Alle inskrywings in die "Ikhwanophobia" Kategorie

Matig en fundamentele Islam

Angel Rabasa

Een van die komponente van hierdie studie is met betrekking tot 'n vraag wat ek gevra is om aan te spreek,dit is hoe radikale Islam verskil van matige of hoofstroom Islam. Frankly, one ofthe problems that we have found in the discourse about Islam is that the terms “radical”or “moderate” are often used in a subjective and imprecise way, without going through aprocess of critically examining what these terms mean. In some cases, the term radical ormilitant is defined in terms of support for terrorism or other forms of violence. Webelieve that this is too narrow a focus, that there is, in werklikheid, a much larger universe offundamentalist or Salafi groups who may not themselves practice violence, but thatpropagate an ideology that creates the conditions for violence and that is subversive ofthe values of democratic societies.

Uitdagings die hoof te Demokrasie in die Arabiese en Moslem wêreld

Alon Ben-Meir

President Bush se opvattings dat demokratiseer Irak sal 'n rimpeleffek op die res VAN DIE Arabiese wêreld het, bring voorspoed en vrede in die streek, en dat demokrasie is die panaceafor Islamitiese terrorisme is ongesubstansieerde sowel as erg misleidend. Even a cursory review of the Arab political landscape indicates that the rise of democracy will not automatically translateinto the establishment of enduring liberal democracies or undermine terrorism in the region. Thesame conclusion may be generally made for the Muslim political landscape. In werklikheid, given theopportunity to compete freely and fairly in elections, Islamic extremist organizations will mostlikely emerge triumphant. In the recent elections in Lebanon and Egypt, Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood respectively, won substantial gains, and in Palestine Hamas won thenational Parliamentary elections handedly. That they did so is both a vivid example of the today’spolitical realities and an indicator of future trends. And if current sentiments in the Arab statesoffer a guide, any government formed by elected Islamist political parties will be more antagonistic to the West than the authoritarian regimes still in power. Daarby, there are noindications that democracy is a prerequisite to defeating terrorism or any empirical data tosupport the claim of linkage between existing authoritarian regimes and terrorism.

Die Ikhwan in Noord-Amerika: 'N Kort Geskiedenis

Douglas Farah

Ron Sandee

Die huidige federale hof saak teen die Heilige Land Stigting vir Retief en Ontwikkeling (HLF) in Dallas, Texas,1 bied 'n ongekende binne kyk na die geskiedenis van die Moslem-broederskap in die Verenigde State, sowel as die doelwitte en strukture. Die dokumente bespreek werwing, organisasie, ideologie en die ontwikkeling van die organisasie in verskillende fases in die Verenigde State. Die vervolging in die geval het aangebied baie interne Moslem-broederskap dokumente uit die 1980's en vroeë 1990's wat gee 'n eerste-ooit, openbare siening van die geskiedenis en ideologie agter die werksaamhede van die Moslem-broers (bekend as die Ikhwan of die groep) in die VSA. oor die afgelope vier dekades. Vir navorsers, die dokumente het die bykomende gewig van wat geskryf is deur die Ikhwan leiers hulself, eerder as interpretasies van sekondêre bronne.

Die Moslem-broederskap in België

Steve Merley,
Senior Analis

Die Global Moslem-broederskap is teenwoordig in Europa sedert 1960 wanneer SaidRamadan, die kleinseun van Hassan Al-Banna, het 'n moskee in München gestig.1 Sedertdien,Broederskapsorganisasies is in byna al die EU-lande gestig, sowel as lande sonder die EU soos Rusland en Turkye. Alhoewel hy onder ander name werk, sommige van die organisasies in die groter lande word erken as deel van die wêreldwye Moslem-Broederskap. Byvoorbeeld, die Unie van Islamitiese Organisasies van Frankryk (UOIF) word algemeen beskou as deel van die Moslem-broederskap in Frankryk. Die netwerk is ook bekend in sommige van die kleiner lande soos Nederland, waar 'n onlangse verslag van dieNEFA-stigting die aktiwiteite van die Moslem-broederskap in daardie land uiteengesit het ..2Neure België het ook 'n belangrike sentrum geword vir die Moslem-broederskap in Europa. A 2002 verslag deur die intelligensiekomitee van die Belgiese parlement verduidelik hoe die broederskap in België werk:“Die Staatsveiligheidsdiens volg sedertdien die aktiwiteite van die InternationalMuslim Brotherhood in België 1982. Die International MuslimBrotherhood het amper 'n klandestiene struktuur gehad 20 jaar. Die identiteit van die lede is geheim; hulle werk volgens die grootste diskresie. Hulle soek na hul ideologie binne die Islamitiese gemeenskap van België, en hulle raak veral by die jongmense van die tweede en derde geslag immigrante. In België soos in ander Europese lande, hulle probeer beheer neem oor die godsdienstige, sosiale, en sportverenigings en vestig hulself die bevoorregte gespreksgenote van die nasionale owerhede om die Islamitiese bestuur te bestuur. The Muslim Brotherhood assumes that the national authorities will bepressed more and more to select Muslim leaders for such management and,in this context, they try to insert within the representative bodies, individualsinfluenced by their ideology.

Die Moslem-broederskap in Europa

Die Moslem Broederskap se VSA. Netwerk

Zeyno Baran

Die Moslem Broederskap se Conquest van Europa

Lorenzo Vidino

Sedert sy stigting in 1928, die Moslem-broederskap (Hizb al-Ikhwan al-Moslem) het diep beïnvloed word deur die politieke lewe van die Midde-Ooste. Sy motto is vertel: “Allah is ons doelwit. Die Profeet is ons leier. Die Koran is ons reg. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”

While the Brotherhood’s radical ideas have shaped the beliefs of generations of Islamists, over the past two decades, it has lost some of its power and appeal in the Middle East, crushed by harsh repression from local regimes and snubbed by the younger generations of Islamists who often prefer more radical organizations.

But the Middle East is only one part of the Muslim world. Europe has become an incubator for Islamist thought and political development. Since the early 1960s, Muslim Brotherhood members and sympathizers have moved to Europe and slowly but steadily established a wide and well-organized network of mosques, charities, and Islamic organizations. Unlike the larger Islamic community, the Muslim Brotherhood’s ultimate goal may not be simply “to help Muslims be the best citizens they can be,” but rather to extend Islamic law throughout Europe and the United States.[2]

Four decades of teaching and cultivation have paid off. The student refugees who migrated from the Middle East forty years ago and their descendants now lead organizations that represent the local Muslim communities in their engagement with Europe’s political elite. Funded by generous contributors from the Persian Gulf, they preside over a centralized network that spans nearly every European country.

These organizations represent themselves as mainstream, even as they continue to embrace the Brotherhood’s radical views and maintain links to terrorists. With moderate rhetoric and well-spoken German, Dutch, and French, they have gained acceptance among European governments and media alike. Politicians across the political spectrum rush to engage them whenever an issue involving Muslims arises or, more parochially, when they seek the vote of the burgeoning Muslim community.

But, speaking Arabic or Turkish before their fellows Muslims, they drop their facade and embrace radicalism. While their representatives speak about interfaith dialogue and integration on television, their mosques preach hate and warn worshippers about the evils of Western society. While they publicly condemn the murder of commuters in Madrid and school children in Russia, they continue to raise money for Hamas and other terrorist organizations. Europeans, eager to create a dialogue with their increasingly disaffected Muslim minority, overlook this duplicity. The case is particularly visible in Germany, which retains a place of key importance in Europe, not only because of its location at the heart of Europe, but also because it played host to the first major wave of Muslim Brotherhood immigrants and is host to the best-organized Brotherhood presence. The German government’s reaction is also instructive if only to show the dangers of accepting Muslim Brotherhood rhetoric at face value, without looking at the broader scope of its activities.

Qutbism: 'N Ideologie van die Islamitiese-Fascisme

DALE C. EIKMEIER

Die onlangs gepubliseerde Nasionale Militêre Strategiese Plan vir die oorlog onTerrorism (NMSP-WOT) is to be commended for identifying “ideology”as al Qaeda’s center of gravity.1 The identification of an ideology as thecenter of gravity rather than an individual or group is a significant shift froma“capture and kill” philosophy to a strategy focused on defeating the rootcause of Islamic terrorism. Daarvolgens, the plan’s principal focus is on attackingand countering an ideology that fuels Islamic terrorism. Ongelukkig,the NMSP-WOT fails to identify the ideology or suggest ways tocounter it. The plan merely describes the ideology as “extremist.” This descriptioncontributes little to the public’s understanding of the threat or to thecapabilities of the strategist who ultimately must attack and defeat it. The intentof this article is to identify the ideology of the Islamic terrorists and recommendhow to successfully counter it.Sun Tzuwisely said, “Know the enemy and know yourself; in a hundredbattles you will never be in peril.”2 Our success in theWar on Terrorismdepends on knowingwho the enemy is and understanding his ideology.While characterizing and labeling an enemymay serve such a purpose, it is only usefulif the labels are clearly defined and understood. Otherwise, overly broadcharacterizations obscure our ability to truly “know the enemy,” they diffuseefforts, and place potential allies and neutrals in the enemy’s camp. Ongelukkig,theWar on Terrorism’s use of labels contributes a great deal to themisunderstandingsassociated with the latter. The fact is, five years after 9/11 theNMSP-WOT provides little specific guidance, other than labeling the enemyas extremist.3 This inability to focus on the specific threat and its supportingphilosophy reflects our own rigid adherence to political correctness and is beingexploited bymilitant Islamists portraying these overly broad descriptionsas a war against Islam.As David F. Forte states “Wemust not fail . . . to distinguishbetween the homicidal revolutionaries like bin Laden and mainstreamMuslim believers.

Terreur en Extremist Bewegings in die Midde-Ooste

Terrorisme en asimmetriese oorlogvoering skaars nuwe funksies van die Midde-Ooste militêre balans, en Islamitiese ekstremisme is skaars die enigste bron van ekstremistiese geweld. Daar is baie ernstige etniese en sektariese verskille in die Midde-Ooste, en dit het lank gelei tot sporadiese geweld binne gegewe state, en soms tot groot burgerlike konflikte. Die burgeroorloë in Jemen en die Dhofar-rebellie in Oman is voorbeelde, so ook die lang geskiedenis van burgeroorlog in Libanon en Sirië se gewelddadige onderdrukking van Islamitiese politieke groepe wat die regime van Hafez al-Asad teengestaan ​​het. Die stygende mag van die Palestynse Bevrydingsorganisasie (PLO) het in September 1970 tot 'n burgeroorlog in Jordanië gelei. Die Iranse rewolusie in 1979 is gevolg deur ernstige politieke gevegte, en 'n poging om 'n teokratiese revolusie uit te voer wat gehelp het om die Iran-Irak-oorlog te ontketen. Bahrein en Saoedi-Arabië het albei burgerlike botsings gehad tussen hul Sunni regerende elites en vyandige Sjiïete en hierdie botsings het gelei tot aansienlike geweld in die geval van Saoedi-Arabië., egter, was 'n lang geskiedenis van gewelddadige Islamitiese ekstremisme in die streek, soms aangemoedig deur regimes wat later die teiken geword het van die einste Islamiete wat hulle aanvanklik ondersteun het. Sadat het probeer om Islamitiese bewegings te gebruik as 'n teenstryd teen sy sekulêre opposisie in Egipte net om deur een so 'n beweging vermoor te word ná sy vredesooreenkoms met Israel. Israel het gedink dit is veilig om Islamitiese bewegings daarna te borg 1967 as 'n teenstryd teen die PLO, net om die vinnige opkoms van gewelddadige anti-Israeliese groepe te sien. Noord- en Suid-Jemen was sedert die vroeë 1960's die toneel van staatsgrepe en burgeroorloë, en dit was 'n burgeroorlog in Suid-Jemen wat uiteindelik gelei het tot die ineenstorting van sy regime en sy samesmelting met Noord-Jemen in 1990. Die val van die sjah het gelei tot 'n Islamitiese oorname in Iran, en weerstand teen die Sowjet-inval in Afghanistan het 'n Islamitiese reaksie ontketen wat steeds die Midde-Ooste en die hele Islamitiese wêreld beïnvloed. Saoedi-Arabië moes 'n opstand by die Groot Moskee in Mekka hanteer 1979. Die godsdienstige karakter van hierdie opstand het baie elemente gedeel van die bewegings wat ontstaan ​​het ná die Sowjet-onttrekking uit Afghanistan en die Golfoorlog in 1991. Algerynse pogings om die oorwinning van Islamitiese politieke partye in 'n demokratiese verkiesing te onderdruk in 1992 is gevolg deur 'n burgeroorlog wat sedertdien duur. Egipte het in die 1990's 'n lang en grootliks suksesvolle stryd met sy eie Islamitiese ekstremiste geveg, maar Egipte het net daarin geslaag om sulke bewegings te onderdruk eerder as om dit uit te roei. In die res van die Arabiese Wêreld, die burgeroorloë in Kosovo en Bosnië het gehelp om nuwe Islamitiese ekstremistiese kaders te skep.Saoedi-Arabië het gely onder twee groot terreuraanvalle voor 2001. Hierdie aanvalle het by 'n National Guard Training-sentrum en USAF-kaserne by Al Khobar plaasgevind, en ten minste een blyk die resultaat van Islamitiese ekstremiste te wees. Marokko, Libië, Tunisië, Jordaan, Bahrein, Katar, Oman, en Jemen het almal gesien hoe harde Islamistiese bewegings 'n ernstige nasionale bedreiging geword het. Terwyl dit nie direk deel van die streek is nie, die Soedan het 'n 15 jaar lange burgeroorlog geveg wat waarskynlik meer as twee miljoen lewens gekos het, en hierdie oorlog is ondersteun deur harde Islamitiese elemente in die Arabiese noorde. Somalië was ook sedertdien die toneel van 'n burgeroorlog 1991 wat Islamitiese selle toegelaat het om in daardie land te werk.

Die dood van politieke Islam

Jon B. Alterman

Die doodsberigte vir politieke Islam het begin om geskryf te word. Na jare van oënskynlik unstoppablegrowth, Islamitiese partye het begin om te struikel. In Morocco, the Justice and DevelopmentParty (or PJD) did far worse than expected in last September’s elections, and Jordan’sIslamic Action Front lost more than half its seats in last month’s polling. The eagerly awaitedmanifesto of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood, a draft of which appeared last September,showed neither strength nor boldness. Instead, it suggested the group was beset by intellectualcontradictions and consumed by infighting.It is too early to declare the death of political Islam, as it was premature to proclaim therebirth of liberalism in the Arab world in 2003-04, but its prospects seem notably dimmerthan they did even a year ago.To some, the fall from grace was inevitable; political Islam has collapsed under its owncontradictions, they say. They argue that, in objective terms, political Islam was never morethan smoke and mirrors. Religion is about faith and truth, and politics are about compromiseand accommodation. Seen this way, political Islam was never a holy enterprise, butmerely an effort to boost the political prospects of one side in a political debate. Backed byreligious authority and legitimacy, opposition to Islamists’ will ceased to be merely political—it became heresy—and the Islamists benefited.These skeptics see political Islam as having been a useful way to protect political movements,cow political foes, and rally support. As a governing strategy, egter, they arguethat political Islam has not produced any successes. In two areas where it recently rose topower, the Palestinian Authority and Iraq, governance has been anemic. In Iran, where themullahs have been in power for almost three decades, clerics struggle for respect and thecountry hemorrhages money to Dubai and other overseas markets with more predictablerules and more positive returns. The most avowedly religious state in the Middle East, SaudiArabia, has notably less intellectual freedom than many of its neighbors, and the guardiansof orthodoxy there carefully circumscribe religious thought. As the French scholar of Islam,Olivier Roy, memorably observed more than a decade ago, the melding of religion and politics did not sanctify politics, it politicizedreligion.But while Islam has not provided a coherent theory of governance, let alone a universally accepted approach to the problems ofhumanity, the salience of religion continues to grow among many Muslims.That salience goes far beyond issues of dress, which have become more conservative for both women and men in recent years, andbeyond language, which invokes God’s name far more than was the case a decade ago. It also goes beyond the daily practice ofIslam—from prayer to charity to fasting—all of which are on the upswing.What has changed is something even more fundamental than physical appearance or ritual practice, and that is this: A growingnumber of Muslims start from the proposition that Islam is relevant to all aspects of their daily lives, and not merely the province oftheology or personal belief.Some see this as a return to traditionalism in the Middle East, when varying measures of superstition and spirituality governed dailylife. More accurately, though, what we are seeing is the rise of “neo-traditionalism,” in which symbols and slogans of the past areenlisted in the pursuit of hastening entry into the future. Islamic finance—which is to say, finance that relies on shares and returnsrather than interest—is booming, and sleek bank branches contain separate entrances for men and women. Slick young televangelistsrely on the tropes of sanctifying the everyday and seeking forgiveness, drawing tens of thousands to their meetings and televisionaudiences in the millions. Music videos—viewable on YouTube—implore young viewers to embrace faith and turn away froma meaningless secular life.Many in the West see secularism and relativism as concrete signs of modernity. In the Middle East, many see them as symbols ofa bankrupt secular nationalist past that failed to deliver justice or development, freedom or progress. The suffering of secularism ismeaningless, but the discipline of Islam is filled with signficance.It is for this reason that it is premature to declare the death of political Islam. Islam, increasingly, cannot be contained. It is spreadingto all aspects of life, and it is robust among some of the most dynamic forces in the Middle East. It enjoys state subsidies to be sure,but states have little to do with the creativity occurring in the religious field.The danger is that this Islamization of public life will cast aside what little tolerance is left in the Middle East, after centuries asa—fundamentally Islamic—multicultural entrepôt. It is hard to imagine how Islamizing societies can flourish if they do not embraceinnovation and creativity, diversity and difference. “Islamic” is not a self-evident concept, as my friend Mustapha Kamal Pasha onceobserved, but it cannot be a source of strength in modern societies if it is tied to ossified and parochial notions of its nature.Dealing with difference is fundamentally a political task, and it is here that political Islam will face its true test. The formal structuresof government in the Middle East have proven durable, and they are unlikely to crumble under a wave of Islamic activism. For politicalIslam to succeed, it needs to find a way to unite diverse coalitions of varying faiths and degrees of faith, not merely speak to itsbase. It has not yet found a way to do so, but that is not to say that it cannot.

TERORRIST diaspora in die Midde Ooste en Suid-Asië

Shannon Peterson

Dawid Goetze

Sedert die Bush-administrasie se verklaring van 'n globale oorlog teen terreur ná 9 / 11, het akademici en beleidmakers gesoek maniere om die wêreldwye terreur bedreiging vir counter. However asJeffrey Record (2003) has noted, treating terrorism monolithically and failing to discriminatebetween terrorist groups and other actors reduces the ability to produce effectivecounterterrorism strategies. Verder, it can set actors “on a course of open-ended andgratuitous conflict with states and nonstate entities that pose no serious threat.” If terrorism andterrorist groups are not homogenous entities, then understanding the differences and similaritiesbetween groups is a crucial first step in constructing an effective counterterrorist response.This research seeks to better discriminate between terrorist groups by examining thegoals, tactics and images embedded in the narratives of terrorist or terrorist spawningorganizations. We define narratives as shared understandings of historical events and relevantactors that are used to justify past political actions or mobilize people for contemporary politicalactions as generally expressed through descriptions or charters issued by organizations orthrough statements of organizational leaders.2 Narrative, as noted by Benedict Anderson, formsthe underbelly of an “imagined community:” the glue binding a group of like-minded individualswho, “will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet inthe minds of each lives the image of their communion” (Anderson 6). Gevolglik, we believethat narratives are excellent sources for uncovering group conceptions of “self” and “others” thatare key in attracting and maintaining ties to diaspora communities, as well as related group goals,strategies and tactics. We argue that by comparing the goals, images and tactics embedded in thenarratives of these different organizations, we can shed insight on crucial differences andsimilarities between these terrorist groups. These insights not only help discriminate betweenterrorist groups and other organizations, but also shed insight on the evolution of suchorganizations themselves.Specifically, this research examines the narratives of four groups: the MuslimBrotherhood, Hamas, Al Qaeda and the Tamil Tigers. Two of these groups, Hamas and AlQaeda, have roots in the Muslim Brotherhood and therefore can be viewed as diasporas of thelatter. Egter, while the Muslim Brotherhood takes an evolutionary and nonviolent approachto goal attainment, Hamas and Al Qaeda advocate violence and terrorism to advance their cause,tactics that are also promoted by the fourth group in the analysis, the Tamil Tigers. Since theTamil Tigers have no connection with the Muslim Brotherhood, their inclusion in ourcomparative analysis allows us to determine how much of the commonality of goals acrossterrorist organizations pertains to common roots and how much pertains to commonality oforganizational type, function or tactics.

Islamitiese bewegings en die gebruik van geweld:

Kirdis waai

.

Ten spyte van onlangse akademiese en populêre fokus op gewelddadige transnasionale Islamitiese terreur netwerke,daar 'n veelheid van die Islamitiese bewegings. Hierdie verskeidenheid bied skoliere met twee kopkrapper. The first puzzle is understanding why domestic-oriented Islamic movements that were formed as a reaction to the establishment of secular nation-states shifted their activities and targets onto a multi-layered transnational space. The second puzzle is understanding why groups with similar aims and targets adopt different strategies of using violence or nonviolence when they “go transnational.” The two main questions that this paper will address are: Why do Islamic movements go transnational? And, why do they take on different forms when they transnationalize? Eerstens, I argue that the transnational level presents a new political venue for Islamic movements which are limited in their claim making at the domestic level. Tweedens, I argue that transnationalization creates uncertainty for groups about their identity and claims at the transnational level. The medium adopted, d.w.s. use of violence versus non-violence, is dependent on type of transnationalization, the actors encounter at the transnational level, and leadership’s interpretations on where the movement should go next. To answer my questions, I will look at four cases: (1) Turkish Islam, (2) die Moslem-broederskap, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, en (4) Tablighi Jamaat

Die Moslem-Broederskap in die Verenigde State

The leadership of the U.S. Moslem Broederskap (MB, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal

Steven Merley

The leadership of the U.S. Moslem Broederskap (MB, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal was and is jihad aimed at destroying the U.S. from within.

The Brotherhood leadership has also said that the means of achieving this goal is to establish Islamic organizations in the U.S. under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Since the early 1960s, the Brotherhood has constructed an elaborate covert organizational infrastructure on which was built a set of public or “front” organizations.

Die huidige Amerikaanse. Broederskap leierskap gepoog het om hierdie geskiedenis te ontken, beide beweer dat dit nie korrek is en op dieselfde tyd wat sê dat dit 'n ouer vorm van denke binne die Brotherhood.

An examination of public and private Brotherhood documents, egter, indicates that this history is both accurate and that the Brotherhood has taken no action to demonstrate change in its mode of thought and/or activity.