RSSAll Entries in the "Ikhwanophobia" Category

Umírněný a radikální islám

Angel Rabasa

One of the components of this study is relevant to a question that I was asked to address,which is how radical Islam differs from moderate or mainstream Islam. Frankly, one ofthe problems that we have found in the discourse about Islam is that the terms “radical”or “moderate” are often used in a subjective and imprecise way, without going through aprocess of critically examining what these terms mean. In some cases, the term radical ormilitant is defined in terms of support for terrorism or other forms of violence. Webelieve that this is too narrow a focus, that there is, in fact, a much larger universe offundamentalist or Salafi groups who may not themselves practice violence, but thatpropagate an ideology that creates the conditions for violence and that is subversive ofthe values of democratic societies.

Výzvy k demokracii v arabském a muslimském světě

Alon Ben-Meir

President Bush’s notions that democratizing Iraq will have a ripple effect on the rest ofthe Arab world, bringing prosperity and peace to the region, and that democracy is the panaceafor Islamic terrorism are unsubstantiated as well as grossly misleading. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. In fact, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. In addition, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.

Ikhwanu v Severní Americe: Krátká historie

Douglas Farah

Ron Sandee


Aktuální federální soud proti Nadace Svaté země pro obnovu a rozvoj (HLF) in Dallas, Texas,1 offers an unprecedented inside look into the history of the Muslim Brotherhood in the United States, as well as its goals and structure. The documents discuss recruitment, organization, ideology and the development of the organization in different phases in the United States. The prosecution in the case has presented many internal Muslim Brotherhood documents from the 1980’s and early 1990’s that give a first-ever, public view of the history and ideology behind the operations of the Muslim Brothers (known as the Ikhwan or The Group) in the U.S. over the past four decades. For researchers, the documents have the added weight of being written by the Ikhwan leaders themselves, rather than interpretations of secondary sources.

Muslimské bratrstvo v Belgii

Steve Merley,
Senior Analyst


Globální muslimské bratrstvo je v Evropě přítomno od té doby 1960 když SaidRamadan, vnuk Hassana Al-Banna, založil mešitu v Mnichově.1 Od té doby,Bratrské organizace byly založeny téměř ve všech zemích EU, stejně jako nečlenské země EU, jako je Rusko a Turecko. Navzdory působení pod jinými jmény, některé z organizací ve větších zemích jsou uznávány jako součást globálního Muslimského bratrství. Například, Unie islámských organizací ve Francii (UOIF) je obecně považována za součást Muslimského bratrstva ve Francii. Síť je také známá v některých menších zemích, jako je Nizozemsko, kde nedávná zpráva Nadace NEFA podrobně popisuje aktivity Muslimského bratrstva v této zemi.2 Sousední Belgie se také stala důležitým centrem Muslimského bratrstva v Evropě. A 2002 zpráva zpravodajského výboru belgického parlamentu vysvětlila, jak Bratrstvo působí v Belgii:"Státní bezpečnostní služba od té doby sleduje aktivity Mezinárodního muslimského bratrstva v Belgii." 1982. The International MuslimBrotherhood has had a clandestine structure for nearly 20 let. The identityof the members is secret; they operate in the greatest discretion. They seek tospread their ideology within the Islamic community of Belgium and they aimin particular at the young people of the second and third generation ofimmigrants. In Belgium as in other European countries, they try to take controlof the religious, social, and sports associations and establish themselves asprivileged interlocutors of the national authorities in order to manage Islamicaffairs. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,in this context, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

Muslimské bratrstvo v Evropě

T vám Brigi maršál
Shumuliyyat al-islám (Islám zahrnuje všechny aspekty života) je prvním z dvaceti principů stanovených v
zakladatel hnutí Muslimské bratrstvo, Hassan al-Banna, naučit své následovníky správnému porozumění
islámu. I když tento princip, obvykle se překládá jako „komplexní způsob života,„Stále zůstává nedílnou součástí
k učení členů Bratrstva, jak v Egyptě, tak v Evropě, je to kupodivu dost
ani komentováno ve vědeckých referencích, ani širší veřejností. Když federace islámské
Organizace v Evropě (FIOE, zastupující hnutí Muslimské bratrstvo na evropské úrovni) v lednu představila evropskou muslimskou chartu mezinárodnímu tisku 2008, nikdo neurčil tuto „univerzální dimenzi“ svého chápání islámu navzdory potenciálnímu napětí nebo dokonce neslučitelnosti, politické i politické
právní, že tento koncept může mít v diskurzu o integraci a občanství. Co tradičně říkají muslimští bratři o tomto konceptu a jak ospravedlňují svou výzvu k němu? Jaké jsou jeho složky
a rozsah jeho použití? Existují nějaké významné úpravy konceptu při pokusu o jeho kontextualizaci v rámci pluralitní Evropy?

Muslimské bratrstvo v USA. Síť

Zeyno Baran


Washington DC. se náhle velmi zajímal o Muslimské bratrstvo. Američtí tvůrci politik diskutují o tom, zda zapojit nenásilné prvky sítě Muslimského bratrstva, uvnitř i vně Spojených států, v naději, že taková angažovanost posílí tyto „umírněné“ proti násilným wahhábistickým a salafistickým skupinám, jako je al-Káida. bohužel, tato strategie je založena na mylném předpokladu: že „umírněné“ islamistické skupiny budou čelit a oslabit své násilné spoluvěřící, okradl je o základnu podpory.
Tato strategie menšího ze dvou zla připomíná důvody, které vedly k rozhodnutí éry studené války podpořit afghánské mudžáhidy proti sovětské armádě. V krátkodobém horizontu, Spojené státy. spojenectví s mudžáhidy skutečně pomohlo Americe v jejím boji proti Sovětskému svazu. Z dlouhodobého hlediska, nicméně, U.S. podpora vedla k zmocnění nebezpečného a mocného protivníka. Při výběru svých spojenců, Spojené státy. si nemůže dovolit povýšit krátkodobé taktické úvahy nad dlouhodobější strategické. A co je nejdůležitější, Spojené státy. musí vzít v úvahu ideologii potenciálních partnerů.
Ačkoli se různé islamistické skupiny hádají o taktiku a často se navzájem znají nepřátelsky, všichni se shodují na koncovce: svět diktovaný politickým islámem. Strategie „rozděl a panuj“ Spojenými státy je bude jen přibližovat k sobě.

Muslimské bratrstvo je dobytí Evropy

Lorenzo Vidino


Od svého založení v 1928, Muslimské bratrstvo (Hizb al-Ikhwan al-Muslimun) hluboce ovlivnil politický život na Středním východě. Jeho motto je výmluvné: “Naším cílem je Alláh. Prorok je náš vůdce. Korán je náš zákon. Džihád je naše cesta. Umírání v cestě Alláha je naší nejvyšší nadějí.”

Zatímco radikální myšlenky Bratrstva formovaly víru generací islamistů, za poslední dvě desetiletí, ztratila část své síly a přitažlivosti na Středním východě, rozdrcen tvrdými represemi ze strany místních režimů a uražen mladší generací islamistů, kteří často upřednostňují radikálnější organizace.

Blízký východ je však pouze jednou částí muslimského světa. Evropa se stala inkubátorem islámského myšlení a politického rozvoje. Od počátku šedesátých let, Členové a sympatizanti Muslimského bratrstva se přestěhovali do Evropy a pomalu, ale stabilně vytvářeli širokou a dobře organizovanou síť mešit, charitativní organizace, a islámské organizace. Na rozdíl od větší islámské komunity, konečný cíl Muslimského bratrstva nemusí být jednoduchý “pomoci muslimům být nejlepšími občany, jakými mohou být,” ale spíše rozšířit islámské právo po celé Evropě a Spojených státech.[2]

Čtyři desetiletí výuky a kultivace se vyplatila. Studentští uprchlíci, kteří před čtyřiceti lety migrovali ze Středního východu, a jejich potomci nyní vedou organizace, které zastupují místní muslimské komunity v jejich zapojení do evropské politické elity.. Financováno velkorysými přispěvateli z Perského zálivu, předsedají centralizované síti pokrývající téměř všechny evropské země.

Tyto organizace se představují jako hlavní proud, i když nadále přijímají radikální názory Bratrstva a udržují kontakty s teroristy. S umírněnou rétorikou a dobře mluvenou němčinou, Holandský, a francouzsky, získaly uznání mezi evropskými vládami i médii. Politici napříč politickým spektrem spěchají, aby je zapojili, kdykoli nastane problém zahrnující muslimy nebo, parochiálněji, když usilují o hlas narůstající muslimské komunity.

Ale, arabsky nebo turecky před muslimy, upustí svou fasádu a přijmou radikalismus. Zatímco jejich zástupci hovoří o mezináboženském dialogu a integraci v televizi, jejich mešity hlásají nenávist a varují věřící před zlem západní společnosti. Zatímco veřejně odsuzují vraždu dojíždějících v Madridu a školních dětí v Rusku, nadále shromažďují peníze pro Hamas a další teroristické organizace. Evropané, touží navázat dialog s jejich stále více neloajální muslimskou menšinou, tuto duplicitu přehlédnout. Případ je zvláště viditelný v Německu, který si v Evropě zachovává klíčový význam, nejen díky své poloze v srdci Evropy, ale také proto, že hostil první velkou vlnu přistěhovalců Muslimského bratrstva a je hostitelem nejlépe organizované přítomnosti Bratrstva. Reakce německé vlády je rovněž poučná, i kdyby jen ukázala nebezpečí přijetí rétoriky Muslimského bratrstva v nominální hodnotě, aniž by se zabývala širším rozsahem jejích činností.

Qutbism: Ideologie islámského fašismu

DALE C. EIKMEIER

Nedávno zveřejněný národní vojenský strategický plán pro válku proti terorismu (NMSP-WOT) je třeba pochválit za identifikaci „ideologie“ jako těžiště Al-Káidy.1 Identifikace ideologie jako těžiště gravitace spíše než jednotlivce nebo skupiny je významným posunem od filozofie „zajmutí a zabití“ ke strategii zaměřené na porážku kořen islámského terorismu. Podle toho, hlavním cílem plánu je útok a potírání ideologie, která podporuje islámský terorismus. bohužel,NMSP-WOT nedokáže identifikovat ideologii nebo navrhnout způsoby, jak s ní čelit. Plán pouze popisuje ideologii jako „extremistickou“. Tento popis přispívá jen málo k tomu, aby veřejnost chápala hrozbu nebo schopnosti stratéga, který ji nakonec musí napadnout a porazit. Účelem tohoto článku je identifikovat ideologii islámských teroristů a doporučit, jak jí úspěšně čelit. Řekl Sun Tzuwisely, "Poznej nepřítele a poznej sám sebe."; za sto bitev nikdy nebudete v nebezpečí. “2 Náš úspěch ve válce proti terorismu závisí na tom, kdo je nepřítel, a na tom, aby porozuměl jeho ideologii. Charakterizace a označení štítu může tomuto účelu sloužit., je to užitečné, pouze pokud jsou štítky jasně definované a srozumitelné. v opačném případě, příliš široká charakteristika zakrývá naši schopnost skutečně „poznat nepřítele,„Šíří úsilí, a umístit potenciální spojence a neutrály do nepřátelského tábora. bohužel,válka proti používání terorismu značkami značně přispívá k nepochopení spojenému s posledně jmenovanými. Skutečnost je, pět let poté 9/11 the NMSP-WOT poskytuje málo konkrétních pokynů, Tato neschopnost zaměřit se na konkrétní hrozbu a její podpůrná filozofie odráží naše vlastní přísné dodržování politické korektnosti a je zneužívána mocnými islamisty, kteří tyto příliš široké popisy vykreslují jako válku proti islámu.. Forte uvádí: „Wemust nesmí selhat . . . rozlišovat mezi vražednými revolucionáři, jako je bin Ládin, a hlavními muslimskými věřícími.

Teroristických a extremistických hnutí na Blízkém východě

Anthony H. Cordesman

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamic
extremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differences
in the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civil
conflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civil
war in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-
Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (OOP) led to a civil war in Jordan in September
1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocratic
revolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between their
Sunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.
There also, nicméně, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged by
regimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamic
movements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after his
peace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to the
OOP, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene of
coups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapse
of its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.
The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggered
an Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal with
an uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elements
of the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.
Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed by
a civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamic
extremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicated
them. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.
Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National Guard
Training center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamic
extremists. Maroko, Libya, Tunisko, Jordán, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamist
movements become a serious national threat.
While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over two
million lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has also
been the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.a

Terrorism and asymmetric warfare are scarcely new features of the Middle Eastern military balance, and Islamicextremism is scarcely the only source of extremist violence. There are many serious ethnic and sectarian differencesin the Middle East, and these have long led to sporadic violence within given states, and sometimes to major civilconflicts. The civil wars in Yemen and the Dhofar Rebellion in Oman are examples, as are the long history of civilwar in Lebanon and Syria’s violent suppression of Islamic political groups that opposed the regime of Hafez al-Asad. The rising power of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (OOP) led to a civil war in Jordan in September1970. The Iranian revolution in 1979 was followed by serious political fighting, and an effort to export a theocraticrevolution that helped trigger the Iran-Iraq War. Bahrain and Saudi Arabia have both had civil clashes between theirSunni ruling elites and hostile Shi’ites and these clashes led to significant violence in the case of Saudi Arabia.There also, nicméně, has been a long history of violent Islamic extremism in the region, sometimes encouraged byregimes that later became the target of the very Islamists they initially supported. Sadat attempted to use Islamicmovements as a counter to his secular opposition in Egypt only to be assassinated by one such movement after hispeace agreement with Israel. Israel thought it safe to sponsor Islamic movements after 1967 as a counter to thePLO, only to see the rapid emergence of violently anti-Israeli groups. North and South Yemen were the scene ofcoups and civil wars since the early 1960s, and it was a civil war in South Yemen that ultimately led to the collapseof its regime and its merger with North Yemen in 1990.The fall of the shah led to an Islamist takeover in Iran, and resistance to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan triggeredan Islamist reaction that still influences the Middle East and the entire Islamic world. Saudi Arabia had to deal withan uprising at the Grand Mosque in Mecca in 1979. The religious character of this uprising shared many elementsof the movements that arose after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and the Gulf War in 1991.Algerian efforts to suppress the victory of Islamic political parties in a democratic election in 1992 were followed bya civil war that has lasted ever since. Egypt fought a long and largely successful battle with its own Islamicextremists in the 1990s, but Egypt has only managed to have suppressed such movements rather than eradicatedthem. In the rest of the Arab World, the civil wars in Kosovo and Bosnia helped create new Islamic extremist cadres.Saudi Arabia suffered from two major terrorist attacks before 2001. These attacks struck at a National GuardTraining center and USAF barracks at Al Khobar, and at least one seems to have been the result of Islamicextremists. Maroko, Libya, Tunisko, Jordán, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, and Yemen have all seen hard-line Islamistmovements become a serious national threat.While not directly part of the region, the Sudan has fought a 15-year long civil war that has probably cost over twomillion lives, and this war had been supported by hard-line Islamist elements in the Arab north. Somalia has alsobeen the scene of a civil war since 1991 that has allowed Islamist cells to operate in that country.

Smrt politického islámu

Jon B. Alterman

The obituaries for political Islam have begun to be written. After years of seemingly unstoppablegrowth, Islamic parties have begun to stumble. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. Instead, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, nicméně, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, SaudiArabia, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. In the Middle East, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. Islám, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.

TERORRIST Diaspory V Středním východě av jižní Asii

Shannon Peterson

David Goetze


Ever since the Bush administration’s declaration of a global war on terror after 9/11,academics and policymakers have sought ways to counter the global terrorist threat. However asJeffrey Record (2003) has noted, treating terrorism monolithically and failing to discriminatebetween terrorist groups and other actors reduces the ability to produce effectivecounterterrorism strategies. navíc, it can set actors “on a course of open-ended andgratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat.” If terrorism andterrorist groups are not homogenous entities, then understanding the differences and similaritiesbetween groups is a crucial first step in constructing an effective counterterrorist response.This research seeks to better discriminate between terrorist groups by examining thegoals, tactics and images embedded in the narratives of terrorist or terrorist spawningorganizations. We define narratives as shared understandings of historical events and relevantactors that are used to justify past political actions or mobilize people for contemporary politicalactions as generally expressed through descriptions or charters issued by organizations orthrough statements of organizational leaders.2 Narrative, as noted by Benedict Anderson, formsthe underbelly of an “imagined community:” the glue binding a group of like-minded individualswho, “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet inthe minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 6). Consequently, we believethat narratives are excellent sources for uncovering group conceptions of “self” and “others” thatare key in attracting and maintaining ties to diaspora communities, as well as related group goals,strategies and tactics. We argue that by comparing the goals, images and tactics embedded in thenarratives of these different organizations, we can shed insight on crucial differences andsimilarities between these terrorist groups. These insights not only help discriminate betweenterrorist groups and other organizations, but also shed insight on the evolution of suchorganizations themselves.Specifically, this research examines the narratives of four groups: muslimská bratrství, Hamas, Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers. Two of these groups, Hamas and AlQaeda, have roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore can be viewed as diasporas of thelatter. Nicméně, while the Muslim Brotherhood takes an evolutionary and nonviolent approachto goal attainment, Hamas and Al Qaeda advocate violence and terrorism to advance their cause,tactics that are also promoted by the fourth group in the analysis, the Tamil Tigers. Since theTamil Tigers have no connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, their inclusion in ourcomparative analysis allows us to determine how much of the commonality of goals acrossterrorist organizations pertains to common roots and how much pertains to commonality oforganizational type, function or tactics.

Islámské hnutí a použití násilí:

Zvířený Kirdis

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Despite recent academic and popular focus on violent transnational Islamic terrorist networks,there is a multiplicity of Islamic movements. This multiplicity presents scholars with two puzzles. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? First, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Second, I argue that transnationalization creates uncertainty for groups about their identity and claims at the transnational level. The medium adopted, tj. use of violence versus non-violence, is dependent on type of transnationalization, the actors encounter at the transnational level, and leadership’s interpretations on where the movement should go next. To answer my questions, I will look at four cases: (1) Turkish Islam, (2) Muslimské bratrstvo, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, a (4) Tablighi Jamaat

Muslimského bratrstva ve Spojených státech

MBusThe leadership of the U.S. Muslimské bratrstvo (MB, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal
was and is jihad aimed at destroying the U.S. from within. The Brotherhood leadership has
also said that the means of achieving this goal is to establish Islamic organizations in the
U.S. under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood. Od počátku šedesátých let, the Brotherhood has
constructed an elaborate covert organizational infrastructure on which was built a set of public or
“front” organizations. The current U.S. Brotherhood leadership has attempted to deny this history,
both claiming that it is not accurate and at the same time that saying that it represents an older
form of thought inside the Brotherhood. An examination of public and private Brotherhood documents,
nicméně, indicates that this history is both accurate and that the Brotherhood has taken
no action to demonstrate change in its mode of thought and/or activity.sss

Steven MerleyMBus

The leadership of the U.S. Muslimské bratrstvo (MB, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal was and is jihad aimed at destroying the U.S. from within.

The Brotherhood leadership has also said that the means of achieving this goal is to establish Islamic organizations in the U.S. under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Od počátku šedesátých let, the Brotherhood has constructed an elaborate covert organizational infrastructure on which was built a set of public or “front” organizations.

The current U.S. Brotherhood leadership has attempted to deny this history, both claiming that it is not accurate and at the same time that saying that it represents an older form of thought inside the Brotherhood.

An examination of public and private Brotherhood documents, nicméně, indicates that this history is both accurate and that the Brotherhood has taken no action to demonstrate change in its mode of thought and/or activity.