Kõik kanded "Ikhwanophobia" Kategooria

Mõõdukas ja radikaalne islam

Angel Rabasa

Üks osa selle uuringu jaoks on oluline küsimus, et mul paluti aadress,mis on see, kuidas radikaalne islam erineb mõõduka või mainstream islam. Ausalt, üks jäävatesse probleeme, et me oleme leitud diskursuse umbes islam on, et mõisted "radikaalne" või "mõõdukad" kasutatakse sageli subjektiivne ja ebatäpne viisil, ilma läbimas aprocess ja kriitiliselt uurida, millised need tingimused tähendavad. Mõnel juhul, perspektiivis radikaalseid ormilitant defineeritakse toetuse terrorismi või muu vägivalla. Webelieve, et see on liiga kitsas keskendumine, et on olemas, tegelikult, palju suurem universumi offundamentalist või Salafi rühmad, kes ei pruugi ise praktikas vägivald, kuid thatpropagate ideoloogia, mis loob tingimused vägivalla ja see on õõnestava jäävatesse väärtusi demokraatlikus ühiskonnas.

Väljakutsed Demokraatia araabia ja moslemi maailmaga

Alon Ben-Meir

President Bushi mõisted, et demokratiseerida Iraagi on pulsatsioon mõju ülejäänud jäävatesse Araabia maailma, toob jõukuse ja rahu sellesse piirkonda,, ja et demokraatia on panaceafor islami terrorism on põhjendamata, samuti äärmiselt eksitav. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. In fact, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. Autor David Zeidan, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.

Ikhwan Põhja-Ameerikas: Lühike ajalugu

Douglas Farah

Ron Sandee

Praegune föderaal kohtuasja vastu Püha Maa Fondi abi-ja arengukoostöö (HLF) Dallas, Texas,1 offers an unprecedented inside look into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, samuti oma eesmärgid ja struktuur. The documents discuss recruitment, organization, ideology and the development of the organization in different phases in the United States. The prosecution in the case has presented many internal Muslim Brotherhood documents from the 1980’s and early 1990’s that give a first-ever, public view of the history and ideology behind the operations of the Muslim Brothers (known as the Ikhwan or The Group) in the U.S. over the past four decades. For researchers, the documents have the added weight of being written by the Ikhwan leaders themselves, rather than interpretations of secondary sources.

Muslim Brotherhood Belgias

Steve Merley,
Senior Analüütik

Globaalne Muslim Brotherhood viibinud Euroopas alates 1960 kui SaidRamadan, lapselaps Hassan Al-Banna, founded a mosque in Munich.1 Since that time,Brotherhood organizations have been established in almost all of the EU countries, as well asnon-EU countries such as Russia and Turkey. Despite operating under other names, some ofthe organizations in the larger countries are recognized as part of the global MuslimBrotherhood. For example, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) isgenerally regarded as part of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. The network is alsobecoming known in some of the smaller countries such as the Netherlands, where a recentNEFA Foundation report detailed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in that country.2Neighboring Belgium has also become an important center for the Muslim Brotherhood inEurope. A 2002 report by the Intelligence Committee of the Belgian Parliament explainedhow the Brotherhood operates in Belgium:“The State Security Service has been following the activities of the InternationalMuslim Brotherhood in Belgium since 1982. The International MuslimBrotherhood has had a clandestine structure for nearly 20 aastat. The identityof the members is secret; they operate in the greatest discretion. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,in this context, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

Muslim Brotherhood Euroopas

Muslim Brotherhood's USA. Võrk

Zeyno Baran

Moslemi Vennaskonna Conquest of Europe

Lorenzo Vidino

Since its founding in 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood (Hizb al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) has profoundly influenced the political life of the Middle East. Its motto is telling: “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”

While the Brotherhood’s radical ideas have shaped the beliefs of generations of Islamists, over the past two decades, it has lost some of its power and appeal in the Middle East, crushed by harsh repression from local regimes and snubbed by the younger generations of Islamists who often prefer more radical organizations.

But the Middle East is only one part of the Muslim world. Europe has become an incubator for Islamist thought and political development. Alates 1960. aastate algusest, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and slowly but steadily established a wide and well-organized network of mosques, charities, and Islamic organizations. Unlike the larger Islamic community, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ultimate goal may not be simply “to help Muslims be the best citizens they can be,” but rather to extend Islamic law throughout Europe and the United States.[2]

Four decades of teaching and cultivation have paid off. The student refugees who migrated from the Middle East forty years ago and their descendants now lead organizations that represent the local Muslim communities in their engagement with Europe’s political elite. Funded by generous contributors from the Persian Gulf, they preside over a centralized network that spans nearly every European country.

These organizations represent themselves as mainstream, even as they continue to embrace the Brotherhood’s radical views and maintain links to terrorists. With moderate rhetoric and well-spoken German, Hollandi, and French, they have gained acceptance among European governments and media alike. Politicians across the political spectrum rush to engage them whenever an issue involving Muslims arises or, more parochially, when they seek the vote of the burgeoning Muslim community.

But, speaking Arabic or Turkish before their fellows Muslims, they drop their facade and embrace radicalism. While their representatives speak about interfaith dialogue and integration on television, their mosques preach hate and warn worshippers about the evils of Western society. While they publicly condemn the murder of commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, they continue to raise money for Hamas and other terrorist organizations. Europeans, eager to create a dialogue with their increasingly disaffected Muslim minority, overlook this duplicity. The case is particularly visible in Germany, which retains a place of key importance in Europe, not only because of its location at the heart of Europe, but also because it played host to the first major wave of Muslim Brotherhood immigrants and is host to the best-organized Brotherhood presence. The German government’s reaction is also instructive if only to show the dangers of accepting Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric at face value, without looking at the broader scope of its activities.

Qutbism: Ideoloogia islami-fašismi

DALE C. EIKMEIER

Hiljuti avaldatud Riiklik sõjalise strateegiline plaan sõja onTerrorism (NMSP-wot) is to be commended for identifying “ideology”as al Qaeda’s center of gravity.1 The identification of an ideology as thecenter of gravity rather than an individual or group is a significant shift froma“capture and kill” philosophy to a strategy focused on defeating the rootcause of Islamic terrorism. Vastavalt, Kava peamine keskendutakse attackingand hoida ideoloogia, et kütuseid islami terrorismi. Kahjuks,NMSP-wot ei määratle ideoloogia või soovitama viise tocounter ta. Plaan lihtsalt kirjeldab ideoloogia kui "ekstremistlike." Käesolev descriptioncontributes vähe üldsuse arusaama oht või thecapabilities on strateeg, kes lõpuks peab rünnaku ja võita see. Intentof see artikkel on välja selgitada ideoloogia islami terroristid ja recommendhow edukalt võidelda it.Sun Tzuwisely ütles, "Tunne vaenlast ja teavad ise; aastal hundredbattles sa kunagi olla ohus. "2. Meie edu theWar kohta Terrorismdepends kohta knowingwho vaenlane on ja mõistmist oma ideology.While iseloomustada ja märgistamise enemymay olla selline eesmärk, see on ainult usefulif etiketid on selgelt määratletud ja kokku lepitud. Muidu, liiga broadcharacterizations varja meie võimet tõeliselt "tunne vaenlast,"Nad diffuseefforts, ja koht võimalike liitlaste ja neutraalsetest on vaenlase leeri. Kahjuks,theWar Terrorismi kasutab siltide aitab palju themisunderstandingsassociated viimasega. Fakt on see,, viis aastat pärast 9/11 theNMSP-wot pakub vähe konkreetseid juhiseid, other than labeling the enemyas extremist.3 This inability to focus on the specific threat and its supportingphilosophy reflects our own rigid adherence to political correctness and is beingexploited bymilitant Islamists portraying these overly broad descriptionsas a war against Islam.As David F. Forte öeldakse, et "Wemust ei suuda . . . to distinguishbetween mõrtsukalik revolutsionääre nagu bin Ladeni ja mainstreamMuslim believers.

Terroristide ja äärmuslike liikumiste kohta Lähis-Idas

Terrorism ja asümmeetriline sõjapidamine on vaevalt uusi omadusi Lähis-Ida sõjalist tasakaalu, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, siiski, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. Maroko, Libya, Tuneesia, Jordaania, Bahrain, Katar, Omaan, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.

Surm politiseerunud islamiga

Jon B. Alterman

Surmakuulutused poliitilise islami hakanud olema kirjutatud. Pärast aastaid kestnud näiliselt unstoppablegrowth, Islami pooled on hakanud komistama. Marokos, Õigluse ja Arengu Partei (või PJD) mullu septembris toimunud valimistel läks oodatust palju kehvemini, ja Jordaania Islami Action Front kaotas eelmise kuu küsitluses enam kui pooled oma kohtadest. Egiptuse Moslemivennaskonna pikisilmi oodatud manifest, mille mustand ilmus mullu septembris,ei näidanud ei jõudu ega julgust. Selle asemel, see viitas sellele, et rühmitus on olnud intellektuaalsetest vastuoludest ja sisetülidest ahvatlev. Poliitilise islami surma on liiga vara kuulutada, aastal oli ennatlik kuulutada liberalismi sündi araabia maailmas 2003-04, kuid selle väljavaated tunduvad märgatavalt nõrgemad kui isegi aasta tagasi.Mõnedele, armust langemine oli vältimatu; poliitiline islam on oma vastuolude tõttu kokku varisenud, nad ütlesid. Nad vaidlevad selle vastu, objektiivses mõttes, poliitiline islam ei olnud kunagi midagi muud kui suits ja peeglid. Religioon on seotud usu ja tõega, ja poliitika seisneb kompromissides ja leppimises. Sedasi vaadatuna, poliitiline islam ei olnud kunagi püha ettevõtmine, vaid pingutus ühe poole poliitilisi väljavaateid poliitilises arutelus suurendada. Toetatud religioosse autoriteedi ja legitiimsuse poolt, vastuseis islamistide tahtele lakkas olemast pelgalt poliitiline – sellest sai ketserlus – ja islamistid said sellest kasu. Need skeptikud peavad poliitilist islamit kasulikuks viisiks poliitiliste liikumiste kaitsmiseks.,lehma poliitilised vaenlased, ja ralli toetus. Juhtiva strateegiana, siiski, nad väidavad, et poliitiline islam ei ole toonud edu. Kahes piirkonnas, kus see hiljuti võimule tõusis, Palestiina omavalitsus ja Iraak, valitsemine on olnud aneemia. Iraanis, kus themullad on võimul olnud peaaegu kolm aastakümmet, vaimulikud võitlevad austuse pärast ja riik hemorraagib raha Dubaisse ja teistele ülemereturgudele prognoositavamate reeglite ja positiivsema tuluga. Kõige tõenäolisemalt religioosne riik Lähis-Idas, SaudiArabia, tal on tunduvalt vähem intellektuaalset vabadust kui paljudel tema naabritel, ja sealsed õigeusu eestkostjad piiravad hoolikalt religioosset mõtlemist. Nagu prantsuse islamiuurija,Olivier Roy, meeldejäävalt enam kui kümme aastat tagasi, religiooni ja poliitika kokkusulamine ei pühitsenud poliitikat, see politiseeris religiooni.Kuid kuigi islam ei ole pakkunud ühtset valitsemisteooriat, rääkimata üldtunnustatud lähenemisest inimkonna probleemidele, religiooni esiletõstmine kasvab paljude moslemite seas. See silmapaistvus ulatub palju kaugemale riietumisküsimustest, mis on viimastel aastatel muutunud nii naiste kui ka meeste jaoks konservatiivsemaks, ja väljaspool keelt, mis kutsub Jumala nime palju rohkem esile kui kümme aastat tagasi. See ulatub ka kaugemale islami igapäevasest praktikast – palvest heategevuseni ja paastumiseni –, mis kõik on tõusuteel. Muutunud on midagi veelgi põhjapanevamat kui füüsiline välimus või rituaalpraktika, ja see on see: Üha suurem hulk moslemeid lähtub väitest, et islam on oluline nende igapäevaelu kõigi aspektide jaoks, mitte ainult teoloogia või isiklike veendumuste provints. Mõned peavad seda Lähis-Ida traditsionalismi juurde naasmiseks., kui ebausk ja vaimsus valitsesid igapäevast elu. Täpsemalt, kuigi, mida me näeme, on "uustraditsionalismi" tõus,“, kus on üles pandud mineviku sümbolid ja loosungid, et kiirendada tulevikku sisenemist. Islami rahandus – see tähendab, rahandus, mis tugineb aktsiatele ja tuludele, mitte intressidele, õitseb, ja klanitud pangakontorites on eraldi sissepääsud meestele ja naistele. Libedad noored televangelistid toetuvad igapäevase pühitsemise ja andestuse otsimise hoobile, meelitades oma koosolekutele kümneid tuhandeid inimesi ja televisiooni vaatajaid miljoneid. YouTube'is vaadatavad muusikavideod anuvad noortele vaatajatele usku omaks võtta ja mõttetust ilmalikust elust ära pöörata. Paljud läänes näevad ilmalikkust ja relativismi modernsuse konkreetsete märkidena.. Lähis-Idas, paljud peavad neid pankrotistunud ilmaliku natsionalistliku mineviku sümboliks, mis ei suutnud tagada õiglust ega arengut, vabadus või progress. Sekularismi kannatused on mõttetud, kuid islami distsipliin on täis tähendust. Just sel põhjusel on ennatlik kuulutada poliitilise islami surma. Islam, järjest enam, ei saa ohjeldada. See levib kõikidesse eluvaldkondadesse, ja see on tugev Lähis-Ida kõige dünaamilisemate jõudude hulgas. See naudib kindlasti riigitoetusi,kuid osariikidel on religioossel alal toimuva loovusega vähe pistmist. Oht on, et avaliku elu islamiseerimine jätab kõrvale selle vähese sallivuse, mis Lähis-Idas on alles jäänud., pärast sajandeid asa-põhimõtteliselt islami-multikultuuriline entrepôt. On raske ette kujutada, kuidas islamiseerivad ühiskonnad saavad õitseda, kui nad ei võta omaks innovatsiooni ja loovust, mitmekesisus ja erinevus. "Islam" ei ole iseenesestmõistetav mõiste, nagu mu sõber Mustapha Kamal Pasha kunagi täheldas, kuid see ei saa olla tänapäeva ühiskondade tugevuse allikaks, kui see on seotud luustunud ja kihelkondlike arusaamadega oma olemusest. Erinevuste käsitlemine on põhimõtteliselt poliitiline ülesanne, ja just siin seisab poliitiline islam silmitsi oma tõelise proovikiviga. Lähis-Ida ametlikud valitsusstruktuurid on osutunud vastupidavaks, ja tõenäoliselt ei lagune nad islamiaktivismi laine all. Et poliitiline islam õnnestuks, see peab leidma viisi, kuidas ühendada erineva usu ja erineva usuastmega koalitsioone, mitte ainult rääkida selle baasiga. Seda pole veel leidnud, aga see ei tähenda, et ei saaks.

TERORRIST DIASPORAS IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Shannon Peterson

David Goetze

Ever since the Bush administration’s declaration of a global war on terror after 9/11,academics and policymakers have sought ways to counter the global terrorist threat. However asJeffrey Record (2003) has noted, treating terrorism monolithically and failing to discriminatebetween terrorist groups and other actors reduces the ability to produce effectivecounterterrorism strategies. enamgi veel, it can set actors “on a course of open-ended andgratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat.” If terrorism andterrorist groups are not homogenous entities, then understanding the differences and similaritiesbetween groups is a crucial first step in constructing an effective counterterrorist response.This research seeks to better discriminate between terrorist groups by examining thegoals, tactics and images embedded in the narratives of terrorist or terrorist spawningorganizations. We define narratives as shared understandings of historical events and relevantactors that are used to justify past political actions or mobilize people for contemporary politicalactions as generally expressed through descriptions or charters issued by organizations orthrough statements of organizational leaders.2 Narrative, as noted by Benedict Anderson, formsthe underbelly of an “imagined community:” the glue binding a group of like-minded individualswho, “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet inthe minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 6). Consequently, we believethat narratives are excellent sources for uncovering group conceptions of “self” and “others” thatare key in attracting and maintaining ties to diaspora communities, as well as related group goals,strategies and tactics. We argue that by comparing the goals, images and tactics embedded in thenarratives of these different organizations, we can shed insight on crucial differences andsimilarities between these terrorist groups. These insights not only help discriminate betweenterrorist groups and other organizations, but also shed insight on the evolution of suchorganizations themselves.Specifically, this research examines the narratives of four groups: the MuslimBrotherhood, Hamas, Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers. Two of these groups, Hamas and AlQaeda, have roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore can be viewed as diasporas of thelatter. Kuid, while the Muslim Brotherhood takes an evolutionary and nonviolent approachto goal attainment, Hamas and Al Qaeda advocate violence and terrorism to advance their cause,tactics that are also promoted by the fourth group in the analysis, the Tamil Tigers. Since theTamil Tigers have no connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, their inclusion in ourcomparative analysis allows us to determine how much of the commonality of goals acrossterrorist organizations pertains to common roots and how much pertains to commonality oforganizational type, function or tactics.

Islami liikumine ja vägivalla kasutamine:

Blowing Kirdis

.

Despite recent academic and popular focus on violent transnational Islamic terrorist networks,there is a multiplicity of Islamic movements. This multiplicity presents scholars with two puzzles. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? First, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Second, I argue that transnationalization creates uncertainty for groups about their identity and claims at the transnational level. The medium adopted, st. use of violence versus non-violence, is dependent on type of transnationalization, the actors encounter at the transnational level, and leadership’s interpretations on where the movement should go next. To answer my questions, I will look at four cases: (1) Turkish Islam, (2) the Muslim Brotherhood, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, ja (4) Tablighi Jamaat

Muslim Brotherhood Ameerika Ühendriikides

USA juhtkond. Muslim Brotherhood (MB, või Ikhwan) on öelnud, et selle eesmärk

Steven Merley

USA juhtkond. Muslim Brotherhood (MB, või Ikhwan) on öelnud, et selle eesmärk oli ja on džihaad suunatud USA hävitamisele. seestpoolt.

Vennaskonna juhtkond on ka öelnud, et selle eesmärgi saavutamise vahend on islami organisatsioonide loomine USA-s. moslemivennaskonna kontrolli all.

Alates 1960. aastate algusest, vennaskond on loonud keeruka varjatud organisatsioonilise infrastruktuuri, millele on ehitatud hulk avalikke või „rindeorganisatsioone“.

Praegune USA. Vennaskonna juhtkond on püüdnud seda ajalugu eitada, mõlemad väidavad, et see pole täpne, ja samal ajal ütlevad, et see esindab Vennaskonnas vanemat mõtteviisi.

Avalike ja privaatsete vennaskonna dokumentide läbivaatamine, siiski, näitab, et see ajalugu on nii täpne kui ka see, et Vennaskond ei ole midagi ette võtnud, et näidata oma mõtteviisi ja / või tegevuse muutust.