RSSमें सभी प्रविष्टियों "Ikhwanophobia" श्रेणी

मध्यम और कट्टरपंथी इस्लाम

एन्जिल Rabasa

One of the components of this study is relevant to a question that I was asked to address,which is how radical Islam differs from moderate or mainstream Islam. Frankly, one ofthe problems that we have found in the discourse about Islam is that the terms “radical”or “moderate” are often used in a subjective and imprecise way, without going through aprocess of critically examining what these terms mean. In some cases, the term radical ormilitant is defined in terms of support for terrorism or other forms of violence. Webelieve that this is too narrow a focus, that there is, in fact, a much larger universe offundamentalist or Salafi groups who may not themselves practice violence, but thatpropagate an ideology that creates the conditions for violence and that is subversive ofthe values of democratic societies.

अरब और मुस्लिम विश्व में लोकतंत्र के लिए चुनौतियां

Alon बेन-Meir

President Bush’s notions that democratizing Iraq will have a ripple effect on the rest ofthe Arab world, bringing prosperity and peace to the region, and that democracy is the panaceafor Islamic terrorism are unsubstantiated as well as grossly misleading. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. In fact, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. इसके साथ - साथ, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.

उत्तरी अमेरिका में इखवान: एक लघु इतिहास

डगलस फरह

रॉन Sandee


रिलीफ एंड डेवलपमेंट के लिए पवित्र भूमि फाउंडेशन के खिलाफ मौजूदा संघीय अदालत ने मामले (HLF) डलास में, टेक्सास,1 offers an unprecedented inside look into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, साथ ही अपने लक्ष्यों और संरचना के रूप में. The documents discuss recruitment, organization, ideology and the development of the organization in different phases in the United States. The prosecution in the case has presented many internal Muslim Brotherhood documents from the 1980’s and early 1990’s that give a first-ever, public view of the history and ideology behind the operations of the Muslim Brothers (known as the Ikhwan or The Group) in the U.S. over the past four decades. For researchers, the documents have the added weight of being written by the Ikhwan leaders themselves, rather than interpretations of secondary sources.

बेल्जियम में मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड

स्टीव Merley,
वरिष्ठ विश्लेषक


The Global Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Europe since 1960 when SaidRamadan, the grandson of Hassan Al-Banna, founded a mosque in Munich.1 Since that time,Brotherhood organizations have been established in almost all of the EU countries, as well asnon-EU countries such as Russia and Turkey. Despite operating under other names, some ofthe organizations in the larger countries are recognized as part of the global MuslimBrotherhood. उदाहरण के लिए, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) isgenerally regarded as part of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. The network is alsobecoming known in some of the smaller countries such as the Netherlands, where a recentNEFA Foundation report detailed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in that country.2Neighboring Belgium has also become an important center for the Muslim Brotherhood inEurope. A 2002 report by the Intelligence Committee of the Belgian Parliament explainedhow the Brotherhood operates in Belgium:“The State Security Service has been following the activities of the InternationalMuslim Brotherhood in Belgium since 1982. The International MuslimBrotherhood has had a clandestine structure for nearly 20 साल. The identityof the members is secret; they operate in the greatest discretion. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,इस सन्दर्भ में, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

यूरोप में मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड

तुम मार्शल टी Brigi
Shumuliyyat al-islam (Islam as encompassing every aspect of life) is the first of twenty principles laid out by the
founder of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, हसन अल Banna, to teach his followers the proper understanding
of Islam. Even though this principle, usually translated as the “comprehensive way of life,” still remains integral
to the teachings of the members of the Brotherhood, both in Egypt and in Europe, it is strangely enough
neither commented upon in scholarly references nor by the wider public. When the Federation of Islamic
Organizations in Europe (FIOE, representing the Muslim Brotherhood movement at the European level) presented the European Muslim Charter to the international press in January 2008, none pinpointed this “universal dimension” of their understanding of Islam despite the potential tensions or even incompatibilities, both political and
legal, that this concept might have on a discourse on integration and citizenship. What do the Muslim Brothers traditionally say about this concept and how do they justify their call for it? What are its constituents
and the scope of its application? Are there any significant modifications to the concept in attempting to contextualize it within a pluralist Europe?

मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड के अमेरिकी. नेटवर्क

Zeyno बारां


Washington D.C. has suddenly become very interested in the Muslim Brotherhood. American policymakers are debating whether to engage non-violent elements of the Muslim Brotherhood network, both inside and outside the United States, in the hope that such engagement will empower these “moderates” against violent Wahhabi and Salafi groups such as al-Qaeda. दुर्भाग्य से, this strategy is based on a false assumption: that “moderate” Islamist groups will confront and weaken their violent co-religionists, robbing them of their support base.
This lesser-of-two-evils strategy is reminiscent of the rationale behind the Cold War-era decision to support the Afghan mujahideen against the Soviet army. In the short term, अमेरिका. alliance with the mujahideen did indeed aid America in its struggle against the Soviet Union. In the long term, तथापि, अमेरिका. support led to the empowerment of a dangerous and potent adversary. In choosing its allies, अमेरिका. cannot afford to elevate short-term tactical considerations above longer-term strategic ones. Most importantly, अमेरिका. must consider the ideology of any potential partners.
Although various Islamist groups do quarrel over tactics and often bear considerable animosity towards one another, they all agree on the endgame: a world dictated by political Islam. A “divide and conquer” strategy by the United States will only push them closer together.

यूरोप के मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड की विजय

Lorenzo Vidino


में इसकी स्थापना के बाद से 1928, मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड (हिज़्ब अल-इखवान अल-मुस्लिमुन) मध्य पूर्व के राजनीतिक जीवन को गहराई से प्रभावित किया है. इसका आदर्श वाक्य बता रहा है: “अल्लाह हमारा उद्देश्य है. पैगंबर हमारे नेता हैं. कुरान हमारा कानून है. जिहाद हमारा रास्ता है. अल्लाह के रास्ते में मरना हमारी सबसे बड़ी उम्मीद है।”

जबकि ब्रदरहुड के कट्टरपंथी विचारों ने इस्लामवादियों की पीढ़ियों के विश्वासों को आकार दिया है, पिछले दो दशक से, इसने मध्य पूर्व में अपनी कुछ शक्ति और आकर्षण खो दिया है, स्थानीय शासनों के कठोर दमन से कुचले गए और इस्लामवादियों की युवा पीढ़ियों द्वारा ठुकराए गए जो अक्सर अधिक कट्टरपंथी संगठनों को पसंद करते हैं.

लेकिन मध्य पूर्व मुस्लिम दुनिया का केवल एक हिस्सा है. यूरोप इस्लामवादी सोच और राजनीतिक विकास के लिए एक इनक्यूबेटर बन गया है. 1960 के दशक की शुरुआत से, मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड के सदस्य और हमदर्द यूरोप चले गए हैं और धीरे-धीरे लेकिन तेजी से मस्जिदों का एक विस्तृत और सुव्यवस्थित नेटवर्क स्थापित किया है।, दान, और इस्लामी संगठन. बड़े इस्लामी समुदाय के विपरीत, मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड का अंतिम लक्ष्य सरल नहीं हो सकता है “मुसलमानों को सर्वश्रेष्ठ नागरिक बनने में मदद करने के लिए वे हो सकते हैं,” बल्कि पूरे यूरोप और संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका में इस्लामी कानून का विस्तार करने के लिए.[2]

चार दशकों के अध्यापन और साधना ने रंग लाया है. चालीस साल पहले मध्य पूर्व से पलायन करने वाले छात्र शरणार्थी और उनके वंशज अब ऐसे संगठनों का नेतृत्व करते हैं जो यूरोप के राजनीतिक अभिजात वर्ग के साथ अपने जुड़ाव में स्थानीय मुस्लिम समुदायों का प्रतिनिधित्व करते हैं।. फारस की खाड़ी के उदार योगदानकर्ताओं द्वारा वित्त पोषित, वे एक केंद्रीकृत नेटवर्क की अध्यक्षता करते हैं जो लगभग हर यूरोपीय देश में फैला हुआ है.

ये संगठन खुद को मुख्य धारा के रूप में प्रस्तुत करते हैं, भले ही वे ब्रदरहुड के कट्टरपंथी विचारों को अपनाना जारी रखते हैं और आतंकवादियों से संबंध बनाए रखते हैं. उदारवादी बयानबाजी और अच्छी तरह से बोली जाने वाली जर्मन के साथ, डच, और फ्रेंच, उन्होंने यूरोपीय सरकारों और मीडिया के बीच समान रूप से स्वीकृति प्राप्त की है. जब भी मुसलमानों से जुड़ा कोई मुद्दा उठता है तो राजनीतिक स्पेक्ट्रम के राजनेता उनसे उलझने के लिए दौड़ पड़ते हैं या, अधिक संकीर्णता से, जब वे बढ़ते मुस्लिम समुदाय का वोट मांगते हैं.

परंतु, अपने साथियों मुसलमानों के सामने अरबी या तुर्की बोलना, वे अपना मुखौटा छोड़ देते हैं और कट्टरवाद को गले लगाते हैं. जबकि उनके प्रतिनिधि टेलीविजन पर अंतरधार्मिक संवाद और एकीकरण की बात करते हैं, उनकी मस्जिदें नफरत का प्रचार करती हैं और पूजा करने वालों को पश्चिमी समाज की बुराइयों के बारे में चेतावनी देती हैं. जबकि वे सार्वजनिक रूप से मैड्रिड में यात्रियों और रूस में स्कूली बच्चों की हत्या की निंदा करते हैं, वे हमास और अन्य आतंकवादी संगठनों के लिए धन जुटाना जारी रखते हैं. गोरों, अपने तेजी से अप्रभावित मुस्लिम अल्पसंख्यकों के साथ संवाद स्थापित करने के लिए उत्सुक हैं, इस दोहरेपन को नज़रअंदाज़ करें. मामला जर्मनी में विशेष रूप से दिखाई दे रहा है, जो यूरोप में एक महत्वपूर्ण स्थान रखता है, न केवल यूरोप के केंद्र में स्थित होने के कारण, लेकिन इसलिए भी कि इसने मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड प्रवासियों की पहली बड़ी लहर की मेजबानी की और सबसे अच्छी तरह से संगठित ब्रदरहुड उपस्थिति की मेजबानी की।. जर्मन सरकार की प्रतिक्रिया भी शिक्षाप्रद है यदि केवल मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड बयानबाजी को अंकित मूल्य पर स्वीकार करने के खतरों को दिखाया जाए, इसकी गतिविधियों के व्यापक दायरे को देखे बिना.

Qutbism: इस्लामी-फासीवाद के एक विचारधारा

Dale सी. EIKMEIER

युद्ध onTerrorism के लिए हाल ही में प्रकाशित राष्ट्रीय सैन्य सामरिक योजना (NMSP-WOT) gravity.1 बल्कि किसी व्यक्ति या समूह से गुरुत्वाकर्षण के thecenter के रूप में एक विचारधारा की पहचान की अलकायदा के केंद्र के रूप में "विचारधारा" की पहचान के लिए सराहना की जानी करने के लिए है एक महत्वपूर्ण बदलाव froma को हराने पर ध्यान केंद्रित एक रणनीति के लिए "पकड़ने और मारने के" दर्शन है इस्लामी आतंकवाद की rootcause. तदनुसार, योजना के मुख्य फोकस एक विचारधारा का मुकाबला करने attackingand पर है कि ईंधन इस्लामी आतंकवाद. दुर्भाग्य से,NMSP-WOT यह tocounter विचारधारा की पहचान या तरीके सुझाने में विफल रहता है. योजना केवल के रूप में विचारधारा का वर्णन "अतिवादी।" यह खतरे की जनता की समझ के लिए या रणनीतिकार की thecapabilities जो अंततः हमला करते हैं और यह हराना होगा करने के लिए थोड़ा descriptioncontributes. इस लेख intentof इस्लामी आतंकवादियों की विचारधारा की पहचान करने और सफलतापूर्वक मुकाबला करने के लिए it.Sun Tzuwisely कहा recommendhow है, "दुश्मन को जानते हैं और अपने आप को पता है; एक hundredbattles में आप जोखिम में कभी नहीं होगा। "पर knowingwho दुश्मन है और उसके ideology.While निस्र्पक समझने और एक enemymay लेबलिंग पर Terrorismdepends theWar में हमारी सफलता 2 इस तरह के एक उद्देश्य पूरा, यह केवल usefulif लेबल स्पष्ट रूप से परिभाषित है और समझा जाता है. अन्यथा, ज्यादा broadcharacterizations हमारे वास्तव में करने के लिए "दुश्मन को पता है की क्षमता को अस्पष्ट,"वे diffuseefforts, और दुश्मन के शिविर में संभावित सहयोगी दलों और तटस्थ जगह. दुर्भाग्य से,theWar लेबल की आतंकवाद के उपयोग पर एक महान सौदा उत्तरार्द्ध के साथ themisunderstandingsassociated के लिए योगदान. तथ्य यह है, पांच साल के बाद 9/11 theNMSP-WOT थोड़ा विशिष्ट मार्गदर्शन प्रदान करता है, enemyas लेबलिंग के अलावा अन्य extremist.3 विशिष्ट खतरा पर ध्यान केंद्रित करने में असमर्थता यह और उसके supportingphilosophy राजनैतिक शुद्धता के लिए अपने स्वयं के कठोर पालन को दर्शाता है और इन दायरा बहुत अधिक व्यापक descriptionsas Islam.As डेविड एफ के खिलाफ एक युद्ध में चित्रित किया इस्लामवादियों bymilitant beingexploited है. Forte "कहा गया है असफल नहीं Wemust . . . बिन लादेन और mainstreamMuslim विश्वासियों की तरह हिंसक क्रांतिकारियों distinguishbetween को.

में आतंकवादी और अतिवादी आंदोलनों मध्य पूर्व

Anthony H. Cordesman

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamic
extremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differences
मध्य पूर्व में, और ये लंबे समय से दिए गए राज्यों के भीतर छिटपुट हिंसा का कारण बने हैं, और कभी-कभी प्रमुख नागरिक के लिए
संघर्ष. यमन में गृह युद्ध और ओमान में ढोफर विद्रोह इसके उदाहरण हैं, जैसा कि नागरिक का लंबा इतिहास है
लेबनान में युद्ध और सीरिया के इस्लामी राजनीतिक समूहों के हिंसक दमन ने हाफ़िज़ अली के शासन का विरोध किया-
असद. फ़िलिस्तीनी मुक्ति संगठन की बढ़ती शक्ति (पीएलओ) सितंबर में जॉर्डन में गृहयुद्ध छिड़ गया
1970. ईरानी क्रांति में 1979 इसके बाद गंभीर राजनीतिक लड़ाई हुई, और एक धार्मिक निर्यात करने का प्रयास
क्रांति जिसने ईरान-इराक युद्ध को गति प्रदान करने में मदद की. बहरीन और सऊदी अरब दोनों के बीच नागरिक संघर्ष हुए हैं
सुन्नी शासक कुलीनों और शत्रुतापूर्ण शियाओं और इन संघर्षों के कारण सऊदी अरब के मामले में महत्वपूर्ण हिंसा हुई.
वहाँ भी, तथापि, इस क्षेत्र में हिंसक इस्लामी चरमपंथ का एक लंबा इतिहास रहा है, कभी कभी द्वारा प्रोत्साहित किया जाता है
शासन जो बाद में उन्हीं इस्लामवादियों का निशाना बने जिनका उन्होंने शुरू में समर्थन किया था. सादात ने इस्लामी इस्तेमाल करने की कोशिश की
मिस्र में उनके धर्मनिरपेक्ष विरोध के प्रतिवाद के रूप में आंदोलनों को केवल उनके बाद ऐसे ही एक आंदोलन द्वारा हत्या कर दी गई
इजरायल के साथ शांति समझौता. इज़राइल ने इस्लामिक आंदोलनों को प्रायोजित करना सुरक्षित समझा: 1967 के लिए एक काउंटर के रूप में
पीएलओ, केवल हिंसक रूप से इजरायल विरोधी समूहों के तेजी से उभरने को देखने के लिए. उत्तर और दक्षिण यमन के दृश्य थे
1960 के दशक की शुरुआत से तख्तापलट और गृह युद्ध, और यह दक्षिण यमन में एक गृहयुद्ध था जो अंततः पतन का कारण बना
इसके शासन और उत्तरी यमन में इसके विलय के बारे में 1990.
शाह के पतन के कारण ईरान में इस्लामवादी अधिकार हो गया, और अफगानिस्तान पर सोवियत आक्रमण का प्रतिरोध शुरू हो गया
एक इस्लामी प्रतिक्रिया जो अभी भी मध्य पूर्व और पूरे इस्लामी दुनिया को प्रभावित करती है. सऊदी अरब को निपटना पड़ा
मक्का में ग्रैंड मस्जिद में विद्रोह 1979. इस विद्रोह के धार्मिक चरित्र ने कई तत्वों को साझा किया
अफगानिस्तान से सोवियत की वापसी और खाड़ी युद्ध के बाद हुए आंदोलनों के बारे में 1991.
एक लोकतांत्रिक चुनाव में इस्लामी राजनीतिक दलों की जीत को दबाने के लिए अल्जीरियाई प्रयास 1992 द्वारा पीछा किया गया
एक गृहयुद्ध जो तब से चला आ रहा है. मिस्र ने अपने स्वयं के इस्लामी के साथ एक लंबी और काफी हद तक सफल लड़ाई लड़ी
1990 के दशक में चरमपंथी, लेकिन मिस्र इस तरह के आंदोलनों को खत्म करने के बजाय केवल दबाने में कामयाब रहा है
उन्हें. बाकी अरब दुनिया में, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.
Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National Guard
Training center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamic
extremists. मोरक्को, Libya, टुनिशिया, जॉर्डन, Bahrain, कतर, ओमान, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamist
movements become a serious national threat.
While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over two
million lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has also
been the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.a

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, और ये लंबे समय से दिए गए राज्यों के भीतर छिटपुट हिंसा का कारण बने हैं, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. यमन में गृह युद्ध और ओमान में ढोफर विद्रोह इसके उदाहरण हैं, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. फ़िलिस्तीनी मुक्ति संगठन की बढ़ती शक्ति (पीएलओ) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. ईरानी क्रांति में 1979 इसके बाद गंभीर राजनीतिक लड़ाई हुई, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, तथापि, इस क्षेत्र में हिंसक इस्लामी चरमपंथ का एक लंबा इतिहास रहा है, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. इज़राइल ने इस्लामिक आंदोलनों को प्रायोजित करना सुरक्षित समझा: 1967 as a counter to thePLO, केवल हिंसक रूप से इजरायल विरोधी समूहों के तेजी से उभरने को देखने के लिए. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. बाकी अरब दुनिया में, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. मोरक्को, Libya, टुनिशिया, जॉर्डन, Bahrain, कतर, ओमान, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.

राजनीतिक इस्लाम की मौत

जॉन बी. Alterman

The obituaries for political Islam have begun to be written. After years of seemingly unstoppablegrowth, Islamic parties have begun to stumble. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. Instead, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, तथापि, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, SaudiArabia, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. मध्य पूर्व में, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. इस्लाम, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.

मध्य पूर्व और दक्षिण एशिया में TERORRIST DIASPORAS

शान्नोन पीटरसन

दाऊद Goetze


Ever since the Bush administration’s declaration of a global war on terror after 9/11,academics and policymakers have sought ways to counter the global terrorist threat. However asJeffrey Record (2003) has noted, treating terrorism monolithically and failing to discriminatebetween terrorist groups and other actors reduces the ability to produce effectivecounterterrorism strategies. अतिरिक्त, it can set actors “on a course of open-ended andgratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat.” If terrorism andterrorist groups are not homogenous entities, then understanding the differences and similaritiesbetween groups is a crucial first step in constructing an effective counterterrorist response.This research seeks to better discriminate between terrorist groups by examining thegoals, tactics and images embedded in the narratives of terrorist or terrorist spawningorganizations. We define narratives as shared understandings of historical events and relevantactors that are used to justify past political actions or mobilize people for contemporary politicalactions as generally expressed through descriptions or charters issued by organizations orthrough statements of organizational leaders.2 Narrative, as noted by Benedict Anderson, formsthe underbelly of an “imagined community:” the glue binding a group of like-minded individualswho, “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet inthe minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 6). फलस्वरूप, we believethat narratives are excellent sources for uncovering group conceptions of “self” and “others” thatare key in attracting and maintaining ties to diaspora communities, as well as related group goals,strategies and tactics. We argue that by comparing the goals, images and tactics embedded in thenarratives of these different organizations, we can shed insight on crucial differences andsimilarities between these terrorist groups. These insights not only help discriminate betweenterrorist groups and other organizations, but also shed insight on the evolution of suchorganizations themselves.Specifically, this research examines the narratives of four groups: the MuslimBrotherhood, हमास, Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers. Two of these groups, Hamas and AlQaeda, have roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore can be viewed as diasporas of thelatter. तथापि, while the Muslim Brotherhood takes an evolutionary and nonviolent approachto goal attainment, Hamas and Al Qaeda advocate violence and terrorism to advance their cause,tactics that are also promoted by the fourth group in the analysis, the Tamil Tigers. Since theTamil Tigers have no connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, their inclusion in ourcomparative analysis allows us to determine how much of the commonality of goals acrossterrorist organizations pertains to common roots and how much pertains to commonality oforganizational type, function or tactics.

इस्लामी आंदोलनों और हिंसा का प्रयोग करें:

आंधी Kirdis

.


हिंसक ट्रांसनेशनल इस्लामिक आतंकवादी नेटवर्क पर हालिया शैक्षणिक और लोकप्रिय फोकस के बावजूद,इस्लामी आंदोलनों की बहुलता है. यह बहुलता विद्वानों को दो पहेलियों के साथ प्रस्तुत करती है. पहली पहेली यह समझ में आ रही है कि धर्मनिरपेक्ष राष्ट्र-राज्यों की स्थापना की प्रतिक्रिया के रूप में गठित घरेलू उन्मुख इस्लामी आंदोलनों ने बहुस्तरीय अंतरराष्ट्रीय अंतरिक्ष में अपनी गतिविधियों और लक्ष्यों को स्थानांतरित क्यों किया?. दूसरी पहेली यह समझ रही है कि जब समान उद्देश्य और लक्ष्य वाले समूह हिंसा या अहिंसा का उपयोग करने की अलग-अलग रणनीति अपनाते हैं, तो वे "अतार्किक" हो जाते हैं। दो मुख्य प्रश्न जो इस पेपर को संबोधित करेंगे: इस्लामिक आंदोलनों को क्यों जाना जाता है? तथा, जब वे प्रत्यारोपित करते हैं तो वे विभिन्न रूपों में क्यों लेते हैं? पहले, मेरा तर्क है कि अंतरराष्ट्रीय स्तर पर इस्लामिक आंदोलनों के लिए एक नया राजनीतिक स्थल प्रस्तुत किया गया है जो घरेलू स्तर पर उनके दावे को सीमित कर रहा है. दूसरा, मेरा तर्क है कि अंतरराष्ट्रीय स्तर पर समूहों के लिए उनकी पहचान और दावों के बारे में अनिश्चितता पैदा होती है. माध्यम ने अपनाया, अर्थात. हिंसा बनाम अहिंसा का उपयोग, ट्रांसनाइजेशन के प्रकार पर निर्भर है, अभिनेताओं का अंतराष्ट्रीय स्तर पर मुकाबला होता है, और नेतृत्व की व्याख्याएं जहां आंदोलन को आगे बढ़ना चाहिए. मेरे सवालों के जवाब देने के लिए, मैं चार मामलों को देखूंगा: (1) तुर्की इस्लाम, (2) मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड, (3) जेमाह इस्लामिया, और (4) तब्लीगी जमात

संयुक्त राज्य अमेरिका में मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड

MBusThe leadership of the U.S. मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड (एमबी, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal
was and is jihad aimed at destroying the U.S. from within. The Brotherhood leadership has
also said that the means of achieving this goal is to establish Islamic organizations in the
अमेरिका. under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood. 1960 के दशक की शुरुआत से, the Brotherhood has
constructed an elaborate covert organizational infrastructure on which was built a set of public or
“front” organizations. The current U.S. Brotherhood leadership has attempted to deny this history,
both claiming that it is not accurate and at the same time that saying that it represents an older
form of thought inside the Brotherhood. An examination of public and private Brotherhood documents,
तथापि, indicates that this history is both accurate and that the Brotherhood has taken
no action to demonstrate change in its mode of thought and/or activity.sss

स्टीवन MerleyMBus

The leadership of the U.S. मुस्लिम ब्रदरहुड (एमबी, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal was and is jihad aimed at destroying the U.S. from within.

The Brotherhood leadership has also said that the means of achieving this goal is to establish Islamic organizations in the U.S. under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood.

1960 के दशक की शुरुआत से, the Brotherhood has constructed an elaborate covert organizational infrastructure on which was built a set of public or “front” organizations.

The current U.S. Brotherhood leadership has attempted to deny this history, both claiming that it is not accurate and at the same time that saying that it represents an older form of thought inside the Brotherhood.

An examination of public and private Brotherhood documents, तथापि, indicates that this history is both accurate and that the Brotherhood has taken no action to demonstrate change in its mode of thought and/or activity.