RSS中的所有條目 "Ikhwanophobia" 類別



One of the components of this study is relevant to a question that I was asked to address,which is how radical Islam differs from moderate or mainstream Islam. Frankly, one ofthe problems that we have found in the discourse about Islam is that the terms “radical”or “moderate” are often used in a subjective and imprecise way, without going through aprocess of critically examining what these terms mean. In some cases, the term radical ormilitant is defined in terms of support for terrorism or other forms of violence. Webelieve that this is too narrow a focus, that there is, in fact, a much larger universe offundamentalist or Salafi groups who may not themselves practice violence, but thatpropagate an ideology that creates the conditions for violence and that is subversive ofthe values of democratic societies.



President Bush’s notions that democratizing Iraq will have a ripple effect on the rest ofthe Arab world, bringing prosperity and peace to the region, and that democracy is the panaceafor Islamic terrorism are unsubstantiated as well as grossly misleading. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. 事實上, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. 此外, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.

該伊赫瓦尼北美: 簡史



The current federal court case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) in Dallas, Texas,1 offers an unprecedented inside look into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, as well as its goals and structure. The documents discuss recruitment, organization, ideology and the development of the organization in different phases in the United States. The prosecution in the case has presented many internal Muslim Brotherhood documents from the 1980’s and early 1990’s that give a first-ever, public view of the history and ideology behind the operations of the Muslim Brothers (known as the Ikhwan or The Group) in the U.S. over the past four decades. For researchers, the documents have the added weight of being written by the Ikhwan leaders themselves, rather than interpretations of secondary sources.



The Global Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Europe since 1960 when SaidRamadan, the grandson of Hassan Al-Banna, founded a mosque in Munich.1 Since that time,Brotherhood organizations have been established in almost all of the EU countries, as well asnon-EU countries such as Russia and Turkey. Despite operating under other names, some ofthe organizations in the larger countries are recognized as part of the global MuslimBrotherhood. 例如, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) isgenerally regarded as part of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. The network is alsobecoming known in some of the smaller countries such as the Netherlands, where a recentNEFA Foundation report detailed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in that country.2Neighboring Belgium has also become an important center for the Muslim Brotherhood inEurope. A 2002 report by the Intelligence Committee of the Belgian Parliament explainedhow the Brotherhood operates in Belgium:“The State Security Service has been following the activities of the InternationalMuslim Brotherhood in Belgium since 1982. The International MuslimBrotherhood has had a clandestine structure for nearly 20 年份. The identityof the members is secret; they operate in the greatest discretion. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,在這種情況下, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.


Shumuliyyat al-islam (Islam as encompassing every aspect of life) is the first of twenty principles laid out by the
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, 哈桑·班納, to teach his followers the proper understanding
of Islam. Even though this principle, usually translated as the “comprehensive way of life,” still remains integral
to the teachings of the members of the Brotherhood, both in Egypt and in Europe, it is strangely enough
neither commented upon in scholarly references nor by the wider public. When the Federation of Islamic
Organizations in Europe (FIOE, representing the Muslim Brotherhood movement at the European level) presented the European Muslim Charter to the international press in January 2008, none pinpointed this “universal dimension” of their understanding of Islam despite the potential tensions or even incompatibilities, both political and
legal, that this concept might have on a discourse on integration and citizenship. What do the Muslim Brothers traditionally say about this concept and how do they justify their call for it? What are its constituents
and the scope of its application? Are there any significant modifications to the concept in attempting to contextualize it within a pluralist Europe?

穆斯林兄弟會的美國. 網絡


Washington D.C. has suddenly become very interested in the Muslim Brotherhood. American policymakers are debating whether to engage non-violent elements of the Muslim Brotherhood network, both inside and outside the United States, in the hope that such engagement will empower these “moderates” against violent Wahhabi and Salafi groups such as al-Qaeda. 很遺憾, this strategy is based on a false assumption: that “moderate” Islamist groups will confront and weaken their violent co-religionists, robbing them of their support base.
This lesser-of-two-evils strategy is reminiscent of the rationale behind the Cold War-era decision to support the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet army. In the short term, 美國. alliance with the mujahideen did indeed aid America in its struggle against the Soviet Union. In the long term, 然而, 我們. support led to the empowerment of a dangerous and potent adversary. In choosing its allies, 美國. cannot afford to elevate short-term tactical considerations above longer-term strategic ones. Most importantly, 美國. must consider the ideology of any potential partners.
Although various Islamist groups do quarrel over tactics and often bear considerable animosity towards one another, they all agree on the endgame: a world dictated by political Islam. A “divide and conquer” strategy by the United States will only push them closer together.



Since its founding in 1928, 穆斯林兄弟會 (Hizb al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) has profoundly influenced the political life of the Middle East. Its motto is telling: “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.

While the Brotherhood’s radical ideas have shaped the beliefs of generations of Islamists, over the past two decades, it has lost some of its power and appeal in the Middle East, crushed by harsh repression from local regimes and snubbed by the younger generations of Islamists who often prefer more radical organizations.

But the Middle East is only one part of the Muslim world. Europe has become an incubator for Islamist thought and political development. 自1960年代初期, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and slowly but steadily established a wide and well-organized network of mosques, charities, and Islamic organizations. Unlike the larger Islamic community, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ultimate goal may not be simplyto help Muslims be the best citizens they can be,” but rather to extend Islamic law throughout Europe and the United States.[2]

Four decades of teaching and cultivation have paid off. The student refugees who migrated from the Middle East forty years ago and their descendants now lead organizations that represent the local Muslim communities in their engagement with Europe’s political elite. Funded by generous contributors from the Persian Gulf, they preside over a centralized network that spans nearly every European country.

These organizations represent themselves as mainstream, even as they continue to embrace the Brotherhood’s radical views and maintain links to terrorists. With moderate rhetoric and well-spoken German, 荷蘭人, and French, they have gained acceptance among European governments and media alike. Politicians across the political spectrum rush to engage them whenever an issue involving Muslims arises or, more parochially, when they seek the vote of the burgeoning Muslim community.

But, speaking Arabic or Turkish before their fellows Muslims, they drop their facade and embrace radicalism. While their representatives speak about interfaith dialogue and integration on television, their mosques preach hate and warn worshippers about the evils of Western society. While they publicly condemn the murder of commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, they continue to raise money for Hamas and other terrorist organizations. Europeans, eager to create a dialogue with their increasingly disaffected Muslim minority, overlook this duplicity. The case is particularly visible in Germany, which retains a place of key importance in Europe, not only because of its location at the heart of Europe, but also because it played host to the first major wave of Muslim Brotherhood immigrants and is host to the best-organized Brotherhood presence. The German government’s reaction is also instructive if only to show the dangers of accepting Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric at face value, without looking at the broader scope of its activities.

庫特布主義: 伊斯蘭法西斯主義的意識形態

DALEç. Eikmeier

The recently published National Military Strategic Plan for the War onTerrorism (NMSP-WOT) is to be commended for identifying “ideology”as al Qaeda’s center of gravity.1 The identification of an ideology as thecenter of gravity rather than an individual or group is a significant shift froma“capture and kill” philosophy to a strategy focused on defeating the rootcause of Islamic terrorism. 因此, the plan’s principal focus is on attackingand countering an ideology that fuels Islamic terrorism. 很遺憾,the NMSP-WOT fails to identify the ideology or suggest ways tocounter it. The plan merely describes the ideology as “extremist.” This descriptioncontributes little to the public’s understanding of the threat or to thecapabilities of the strategist who ultimately must attack and defeat it. The intentof this article is to identify the ideology of the Islamic terrorists and recommendhow to successfully counter it.Sun Tzuwisely said, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundredbattles you will never be in peril.”2 Our success in theWar on Terrorismdepends on knowingwho the enemy is and understanding his ideology.While characterizing and labeling an enemymay serve such a purpose, it is only usefulif the labels are clearly defined and understood. Otherwise, overly broadcharacterizations obscure our ability to truly “know the enemy,” they diffuseefforts, and place potential allies and neutrals in the enemy’s camp. 很遺憾,theWar on Terrorism’s use of labels contributes a great deal to themisunderstandingsassociated with the latter. The fact is, five years after 9/11 theNMSP-WOT provides little specific guidance, other than labeling the enemyas extremist.3 This inability to focus on the specific threat and its supportingphilosophy reflects our own rigid adherence to political correctness and is beingexploited bymilitant Islamists portraying these overly broad descriptionsas a war against Islam.As David F. Forte states “Wemust not fail . . . to distinguishbetween the homicidal revolutionaries like bin Laden and mainstreamMuslim believers.


安東尼H. 科德斯曼

恐怖主義和不對稱戰爭並不是中東軍事平衡的新特徵, 和伊斯蘭教
極端主義並非極端主義暴力的唯一根源. 存在許多嚴重的種族和宗派差異
在中東, 這些長期以來導致了特定國家內的零星暴力, 有時也會向主要民事部門
衝突. 也門內戰和阿曼佐法爾叛亂就是例子, 正如悠久的民事歷史一樣
阿薩德. 巴勒斯坦解放組織的崛起 (巴解組織) 9月導致約旦內戰
1970. 伊朗革命於 1979 隨後發生了嚴重的政治鬥爭, 並努力輸出神權政治
引發兩伊戰爭的革命. 巴林和沙烏地阿拉伯之間都曾發生內戰
還有, 然而, 該地區伊斯蘭極端主義暴力活動由來已久, 有時受到鼓勵
這些政權後來成為他們最初支持的伊斯蘭主義者的目標. 薩達特試圖利用伊斯蘭教
與以色列的和平協議. 以色列認為贊助伊斯蘭運動是安全的 1967 作為對
巴解組織, 卻看到暴力反以色列團體迅速崛起. 北也門和南葉門是
1960年代初以來的政變與內戰, 最終導致也門崩潰的是南也門的內戰
其政權的推翻及其與北葉門的合併 1990.
國王的倒台導致伊斯蘭主義者在伊朗掌權, 並引發了對蘇聯入侵阿富汗的抵抗
伊斯蘭主義的反應仍然影響著中東和整個伊斯蘭世界. 沙烏地阿拉伯必須應對
麥加大清真寺發生起義 1979. 這次起義的宗教特徵有許多共同點
蘇聯從阿富汗撤軍和海灣戰爭後發生的運動 1991.
阿爾及利亞努力鎮壓伊斯蘭政黨在民主選舉中的勝利 1992 隨後是
一場從那時起就一直持續的內戰. 埃及與自己的伊斯蘭教進行了一場長期且基本上成功的戰鬥
1990年代的極端分子, 但埃及只是鎮壓了這類運動,而不是根除
他們. 在阿拉伯世界的其他地區, 科索沃和波士尼亞的內戰造就了新的伊斯蘭極端主義幹部.
沙烏地阿拉伯此前曾遭受兩次重大恐怖攻擊 2001. 這些攻擊針對國民警衛隊
胡拜爾的訓練中心和美國空軍軍營, 至少有一個似乎是伊斯蘭教的結果
極端分子. 摩洛哥, 利比亞, 突尼斯, 約旦, 巴林, 卡塔爾, 阿曼, 和葉門都看到了強硬的伊斯蘭主義者
雖然不直接屬於該地區, 蘇丹已經打了一場長達 15 年的內戰,造成的損失可能超過兩年
百萬生命, 這場戰爭得到了阿拉伯北部強硬伊斯蘭分子的支持. 索馬利亞也有
自那時以來一直是內戰現場 1991 這使得伊斯蘭組織得以在該國活動。a

恐怖主義和不對稱戰爭並不是中東軍事平衡的新特徵, 伊斯蘭極端主義並不是極端主義暴力的唯一根源. 中東地區存在著許多嚴重的民族和宗派差異, 這些長期以來導致了特定國家內的零星暴力, 有時會導致重大國內衝突. 也門內戰和阿曼佐法爾叛亂就是例子, 黎巴嫩內戰的悠久歷史以及敘利亞對反對哈菲茲·阿薩德政權的伊斯蘭政治團體的暴力鎮壓也是如此. 巴勒斯坦解放組織的崛起 (巴解組織) 1970年9月導致約旦內戰. 伊朗革命於 1979 隨後發生了嚴重的政治鬥爭, 並努力輸出導致兩伊戰爭的神權革命. 巴林和沙烏地阿拉伯的遜尼派統治菁英和敵對的什葉派之間都曾發生內戰,這些衝突導致了沙烏地阿拉伯的嚴重暴力事件。, 然而, 該地區伊斯蘭極端主義暴力活動由來已久, 有時會受到政權的鼓勵,這些政權後來成為他們最初支持的伊斯蘭主義者的目標. 薩達特試圖利用伊斯蘭運動來對抗他在埃及的世俗反對派,結果在他與以色列達成和平協議後被一場這樣的運動暗殺. 以色列認為贊助伊斯蘭運動是安全的 1967 作為巴解組織的反制, 卻看到暴力反以色列團體迅速崛起. 自 1960 年代初以來,北也門和南葉門一直是政變和內戰的發生地, 南也門的內戰最終導致其政權垮台,並於 1990 年與北也門合併。國王的倒台導致伊斯蘭主義者在伊朗掌權, 對蘇聯入侵阿富汗的抵抗引發了伊斯蘭主義的反應,至今仍影響著中東和整個伊斯蘭世界. 沙烏地阿拉伯不得不應對麥加大清真寺的起義 1979. 這次起義的宗教性質與 1991 年蘇聯從阿富汗撤軍和海灣戰爭後發生的運動有許多共同點。阿爾及利亞努力鎮壓伊斯蘭政黨在民主選舉中的勝利 1992 隨後發生了一場持續至今的內戰. 1990 年代,埃及與其本國的伊斯蘭極端分子進行了一場長期且基本成功的戰鬥, 但埃及只是壓制了這類運動,而不是根除它們. 在阿拉伯世界的其他地區, 科索沃和波斯尼亞內戰造就了新的伊斯蘭極端主義幹部。沙烏地阿拉伯此前曾遭受兩次重大恐怖攻擊 2001. 這些攻擊襲擊了胡拜爾的國民警衛隊訓練中心和美國空軍軍營, 至少其中一個似乎是伊斯蘭極端分子造成的. 摩洛哥, 利比亞, 突尼斯, 約旦, 巴林, 卡塔爾, 阿曼, 和也門都看到強硬的伊斯蘭運動成為嚴重的國家威脅。雖然不直接屬於該地區, 蘇丹經歷了長達 15 年的內戰,可能造成超過 200 萬人喪生, 這場戰爭得到了阿拉伯北部強硬伊斯蘭分子的支持. 自建國以來索馬利亞也一直處於內戰現場 1991 這使得伊斯蘭組織能夠在該國活動.


喬恩乙. 奧特曼

The obituaries for political Islam have begun to be written. After years of seemingly unstoppablegrowth, Islamic parties have begun to stumble. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. 反而, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, 然而, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, 沙特阿拉伯, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. In the Middle East, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. 伊斯蘭教, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.




Ever since the Bush administration’s declaration of a global war on terror after 9/11,academics and policymakers have sought ways to counter the global terrorist threat. However asJeffrey Record (2003) has noted, treating terrorism monolithically and failing to discriminatebetween terrorist groups and other actors reduces the ability to produce effectivecounterterrorism strategies. 而且, it can set actors “on a course of open-ended andgratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat.” If terrorism andterrorist groups are not homogenous entities, then understanding the differences and similaritiesbetween groups is a crucial first step in constructing an effective counterterrorist response.This research seeks to better discriminate between terrorist groups by examining thegoals, tactics and images embedded in the narratives of terrorist or terrorist spawningorganizations. We define narratives as shared understandings of historical events and relevantactors that are used to justify past political actions or mobilize people for contemporary politicalactions as generally expressed through descriptions or charters issued by organizations orthrough statements of organizational leaders.2 Narrative, as noted by Benedict Anderson, formsthe underbelly of an “imagined community:” the glue binding a group of like-minded individualswho, “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet inthe minds of each lives the image of their communion” (安德森 6). 所以, we believethat narratives are excellent sources for uncovering group conceptions of “self” and “others” thatare key in attracting and maintaining ties to diaspora communities, as well as related group goals,strategies and tactics. We argue that by comparing the goals, images and tactics embedded in thenarratives of these different organizations, we can shed insight on crucial differences andsimilarities between these terrorist groups. These insights not only help discriminate betweenterrorist groups and other organizations, but also shed insight on the evolution of suchorganizations themselves.Specifically, this research examines the narratives of four groups: the MuslimBrotherhood, 哈馬斯, Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers. Two of these groups, Hamas and AlQaeda, have roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore can be viewed as diasporas of thelatter. 然而, while the Muslim Brotherhood takes an evolutionary and nonviolent approachto goal attainment, Hamas and Al Qaeda advocate violence and terrorism to advance their cause,tactics that are also promoted by the fourth group in the analysis, the Tamil Tigers. Since theTamil Tigers have no connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, their inclusion in ourcomparative analysis allows us to determine how much of the commonality of goals acrossterrorist organizations pertains to common roots and how much pertains to commonality oforganizational type, function or tactics.




儘管最近學術界和民眾都將注意力集中在暴力跨國伊斯蘭恐怖網絡上,伊斯蘭運動眾多. 這種多樣性給學者帶來了兩個難題. 第一個難題是要理解為什麼作為對世俗民族國家建立的反應而形成的面向家庭的伊斯蘭運動將其活動和目標轉移到多層跨國空間上. 第二個難題是要理解為什麼目標和目標相似的群體在“跨國”時採用不同的使用暴力或非暴力的策略。本文將要解決的兩個主要問題是: 為什麼伊斯蘭運動走向跨國? 和, 他們為何在跨國化時採取不同的形式? 第一, 我認為,跨國層面為伊斯蘭運動提供了新的政治場所,伊斯蘭運動在國內的主張受到限制. 第二, 我認為跨國化在跨國層面上為群體帶來了關於身份和主張的不確定性. 所採用的媒介, 即. 使用暴力與非暴力, 取決於跨國化的類型, 演員在跨國層面遇到, 和領導對運動下一步走向的解釋. 回答我的問題, 我來看四種情況: (1) 土耳其伊斯蘭教, (2) 穆斯林兄弟會, (3) 伊斯蘭祈禱團, 和 (4) 塔比吉·賈瑪(Tablighi Jamaat)


MBus美國的領導. 穆斯林兄弟會 (MB, 或伊坤) 已經說過它的目標
過去和現在都是旨在摧毀美國的聖戰. 從內部. 兄弟會的領導有
我們. 在穆斯林兄弟會的控制下. 自1960年代初期, 兄弟會
“前”組織. 當前的美國. 兄弟會領導人試圖否認這一歷史,
兄弟會內部的思想形式. 檢查公共和私人兄弟會文件,
然而, 表示這段歷史既準確又代表兄弟會


美國的領導. 穆斯林兄弟會 (MB, 或伊坤) 曾經說過,它的目標過去是,現在已經是旨在摧毀美國的聖戰. 從內部.

兄弟會領導人還表示,實現這一目標的方法是在美國建立伊斯蘭組織. 在穆斯林兄弟會的控制下.

自1960年代初期, 兄弟會建立了精心設計的秘密組織基礎架構,並在該基礎架構上構建了一組公共或“前”組織.

當前的美國. 兄弟會領導人試圖否認這一歷史, 都聲稱這是不正確的,同時又說它代表了兄弟會內部較舊的思想形式.

檢查公共和私人兄弟會文件, 然而, 表示這段歷史既準確又表明兄弟會未採取任何行動來證明其思想和/或活動方式的變化.