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ÍSLAM, LÝÐRÆÐI & BANDARÍKIN:

Cordoba Foundation

Abdullah Faliq

Intro ,


In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Ennfremur, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Enlisting the expertise and insight of prolifi
c scholars, academics, seasoned journalists and politicians, Arches Quarterly brings to light the relationship between Islam and Democracy and the role of America – as well as the changes brought about by Obama, in seeking the common ground. Anas Altikriti, the CEO of Th e Cordoba Foundation provides the opening gambit to this discussion, where he refl ects on the hopes and challenges that rests on Obama’s path. Following Altikriti, the former advisor to President Nixon, Dr Robert Crane off ers a thorough analysis of the Islamic principle of the right to freedom. Anwar Ibrahim, former Deputy Prime Minister of Malaysia, enriches the discussion with the practical realities of implementing democracy in Muslim dominant societies, nefnilega, in Indonesia and Malaysia.
We also have Dr Shireen Hunter, of Georgetown University, US, who explores Muslim countries lagging in democratisation and modernisation. Th is is complemented by terrorism writer, Dr Nafeez Ahmed’s explanation of the crisis of post-modernity and the
demise of democracy. Dr Daud Abdullah (Director of Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (former ITN and BBC Panorama correspondent; author of Zionism: Th e Real Enemy of the Jews) and Asem Sondos (Editor of Egypt’s Sawt Al Omma weekly) concentrate on Obama and his role vis-à-vis democracy-promotion in the Muslim world, as well as US relations with Israel and the Muslim Brotherhood.
Minister of Foreign Aff airs, Maldives, Ahmed Shaheed speculates on the future of Islam and Democracy; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
We hope all this makes for a comprehensive reading and a source for refl ection on issues that aff ect us all in a new dawn of hope.
Thank you

Íslamsk stjórnmálamenning, Lýðræði, og mannréttindi

Daniel E. Verð

Því hefur verið haldið fram að íslam auðveldi forræðishyggju, stangast á við gildi vestrænna samfélaga, og hefur veruleg áhrif á mikilvægar pólitískar niðurstöður í múslimskum þjóðum. Þar af leiðandi, fræðimenn, álitsgjafar, og embættismenn benda oft á „íslamskan bókstafstrú“ sem næstu hugmyndafræðilegu ógn við frjálslynd lýðræðisríki. Þetta útsýni, þó, byggir fyrst og fremst á greiningu texta, Íslamsk stjórnmálakenning, og sérstakar rannsóknir á einstökum löndum, sem taka ekki tillit til annarra þátta. Það er fullyrðing mín að textar og hefðir íslams, eins og annarra trúarbragða, hægt að nota til að styðja við margvísleg stjórnmálakerfi og stefnur. Landssértækar og lýsandi rannsóknir hjálpa okkur ekki að finna mynstur sem hjálpa okkur að útskýra mismunandi tengsl milli íslams og stjórnmála í löndum múslimaheimsins. Þess vegna, ný nálgun við rannsókn á
tengsl milli íslams og stjórnmála eru kallaðar.
ég legg til, með ströngu mati á tengslum íslams, lýðræði, og mannréttindi á þverþjóðlegum vettvangi, að of mikil áhersla sé lögð á vald íslams sem stjórnmálaafls. Ég nota fyrst samanburðarrannsóknir, sem fjalla um þætti sem tengjast samspili íslamskra hópa og stjórnvalda, efnahagsleg áhrif, þjóðernisbrot, og samfélagsþróun, að útskýra mismunandi áhrif íslams á stjórnmál milli átta þjóða. Ég held því fram að mikið af valdinu
rekja til íslams sem drifkrafts stefnu og stjórnmálakerfa í múslimskum þjóðum má skýra betur með áðurnefndum þáttum. Ég finn líka, þvert á almenna trú, að aukinn styrkur íslamskra stjórnmálahópa hefur oft verið tengdur hóflegri fjölvæðingu stjórnmálakerfa.
Ég hef smíðað vísitölu yfir íslamska stjórnmálamenningu, byggt á því að hve miklu leyti íslömsk lög eru notuð og hvort og, ef svo, hvernig,Vestrænar hugmyndir, stofnanir, og tækni er innleidd, að prófa eðli sambandsins milli íslams og lýðræðis og íslams og mannréttinda. Þessi vísir er notaður í tölfræðilegri greiningu, sem inniheldur úrtak af tuttugu og þremur löndum sem eru aðallega múslimar og samanburðarhópur tuttugu og þriggja þróunarríkja sem ekki eru múslimar. Auk þess að bera saman
Íslamskar þjóðir til þróunarríkja sem ekki eru íslamskir, tölfræðileg greining gerir mér kleift að stjórna áhrifum annarra breyta sem hafa reynst hafa áhrif á lýðræðisstig og vernd einstaklingsréttinda. Niðurstaðan ætti að vera raunsærri og réttari mynd af áhrifum íslams á stjórnmál og stefnur.

PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:

Sherifa Zuhur

Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) árásir, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; og (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Toby Archer

Heidi Huuhtanen

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB, Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB. Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB.

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB. Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

mannréttindi, Íslamskir stjórnarandstöðuflokkar og möguleiki á þátttöku í ESB

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

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innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum, og

innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum. innlent mikilvægi íslamistaflokka og vaxandi þátttöku þeirra í alþjóðamálum

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg, takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

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takast á við stjórnarfar sem eru einræðisleg

að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum, að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum

að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum, að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum

að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum, að stofna íslamskt ríki sem lýtur íslömskum lögum.

Pólitískt íslam í Miðausturlöndum

Eru Knudsen

This report provides an introduction to selected aspects of the phenomenon commonly

referred to as “political Islam”. The report gives special emphasis to the Middle East, í

particular the Levantine countries, and outlines two aspects of the Islamist movement that may

be considered polar opposites: democracy and political violence. In the third section the report

reviews some of the main theories used to explain the Islamic resurgence in the Middle East

(Mynd 1). In brief, the report shows that Islam need not be incompatible with democracy and

that there is a tendency to neglect the fact that many Middle Eastern countries have been

engaged in a brutal suppression of Islamist movements, causing them, some argue, að taka upp

vopn gegn ríkinu, og sjaldnar, framandi löndum. Notkun pólitísks ofbeldis er

útbreidd í Miðausturlöndum, en er hvorki órökrétt né rökleysa. Í mörgum tilfellum jafnvel

Íslamistahópar sem þekktir eru fyrir að beita ofbeldi hafa verið breyttir í friðsamleg pólitísk

flokkar sem taka þátt í sveitarstjórnar- og landskosningum með góðum árangri. Engu að síður, íslamistinn

vakning í Miðausturlöndum er enn að hluta til óútskýrð þrátt fyrir fjölda kenninga sem leitast við

gera grein fyrir vexti þess og vinsælli aðdráttarafl. Almennt, flestar kenningar halda að íslamismi sé a

viðbrögð við tiltölulega skorti, sérstaklega félagslegur ójöfnuður og pólitísk kúgun. Valkostur

kenningar leita svara við endurvakningu íslamista innan ramma trúarbragðanna sjálfra og þeirra

öflugur, hvetjandi möguleika trúarlegrar táknmyndar.

The conclusion argues in favour of moving beyond the “gloom and doom” approach that

portrays Islamism as an illegitimate political expression and a potential threat to the West (“Old

Islamism”), and of a more nuanced understanding of the current democratisation of the Islamist

movement that is now taking place throughout the Middle East (“New Islamism”). This

importance of understanding the ideological roots of the “New Islamism” is foregrounded

along with the need for thorough first-hand knowledge of Islamist movements and their

adherents. As social movements, its is argued that more emphasis needs to be placed on

understanding the ways in which they have been capable of harnessing the aspirations not only

af fátækari hluta samfélagsins en einnig millistéttarinnar.

STEFNI TIL AÐ TAKA PÓLITÍSKA ÍSLAM

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA KADLEC

Pólitískt íslam er eina virkasta stjórnmálaaflið í Miðausturlöndum í dag. Framtíð þess er nátengd framtíð svæðisins. Ef Bandaríkin og Evrópusambandið eru staðráðin í að styðja pólitískar umbætur á svæðinu, þeir þurfa að búa til steinsteypu, samræmdar aðferðir til að taka þátt í íslömskum hópum. Samt, Bandaríkin. hefur almennt ekki viljað hefja viðræður við þessar hreyfingar. Á sama hátt, Samskipti ESB við íslamista hafa verið undantekningin, ekki reglan. Þar sem lágstig tengiliðir eru fyrir hendi, þær þjóna aðallega upplýsingaöflunartilgangi, ekki stefnumótandi markmið. The US. og ESB eru með fjölda áætlana sem fjalla um efnahagslega og pólitíska þróun á svæðinu - þar á meðal Miðausturlönd samstarfsverkefnið (MEPI), Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), Miðjarðarhafsbandalagið, og nágrannastefnu Evrópu (ENP) – samt hafa þeir lítið að segja um hvernig áskorun pólitískrar andstöðu íslamista passar við víðtækari svæðisbundin markmið. US. og lýðræðisaðstoð og áætlanagerð ESB beinist nær eingöngu að annað hvort valdsstjórnum sjálfum eða veraldlegum borgaralegum hópum með lágmarksstuðning í eigin samfélögum.
Það er kominn tími til að endurmeta núverandi stefnu. Frá hryðjuverkaárásunum í september 11, 2001, stuðningur við lýðræði í Mið-Austurlöndum hefur verið mikilvægara fyrir vestræna stefnumótendur, sem sjá tengsl milli skorts á lýðræði og pólitísks ofbeldis. Meiri athygli hefur verið lögð á að skilja afbrigðin innan pólitísks íslams. Nýja bandaríska stjórnin er opnari fyrir því að auka samskipti við múslimska heiminn. Á meðan, mikill meirihluti almennra íslamistasamtaka – þar á meðal Bræðralag múslima í Egyptalandi, Islamic Action Front Jórdaníu (IAF), Réttlætis- og þróunarflokkur Marokkó (PJD), Íslamska stjórnarskrárhreyfingin í Kúveit, og Yemeni Islah flokkurinn - hafa í auknum mæli gert stuðning við pólitískar umbætur og lýðræði að meginþáttum í pólitískum vettvangi þeirra. Auk, margir hafa gefið til kynna mikinn áhuga á að hefja viðræður við Bandaríkin. og ríkisstjórnir ESB.
Framtíð samskipta milli vestrænna ríkja og Miðausturlanda kann að miklu leyti að ráðast af því hversu miklu þeir fyrrnefndu taka þátt í víðtækri umræðu um sameiginlega hagsmuni og markmið, sem ekki eru ofbeldisfullir íslamista.. Nýlega hefur verið fjölgað rannsóknum á tengslum við íslamista, en fáir fjalla greinilega um hvað það gæti falið í sér í reynd. Ace Zoé Nautré, gestgjafi hjá þýska ráðinu um utanríkistengsl, setur það, „ESB er að hugsa um þátttöku en veit í raun ekki hvernig.“1 Í von um að skýra umræðuna, við greinum á milli þriggja stiga „þátttöku,“ hver með mismunandi hætti og markmiðum: lágstig tengiliðir, stefnumótandi samtal, og samstarf.

Íslamistaflokkar : þátttöku án valds

Malika Zeghal

Over the last two decades, social and political movements grounding their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Morocco’s own Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has been legal since the mid- 1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. In Egypt, múslimska bræðralagið (MB) has never been authorized to form a political party, but in spite of state repression it has successfully run candidates as nominal independents in both national and local elections.
Since the early 1990s, this trend has gone hand-in-hand with official policies of limited political liberalization. Together, the two trends have occasioned a debate about whether these movements are committed to “democracy.” A vast literature has sprung up to underline the paradoxes as well as the possible risks and benefits of including Islamist parties in the electoral process. The main paradigm found in this body of writing focuses on the consequences that might ensue when Islamists use democratic instruments, and seeks to divine the “true” intentions that Islamists will manifest if they come to power.

ISLAMIST MOVEMENTS AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROCESS IN THE ARAB WORLD: Exploring the Gray Zones

Nathan J. Brúnn, Amr Hamzawy,

Marina Ottaway

During the last decade, Islamist movements have established themselves as major political players in the Middle East. Together with the governments, Islamist movements, moderate as well as radical, will determine how the politics of the region unfold in the foreseeable future. Th ey have shown the ability not only to craft messages with widespread popular appeal but also, and most importantly, to create organizations with genuine social bases and develop coherent political strategies. Other parties,
by and large, have failed on all accounts.
Th e public in the West and, sérstaklega, the United States, has only become aware of the importance of Islamist movements after dramatic events, such as the revolution in Iran and the assassination of President Anwar al-Sadat in Egypt. Attention has been far more sustained since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. As a result, Islamist movements are widely regarded as dangerous and hostile. While such a characterization is accurate regarding organizations at the radical end of the Islamist spectrum, which are dangerous because of their willingness to resort to indiscriminate violence in pursuing their goals, it is not an accurate characterization of the many groups that have renounced or avoided violence. Because terrorist organizations pose an immediate
threat, þó, policy makers in all countries have paid disproportionate attention to the violent organizations.
It is the mainstream Islamist organizations, not the radical ones, that will have the greatest impact on the future political evolution of the Middle East. Th e radicals’ grandiose goals of re-establishing a caliphate uniting the entire Arab world, or even of imposing on individual Arab countries laws and social customs inspired by a fundamentalist interpretation of Islam are simply too far removed from today’s reality to be realized. Th is does not mean that terrorist groups are not dangerous—they could cause great loss of life even in the pursuit of impossible goals—but that they are unlikely to change the face of the Middle East. Mainstream Islamist organizations are generally a diff erent matter. Th ey already have had a powerful impact on social customs in many countries, halting and reversing secularist trends and changing the way many Arabs dress and behave. And their immediate political goal, to become a powerful force by participating in the normal politics of their country, is not an impossible one. It is already being realized in countries such as Morocco, Jórdanía, and even Egypt, which still bans all Islamist political organizations but now has eighty-eight Muslim Brothers in the Parliament. Politics, not violence, is what gives mainstream Islamists their infl uence.

ISLAMIST RADICALISATION

PREFACE
RICHARD YOUNGS
MICHAEL EMERSON

Issues relating to political Islam continue to present challenges to European foreign policies in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA). As EU policy has sought to come to terms with such challenges during the last decade or so political Islam itself has evolved. Experts point to the growing complexity and variety of trends within political Islam. Some Islamist organisations have strengthened their commitment to democratic norms and engaged fully in peaceable, mainstream national politics. Others remain wedded to violent means. And still others have drifted towards a more quietist form of Islam, disengaged from political activity. Political Islam in the MENA region presents no uniform trend to European policymakers. Analytical debate has grown around the concept of ‘radicalisation’. This in turn has spawned research on the factors driving ‘de-radicalisation’, and conversely, ‘re-radicalisation’. Much of the complexity derives from the widely held view that all three of these phenomena are occurring at the same time. Even the terms themselves are contested. It has often been pointed out that the moderate–radical dichotomy fails fully to capture the nuances of trends within political Islam. Some analysts also complain that talk of ‘radicalism’ is ideologically loaded. At the level of terminology, we understand radicalisation to be associated with extremism, but views differ over the centrality of its religious–fundamentalist versus political content, and over whether the willingness to resort to violence is implied or not.

Such differences are reflected in the views held by the Islamists themselves, as well as in the perceptions of outsiders.

Political Islam and European Foreign Policy

POLITICAL ISLAM AND THE EUROPEAN NEIGHBOURHOOD POLICY

MICHAEL EMERSON

RICHARD YOUNGS

Síðan 2001 and the international events that ensued the nature of the relationship between the West and political Islam has become a definingissue for foreign policy. In recent years a considerable amount of research and analysis has been undertaken on the issue of political Islam. This has helped to correct some of the simplistic and alarmist assumptions previously held in the West about the nature of Islamist values and intentions. Parallel to this, the European Union (EU) has developed a number of policy initiatives primarily the European Neighbourhood Policy(ENP) that in principle commit to dialogue and deeper engagement all(non-violent) political actors and civil society organisations within Arab countries. Yet many analysts and policy-makers now complain of a certain a trophy in both conceptual debate and policy development. It has been established that political Islam is a changing landscape, deeply affected bya range of circumstances, but debate often seems to have stuck on the simplistic question of ‘are Islamists democratic?’ Many independent analysts have nevertheless advocated engagement with Islamists, but theactual rapprochement between Western governments and Islamist organisations remains limited .

Íslamistaflokkar , ARE THEY DEMOCRATS? DOES it matter ?

Tarek Masoud

Driven by a sense that “the Islamists are coming,” journalists and policy makers have been engaged of late in fevered speculation over whether Islamist parties such as Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood (MB) or Palestine’s Hamas really believe in democracy. While I attempt to outline the boundaries of the Islamist democratic commitment, I think that peering into the Islamist soul is a misuse of energies. The Islamists are not coming. Ennfremur, as Adam Przeworski and others have argued, commitments to democracy are more often born of environmental constraints than of true belief. Instead of worrying whether Islamists are real democrats,
our goal should be to help fortify democratic and liberal institutions and actors so that no group—Islamist or otherwise—can subvert them.
But what is this movement over whose democratic bona fides we worry? Islamism is a slippery concept. Til dæmis, if we label as Islamist those parties that call for the application of shari‘a, we must exclude Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (which is widely considered Islamist) and include Egypt’s ruling National Democratic Party (which actively represses Islamists). Instead of becoming mired in definitional issues, we would do better to focus on a set of political parties that have grown from the same historical roots, derive many of their goals and positions from the same body of ideas, and maintain organizational ties to one another—that is, those parties that spring from the international MB. These include the Egyptian mother organization (stofnað í 1928), but also Hamas, Islamic Action Front Jórdaníu, Algeria’s Movement for a Peaceful Society, the Iraqi Islamic Party, Lebanon’s Islamic Group, and others.

Counter Transformations in the Center and Periphery of Turkish Society and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party

Ramin Ahmadov

The election results on November 3, 2002, which brought the Justice and Development Party into power, shocked many, but for varying reasons. Afterwards, some became more hopeful about future of their country, while others became even more doubtful and anxious, since for them the “republican regime” came under threat. These opposing responses, along with the perceptions that fueled them, neatly describe the two very different worlds that currently exist within Turkish society, and so it is important to think through many of the contested issues that have arisen as a result of these shifting political winds.
The winning Justice and Development Party (JDP) was established in 2001 by a group of politicians under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan, many of whom split from the religio-political movement of Necmetiin Erbakan, the National Outlook Movement, and the Welfare Party. Athyglisvert, in less than two years after its establishment, and at the first general election it participated in, the JDP received 34.29 % of the vote when all other established parties fell under the 10 % threshold. The only exception to this was the Republican People’s Party (19.38 %). The JDP captured 365 out of 550 seats in the parliament and therefore was given the opportunity of establishing the government alone, which is exactly what happened. Two years later, í 2004 local elections, the JDP increased its votes to 41.46 %, while the RPP slightly decreased to 18.27 %, and the Nationalist Action Party increased to 10.10 % (frá 8.35 % í 2002). Loksins, in the most recent general elections in Turkey in 2007, which was marked by intense debate over presidential elections and an online military note, the JDP won nearly half of all votes, 46.58 %, and began its second term in power.

Turkey and the EU: A Survey on Turkish MPs’ EU Vision

Power Bulbul

Even though Turkey’s dream for being a member of European Union (EU) dates back to late 1950s, it can be said that this process has gained its momentum since the governing period of Justice and Development Party, which is shortly called AK party or AKP in Turkish. When compared with earlier periods, the enormous accomplishments during the AK party’s rule are recognized by domestic and European authorities alike. In the parallel of gigantic steps towardsthe European membership, which is now a real possibility for Turkey, there have been increasingdebates about this process. While some European authorities generate policies over Cyprus issueagainst Turkey’s membership, some others mainly lead by German Christian Democrats proposea privileged status rather than full membership. Turkish authorities do not stay silent over thesearguments, and probably first time the Turkish foreign minister can articulate that “should they(the EU) propose anything short of full membership, or any new conditions, we will walk away.And this time it will be for good” (The Economist 2005 30-31) After October third, Even though Mr. Abdullah Gül, who is the foreign minister of the AK party govenrment, persistentlyemphasizes that there is no such a concept so-called “privileged partnership” in the framework document, (Milliyet, 2005) the prime minister of France puts forward that this option is actually one of the possible alternatives.

zealous democrats : ISLAMISM AND DEMOCRACY IN EGYPT, INDONESIA AND TURKEY

Anthony Bubalo
Greg Fealy
Whit Mason

The fear of Islamists coming to power through elections has long been an obstacle to democratisation in authoritarian states of the Muslim world. Islamists have been, and continue to be, the best organised and most credible opposition movements in many of these countries.

They are also commonly, if not always correctly, assumed to be in the best position to capitalise on any democratic opening of their political systems. Á sama tíma, the commitment of Islamists to democracy is often questioned. Einmitt, when it comes to democracy, Islamism’s intellectual heritage and historical record (in terms of the few examples of Islamist-led states, such as Sudan and Iran) have not been reassuring. The apparent strength of Islamist movements, combined with suspicions about Islamism’s democratic compatibility, has been used by authoritarian governments as an argument to defl ect both domestic and international calls for political reform and democratisation.

Domestically, secular liberals have preferred to settle for nominally secular dictatorships over potentially religious ones. Internationally, Western governments have preferred friendly autocrats to democratically elected, but potentially hostile, Islamist-led governments.

The goal of this paper is to re-examine some of the assumptions about the risks of democratisation in authoritarian countries of the Muslim world (and not just in the Middle East) where strong Islamist movements or parties exist.

Árangur Tyrklands AK flokks má ekki draga úr áhyggjum af arabískum íslamistum

Mona Eltahawy

It has been unsurprising that since Abdullah Gul became president of Turkey on 27 August that much misguided analyses has been wasted on howIslamistscan pass the democracy test. His victory was bound to be described as the “Íslamista” routing of Turkish politics. And Arab Islamistsin the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, their supporters and defenderswere always going to point to Turkey and tell us that we’ve been wrong all along to worry about the Arab Islamistalleged flirtation with democracy. “It worked in Turkey, it can work in the Arab world,” they would try to assure us.Wrong. Wrong. And wrong.Firstly, Gul is not an Islamist. His wife’s headscarf might be the red cloth to the bull of the secular nationalists in Turkey, but neither Gul nor the AK Party which swept parliamentary elections in Turkey in June, can be called Islamists. Reyndar, so little does the AK Party share with the Muslim Brotherhoodaside from the common faith of its membersthat it’s absurd to use its success in Turkish politics as a reason to reduce fears over the Mus-lim Brotherhood’s role in Arab politics.The three litmus tests of Islamism will prove my point: women and sex, the “West”, and Israel.As a secular Muslim who has vowed never to live in Egypt should Islamists ever take power, I never take lightly any attempt to blend religion with politics. So it has been with a more than skeptical eye that I’ve followed Turkish politics over the past few years.

Tilkall til Miðstöðvarinnar: Pólitískt íslam í umskiptum

John L. Edwards

In the 1990s political Islam, what some callIslamic fundamentalism,” remains a major presence in government and in oppositional politics from North Africa to Southeast Asia. Political Islam in power and in politics has raised many issues and questions: “Is Islam antithetical to modernization?,” “Are Islam and democracy incompatible?,” “What are the implications of an Islamic government for pluralism, minority and women’s rights,” “How representative are Islamists,” “Are there Islamic moderates?,” “Should the West fear a transnational Islamic threat or clash of civilizations?” Contemporary Islamic Revivalism The landscape of the Muslim world today reveals the emergence of new Islamic republics (Íran, Sudan, Afganistan), the proliferation of Islamic movements that function as major political and social actors within existing systems, and the confrontational politics of radical violent extremists._ In contrast to the 1980s when political Islam was simply equated with revolutionary Iran or clandestine groups with names like Islamic jihad or the Army of God, the Muslim world in the 1990s is one in which Islamists have participated in the electoral process and are visible as prime ministers, cabinet officers, speakers of national assemblies, parliamentarians, and mayors in countries as diverse as Egypt, Sudan, Tyrkland, Íran, Líbanon, Kuwait, Yemen, Jórdanía, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Malasía, Indónesía, and Israel/Palestine. At the dawn of the twenty-first century, political Islam continues to be a major force for order and disorder in global politics, one that participates in the political process but also in acts of terrorism, a challenge to the Muslim world and to the West. Understanding the nature of political Islam today, and in particular the issues and questions that have emerged from the experience of the recent past, remains critical for governments, policymakers, and students of international politics alike.