Všechny záznamy v "Nejlepší" Kategorie
ROOTS OF MISCONCEPTION
IBRAHIM KALIN
In the aftermath of September 11, the long and checkered relationship between Islam and the West entered a new phase. The attacks were interpreted as the fulfillment of a prophecy that had been in the consciousness of the West for a long time, i.e., the coming of Islam as a menacing power with a clear intent to destroy Western civilization. Representations of Islam as a violent, militant, and oppressive religious ideology extended from television programs and state offices to schools and the internet. It was even suggested that Makka, the holiest city of Islam, be “nuked” to give a lasting lesson to all Muslims. Although one can look at the widespread sense of anger, hostility, and revenge as a normal human reaction to the abominable loss of innocent lives, the demonization of Muslims is the result of deeper philosophical and historical issues.
In many subtle ways, the long history of Islam and the West, from the theological polemics of Baghdad in the eighth and ninth centuries to the experience of convivencia in Andalusia in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, informs the current perceptions and qualms of each civilization vis-à-vis the other. This paper will examine some of the salient features of this history and argue that the monolithic representations of Islam, created and sustained by a highly complex set of image-producers, think-tanks, akademiků, lobbyists, policy makers, and media, dominating the present Western conscience, have their roots in the West’s long history with the Islamic world. It will also be argued that the deep-rooted misgivings about Islam and Muslims have led and continue to lead to fundamentally flawed and erroneous policy decisions that have a direct impact on the current relations of Islam and the West. The almost unequivocal identification of Islam with terrorism and extremism in the minds of many Americans after September 11 is an outcome generated by both historical misperceptions, which will be analyzed in some detail below, and the political agenda of certain interest groups that see confrontation as the only way to deal with the Islamic world. It is hoped that the following analysis will provide a historical context in which we can make sense of these tendencies and their repercussions for both worlds.
| září 07, 2010 | Komentáře 0
Islám na Západě
Jocelyne Cesari
The immigration of Muslims to Europe, North America, and Australia and the complex socioreligious dynamics that have subsequently developed have made Islam in the West a compelling new ªeld of research. The Salman Rushdie affair, hijab controversies, the attacks on the World Trade Center, and the furor over the Danish cartoons are all examples of international crises that have brought to light the connections between Muslims in the West and the global Muslim world. These new situations entail theoretical and methodological challenges for the study of contemporary Islam, and it has become crucial that we avoid essentializing either Islam or Muslims and resist the rhetorical structures of discourses that are preoccupied with security and terrorism.
In this article, I argue that Islam as a religious tradition is a terra incognita. A preliminary reason for this situation is that there is no consensus on religion as an object of research. Religion, as an academic discipline, has become torn between historical, sociological, and hermeneutical methodologies. With Islam, the situation is even more intricate. In the West, the study of Islam began as a branch of Orientalist studies and therefore followed a separate and distinctive path from the study of religions. Even though the critique of Orientalism has been central to the emergence of the study of Islam in the ªeld of social sciences, tensions remain strong between Islamicists and both anthropologists and sociologists. The topic of Islam and Muslims in the West is embedded in this struggle. One implication of this methodological tension is that students of Islam who began their academic career studying Islam in France, Germany, or America ªnd it challenging to establish credibility as scholars of Islam, particularly in the North American academic
context.
| září 07, 2010 | Komentáře 0
Povolání, Kolonialismus, Apartheid?
The Human Sciences Research Council
The Human Sciences Research Council of South Africa commissioned this study to test the hypothesis posed by Professor John Dugard in the report he presented to the UN Human Rights Council in January 2007, in his capacity as UN Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Palestinian territories occupied by Israel (a to, the West Bank, including East Jerusalem, a
Plyn, hereafter OPT). Professor Dugard posed the question: Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. Ve stejnou dobu, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law. What are the legal consequences of a regime of prolonged occupation with features of colonialism and apartheid for the occupied people, the Occupying Power and third States?
In order to consider these consequences, this study set out to examine legally the premises of Professor Dugard’s question: is Israel the occupant of the OPT, a, if so, do elements of its occupation of these territories amount to colonialism or apartheid? South Africa has an obvious interest in these questions given its bitter history of apartheid, which entailed the denial of selfdetermination
to its majority population and, during its occupation of Namibia, the extension of apartheid to that territory which South Africa effectively sought to colonise. These unlawful practices must not be replicated elsewhere: other peoples must not suffer in the way the populations of South Africa and Namibia have suffered.
To explore these issues, an international team of scholars was assembled. The aim of this project was to scrutinise the situation from the nonpartisan perspective of international law, rather than engage in political discourse and rhetoric. This study is the outcome of a fifteen-month collaborative process of intensive research, consultation, writing and review. It concludes and, it is to be hoped, persuasively argues and clearly demonstrates that Israel, since 1967, has been the belligerent Occupying Power in the OPT, and that its occupation of these territories has become a colonial enterprise which implements a system of apartheid. Belligerent occupation in itself is not an unlawful situation: it is accepted as a possible consequence of armed conflict. Ve stejnou dobu, under the law of armed conflict (also known as international humanitarian law), occupation is intended to be only a temporary state of affairs. International law prohibits the unilateral annexation or permanent acquisition of territory as a result of the threat or use of force: should this occur, no State may recognise or support the resulting unlawful situation. In contrast to occupation, both colonialism and apartheid are always unlawful and indeed are considered to be particularly serious breaches of international law because they are fundamentally contrary to core values of the international legal order. Colonialism violates the principle of self-determination,
which the International Court of Justice (ICJ) has affirmed as ‘one of the essential principles of contemporary international law’. All States have a duty to respect and promote self-determination. Apartheid is an aggravated case of racial discrimination, which is constituted according to the International Convention for the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973,
hereafter ‘Apartheid Convention’) by ‘inhuman acts committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them’. The practice of apartheid, moreover, is an international crime.
Professor Dugard in his report to the UN Human Rights Council in 2007 suggested that an advisory opinion on the legal consequences of Israel’s conduct should be sought from the ICJ. This advisory opinion would undoubtedly complement the opinion that the ICJ delivered in 2004 on the Legal consequences of the construction of a wall in the occupied Palestinian territories (hereafter ‘the Wall advisory opinion’). This course of legal action does not exhaust the options open to the international community, nor indeed the duties of third States and international organisations when they are appraised that another State is engaged in the practices of colonialism or apartheid.
| září 07, 2010 | Komentáře 0
ISLÁM, DEMOKRACIE & SPOJENÉ STÁTY AMERICKÉ:
Cordoba Foundation
Abdullah Faliq
Intro ,
Navzdory tomu, že je to jak trvalá, tak složitá debata, Arches čtvrtletní reexamines od teologického a praktického základu, důležitá debata o vztahu a kompatibilitě mezi islámem a demokracií, jak se odráží v programu naděje a změny Baracka Obamy. Zatímco mnozí oslavují Obamův nástup do Oválné pracovny jako národní katarzi pro USA, jiní zůstávají méně optimističtí, pokud jde o posun v ideologii a přístupu na mezinárodní scéně. Zatímco velkou část napětí a nedůvěry mezi muslimským světem a USA lze přičíst přístupu prosazování demokracie, typicky upřednostňují diktatury a loutkové režimy, které naříkají na demokratické hodnoty a lidská práva, následný otřes 9/11 skutečně upevnil obavy prostřednictvím amerického postoje k politickému islámu. Vytvořila zeď negativity, jak ji objevil worldpublicopinion.org, podle kterého 67% Egypťanů věří, že globálně Amerika hraje „hlavně negativní“ roli.
Reakce Ameriky byla tedy výstižná. Volbou Obamy, mnoho lidí po celém světě vkládá své naděje do rozvoje méně agresivních, ale spravedlivější zahraniční politiku vůči muslimskému světu. Test pro Obamu, jak diskutujeme, je to, jak Amerika a její spojenci prosazují demokracii. Bude to usnadňující nebo vnucující?
navíc, může to důležité být čestný makléř v prodloužených zónách konfliktů? Získávání odborných znalostí a náhledu na prolifi
c učenci, akademiků, ostřílení novináři a politici, Arches Quarterly přibližuje vztah mezi islámem a demokracií a roli Ameriky – stejně jako změny, které přinesl Obama, při hledání společného základu. Anas Altikriti, generální ředitel Th e Cordoba Foundation poskytuje úvodní gamut této diskuse, kde reflektuje naděje a výzvy, které stojí na Obamově cestě. Po Altikriti, bývalý poradce prezidenta Nixona, Dr. Robert Crane nabízí důkladnou analýzu islámského principu práva na svobodu. Anwar Ibrahim, bývalý místopředseda vlády Malajsie, obohacuje diskusi o praktickou realitu zavádění demokracie v muslimských dominantních společnostech, a to, v Indonésii a Malajsii.
Máme také Dr Shireen Hunter, z Georgetownské univerzity, USA, který zkoumá muslimské země zaostávající v demokratizaci a modernizaci. To je doplněno spisovatelem terorismu, Vysvětlení Dr. Nafeeze Ahmeda o krizi postmoderny a
zánik demokracie. Dr. Daud Abdullah (Ředitel Middle East Media Monitor), Alan Hart (bývalý zpravodaj ITN a BBC Panorama; autor sionismu: Skutečný nepřítel Židů) a Asem Sondos (Redaktor egyptského týdeníku Sawt Al Omma) soustředit se na Obamu a jeho roli ve vztahu k podpoře demokracie v muslimském světě, stejně jako vztahy USA s Izraelem a Muslimským bratrstvem.
Ministr zahraničních věcí, Maledivy, Ahmed Shaheed spekuluje o budoucnosti islámu a demokracie; Cllr. Gerry Maclochlainn
– a Sinn Féin member who endured four years in prison for Irish Republican activities and a campaigner for the Guildford 4 and Birmingham 6, refl ects on his recent trip to Gaza where he witnessed the impact of the brutality and injustice meted out against Palestinians; Dr Marie Breen-Smyth, Director of the Centre for the Study of Radicalisation and Contemporary Political Violence discusses the challenges of critically researching political terror; Dr Khalid al-Mubarak, writer and playwright, discusses prospects of peace in Darfur; and fi nally journalist and human rights activist Ashur Shamis looks critically at the democratisation and politicisation of Muslims today.
Doufáme, že toto vše poslouží k obsáhlému čtení a zdroji pro úvahy o problémech, které se nás všech dotýkají v novém úsvitu naděje.
Děkuji
| září 07, 2010 | Komentáře 0
US Hamas policy blocks Middle East peace
Henry Siegmana
Failed bilateral talks over these past 16 years have shown that a Middle East peace accord can never be reached by the parties themselves. Israeli governments believe they can defy international condemnation of their illegal colonial project in the West Bank because they can count on the US to oppose international sanctions. Bilateral talks that are not framed by US-formulated parameters (based on Security Council resolutions, the Oslo accords, the Arab Peace Initiative, the “road map” and other previous Israeli-Palestinian agreements) cannot succeed. Israel’s government believes that the US Congress will not permit an American president to issue such parameters and demand their acceptance. What hope there is for the bilateral talks that resume in Washington DC on September 2 depends entirely on President Obama proving that belief to be wrong, and on whether the “bridging proposals” he has promised, should the talks reach an impasse, are a euphemism for the submission of American parameters. Such a US initiative must offer Israel iron-clad assurances for its security within its pre-1967 borders, but at the same time must make it clear these assurances are not available if Israel insists on denying Palestinians a viable and sovereign state in the West Bank and Gaza. This paper focuses on the other major obstacle to a permanent status agreement: the absence of an effective Palestinian interlocutor. Addressing Hamas’ legitimate grievances – and as noted in a recent CENTCOM report, Hamas has legitimate grievances – could lead to its return to a Palestinian coalition government that would provide Israel with a credible peace partner. If that outreach fails because of Hamas’ rejectionism, the organization’s ability to prevent a reasonable accord negotiated by other Palestinian political parties will have been significantly impeded. If the Obama administration will not lead an international initiative to define the parameters of an Israeli-Palestinian agreement and actively promote Palestinian political reconciliation, Europe must do so, and hope America will follow. bohužel, there is no silver bullet that can guarantee the goal of “two states living side by side in peace and security.”
But President Obama’s present course absolutely precludes it.
| září 07, 2010 | Komentáře 0
Islamism revisited
MAHA Azzam
There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 let, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Červenec 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.
| září 06, 2010 | Komentáře 0
ISLAM AND THE RULE OF LAW
Birgit Krawietz
Helmut Reifeld
In our modern Western society, state-organised legal sys-tems normally draw a distinctive line that separates religion and the law. Conversely, there are a number of Islamic re-gional societies where religion and the laws are as closely interlinked and intertwined today as they were before the onset of the modern age. Ve stejnou dobu, the proportion in which religious law (shariah in Arabic) and public law (qanun) are blended varies from one country to the next. What is more, the status of Islam and consequently that of Islamic law differs as well. According to information provided by the Organisation of the Islamic Conference (OIC), there are currently 57 Islamic states worldwide, defined as countries in which Islam is the religion of (1) the state, (2) the majority of the population, or (3) a large minority. All this affects the development and the form of Islamic law.
| září 06, 2010 | Komentáře 0
Islámská politická kultura, Demokracie, a lidská práva
Daniel E. Cena
Tvrdilo se, že islám usnadňuje autoritářství, contradicts the values of Western societies, and significantly affects important political outcomes in Muslim nations. tudíž, učenci, komentátoři, and government officials frequently point to ‘‘Islamic fundamentalism’’ as the next ideological threat to liberal democracies. Tento pohled, nicméně, is based primarily on the analysis of texts, Islámská politická teorie, and ad hoc studies of individual countries, které neberou v úvahu další faktory. It is my contention that the texts and traditions of Islam, jako u jiných náboženství, lze použít k podpoře různých politických systémů a politik. Country specific and descriptive studies do not help us to find patterns that will help us explain the varying relationships between Islam and politics across the countries of the Muslim world. Proto, nový přístup ke studiu
Požaduje se spojení mezi islámem a politikou.
navrhuji, přes přísné hodnocení vztahu mezi islámem, demokracie, a lidská práva na mezinárodní úrovni, that too much emphasis is being placed on the power of Islam as a political force. I first use comparative case studies, which focus on factors relating to the interplay between Islamic groups and regimes, ekonomické vlivy, etnické štěpení, a společenského rozvoje, to explain the variance in the influence of Islam on politics across eight nations. I argue that much of the power
attributed to Islam as the driving force behind policies and political systems in Muslim nations can be better explained by the previously mentioned factors. I also find, contrary to common belief, that the increasing strength of Islamic political groups has often been associated with modest pluralization of political systems.
I have constructed an index of Islamic political culture, based on the extent to which Islamic law is utilized and whether and, if so, how,Western ideas, institutions, and technologies are implemented, to test the nature of the relationship between Islam and democracy and Islam and human rights. This indicator is used in statistical analysis, which includes a sample of twenty-three predominantly Muslim countries and a control group of twenty-three non-Muslim developing nations. In addition to comparing
Islamic nations to non-Islamic developing nations, statistical analysis allows me to control for the influence of other variables that have been found to affect levels of democracy and the protection of individual rights. The result should be a more realistic and accurate picture of the influence of Islam on politics and policies.
| září 06, 2010 | Komentáře 0
PRECISION IN THE GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR:
Sherifa Zuhur
Seven years after the September 11, 2001 (9/11) attacks, many experts believe al-Qa’ida has regained strength and that its copycats or affiliates are more lethal than before. The National Intelligence Estimate of 2007 asserted that al-Qa’ida is more dangerous now than before 9/11.1 Al-Qa’ida’s emulators continue to threaten Western, Middle Eastern, and European nations, as in the plot foiled in September 2007 in Germany. Bruce Riedel states: Thanks largely to Washington’s eagerness to go into Iraq rather than hunting down al Qaeda’s leaders, the organization now has a solid base of operations in the badlands of Pakistan and an effective franchise in western Iraq. Its reach has spread throughout the Muslim world and in Europe . . . Osama bin Laden has mounted a successful propaganda campaign. . . . His ideas now attract more followers than ever.
It is true that various salafi-jihadist organizations are still emerging throughout the Islamic world. Why have heavily resourced responses to the Islamist terrorism that we are calling global jihad not proven extremely effective?
Moving to the tools of “soft power,” what about the efficacy of Western efforts to bolster Muslims in the Global War on Terror (GWOT)? Why has the United States won so few “hearts and minds” in the broader Islamic world? Why do American strategic messages on this issue play so badly in the region? Why, despite broad Muslim disapproval of extremism as shown in surveys and official utterances by key Muslim leaders, has support for bin Ladin actually increased in Jordan and in Pakistan?
This monograph will not revisit the origins of Islamist violence. It is instead concerned with a type of conceptual failure that wrongly constructs the GWOT and which discourages Muslims from supporting it. They are unable to identify with the proposed transformative countermeasures because they discern some of their core beliefs and institutions as targets in
this endeavor.
Several deeply problematic trends confound the American conceptualizations of the GWOT and the strategic messages crafted to fight that War. These evolve from (1) post-colonial political approaches to Muslims and Muslim majority nations that vary greatly and therefore produce conflicting and confusing impressions and effects; a (2) residual generalized ignorance of and prejudice toward Islam and subregional cultures. Add to this American anger, fear, and anxiety about the deadly events of 9/11, and certain elements that, despite the urgings of cooler heads, hold Muslims and their religion accountable for the misdeeds of their coreligionists, or who find it useful to do so for political reasons.
| září 06, 2010 | Komentáře 0
DEBATING DEMOCRACY IN THE ARAB WORLD
Ibtisam Ibrahim
What is Democracy?
Western scholars define democracy a method for protecting individuals’ civil and political rights. It provides for freedom of speech, press, víra, opinion, ownership, and assembly, as well as the right to vote, nominate and seek public office. Huntington (1984) argues that a political system is democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through
periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all adults are eligible to vote. Rothstein (1995) states that democracy is a form of government and a process of governance that changes and adapts in response to circumstances. He also adds that the Western definition of democracy — in addition to accountability, competition, some degree of participation — contains a guarantee of important civil and political rights. Anderson (1995) argues that the term democracy means a system in which the most powerful collective decision makers are selected through periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), an Egyptian scholar, sees democracy that might apply to the Arab world as a set of rules and institutions designed to enable governance through the peaceful
management of competing groups and/or conflicting interests. Nicméně, Samir Amin (1991) based his definition of democracy on the social Marxist perspective. He divides democracy into two categories: bourgeois democracy which is based on individual rights and freedom for the individual, but without having social equality; and political democracy which entitles all people in society the right to vote and to elect their government and institutional representatives which will help to obtain their equal social rights.
To conclude this section, I would say that there is no one single definition of democracy that indicates precisely what it is or what is not. Nicméně, as we noticed, most of the definitions mentioned above have essential similar elements – accountability, competition, and some degree of participation – which have become dominant in the Western world and internationally.
| září 05, 2010 | Komentáře 0
Demokracie, Elections and the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood
Israel Elad-Altman
The American-led Middle East reform and democratization campaign of the last two years has helped shape a new political reality in Egypt. Opportunities have opened up for dissent. With U.S. and European support, local opposition groups have been able to take initiative, advance their causes and extract concessions from the state. The Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood movement (MB), which has been officially outlawed as a political organization, is now among the groups facing both new opportunities
and new risks.
Western governments, including the government of the United States, are considering the MB and other “moderate Islamist” groups as potential partners in helping to advance democracy in their countries, and perhaps also in eradicating Islamist terrorism. Could the Egyptian MB fill that role? Could it follow the track of the Turkish Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Indonesian Prosperous Justice Party (PKS), two Islamist parties that, according to some analysts, are successfully adapting to the rules of liberal democracy and leading their countries toward greater integration with, respectively, Europe and a “pagan” Asia?
This article examines how the MB has responded to the new reality, how it has handled the ideological and practical challenges and dilemmas that have arisen during the past two years. To what extent has the movement accommodated its outlook to new circumstances? What are its objectives and its vision of the political order? How has it reacted to U.S. overtures and to the reform and democratization campaign?
How has it navigated its relations with the Egyptian regime on one hand, and other opposition forces on the other, as the country headed toward two dramatic elections in autumn 2005? To what extent can the MB be considered a force that might lead Egypt
toward liberal democracy?
| září 05, 2010 | Komentáře 0
EGYPT’S MUSLIM BROTHERS: CONFRONTATION OR INTEGRATION?
Research
The Society of Muslim Brothers’ success in the November-December 2005 elections for the People’s Assembly sent shockwaves through Egypt’s political system. In response, the regime cracked down on the movement, harassed other potential rivals and reversed its fledging reform process. This is dangerously short-sighted. There is reason to be concerned about the Muslim Brothers’ political program, and they owe the people genuine clarifications about several of its aspects. But the ruling National Democratic
Party’s (NDP) refusal to loosen its grip risks exacerbating tensions at a time of both political uncertainty surrounding the presidential succession and serious socio-economic unrest. Though this likely will be a prolonged, gradual process, the regime should take preliminary steps to normalise the Muslim Brothers’ participation in political life. The Muslim Brothers, whose social activities have long been tolerated but whose role in formal politics is strictly limited, won an unprecedented 20 per cent of parliamentary seats in the 2005 volby. They did so despite competing for only a third of available seats and notwithstanding considerable obstacles, including police repression and electoral fraud. This success confirmed their position as an extremely wellorganised and deeply rooted political force. Ve stejnou dobu, it underscored the weaknesses of both the legal opposition and ruling party. The regime might well have wagered that a modest increase in the Muslim Brothers’ parliamentary representation could be used to stoke fears of an Islamist takeover and thereby serve as a reason to stall reform. If so, the strategy is at heavy risk of backfiring.
| září 05, 2010 | Komentáře 0
Islám a demokracie: Text, Tradition, and History
Ahrar Ahmad
Popular stereotypes in the West tend to posit a progressive, rational, and free West against a backward, oppressive, and threatening Islam. Public opinion polls conducted in the United States during the 1990s revealed a consistent pattern of Americans labeling Muslims as “religious fanatics” and considering Islam’s ethos as fundamentally “anti-democratic.”1 These characterizations
and misgivings have, for obvious reasons, significantly worsened since the tragedy of 9/11. Nicméně, these perceptions are not reflected merely in the popular consciousness or crude media representations. Respected scholars also have contributed to this climate of opinion by writing about the supposedly irreconcilable differences between Islam and the West, the famous “clash of civilizations” that is supposed to be imminent and inevitable, and about the seeming incompatibility between Islam and democracy. Například, Professor Peter Rodman worries that “we are challenged from the outside by a militant atavistic force driven by hatred of all Western political thought harking back to age-old grievances against Christendom.” Dr. Daniel Pipes proclaims that the Muslims challenge the West more profoundly than the communists ever did, for “while the Communists disagree with our policies, the fundamentalist Muslims despise our whole way of life.” Professor Bernard Lewis warns darkly about “the historic reaction of an ancient rival against our Judeo–Christian heritage, our secular present, and the expansion of both.” Professor Amos Perlmutter asks: “Is Islam, fundamentalist or otherwise, compatible with human-rights oriented Western style representative democracy? The answer is an emphatic NO.” And Professor Samuel Huntington suggests with a flourish that “the problem is not Islamic fundamentalism, but Islam itself.” It would be intellectually lazy and simple-minded to dismiss their positions as based merely on spite or prejudice. Ve skutečnosti, if one ignores some rhetorical overkill, some of their charges, though awkward for Muslims, are relevant to a discussion of the relationship between Islam and democracy in the modern world. Například, the position of women or sometimes non-Muslims in some Muslim countries is problematic in terms of the supposed legal equality of all people in a democracy. Podobně, the intolerance directed by some Muslims against writers (e.g., Salman Rushdie in the UK, Taslima Nasrin in Bangladesh, and Professor Nasr Abu Zaid in Egypt) ostensibly jeopardizes the principle of free speech, which is essential to a democracy.
It is also true that less than 10 of the more than 50 members of the Organization of the Islamic Conference have institutionalized democratic principles or processes as understood in the West, and that too, only tentatively. Konečně, the kind of internal stability and external peace that is almost a prerequisite for a democracy to function is vitiated by the turbulence of internal implosion or external aggression evident in many Muslim countries today (e.g., Somálsko, Súdán, Indonésie, Pákistán, Irák, Afghánistán, Alžírsko, and Bosnia).
| září 04, 2010 | Komentáře 0
Irák a budoucnost politického islámu
James Piscatori
Před 65 lety položil jeden z největších učenců moderního islámu jednoduchou otázku, „Kam islám?“, kam šel islámský svět? Byla to doba intenzivního zmatku v západním i muslimském světě – zánik imperialismu a krystalizace nového státního systému mimo Evropu; vytvoření a testování neo- Wilsonův světový řád ve Společnosti národů; nástup evropského fašismu. Sir Hamilton Gibb uznal, že muslimské společnosti, nelze se takovým světovým trendům vyhnout, byli také konfrontováni se stejně nevyhnutelným pronikáním nacionalismu, sekularismus, a westernizace. I když prozíravě varoval před předpovídáním – nebezpečím pro nás všechny, kteří se zajímají o blízkovýchodní a islámskou politiku – byl si jistý dvěma věcmi.:
(A) islámský svět by se pohyboval mezi ideálem solidarity a realitou rozdělení;
(b) klíč k budoucnosti spočíval ve vedení, nebo kdo autoritativně mluví za islám.
Dnes mohou Gibbovy prognózy znovu nabýt relevance, protože čelíme prohlubující se krizi ohledně Iráku, rozvíjení rozsáhlé a kontroverzní války proti terorismu, a pokračující palestinský problém. V této přednášce bych se rád podíval na faktory, které mohou ovlivnit chod muslimské politiky v současnosti a blízké budoucnosti.. I když body, které uvedu, budou mít pravděpodobně širší význam, Budu čerpat především z případu arabského světa.
Předpoklady o politickém islámu Pokud jde o zpolitizovaný islám nebo islamismus, nechybí předpovědi. „Islamismus“ je nejlépe chápán jako pocit, že se v současných muslimských společnostech něco pokazilo a že řešení musí spočívat v řadě politických akcí.. Často se používá zaměnitelně s „fundamentalismem“, Islamismus je lépe ztotožňován s „politickým islámem“. Několik komentátorů prohlásilo její zánik a nástup postislamistické éry. Argumentují tím, že represivní aparát státu se ukázal odolnější než islámská opozice a že ideologická nesoudržnost islamistů je učinila nevhodnými pro moderní politickou konkurenci.. Zdálo se, že události z 11. září této předpovědi odporují, dosud, neotřesený, tvrdili, že je to tak velkolepé, prakticky anarchické činy jen dokazují bankrot islamistických myšlenek a naznačují, že radikálové opustili jakoukoli skutečnou naději na převzetí moci.
| září 04, 2010 | Komentáře 0
Islám a demokracie
ITAC
Pokud člověk čte tisk nebo poslouchá komentátory mezinárodních záležitostí, často se říká – a ještě častěji naznačeno, ale neříká se – že islám není slučitelný s demokracií. V devadesátých letech, Samuel Huntington spustil intelektuální bouři, když vydal knihu Střet civilizací a přetvoření světového řádu, ve kterém prezentuje své předpovědi pro svět – writ large. V politické sféře, poznamenává, že zatímco Turecko a Pákistán mohou mít nějaký malý nárok na „demokratickou legitimitu“, všechny ostatní „... muslimské země byly v drtivé většině nedemokratické: monarchií, systémy jedné strany, vojenské režimy, osobní diktatury nebo jejich kombinace, obvykle spočívá na omezené rodině, klan, nebo kmenová základna“. Premisa, na které je jeho argument založen, je ten, že nejen že „nejsou jako my“, jsou ve skutečnosti v rozporu s našimi základními demokratickými hodnotami. On věří, stejně jako ostatní, že zatímco v jiných částech světa se myšlence západní demokratizace brání, konfrontace je nejpozoruhodnější v těch oblastech, kde je dominantní vírou islám.
Argument zazněl i z druhé strany. Íránský náboženský učenec, reflektující ústavní krizi v jeho zemi na počátku dvacátého století, prohlásil, že islám a demokracie nejsou kompatibilní, protože lidé si nejsou rovni a zákonodárný orgán je zbytečný kvůli inkluzivní povaze islámského náboženského práva. Podobný postoj nedávno zaujal Ali Belhadj, alžírský středoškolský učitel, kazatel a (v tomto kontextu) vůdce FIS, když prohlásil „demokracie není islámský koncept“. Snad nejdramatičtějším prohlášením v tomto smyslu bylo prohlášení Abú Musaba al-Zarkávího, vůdce sunnitských povstalců v Iráku, který, když stojí před vyhlídkou na volby, odsuzoval demokracii jako „zlý princip“.
Ale podle některých muslimských učenců, demokracie zůstává důležitým ideálem islámu, s výhradou, že vždy podléhá náboženskému právu. Důraz na prvořadé místo šaría je prvkem téměř každého islámského komentáře o vládnutí., umírněný nebo extremistický. Pouze pokud vládce, který přijímá svou autoritu od Boha, omezuje své jednání na „dohled nad správou šaría“, má být uposlechnut. Pokud dělá něco jiného než toto, je nevěřící a oddaní muslimové se proti němu mají bouřit. Zde leží ospravedlnění pro většinu násilí, které sužuje muslimský svět v takových bojích, jaké panovaly v Alžírsku v 90.
| září 04, 2010 | Komentáře 0
Hledání v islámské konstitucionalismu
Nadirsyah Kalhoty
While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. For instance, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. As
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. Nicméně, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
za prvé, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts
| září 03, 2010 | Komentáře 0
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