobežotas politiskās liberalizācijas politiku. Kopā, abas tendences ir izraisījušas debates par to, vai šīs kustības ir apņēmušās ievērot “demokrātiju”. Ir izveidojusies plaša literatūra, lai uzsvērtu paradoksus, kā arī iespējamos riskus un ieguvumus, iesaistot islāmistu partijas vēlēšanu procesā.. Galvenā paradigma, kas atrodama šajā rakstā, ir vērsta uz sekām, kas var rasties, ja islāmisti izmantos demokrātiskus instrumentus., un cenšas noteikt “patiesos” nodomus, ko islāmisti izpaudīs, ja viņi nonāks pie varas.

| augusts 19, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Neitans Dž. Brūns, Amrs Hamzavijs,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, in particular, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, tomēr, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Džordana, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politika, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

| augusts 18, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

| augusts 17, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Since 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

| augusts 17, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Islāmistu partijas , ARE THEY DEMOCRATS? DOES it matter ?

Tareks Masouds

Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. Turklāt, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. For example, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (founded in 1928), but also Hamas, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.

| augusts 17, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of Turkish Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party

Ramīns Ahmadovs

The election results on November 3, 2002, which brought the Justice and Development Party into power, shocked many, but for varying reasons. Afterwards, some became more hopeful about future of their country, while others became even more doubtful and anxious, since for them the “republican regime” came under threat. These opposing responses, along with the perceptions that fueled them, neatly describe the two very different worlds that currently exist within Turkish society, and so it is important to think through many of the contested issues that have arisen as a result of these shifting political winds.
The winning Justice and Development Party (JDP) was established in 2001 by a group of politicians under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, many of whom split from the religio-political movement of Necmetiin Erbakan, the National Outlook Movement, and the Welfare Party. Interesanti, in less than two years after its establishment, and at the first general election it participated in, the JDP received 34.29 % of the vote when all other established parties fell under the 10 % threshold. The only exception to this was the Republican People’s Party (19.38 %). The JDP captured 365 out of 550 seats in the parliament and therefore was given the opportunity of establishing the government alone, which is exactly what happened. Two years later, in the 2004 local elections, the JDP increased its votes to 41.46 %, while the RPP slightly decreased to 18.27 %, and the Nationalist Action Party increased to 10.10 % (from 8.35 % iekšā 2002). Finally, in the most recent general elections in Turkey in 2007, which was marked by intense debate over presidential elections and an online military note, the JDP won nearly half of all votes, 46.58 %, and began its second term in power.

| augusts 12, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Turkey and the EU: A Survey on Turkish MPs’ EU Vision

Kudrets Bulbuls

Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (EU) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.

| augusts 11, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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zealous democrats : ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT, INDONESIA AND TURKEY

Anthony Bubalo
Greg Fealy
Vasars Masons

The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.

They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. At the same time, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. Indeed, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.

Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.

The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.

| augusts 07, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Success of Turkey’s AK Party must not dilute worries over Arab Islamists

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on how “Islamists” can pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “islāmists” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamists – in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenders – were always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamist’ alleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. Patiesībā, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhood – aside from the common faith of its members – that it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, the “Rietumi”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

| augusts 02, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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Claiming the Center: Political Islam in Transition

Džons L. Esposito

90. gadu politiskais islāms, ko daži sauc “Islāma fundamentālisms,” joprojām ir liela klātbūtne valdībā un opozīcijas politikā no Ziemeļāfrikas līdz Dienvidaustrumāzijai. Politiskais islāms pie varas un politikā ir radījis daudz jautājumu un jautājumu: “Vai islāms ir pretrunā ar modernizāciju?,” “Vai islāms un demokrātija nav savienojami?,” “Kāda ir islāma valdības ietekme uz plurālismu?, minoritāšu un sieviešu tiesības,” “Cik reprezentatīvi ir islāmisti,” “Vai ir islāma mērenie?,” “Vai Rietumiem jābaidās no transnacionāliem islāma draudiem vai civilizāciju sadursmes?” Mūsdienu islāma atdzimšana Musulmaņu pasaules ainava šodien atklāj jaunu islāma republiku rašanos (Irāna, Sudāna, Afganistāna), islāma kustību izplatība, kas darbojas kā galvenie politiskie un sociālie dalībnieki esošajās sistēmās, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudāna, Turcija, Irāna, Libāna, Kuwait, Yemen, Džordana, Pakistāna, Bangladesh, Malaizija, Indonēzija, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.

| augusts 01, 2010 | Komentāri 0
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