Semua Entries dalam "Ikhwanophobia" Kategori

Moderat dan Islam Radikal

Angel Rabasa

Salah satu komponen dari penelitian ini adalah relevan dengan pertanyaan yang saya diminta untuk alamat,yang bagaimana Islam radikal berbeda dari Islam moderat atau mainstream. Sebetulnya, satu masalah tersebut yang bahwa kita telah ditemukan dalam wacana Islam adalah bahwa istilah "radikal" atau "moderat" sering digunakan dengan cara subjektif dan tidak tepat, tanpa melalui aprocess kritis memeriksa istilah tersebut,. Dalam beberapa kasus, istilah radikal yang ormilitant didefinisikan dalam hal dukungan untuk terorisme atau bentuk-bentuk lain kekerasan. Webelieve bahwa ini terlalu sempit fokus, bahwa ada, sebenarnya, sebuah offundamentalist alam semesta jauh lebih besar atau kelompok-kelompok Salafi yang mungkin kekerasan tidak sendiri praktek, tapi thatpropagate ideologi yang menciptakan kondisi untuk kekerasan dan yang nilai tersebut yang subversif dari masyarakat demokratis.

Tantangan untuk Demokrasi di Dunia Arab dan Muslim

Alon Ben-Meir

Presiden Bush pengertian bahwa demokratisasi Irak akan memiliki efek riak di dunia Arab ofthe sisanya, membawa kemakmuran dan perdamaian ke wilayah, dan demokrasi itu adalah terorisme panaceafor Islam beralasan serta terlalu menyesatkan. Bahkan review sepintas dari lanskap politik Arab menunjukkan bahwa munculnya demokrasi tidak akan secara otomatis translateinto pembentukan demokrasi liberal abadi atau melemahkan terorisme di wilayah tersebut. Thesame mungkin kesimpulan umumnya dibuat untuk lanskap politik Muslim. Sebenarnya, theopportunity diberikan untuk bersaing secara bebas dan adil dalam pemilu, organisasi-organisasi ekstremis Islam mostlikely akan muncul kemenangan. Dalam pemilu baru-baru ini di Libanon dan Mesir, Hizbullah dan Ikhwanul Muslimin masing-masing, menang besar keuntungan, dan di Palestina Hamas memenangkan pemilihan parlemen thenational sendirian. Bahwa mereka melakukannya adalah baik contoh jelas tentang realitas today'spolitical dan indikator tren masa depan. Dan jika saat ini sentimen di Arab statesoffer panduan, setiap pemerintah dibentuk oleh partai politik Islam yang terpilih akan lebih antagonis ke Barat dari rezim otoriter masih berkuasa. Selain, ada noindications bahwa demokrasi merupakan prasyarat untuk mengalahkan terorisme atau data empiris tosupport klaim hubungan antara rezim otoriter yang ada dan terorisme.

Ikhwan di Amerika Utara: Sejarah Singkat

Douglas Farah

Ron Sandee

Pengadilan federal terhadap kasus saat ini Kudus Yayasan Tanah Relief dan Pengembangan (HLF) di Dallas, Texas,1 menawarkan melihat ke dalam belum pernah terjadi sebelumnya ke sejarah Ikhwanul Muslim di Amerika Serikat, serta tujuannya dan struktur. Dokumen mendiskusikan perekrutan, organisasi, ideologi dan pengembangan organisasi dalam fase berbeda di Amerika Serikat. Penuntutan dalam kasus ini telah banyak disajikan dokumen internal Muslim Brotherhood dari tahun 1980-an dan awal 1990-an yang memberikan-pertama, masyarakat melihat dari sejarah dan ideologi di balik operasi Brothers muslim (known as the Ikhwan or The Group) di Amerika Serikat. selama empat dekade terakhir. Untuk peneliti, dokumen memiliki bobot tambahan karena ditulis oleh para pemimpin Ikhwan sendiri, daripada interpretasi dari sumber-sumber sekunder.

Ikhwanul Muslimin di Belgia

Steve Merley,
Senior Analyst

Ikhwanul Muslimin telah hadir di Eropa sejak saat itu 1960 saat SaidRamadan, cucu Hassan Al-Banna, mendirikan masjid di Munich.1 Sejak saat itu,Organisasi persaudaraan telah didirikan di hampir semua negara Uni Eropa, serta negara non-UE seperti Rusia dan Turki. Meski beroperasi dengan nama lain, beberapa organisasi di negara yang lebih besar diakui sebagai bagian dari Persaudaraan Muslim global. Misalnya, Persatuan Organisasi Islam Prancis (UOIF) umumnya dianggap sebagai bagian dari Ikhwanul Muslimin di Prancis. Jaringan ini juga dikenal di beberapa negara kecil seperti Belanda, di mana laporan Yayasan NEFA baru-baru ini merinci kegiatan Ikhwanul Muslimin di negara itu.2 Negara tetangga Belgia juga telah menjadi pusat penting bagi Ikhwanul Muslimin di Eropa. SEBUAH 2002 laporan oleh Komite Intelijen Parlemen Belgia menjelaskan bagaimana Ikhwanul Muslimin beroperasi di Belgia:“Dinas Keamanan Negara telah mengikuti aktivitas Ikhwanul Muslimin Internasional di Belgia sejak saat itu 1982. Persaudaraan Muslim Internasional telah memiliki struktur klandestin hampir 20 tahun. Identitas anggota dirahasiakan; mereka beroperasi dengan kebijaksanaan terbesar. Mereka berusaha untuk menyebarkan ideologi mereka di dalam komunitas Islam Belgia dan mereka menargetkan khususnya pada kaum muda dari generasi kedua dan ketiga imigran.. Di Belgia seperti di negara Eropa lainnya, mereka mencoba mengambil kendali agama, sosial, dan asosiasi olahraga dan membangun diri mereka sebagai lawan bicara yang berhak dari otoritas nasional untuk mengelola Islamaffair. Ikhwanul Muslimin berasumsi bahwa otoritas nasional akan semakin tertekan untuk memilih pemimpin Muslim untuk manajemen tersebut dan,pada konteks ini, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

Ikhwanul Muslimin di Eropa

Ikhwanul Muslim AS. Jaringan

Zeyno Baran

Ikhwanul Muslim Penaklukan Eropa

Lorenzo Vidino

Sejak didirikan pada 1928, Ikhwanul Muslimin (Hizb al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) has profoundly influenced the political life of the Middle East. Its motto is telling: “Allah is our objective. Nabi adalah pemimpin kami. The Qur’an is our law. Jihad adalah cara kami. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”

While the Brotherhood’s radical ideas have shaped the beliefs of generations of Islamists, over the past two decades, it has lost some of its power and appeal in the Middle East, crushed by harsh repression from local regimes and snubbed by the younger generations of Islamists who often prefer more radical organizations.

But the Middle East is only one part of the Muslim world. Europe has become an incubator for Islamist thought and political development. Sejak awal 1960-an, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and slowly but steadily established a wide and well-organized network of mosques, charities, and Islamic organizations. Unlike the larger Islamic community, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ultimate goal may not be simply “to help Muslims be the best citizens they can be,” but rather to extend Islamic law throughout Europe and the United States.[2]

Four decades of teaching and cultivation have paid off. The student refugees who migrated from the Middle East forty years ago and their descendants now lead organizations that represent the local Muslim communities in their engagement with Europe’s political elite. Funded by generous contributors from the Persian Gulf, they preside over a centralized network that spans nearly every European country.

These organizations represent themselves as mainstream, even as they continue to embrace the Brotherhood’s radical views and maintain links to terrorists. With moderate rhetoric and well-spoken German, Belanda, and French, they have gained acceptance among European governments and media alike. Politicians across the political spectrum rush to engage them whenever an issue involving Muslims arises or, more parochially, when they seek the vote of the burgeoning Muslim community.

But, speaking Arabic or Turkish before their fellows Muslims, they drop their facade and embrace radicalism. While their representatives speak about interfaith dialogue and integration on television, their mosques preach hate and warn worshippers about the evils of Western society. While they publicly condemn the murder of commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, they continue to raise money for Hamas and other terrorist organizations. Europeans, eager to create a dialogue with their increasingly disaffected Muslim minority, overlook this duplicity. The case is particularly visible in Germany, which retains a place of key importance in Europe, not only because of its location at the heart of Europe, but also because it played host to the first major wave of Muslim Brotherhood immigrants and is host to the best-organized Brotherhood presence. The German government’s reaction is also instructive if only to show the dangers of accepting Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric at face value, without looking at the broader scope of its activities.

Qutbism: Sebuah Ideologi Islam-Fasisme

Dale C. EIKMEIER

The recently published National Military Strategic Plan for the War onTerrorism (NMSP-WOT) is to be commended for identifying “ideology”as al Qaeda’s center of gravity.1 The identification of an ideology as thecenter of gravity rather than an individual or group is a significant shift froma“capture and kill” philosophy to a strategy focused on defeating the rootcause of Islamic terrorism. Demikian, the plan’s principal focus is on attackingand countering an ideology that fuels Islamic terrorism. Sayangnya,the NMSP-WOT fails to identify the ideology or suggest ways tocounter it. The plan merely describes the ideology as “extremist.” This descriptioncontributes little to the public’s understanding of the threat or to thecapabilities of the strategist who ultimately must attack and defeat it. The intentof this article is to identify the ideology of the Islamic terrorists and recommendhow to successfully counter it.Sun Tzuwisely said, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundredbattles you will never be in peril.”2 Our success in theWar on Terrorismdepends on knowingwho the enemy is and understanding his ideology.While characterizing and labeling an enemymay serve such a purpose, it is only usefulif the labels are clearly defined and understood. Otherwise, overly broadcharacterizations obscure our ability to truly “know the enemy,” they diffuseefforts, and place potential allies and neutrals in the enemy’s camp. Sayangnya,theWar on Terrorism’s use of labels contributes a great deal to themisunderstandingsassociated with the latter. The fact is, five years after 9/11 theNMSP-WOT provides little specific guidance, other than labeling the enemyas extremist.3 This inability to focus on the specific threat and its supportingphilosophy reflects our own rigid adherence to political correctness and is beingexploited bymilitant Islamists portraying these overly broad descriptionsas a war against Islam.As David F. Forte states “Wemust not fail . . . to distinguishbetween the homicidal revolutionaries like bin Laden and mainstreamMuslim believers.

Mutasi teroris dan ekstremis di Timur Tengah

Terorisme dan perang asimetris adalah jarang fitur baru dari saldo militer Timur Tengah, dan Islamicextremism adalah hampir satu-satunya sumber kekerasan ekstremis. Ada differencesin etnis dan sektarian yang serius di Timur Tengah, dan ini telah lama mengakibatkan kekerasan sporadis dalam negara yang diberikan, dan kadang-kadang untuk civilconflicts utama. Perang sipil di Yaman dan Pemberontakan Dhofar di Oman adalah contoh, sebagaimana sejarah panjang civilwar di Lebanon dan penindasan kekerasan Suriah dari kelompok politik Islam yang menentang rezim Hafez al-Asad. Kekuatan meningkatnya Organisasi Pembebasan Palestina (PLO) menyebabkan perang sipil di Yordania di September1970. Revolusi Iran di 1979 diikuti oleh pertempuran politik yang serius, dan upaya untuk mengekspor theocraticrevolution yang membantu memicu Perang Iran-Irak. Bahrain dan Arab Saudi memiliki keduanya telah bentrokan sipil antara elite penguasa theirSunni dan Syiah bermusuhan dan bentrokan ini mengakibatkan kekerasan yang signifikan dalam hal Saudi Arabia.There juga, Namun, telah menjadi sejarah panjang kekerasan ekstrimisme Islam di daerah, kadang-kadang mendorong byregimes yang kemudian menjadi target kelompok Islam yang sangat mereka awalnya didukung. Sadat berusaha untuk menggunakan Islamicmovements sebagai counter untuk oposisi sekuler di Mesir hanya untuk dibunuh oleh satu gerakan tersebut setelah perjanjian hispeace dengan Israel. Israel pikir itu aman untuk mensponsori gerakan Islam setelah 1967 sebagai counter untuk thePLO, hanya untuk melihat munculnya cepat kelompok keras anti-Israel. Utara dan Yaman Selatan adalah ofcoups tempat kejadian dan perang sipil sejak awal 1960-an, dan itu adalah perang sipil di Yaman Selatan yang pada akhirnya menyebabkan collapseof rezim dan merger dengan Yaman Utara di 1990.The jatuhnya Syah mengarah ke pengambilalihan Islam di Iran, dan perlawanan terhadap invasi Soviet reaksi triggeredan Islam Afghanistan yang masih mempengaruhi Timur Tengah dan seluruh dunia Islam. Arab Saudi harus menghadapi pemberontakan withan di Masjidil Haram di Mekkah pada 1979. Karakter religius pemberontakan ini bersama elementsof banyak gerakan yang muncul setelah penarikan Soviet dari Afghanistan dan Perang Teluk 1991.Algerian dalam upaya untuk menekan kemenangan partai politik Islam dalam pemilu demokratis di 1992 bya diikuti perang sipil yang telah berlangsung sejak. Mesir berjuang pertempuran panjang dan sebagian besar sukses dengan Islamicextremists sendiri pada 1990-an, namun Mesir hanya berhasil telah menekan gerakan seperti daripada eradicatedthem. Di seluruh Dunia Arab, perang sipil di Kosovo dan Bosnia membantu menciptakan ekstrimis Islam baru cadres.Saudi Saudi menderita dua serangan teroris besar sebelum 2001. Serangan-serangan ini menyerang di sebuah pusat GuardTraining Nasional dan barak USAF di Al Khobar, dan setidaknya satu tampaknya telah hasil Islamicextremists. Kulit kambing yg halus, Libya, Tunisia, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, dan Yaman telah melihat semua garis keras Islamistmovements menjadi threat.While nasional serius tidak langsung bagian dari wilayah, Sudan telah berjuang perang sipil 15 tahun panjang yang mungkin biaya selama masa twomillion, dan perang ini telah didukung oleh elemen-elemen Islam garis keras di utara Arab. Somalia alsobeen adegan perang sipil sejak 1991 yang telah memungkinkan sel Islamis untuk beroperasi di negara itu.

Kematian Islam Politik

Jon B. Alterman

Berita kematian bagi Islam politik telah mulai ditulis. Setelah bertahun-tahun tampaknya unstoppablegrowth, partai-partai Islam telah mulai tersandung. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. Sebagai gantinya, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, Namun, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, SaudiArabia, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. Di Timur Tengah, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. Islam, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.

Terorisme diaspora DI ASIA TIMUR DAN SELATAN TENGAH

Shannon Peterson

David Goetze

Ever since the Bush administration’s declaration of a global war on terror after 9/11,academics and policymakers have sought ways to counter the global terrorist threat. However asJeffrey Record (2003) has noted, treating terrorism monolithically and failing to discriminatebetween terrorist groups and other actors reduces the ability to produce effectivecounterterrorism strategies. Lagi pula, it can set actors “on a course of open-ended andgratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat.” If terrorism andterrorist groups are not homogenous entities, then understanding the differences and similaritiesbetween groups is a crucial first step in constructing an effective counterterrorist response.This research seeks to better discriminate between terrorist groups by examining thegoals, tactics and images embedded in the narratives of terrorist or terrorist spawningorganizations. We define narratives as shared understandings of historical events and relevantactors that are used to justify past political actions or mobilize people for contemporary politicalactions as generally expressed through descriptions or charters issued by organizations orthrough statements of organizational leaders.2 Narrative, as noted by Benedict Anderson, formsthe underbelly of an “imagined community:” the glue binding a group of like-minded individualswho, “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet inthe minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 6). Karenanya, we believethat narratives are excellent sources for uncovering group conceptions of “self” and “others” thatare key in attracting and maintaining ties to diaspora communities, as well as related group goals,strategies and tactics. We argue that by comparing the goals, images and tactics embedded in thenarratives of these different organizations, we can shed insight on crucial differences andsimilarities between these terrorist groups. These insights not only help discriminate betweenterrorist groups and other organizations, but also shed insight on the evolution of suchorganizations themselves.Specifically, this research examines the narratives of four groups: the MuslimBrotherhood, Hamas, Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers. Two of these groups, Hamas and AlQaeda, have roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore can be viewed as diasporas of thelatter. Namun, while the Muslim Brotherhood takes an evolutionary and nonviolent approachto goal attainment, Hamas and Al Qaeda advocate violence and terrorism to advance their cause,tactics that are also promoted by the fourth group in the analysis, the Tamil Tigers. Since theTamil Tigers have no connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, their inclusion in ourcomparative analysis allows us to determine how much of the commonality of goals acrossterrorist organizations pertains to common roots and how much pertains to commonality oforganizational type, function or tactics.

Islam Mutasi dan Penggunaan Kekerasan:

Hembusan Kirdis

.

Meskipun fokus akademik dan populer kekerasan baru pada jaringan teroris transnasional Islam,ada bermacam-macam gerakan Islam. keserbaragaman ini menyajikan sarjana dengan dua teka-teki. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? Pertama, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Kedua, I argue that transnationalization creates uncertainty for groups about their identity and claims at the transnational level. The medium adopted, i. use of violence versus non-violence, is dependent on type of transnationalization, the actors encounter at the transnational level, and leadership’s interpretations on where the movement should go next. To answer my questions, I will look at four cases: (1) Turkish Islam, (2) Ikhwanul Muslimin, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, dan (4) Tablighi Jamaat

Ikhwanul Muslim di Amerika Serikat

Kepemimpinan AS. Ikhwanul Muslimin (MB, atau Ikhwan) telah mengatakan bahwa tujuannya

Steven Merley

Kepemimpinan AS. Ikhwanul Muslimin (MB, atau Ikhwan) telah mengatakan bahwa tujuannya adalah dan sedang jihad bertujuan untuk menghancurkan AS. dari dalam.

Pimpinan Ikhwanul Muslimin juga mengatakan bahwa cara untuk mencapai tujuan ini adalah dengan mendirikan organisasi Islam di AS. di bawah kendali Ikhwanul Muslimin.

Sejak awal 1960-an, Persaudaraan telah membangun infrastruktur organisasi rahasia yang rumit yang di atasnya dibangun seperangkat organisasi publik atau "depan".

AS saat ini. Kepemimpinan persaudaraan telah berusaha untuk menyangkal sejarah ini, keduanya mengklaim bahwa itu tidak akurat dan pada saat yang sama mengatakan bahwa itu mewakili bentuk pemikiran yang lebih tua di dalam Ikhwan.

Pemeriksaan dokumen Persaudaraan publik dan pribadi, Namun, menunjukkan bahwa sejarah ini akurat dan bahwa Persaudaraan tidak mengambil tindakan untuk menunjukkan perubahan dalam cara berpikir dan / atau aktivitasnya.