Alle poster i "Ikhwanophobia" Kategori

Moderat og radikal islam

ENGEL RABASA

En af komponenterne i denne undersøgelse er relevant for et spørgsmål, som jeg blev bedt om at besvare,hvilket er, hvor radikal islam adskiller sig fra moderat eller mainstream islam. Ærligt talt, et af de problemer, vi har fundet i diskursen om islam, er, at begreberne "radikal" eller "moderat" ofte bruges på en subjektiv og upræcis måde., uden at gennemgå en proces med kritisk undersøgelse af, hvad disse udtryk betyder. I nogle tilfælde, begrebet radikal eller militant defineres i form af støtte til terrorisme eller andre former for vold. Web mener, at dette er for snævert et fokus, at der er, faktisk, et meget større univers, offundamentalistiske eller salafiske grupper, som måske ikke selv udøver vold, men som udbreder en ideologi, der skaber betingelserne for vold, og som er undergravende for de demokratiske samfunds værdier.

Challenges to Democracy in the Arab and Muslim World

Alon Ben-Meir

President Bush’s notions that democratizing Iraq will have a ripple effect on the rest ofthe Arab world, bringing prosperity and peace to the region, and that democracy is the panaceafor Islamic terrorism are unsubstantiated as well as grossly misleading. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. Faktisk, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. Ud over, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.

Ikhwan i Nordamerika: En kort historie

Douglas Farah

Ron Sandee

The current federal court case against the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development (HLF) in Dallas, Texas,1 offers an unprecedented inside look into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, as well as its goals and structure. The documents discuss recruitment, organization, ideology and the development of the organization in different phases in the United States. The prosecution in the case has presented many internal Muslim Brotherhood documents from the 1980’s and early 1990’s that give a first-ever, public view of the history and ideology behind the operations of the Muslim Brothers (known as the Ikhwan or The Group) in the U.S. over the past four decades. For researchers, the documents have the added weight of being written by the Ikhwan leaders themselves, rather than interpretations of secondary sources.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Belgium

Steve Merley,
Senioranalytiker

The Global Muslim Brotherhood has been present in Europe since 1960 when SaidRamadan, the grandson of Hassan Al-Banna, founded a mosque in Munich.1 Since that time,Brotherhood organizations have been established in almost all of the EU countries, as well asnon-EU countries such as Russia and Turkey. Despite operating under other names, some ofthe organizations in the larger countries are recognized as part of the global MuslimBrotherhood. For eksempel, the Union des Organizations Islamiques de France (UOIF) isgenerally regarded as part of the Muslim Brotherhood in France. The network is alsobecoming known in some of the smaller countries such as the Netherlands, where a recentNEFA Foundation report detailed the activities of the Muslim Brotherhood in that country.2Neighboring Belgium has also become an important center for the Muslim Brotherhood inEurope. A 2002 report by the Intelligence Committee of the Belgian Parliament explainedhow the Brotherhood operates in Belgium:“The State Security Service has been following the activities of the InternationalMuslim Brotherhood in Belgium since 1982. The International MuslimBrotherhood has had a clandestine structure for nearly 20 flere år. The identityof the members is secret; they operate in the greatest discretion. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,i denne sammenhæng, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

The Muslim Brotherhood in Europe

Det Muslimske Broderskabs U.S. Netværk

Zeyno Baran

Det Muslimske Broderskabs Erobring af Europa

Lorenzo Vidino

Siden grundlæggelsen i 1928, det muslimske broderskab (Hizb al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) has profoundly influenced the political life of the Middle East. Its motto is telling: “Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. The Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”

While the Brotherhood’s radical ideas have shaped the beliefs of generations of Islamists, over the past two decades, it has lost some of its power and appeal in the Middle East, crushed by harsh repression from local regimes and snubbed by the younger generations of Islamists who often prefer more radical organizations.

But the Middle East is only one part of the Muslim world. Europe has become an incubator for Islamist thought and political development. Siden begyndelsen af ​​1960'erne, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and slowly but steadily established a wide and well-organized network of mosques, charities, and Islamic organizations. Unlike the larger Islamic community, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ultimate goal may not be simply “to help Muslims be the best citizens they can be,” but rather to extend Islamic law throughout Europe and the United States.[2]

Four decades of teaching and cultivation have paid off. The student refugees who migrated from the Middle East forty years ago and their descendants now lead organizations that represent the local Muslim communities in their engagement with Europe’s political elite. Funded by generous contributors from the Persian Gulf, they preside over a centralized network that spans nearly every European country.

These organizations represent themselves as mainstream, even as they continue to embrace the Brotherhood’s radical views and maintain links to terrorists. With moderate rhetoric and well-spoken German, Dutch, and French, they have gained acceptance among European governments and media alike. Politicians across the political spectrum rush to engage them whenever an issue involving Muslims arises or, more parochially, when they seek the vote of the burgeoning Muslim community.

But, speaking Arabic or Turkish before their fellows Muslims, they drop their facade and embrace radicalism. While their representatives speak about interfaith dialogue and integration on television, their mosques preach hate and warn worshippers about the evils of Western society. While they publicly condemn the murder of commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, they continue to raise money for Hamas and other terrorist organizations. Europeans, eager to create a dialogue with their increasingly disaffected Muslim minority, overlook this duplicity. The case is particularly visible in Germany, which retains a place of key importance in Europe, not only because of its location at the heart of Europe, but also because it played host to the first major wave of Muslim Brotherhood immigrants and is host to the best-organized Brotherhood presence. The German government’s reaction is also instructive if only to show the dangers of accepting Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric at face value, without looking at the broader scope of its activities.

Qutbism: En ideologi om islamisk-fascisme

DALE C. EIKMEIER

Den nyligt offentliggjorte nationale militærstrategiske plan for krigen mod terrorisme (NMSP-WOT) skal have ros for at identificere "ideologi" som al Qaedas tyngdepunkt.1 Identifikationen af ​​en ideologi som tyngdepunktet snarere end et individ eller en gruppe er et væsentligt skift fra en "fang og dræb"-filosofi til en strategi fokuseret på at besejre årsagen til islamisk terrorisme. Derfor, Planens primære fokus er på at angribe og imødegå en ideologi, der giver næring til islamisk terrorisme. uheldigvis,NMSP-WOT formår ikke at identificere ideologien eller foreslå måder at imødegå den på. Planen beskriver blot ideologien som "ekstremistisk". Denne beskrivelse bidrager kun lidt til offentlighedens forståelse af truslen eller til strategens evner, som i sidste ende skal angribe og besejre den. Hensigten med denne artikel er at identificere ideologien for de islamiske terrorister og anbefale, hvordan man med succes kan imødegå den. Sun Tzuwisely sagde, "Kend fjenden og kend dig selv; i hundrede kampe vil du aldrig være i fare.«2 Vores succes i krigen mod terrorisme afhænger af at vide, hvem fjenden er og forstå hans ideologi. Mens karakterisering og mærkning af en fjende tjener et sådant formål, det er kun nyttigt, hvis etiketterne er klart defineret og forstået. Ellers, alt for brede karakteriseringer slører vores evne til virkelig at "kende fjenden,” de diffusebestræbelser, og placere potentielle allierede og neutrale i fjendens lejr. uheldigvis,The War on Terrorisms brug af etiketter bidrager meget til de misforståelser, der er forbundet med sidstnævnte. Faktum er, fem år efter 9/11 theNMSP-WOT giver lidt specifik vejledning, andet end at betegne fjenden som ekstremistisk.3 Denne manglende evne til at fokusere på den specifikke trussel og dens understøttende filosofi afspejler vores egen stive tilslutning til politisk korrekthed og bliver udnyttet af militante islamister, der fremstiller disse alt for brede beskrivelser som en krig mod islam.Som David F.. Forte udtaler: "Vi må ikke fejle . . . at skelne mellem de drabsagtige revolutionære som bin Laden og mainstream muslimske troende.

Terroristiske og ekstremistiske bevægelser i Mellemøsten

Terrorisme og asymmetrisk krigsførelse er næppe nye træk ved den mellemøstlige militære balance, og Islamicextremism er næppe den eneste kilde til ekstremistisk vold. Der er mange alvorlige etniske og sekteriske forskelle i Mellemøsten, og disse har længe ført til sporadisk vold inden for givne stater, og nogle gange til større civile konflikter. Borgerkrigene i Yemen og Dhofar-oprøret i Oman er eksempler, ligesom den lange historie med borgerkrig i Libanon og Syriens voldelige undertrykkelse af islamiske politiske grupper, der var imod Hafez al-Asads regime. Den stigende magt i den palæstinensiske befrielsesorganisation (PLO) førte til en borgerkrig i Jordan i september1970. Den iranske revolution i 1979 blev efterfulgt af alvorlig politisk kamp, og et forsøg på at eksportere en teokratisk revolution, der var med til at udløse krigen mellem Iran og Irak. Bahrain og Saudi-Arabien har begge haft civile sammenstød mellem deres sunnitiske herskende eliter og fjendtlige shi'itter, og disse sammenstød førte til betydelig vold i Saudi-Arabiens tilfælde., imidlertid, har været en lang historie med voldelig islamisk ekstremisme i regionen, undertiden opmuntret af regimer, der senere blev målet for de islamister, de oprindeligt støttede. Sadat forsøgte at bruge islamiske bevægelser som en modvirker mod sin verdslige opposition i Egypten for kun at blive myrdet af en sådan bevægelse efter hans fredsaftale med Israel. Israel troede, at det var sikkert at sponsorere islamiske bevægelser efter 1967 som en tæller mod PLO, kun for at se den hurtige fremkomst af voldeligt anti-israelske grupper. Nord- og Syd Yemen var stedet for grupper og borgerkrige siden begyndelsen af ​​1960'erne, og det var en borgerkrig i Syd Yemen, der i sidste ende førte til sammenbruddet af dets regime og dets fusion med Nord Yemen i 1990. Shahens fald førte til en islamistisk overtagelse i Iran, og modstand mod den sovjetiske invasion af Afghanistan udløste en islamistisk reaktion, der stadig påvirker Mellemøsten og hele den islamiske verden. Saudi-Arabien måtte håndtere et oprør ved den store moske i Mekka i 1979. Denne opstands religiøse karakter delte mange elementer i de bevægelser, der opstod efter den sovjetiske tilbagetrækning fra Afghanistan og Golfkrigen i 1991. Algeriets bestræbelser på at undertrykke sejren for islamiske politiske partier i et demokratisk valg i 1992 blev efterfulgt af en borgerkrig, der har varet lige siden. Egypten kæmpede en lang og stort set vellykket kamp med sine egne Islamice-ekstremister i 1990'erne, men Egypten har kun formået at have undertrykt sådanne bevægelser snarere end udryddet dem. I resten af ​​den arabiske verden, borgerkrigene i Kosovo og Bosnien var med til at skabe nye islamiske ekstremistiske kadre. Saudi-Arabien led af to store terrorangreb før 2001. Disse angreb ramte på et National GuardTraining center og USAF kaserne i Al Khobar, og mindst én ser ud til at have været resultatet af Islamicextremists. Marokko, Libyen, Tunesien, Jordan, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, og Yemen har alle set hårde islamistiske bevægelser blive en alvorlig national trussel. Mens de ikke direkte er en del af regionen, Sudan har kæmpet en 15 år lang borgerkrig, der sandsynligvis har kostet over to millioner menneskeliv, og denne krig var blevet understøttet af hårde islamistiske elementer i det arabiske nord. Somalia har siden dengang været borgerkrig 1991 der har gjort det muligt for islamistiske celler at operere i dette land.

Den politiske islams død

Jon B. Alterman

The obituaries for political Islam have begun to be written. After years of seemingly unstoppablegrowth, Islamic parties have begun to stumble. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. I stedet, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, imidlertid, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, Saudi Arabien, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. I Mellemøsten, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. islam, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.

TERORRISKE DIASPORAS I MELLEMØSTEN OG SYDASIEN

Shannon Peterson

David Goetze

Ever since the Bush administration’s declaration of a global war on terror after 9/11,academics and policymakers have sought ways to counter the global terrorist threat. However asJeffrey Record (2003) has noted, treating terrorism monolithically and failing to discriminatebetween terrorist groups and other actors reduces the ability to produce effectivecounterterrorism strategies. i øvrigt, it can set actors “on a course of open-ended andgratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat.” If terrorism andterrorist groups are not homogenous entities, then understanding the differences and similaritiesbetween groups is a crucial first step in constructing an effective counterterrorist response.This research seeks to better discriminate between terrorist groups by examining thegoals, tactics and images embedded in the narratives of terrorist or terrorist spawningorganizations. We define narratives as shared understandings of historical events and relevantactors that are used to justify past political actions or mobilize people for contemporary politicalactions as generally expressed through descriptions or charters issued by organizations orthrough statements of organizational leaders.2 Narrative, as noted by Benedict Anderson, formsthe underbelly of an “imagined community:” the glue binding a group of like-minded individualswho, “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet inthe minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 6). følgelig, we believethat narratives are excellent sources for uncovering group conceptions of “self” and “others” thatare key in attracting and maintaining ties to diaspora communities, as well as related group goals,strategies and tactics. We argue that by comparing the goals, images and tactics embedded in thenarratives of these different organizations, we can shed insight on crucial differences andsimilarities between these terrorist groups. These insights not only help discriminate betweenterrorist groups and other organizations, but also shed insight on the evolution of suchorganizations themselves.Specifically, this research examines the narratives of four groups: the MuslimBrotherhood, Hamas, Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers. Two of these groups, Hamas and AlQaeda, have roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore can be viewed as diasporas of thelatter. Imidlertid, while the Muslim Brotherhood takes an evolutionary and nonviolent approachto goal attainment, Hamas and Al Qaeda advocate violence and terrorism to advance their cause,tactics that are also promoted by the fourth group in the analysis, the Tamil Tigers. Since theTamil Tigers have no connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, their inclusion in ourcomparative analysis allows us to determine how much of the commonality of goals acrossterrorist organizations pertains to common roots and how much pertains to commonality oforganizational type, function or tactics.

Islamic Movements and the Use of Violence:

Esen Kirdis

.

Despite recent academic and popular focus on violent transnational Islamic terrorist networks,there is a multiplicity of Islamic movements. This multiplicity presents scholars with two puzzles. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? Først, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Second, I argue that transnationalization creates uncertainty for groups about their identity and claims at the transnational level. The medium adopted, i.e. use of violence versus non-violence, is dependent on type of transnationalization, the actors encounter at the transnational level, and leadership’s interpretations on where the movement should go next. To answer my questions, I will look at four cases: (1) Turkish Islam, (2) det muslimske broderskab, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, og (4) Tablighi Jamaat

Det Muslimske Broderskab i USA

Ledelsen af ​​U.S. muslimsk Broderskab (MB, eller Ikhwan) har sagt, at dets mål

Steven Merley

Ledelsen af ​​U.S. muslimsk Broderskab (MB, eller Ikhwan) har sagt, at dens mål var og er jihad rettet mod at ødelægge U.S. indefra.

Broderskabets ledelse har også sagt, at midlet til at nå dette mål er at etablere islamiske organisationer i USA. under Det Muslimske Broderskabs kontrol.

Siden begyndelsen af ​​1960'erne, Broderskabet har konstrueret en omfattende skjult organisatorisk infrastruktur, hvorpå der blev bygget et sæt offentlige eller "front"-organisationer.

Det nuværende U.S. Broderskabets ledelse har forsøgt at benægte denne historie, både at hævde, at det ikke er nøjagtigt, og samtidig at sige, at det repræsenterer en ældre form for tanke i Broderskabet.

En undersøgelse af offentlige og private broderskabsdokumenter, imidlertid, angiver, at denne historie både er nøjagtig, og at Broderskabet ikke har truffet nogen handling for at demonstrere ændringer i dets tankemåde og/eller aktivitet.