All Entries in the "Problemos" Category
Arabų rytoj
DAVIDAS B. OTAVEJUS
Spalio mėn 6, 1981, turėjo būti švenčiama Egipte. Ji pažymėjo didžiausios Egipto pergalės trijuose arabų ir Izraelio konfliktuose metines, kai šalies nepalankioji armija veržėsi per Sueco kanalą atidarymo dienomis 1973 Jom Kipuro karas ir išsiuntė Izraelio karius besitraukiančius. Ant vėsaus, debesuotas rytas, Kairo stadionas buvo sausakimšas egiptiečių šeimų, atvykusių pažiūrėti kariškių. Ant apžvalgos stendo, Prezidentas Anwaras el-Sadatas,karo architektas, su pasitenkinimu stebėjo, kaip prieš jį demonstruoja vyrai ir mašinos. Aš buvau šalia, ką tik atvykęs užsienio korespondentas.Staiga, vienas iš armijos sunkvežimių sustojo tiesiai prieš apžvalgos stendą, kai šeši „Mirage“ reaktyviniai lėktuvai riaumoja virš galvos ir atliko akrobatinį pasirodymą., dangų nudažius ilgais raudonos spalvos takais, geltona, violetinė,ir žali dūmai. Sadatas atsistojo, matyt, ruošiasi keistis sveikinimais su dar vienu egiptiečių karių kontingentu. Jis tapo puikiu taikiniu keturiems islamistams, iššokusiems iš sunkvežimio, šturmavo podiumą, ir apipylė jo kūną kulkomis.Kai žudikai tęsė, atrodytų, amžinybę, apipurškę stovą mirtina ugnimi., Akimirksniu svarsčiau, ar atsitrenkti į žemę ir rizikuoti, kad panikuoti žiūrovai mane mirtinai sutryps, ar likti toliau ir rizikuoti paimti užklydusią kulką. Instinktas liepė man stovėti ant kojų, ir mano žurnalistinės pareigos jausmas paskatino mane eiti išsiaiškinti, ar Sadatas gyvas, ar miręs.
| Rugsėjo mėn 26, 2010 | Komentarai 0
FEMINIZMAS TARP SEKULARIZMO IR ISLAMISMO: PALESTINOS ATVEJIS
Dr, Islah Jad
Vakarų Krante ir Gazos Ruože įvyko įstatymų leidžiamosios valdžios rinkimai 2006 atvedė į valdžią islamistų judėjimą „Hamas“., vėliau suformavo daugumą Palestinos įstatymų leidžiamosios tarybos ir pirmąją daugumos Hamas vyriausybę. Per šiuos rinkimus buvo paskirta pirmoji Hamas ministrė moteris, kuri tapo moterų reikalų ministre. Tarp kovo mėn 2006 ir birželį 2007, šias pareigas užėmė dvi skirtingos „Hamas“ ministrės, tačiau abiem buvo sunku valdyti ministeriją, nes dauguma jos darbuotojų nebuvo Hamas nariai, bet priklausė kitoms politinėms partijoms, ir dauguma buvo Fatah nariai, dominuojantis judėjimas, kontroliuojantis daugumą Palestinos valdžios institucijų. Įtempta kova tarp Hamas moterų Moterų reikalų ministerijoje ir Fatah narių baigėsi po to, kai Hamas perėmė valdžią Gazos Ruože ir dėl to žlugo jos vyriausybė Vakarų Krante – kova. kuri kartais pasisukdavo žiauriai. Viena iš priežasčių, nurodyta vėliau paaiškinti šią kovą, buvo skirtumas tarp pasaulietinio feministinio diskurso ir islamistų diskurso moterų klausimais.. Palestinos kontekste šis nesutarimas įgavo pavojingą pobūdį, nes buvo panaudotas kruvinos politinės kovos įamžinimui., Hamas moterų pašalinimas iš jų pareigų ar postų, ir tuo metu Vakarų Krante ir okupuotame Gazos ruože vyravusių politinių ir geografinių skirtumų.
Ši kova kelia daug svarbių klausimų: ar turėtume nubausti į valdžią atėjusį islamistų judėjimą, ar turėtume apsvarstyti priežastis, lėmusias Fateh nesėkmę politinėje arenoje? Ar feminizmas gali pasiūlyti moterims visapusišką sistemą, neatsižvelgiant į jų socialinę ir ideologinę priklausomybę? Ar bendro bendro pagrindo diskursas moterims gali padėti joms suvokti ir susitarti dėl bendrų tikslų?? Ar paternalizmas yra tik islamistinėje ideologijoje?, o ne nacionalizme ir patriotizme? Ką turime omenyje sakydami feminizmą? Ar yra tik vienas feminizmas, ar keli feminizmai? Ką turime omenyje sakydami islamą – ar tai šiuo vardu žinomas judėjimas, ar religija, filosofija, arba teisinė sistema? Turime eiti į šių klausimų esmę ir atidžiai juos apsvarstyti, ir mes turime dėl jų susitarti, kad vėliau galėtume nuspręsti, kaip feministės, jei mūsų paternalizmo kritika turėtų būti nukreipta į religiją (tikėjimas), kuri turėtų apsiriboti tikinčiojo širdimi ir neleisti valdyti viso pasaulio, arba jurisprudencija, kuri yra susijusi su skirtingomis tikėjimo mokyklomis, kurios paaiškina Korane esančią teisinę sistemą ir pranašo posakius – Suna.
| Rugsėjo mėn 19, 2010 | Komentarai 0
ISLAMISTINIS MOTERŲ AKTYVIZMAS OKUPUOTOJE PALESTINOJE
Khaledo Amayreho interviu
Interviu su Sameera Al-Halayka
Sameera Al-Halayka yra išrinkta Palestinos įstatymų leidžiamosios tarybos narė. Ji buvo
gimė Shoyoukh kaime netoli Hebrono m 1964. Ji turi šariato bakalauro laipsnį (Islamo
Jurisprudencija) iš Hebrono universiteto. Ji dirbo žurnaliste nuo 1996 į 2006 kada
ji pateko į Palestinos įstatymų leidžiamąją tarybą kaip išrinkta narė 2006 rinkimai.
Ji ištekėjusi ir turi septynis vaikus.
K: Kai kuriose Vakarų šalyse susidaro bendras įspūdis, kad moterys gauna
islamo pasipriešinimo grupėse, tokių kaip Hamas. Ar tai tiesa?
Kaip „Hamas“ elgiamasi su moterimis aktyvistėmis?
Musulmonių moterų teisės ir pareigos pirmiausia kyla iš islamo šariato arba įstatymų.
Tai nėra savanoriški ar labdaringi veiksmai ar gestai, kuriuos gauname iš Hamas ar kieno nors kito
Kitas. Taigi, kiek tai susiję su politiniu įsitraukimu ir aktyvumu, moterys paprastai turi
tos pačios teisės ir pareigos kaip ir vyrų. Po visko, moterų sudaro bent 50 procentų
visuomenė. Tam tikra prasme, jie yra visa visuomenė, nes jie gimdo, ir pakelti,
naujoji karta.
Todėl, Galiu pasakyti, kad moterų statusas „Hamas“ ją visiškai atitinka
statusas pačiame islame. Tai reiškia, kad ji yra visavertė partnerė visais lygiais. Iš tikrųjų, tai būtų
nesąžininga ir neteisinga islamo atžvilgiu (arba islamistas, jei norite) moteris turi būti partnerė kančiose
while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in
Hamas has always been pioneering.
K: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is
a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts
regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to
pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued
Israeli occupation?
There is no text in Islamic jurisprudence nor in Hamas’ charter which impedes women from
political participation. I believe the opposite is true — there are numerous Quranic verses
and sayings of the Prophet Muhammed urging women to be active in politics and public
issues affecting Muslims. But it is also true that for women, as it is for men, political activism
is not compulsory but voluntary, and is largely decided in light of each woman’s abilities,
qualifications and individual circumstances. None the less, showing concern for public
matters is mandatory upon each and every Muslim man and woman. The Prophet
Muhammed said: “He who doesn’t show concern for the affairs of Muslims is not a Muslim.”
Moreover, Palestinian Islamist women have to take all objective factors on the ground into
account when deciding whether to join politics or get involved in political activism.
| Rugsėjo mėn 19, 2010 | Komentarai 0
tepimasis: How Islamophobes spread fear, bigotry and misinformation
FAIR
Julie Hollar
Jimas Naureckas
Making Islamophobia Mainstream:
How Muslim-bashers broadcast their bigotry
A remarkable thing happened at the National Book Critics Circle (NBCC) nominations in February 2007: The normally highbrow and tolerant group nominated for best book in the field of criticism a book widely viewed as denigrating an entire religious group.
The nomination of Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (Niujorko laikas, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, bigotry and misinformation. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. Ir ne kitaip, kaip klasikiniame antisemitizmo dokumente pateikti kaltinimai, Siono vyresniųjų protokolai, kai kurios žiauresnės islamofobijos išraiškos–kaip Kol Europa miegojo–apima islamo dizaino, dominuojančio Vakaruose, prisiminimus.
Islamo institucijos ir musulmonai, žinoma, turėtų būti vertinamas ir kritikuojamas taip pat, kaip ir bet kas kitas. Pavyzdžiui, kai Norvegijos islamo taryba diskutuoja, ar gėjams ir lesbietėms turi būti įvykdyta mirties bausmė, galima griežtai pasmerkti asmenis ar grupes, kurios laikosi tokios nuomonės, neįtraukiant visų Europos musulmonų, kaip ir Bawer's Pajamas Media įrašas (8/7/08),
„Europos musulmonų debatai: Ar gėjai turėtų būti įvykdyti mirties bausme?“
Panašiai, ekstremistai, kurie pateisina savo smurtinius veiksmus remdamiesi tam tikra islamo interpretacija, gali būti kritikuojami, neįtraukiant į labai skirtingą musulmonų populiaciją visame pasaulyje.. Po visko, žurnalistams pavyko nušviesti Oklahomos miesto sprogdinimą, kurį surengė Timothy McVeigh–rasistinės krikščioniškos tapatybės sektos šalininkas–nesiimant apibendrintų teiginių apie „krikščionišką terorizmą“. taip pat, žiniasklaida nušvietė žydų fanatikų teroro aktus–pavyzdžiui, Hebrono žudynės, kurias įvykdė Baruchas Goldsteinas (Papildomai!, 5/6/94)–neįtraukiant judaizmo visumos.
| Rugsėjo mėn 16, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Džihadistinio islamizmo totalitarizmas ir jo iššūkis Europai ir islamui
Basso blauzdikaulis
When reading the majority of texts that comprise the vast literature that has been published by self-proclaimed pundits on political Islam, it is easy to miss the fact that a new movement has arisen. Toliau, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, tačiau, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty
in the history of politics since it has its roots in two parallel and related phenomena: first, the culturalisation of politics which leads to politics being conceptualised as a cultural system (a view pioneered by Clifford Geertz); and second the return of the sacred, or ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, kaip reakcija į jos intensyvią sekuliarizaciją, atsirandančią dėl globalizacijos.
Religijomis pagrįstų politinių ideologijų analizė, ir tai gali būti patraukli kaip politinė religija dėl to, apima socialinių mokslų supratimą apie religijos vaidmenį pasaulio politikoje, ypač po to, kai Šaltojo karo dvipolė sistema užleido vietą daugiapoliam pasauliui. Hannos Arendt instituto projekte, skirtame totalitarizmo taikymui tiriant politines religijas, Aš pasiūliau skirtumą tarp pasaulietinių ideologijų, kurios veikia kaip religijos pakaitalas, ir religinės ideologijos, pagrįstos tikru religiniu tikėjimu, kas yra religinio fundamentalizmo atveju (žr. pastabą
24). Kitas projektas „Politinė religija“, carried out at the University of Basel, has made clearer the point that new approaches to politics become necessary once a religious faith becomes clothed in a political garb.Drawing on the authoritative sources of political Islam, this article suggests that the great variety of organisations inspired by Islamist ideology are to be conceptualised both as political religions and as political movements. The unique quality of political Islam lies is the fact that it is based on a transnational religion (žr. pastabą 26).
| Rugsėjo mėn 15, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Islamas, Politinis islamas ir Amerika
Arabų įžvalga
Ar įmanoma „brolystė“ su Amerika?
chalilas al-anani
„nėra jokios galimybės bendrauti su jokiu JAV. administracija tol, kol Jungtinės Valstijos išlaikys savo ilgalaikį požiūrį į islamą kaip į realų pavojų, požiūrio, pagal kurį JAV atsiduria vienoje valtyje su sionistų priešu. Mes neturime jokių išankstinių nuomonių apie Amerikos žmones ar JAV. visuomenė ir jos pilietinės organizacijos bei ekspertų grupės. Mums nėra problemų bendrauti su Amerikos žmonėmis, tačiau nėra dedamos tinkamos pastangos mus suartinti,“, – sakė dr. Issamas al-Iryanas, Musulmonų brolijos politinio skyriaus vadovas interviu telefonu.
Al-Iryano žodžiai apibendrina Musulmonų brolijos požiūrį į Amerikos žmones ir JAV. vyriausybė. Kiti Musulmonų brolijos nariai sutiktų, kaip ir velionis Hassanas al-Banna, kas įkūrė grupę 1928. Al- Banna į Vakarus žiūrėjo kaip į moralinio nuosmukio simbolį. Kiti salafiai – islamo mąstymo mokykla, kuri remiasi protėviais kaip pavyzdiniais modeliais – laikosi to paties požiūrio į JAV., tačiau trūksta ideologinio lankstumo, kurio palaiko Musulmonų brolija. Nors Musulmonų brolija tiki įtraukti amerikiečius į pilietinį dialogą, kitos ekstremistų grupės nemato prasmės dialogui ir teigia, kad jėga yra vienintelis būdas susidoroti su Jungtinėmis Valstijomis.
| Rugsėjo mėn 15, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Islam and the New Political Landscape
„Les Back“, Michaelas Keithas, Azra Khanas,
Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos
IN THE wake of the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 Rugsėjo mėn 2001, and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 ir 2005, a literature that addresses the forms and modalities of religious expression – particularly Islamic religious expression – has flourished in the penumbral regions that link mainstream social science to social policy design, think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Consultancy, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (Bright, 2006a; Mirza et al., 2007). Studies of Islamism and Jihadism have created a particular focus on the syncretic and complex links between Islamic religious faith and forms of social movement and political mobilization (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Conventionally, the analytical focus has spotlighted the culture of Islam, the belief systems of the faithful, and the historical and geographical trajectories of Muslim populations across the world in general and in ‘the West’ in particular (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade and Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). In this article the emphasis is different. We argue that studies of Islamic political participation need to be contextualized carefully without recourse to grand generalities about culture and faith. This is because both culture and faith are structured by and in turn structure the cultural, institutional and deliberative landscapes through which they are articulated. In the case of the British experience, the hidden traces of Christianity in the formation of the welfare state in the last century, sparčiai besikeičianti politinių erdvių kartografija ir „tikėjimo organizacijų“ vaidmuo pertvarkant gerovės teikimą sukuria materialų socialinį kontekstą, nulemiantį naujų politinio dalyvavimo formų galimybes ir kontūrus..
| Rugsėjo mėn 08, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Islamo reformacija
Adnan Chanas
Italijos ministras pirmininkas, Silvio Berlusconi gyrėsi po įvykių 9/11:
„...turime suvokti savo civilizacijos pranašumą, sistema, kuri garantavo
gerovę, pagarba žmogaus teisėms ir – priešingai nei islamo šalyse – pagarba
už religines ir politines teises, sistema, kurios vertybės supranta įvairovę
ir tolerancija... Vakarai užkariaus tautas, like it conquered communism, even if it
means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was
1,400 years ago…”1
And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of
ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”
Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute
The concept of ‘islah’ (reform) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the
history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical
Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified
their Islamic rulings (fiqh) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to
apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the
Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time
understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined
principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of
study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Those who became
smitten by Greek philosophy such as the Muslim philosophers and some from amongst the Mut’azilah
were considered to have left the fold of Islam as the Qur’an ceased to be their basis of study. Taigi už
bet kuris musulmonas, bandantis išvesti taisykles arba suprasti, kokios pozicijos turėtų būti laikomasi konkrečiu atveju
Koranas yra šio tyrimo pagrindas.
Pirmasis bandymas reformuoti islamą įvyko XIX amžiaus sandūroje. Savo ruožtu
amžiuje Uma išgyveno ilgą nuosmukio laikotarpį, kai pasikeitė pasaulinė jėgų pusiausvyra
nuo Khilafah iki Didžiosios Britanijos. Montavimo problemos apėmė Khilafah, kol Vakarų Europa buvo viduje
pramonės revoliucijos viduryje. Uma prarado savo nesugadintą islamo supratimą, ir
bandant pakeisti Uthmani's apėmusį nuosmukį (Osmanai) kai kurie musulmonai buvo išsiųsti į
Vakarai, ir dėl to sužavėjo tai, ką jie pamatė. Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi iš Egipto (1801-1873),
grįžęs iš Paryžiaus, wrote a biographical book called Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The
Extraction of Gold, or an Overview of Paris, 1834), praising their cleanliness, love of work, and above
all social morality. He declared that we must mimic what is being done in Paris, advocating changes to
the Islamic society from liberalising women to the systems of ruling. This thought, and others like it,
marked the beginning of the reinventing trend in Islam.
| Rugsėjo mėn 07, 2010 | Komentarai 0
ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION
IBRAHIM KALIN
In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, akademikai, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.
| Rugsėjo mėn 07, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Islam in the West
Jocelyne Cesari
The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.
| Rugsėjo mėn 07, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Okupacija, Kolonializmas, Apartheidas?
The Human Sciences Research Council
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (būtent, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, ir
Gazoje, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. Tuo pačiu metu, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, ir, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. Tuo pačiu metu, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.
| Rugsėjo mėn 07, 2010 | Komentarai 0
ISLAMAS, DEMOCRACY & THE USA:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq |
Intro ,
In spite of it being both a perennial and a complex debate, Arches Quarterly reexamines from theological and practical grounds, the important debate about the relationship and compatibility between Islam and Democracy, as echoed in Barack Obama’s agenda of hope and change. Whilst many celebrate Obama’s ascendancy to the Oval Office as a national catharsis for the US, others remain less optimistic of a shift in ideology and approach in the international arena. While much of the tension and distrust between the Muslim world and the USA can be attributed to the approach of promoting democracy, typically favoring dictatorships and puppet regimes that pay lip-service to democratic values and human rights, the aftershock of 9/11 has truly cemented the misgivings further through America’s position on political Islam. It has created a wall of negativity as found by worldpublicopinion.org, according to which 67% of Egyptians believe that globally America is playing a “mainly negative” role.
America’s response has thus been apt. By electing Obama, many around the world are pinning their hopes for developing a less belligerent, but fairer foreign policy towards the Muslim world. Th e test for Obama, as we discuss, is how America and her allies promote democracy. Will it be facilitating or imposing?
Moreover, can it importantly be an honest broker in prolonged zones of confl icts? Prolifi patirties ir įžvalgos panaudojimas
c mokslininkai, akademikai, patyrę žurnalistai ir politikai, Arches Quarterly atskleidžia islamo ir demokratijos santykius bei Amerikos vaidmenį, taip pat Obamos sukeltus pokyčius., ieškant bendros kalbos. Anas Altikriti, Th e Cordoba Foundation generalinis direktorius pateikia šios diskusijos pradžią, kur jis apmąsto Obamos kelyje esančias viltis ir iššūkius. Sekant Altikriti, buvęs prezidento Niksono patarėjas, Daktaras Robertas Crane'as siūlo išsamią islamo teisės į laisvę principo analizę. Anvaras Ibrahimas, buvęs Malaizijos ministro pirmininko pavaduotojas, praturtina diskusiją praktine demokratijos įgyvendinimo musulmonų dominuojančiose visuomenėse realijomis, būtent, Indonezijoje ir Malaizijoje.
Taip pat turime daktarę Shireen Hunter, Džordžtauno universitete, JAV, kuris tyrinėja musulmoniškas šalis, atsilikusias demokratizacijos ir modernizavimo srityje. Ją papildo terorizmo rašytojas, Dr Nafeez Ahmed paaiškino postmodernybės krizę ir
demokratijos žlugimas. Daktaras Daudas Abdullah (Vidurio Rytų žiniasklaidos monitoriaus direktorius), Alanas Hartas (buvęs ITN ir BBC Panoramos korespondentas; sionizmo autorius: Tikrasis žydų priešas) ir Asemas Sondosas (Egipto savaitraščio Sawt Al Omma redaktorius) sutelkti dėmesį į Obamą ir jo vaidmenį skatinant demokratiją musulmonų pasaulyje, taip pat JAV santykius su Izraeliu ir Musulmonų brolija.
Užsienio reikalų ministras, Maldyvai, Ahmedas Shaheedas spėlioja apie islamo ir demokratijos ateitį; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
Tikimės, kad visa tai suteiks išsamų skaitymą ir šaltinį apmąstymams apie problemas, kurios liečia mus visus naujoje vilties aušroje.
Ačiū
| Rugsėjo mėn 07, 2010 | Komentarai 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Henris Siegmanas
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. Unfortunately, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| Rugsėjo mėn 07, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Islamism revisited
MAHA AZZAMAS
There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 years, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Liepos mėn 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.
| Rugsėjo mėn 06, 2010 | Komentarai 0
ISLAMAS IR TEISĖS TAISYKLĖ
Birgit Krawietz
Helmutas Reifeldas
Mūsų šiuolaikinėje Vakarų visuomenėje, valstybės organizuotos teisinės sistemos paprastai nubrėžia skiriamąją liniją, atskiriančią religiją ir teisę. Ir atvirkščiai, yra nemažai islamo regioninių visuomenių, kuriose religija ir įstatymai šiandien yra taip glaudžiai susiję ir susipynę, kaip buvo iki šių laikų pradžios. Tuo pačiu metu, religinės teisės proporcija (šariato arabų kalba) ir viešoji teisė (įstatymas) įvairiose šalyse skiriasi. Kas daugiau, skiriasi ir islamo, taigi ir islamo teisės, statusas. Remiantis Islamo konferencijos organizacijos pateikta informacija (OIC), šiuo metu yra 57 Islamo valstybės visame pasaulyje, apibrėžta kaip šalys, kuriose religija yra islamas (1) valstija, (2) gyventojų dauguma, arba (3) didelė mažuma. Visa tai turi įtakos islamo teisės raidai ir formai.
| Rugsėjo mėn 06, 2010 | Komentarai 0
Islamic Political Culture, Demokratija, and Human Rights
Daniele. Kaina
It has been argued that Islam facilitates authoritarianism, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. Consequently, scholars, commentators, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. This view, tačiau, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islamic political theory, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, which do not consider other factors. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, like those of other religions, can be used to support a variety of political systems and policies. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Hence, a new approach to the study of the
connection between Islam and politics is called for.
I suggest, through rigorous evaluation of the relationship between Islam, democracy, and human rights at the cross-national level, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, economic influences, ethnic cleavages, and societal development, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| Rugsėjo mėn 06, 2010 | Komentarai 0
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