Kõik kanded "Soovitatavad" Kategooria
Araabia homme
DAVID B. OTAWAY
oktoober 6, 1981, oli mõeldud Egiptuses pidupäevaks. See tähistas aastapäeva Egiptuse suurimast võiduhetkest kolmes Araabia-Iisraeli konfliktis, kui riigi allajäänud armee tungis selle avapäevadel üle Suessi kanali 1973 Jom Kippuri sõda ja saatis Iisraeli väed taganema. Jahedal, pilvitu hommik, Kairo staadion oli pungil Egiptuse peredest, kes olid tulnud vaatama sõjaväelasi, jalas oma riistvara., president Anwar el-Sadat,sõja arhitekt, vaatas rahulolevalt, kuidas mehed ja masinad tema ees paradeerusid. Olin lähedal, äsja saabunud väliskorrespondent.Äkki, üks armee veoautodest peatus otse ülevaatuse stendi ees just siis, kui kuus Mirage'i lennukit möirgasid pea kohal akrobaatilises etenduses, taeva maalimine pikkade punaste jälgedega, kollane, lilla,ja rohelist suitsu. Sadat tõusis püsti, ilmselt valmistub tervitusi vahetama veel ühe Egiptuse vägede kontingendiga. Ta tegi endast täiusliku sihtmärgi neljale veoautolt hüpanud islami palgamõrvarile, tungis poodiumile, ja täitis ta keha kuulidega.Kui mõrvarid jätkasid terve igaviku, et pritsida püstiku oma surmava tulega., Mõtlesin hetke, kas lüüa vastu maad ja riskida, et paanikas pealtvaatajad tallavad end surnuks või jään jalgele ja riskin hulkuva kuuliga. Sisetunne käskis mul jalul püsida, ja minu ajakirjanduslik kohusetunne sundis mind minema uurima, kas Sadat on elus või surnud.
| september 26, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Islam ja riigivõimu kujunemine
seyyed Vali Reza Nasr
sisse 1979 Kindral Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, Pakistani sõjaväeline valitseja, teatas, et Pakistanist saab islamiriik. Islami väärtused ja normid oleksid rahvusliku identiteedi aluseks, seadus, majandust, ja sotsiaalsed suhted, ja see inspireeriks kogu poliitika kujundamist. sisse 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, Malaisia uus peaminister, võttis kasutusele sarnase laiapõhjalise plaani, et ankurdada riigi poliitika kujundamine islami väärtustesse, ning viia oma riigi seadused ja majandustavad kooskõlla islami õpetustega. Miks valisid need valitsejad oma riikide jaoks "islamiseerumise" tee?? Ja kuidas kunagistest ilmalikest postkoloniaalsetest riikidest said islamiseerumise agendid ja "tõelise" islamiriigi kuulutajad?
Malaisia ja Pakistan on alates 1970. aastate lõpust – 1980. aastate algusest järginud ainulaadset arenguteed, mis erineb teiste kolmanda maailma riikide kogemustest.. Nendes kahes riigis integreeriti religioosne identiteet riigi ideoloogiasse, et teavitada islami väärtustest lähtuva arengu eesmärki ja protsessi.
See ettevõtmine on andnud ka väga erineva pildi islami ja poliitika suhetest moslemiühiskondades. Malaisias ja Pakistanis, see on olnud pigem riiklikud institutsioonid kui islamistlikud aktivistid (need, kes propageerivad islami poliitilist lugemist; tuntud ka kui revivalistid või fundamentalistid) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, ja laiemalt, kuidas kultuur ja religioon teenivad riigivõimu ja arengu vajadusi. Siinne analüüs tugineb teoreetilistele aruteludele
riigikäitumise sotsiaalteadustes ning kultuuri ja religiooni rollis selles. Tähtsam, see teeb uuritavatest juhtumitest järeldusi, et teha teadusharudele huvi pakkuvaid laiemaid järeldusi.
| september 25, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Feminism VAHEL ilmalikkuse ja islamismi: CASE Palestiina
Dr, Islah Jad
aastal toimusid Läänekaldal ja Gaza sektoris seadusandlikud valimised 2006 tõi võimule islamistliku liikumise Hamas, mis moodustas enamuse Palestiina seadusandlikus nõukogus ja ka esimese enamusvalitsuse Hamasi. Nende valimiste tulemusel nimetati ametisse esimene Hamasi naisminister, kellest sai naisminister. Märtsi vahel 2006 ja juuni 2007, sellele ametikohale asusid kaks erinevat Hamasi naisministrit, kuid mõlemal oli ministeeriumi juhtimine keeruline, kuna enamik selle töötajatest ei olnud Hamasi liikmed, vaid kuulusid teistesse erakondadesse, ja enamik neist olid Fatahi liikmed, domineeriv liikumine, mis kontrollib enamikku Palestiina omavalitsuse institutsioone. Pingeline võitlusperiood naisteasjade ministeeriumis tegutsevate Hamasi naiste ja Fatahi naisliikmete vahel lõppes pärast Hamasi võimuhaaramist Gaza sektoris ja sellest tulenevat valitsuse langemist Läänekaldal – võitlus mis võttis vahel vägivaldse pöörde. Üks põhjus, miks seda võitlust hiljem selgitati, oli erinevus ilmaliku feministliku diskursuse ja islamistliku diskursuse vahel naiste teemadel.. Palestiina kontekstis omandas see erimeelsus ohtliku iseloomu, kuna seda kasutati verise poliitilise võitluse jätkamise õigustamiseks, Hamasi naiste ametikohalt või ametikohalt kõrvaldamine, ning sel ajal valitsenud poliitilised ja geograafilised lõhed nii Läänekaldal kui ka okupeeritud Gaza sektoris.
See võitlus tõstatab mitmeid olulisi küsimusi: kas peaksime karistama võimule tulnud islamistlikku liikumist, või peaksime kaaluma põhjuseid, mis viisid Fateh'i läbikukkumiseni poliitilisel areenil? Kas feminism võib pakkuda naistele terviklikku raamistikku, sõltumata nende sotsiaalsest ja ideoloogilisest kuuluvusest? Kas naiste ühise ühisosa diskursus aitab neil ühiseid eesmärke mõista ja nendes kokku leppida?? Kas paternalism on ainult islamistlikus ideoloogias?, ja mitte rahvusluses ja patriotismis? Mida me mõtleme feminismi all? Kas on ainult üks feminism, või mitu feminismi? Mida me islami all mõtleme – kas selle nime all tuntud liikumine või religioon, filosoofia, või õigussüsteem? Peame minema nende probleemide põhja ja neid hoolikalt kaaluma, ja me peame nendega kokku leppima, et saaksime hiljem otsustada, kui feministid, kui meie paternalismi kriitika peaks olema suunatud religioonile (usk), mis peaks piirduma uskliku südamega ja millel ei tohi lasta üle maailma kontrolli haarata, või kohtupraktika, mis on seotud erinevate usukoolkondadega, mis selgitavad Koraanis sisalduvat õigussüsteemi ja prohveti ütlusi – sunna.
| september 19, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Islamistlike NAISTE aktivismi okupeeritud Palestiina
Interviews by Khaled Amayreh
Interview with Sameera Al-Halayka
Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. She was
born in the village of Shoyoukh near Hebron in 1964. She has a BA in Sharia (Islami
Jurisprudence) from Hebron University. She worked as a journalist from 1996 kuni 2006 when
she entered the Palestinian Legislative Council as an elected member in the 2006 valimised.
She is married and has seven children.
Q: There is a general impression in some western countries that women receive
inferior treatment within Islamic resistance groups, such as Hamas. Is this true?
How are women activists treated in Hamas?
Rights and duties of Muslim women emanate first and foremost from Islamic Sharia or law.
They are not voluntary or charitable acts or gestures we receive from Hamas or anyone
else. Thus, mis puudutab poliitilist kaasatust ja aktivismi, naistel üldiselt on
samad õigused ja kohustused mis meestel. Pealegi, naised moodustavad vähemalt 50 protsenti
ühiskond. Teatud mõttes, nad on kogu ühiskond, sest nad sünnitavad, ja tõsta,
uus põlvkond.
Seetõttu, Võin öelda, et naiste staatus Hamasis on temaga täielikult kooskõlas
staatus islamis endas. See tähendab, et ta on täispartner kõigil tasanditel. Tõepoolest, see oleks
islami jaoks ebaõiglane ja ebaõiglane (või islamist, kui soovite) naine olla kannatustes partner
samas kui ta on otsustusprotsessist välja jäetud. Sellepärast on naise roll selles
Hamas on alati olnud teerajaja.
Q: Kas teile tundub, et Hamasis on esile kerkinud naiste poliitiline aktiivsus?
loomulik areng, mis sobib kokku klassikaliste islami kontseptsioonidega
naiste staatuse ja rolli kohta, või on see lihtsalt vajalik vastus
modernsusest ja poliitilise tegevuse nõuetest ja jätkumisest
Iisraeli okupatsioon?
Islami kohtupraktikas ega Hamasi põhikirjas ei ole ühtegi teksti, mis takistaks naistel
poliitiline osalus. Usun, et see on vastupidine — seal on palju Koraani salme
ja prohvet Muhamedi ütlused, mis kutsuvad naisi üles olema poliitikas ja avalikkuses aktiivsed
moslemeid puudutavad probleemid. Aga see on tõsi ka naiste puhul, nagu meeste jaoks on, poliitiline aktiivsus
ei ole kohustuslik, vaid vabatahtlik, ja see otsustatakse suuresti iga naise võimete valguses,
kvalifikatsioonist ja individuaalsetest asjaoludest. Sellest hoolimata, ilmutades muret avalikkuse pärast
on kohustuslik igale moslemi mehele ja naisele. Prohvet
ütles Muhammed: "See, kes ei näita muret moslemite asjade pärast, pole moslem."
enamgi veel, Palestiina islamistlikud naised peavad arvesse võtma kõiki kohapealseid objektiivseid tegureid
otsustades, kas liituda poliitikaga või osaleda poliitilises aktivismis.
| september 19, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Iraani naistel pärast islamirevolutsiooni
Ansiia Khaz Allii
Iraani islamirevolutsiooni võidukäigust on möödunud üle kolmekümne aasta, siiski on jäänud a palju küsimusi ja ebaselgust islamivabariigi ja selle seaduste käsitlemise kohta tänapäeva probleemid ja hetkeolud, eriti naiste ja naiste õiguste osas. See lühike artikkel heidab neile küsimustele valgust ja uurib naiste praegust positsiooni erinevates valdkondades, kui võrrelda seda olukorraga enne islamirevolutsiooni. Kasutatud on usaldusväärseid ja autentitud andmeid kus vähegi võimalik. Sissejuhatuses tehakse kokkuvõte mitmetest teoreetilistest ja juriidilistest uuringutest, mis pakuvad on aluseks hilisemale praktilisemale analüüsile ja on allikad, kust andmed on saadud.
Esimene osa käsitleb Iraani Islamivabariigi juhtkonna suhtumist naistesse ja naiste õigused, ja seejärel heidab põhjaliku ülevaate pärast islamirevolutsiooni välja kuulutatud seadusi naiste ja nende positsiooni kohta ühiskonnas. Teises osas käsitletakse naiste kultuuri- ja educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. The third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. The fourth section then examines questions of the family, the relationship between women and the family, and the family’s role in limiting or increasing women’s rights in the Islamic Republic of Iran.
| september 19, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Naised islamis
Amira Burghul
Despite major consensus amongst a large number of philosophers and historians that the
principles and teachings of Islam caused a fundamental change in the position of women
compared to the prevailing situation in countries in both East and West at the time, and despite
suure hulga mõtlejate ja seadusandjate kokkulepe, et naised ajal
prohvet (PBUH) neile anti õigusi ja seaduslikke privileege, mida inimtegevusest tulenevad seadused ei andnud kuni
hiljuti, läänlaste ja lääneliku vaatenurgaga inimeste propagandakampaaniad
süüdistavad islamit järjekindlalt naiste suhtes ebaõigluses, neile piirangute kehtestamisest, ja
marginaliseerida oma rolli ühiskonnas.
Olukorda on halvendanud kogu riigis valitsev atmosfäär ja tingimused
Moslemimaailm, kus teadmatus ja vaesus on loonud piiratud arusaama religioonist
pere- ja inimsuhted, mis takistavad õiglust ja tsiviliseeritud eluviisi, eriti
meeste ja naiste vahel. Väike grupp inimesi, kellele on antud võimalused
acquire an education and abilities have also fallen into the trap of believing that achieving justice
for women and capitalising on their abilities is dependent upon rejecting religion and piety and
adopting a Western way of life, as a result of their superficial studies of Islam on the one hand
and the effect of life’s diversions on the other.
Only a very small number of people from these two groups have managed to escape and cast off
their cloaks of ignorance and tradition. These people have studied their heritage in great depth
and detail, and have looked at the results of Western experiences with an open mind. They have
distinguished between the wheat and the chaff in both the past and the present, and have dealt
scientifically and objectively with the problems which have arisen. They have refuted the false
charges made against Islam with eloquent arguments, and have admitted to concealed flaws.
They have also re-examined the sayings and customs of the Infallible Ones in order to
distinguish between what is established and holy and what has been altered and distorted.
The responsible behaviour of this group has established new directions and new ways of dealing
with the question of women in Islamic societies. They have clearly not yet tackled all problems
and found final solutions for the many legislative gaps and deficiencies, but they have laid the
ground for the emergence of a new model for Muslim women, who are both strong and
committed to the legal and effective foundations of their society.
Islamirevolutsiooni võidukäiguga Iraanis ja selle juhtide õnnistusega, mis on
peamine religioosne autoriteet naiste osalemisel ning nende tõhus poliitiline ja sotsiaalne
osalemine, islami naiste üle tugeva arutelu ulatus on oluliselt laienenud.
Iraani mosleminaiste mudel on levinud Liibanoni islami vastupanuliikumisse,
Palestiina teised araabia riigid ja isegi läänemaailm, ja selle tulemusena, propagandat
islamivastased kampaaniad on mingil määral vaibunud.
Salafi islamiliikumiste, näiteks Talibani tekkimine Afganistanis jms
Salafi liikumised Saudi Araabias ja Põhja-Aafrikas, ja nende fanaatiline naiste kohtlemise viis,
on ärgitanud närvilisi pealtvaatajaid, kes kardavad islami taastekke, uut propagandat käivitama
campaigns accusing Islam of inspiring terrorism and being backwards and unjust towards
women.
| september 17, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
smearcasting: How Islamophobes spread fear, bigotry and misinformation
FAIR
Julie Hollar
Jim Naureckas
Making Islamophobia Mainstream:
How Muslim-bashers broadcast their bigotry
A remarkable thing happened at the National Book Critics Circle (NBCC) nominations in February 2007: The normally highbrow and tolerant group nominated for best book in the field of criticism a book widely viewed as denigrating an entire religious group.
The nomination of Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept: How Radical Islam Is Destroying the West From Within didn’t pass without controversy. Past nominee Eliot Weinberger denounced the book at the NBCC’s annual gathering, calling it ‘‘racism as criticism’’ (New York Times, 2/8/07). NBCC board president John Freeman wrote on the group’s blog (Critical Mass, 2/4/07): ‘‘I have never been
more embarrassed by a choice than I have been with Bruce Bawer’s While Europe Slept…. Its hyperventilated rhetoric tips from actual critique into Islamophobia.’’
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” kirjeldab, kuidas islamofoobid jätkavad meediaga manipuleerimist, et maalida moslemeid laiapõhjaliselt, vihkav pintsel. Meie eesmärk on dokumenteerida määrdumist: tahtlikult ja regulaarselt hirmu levitavate islamofoobsete aktivistide ja asjatundjate avalikud kirjutised ja esinemised, bigotry and misinformation. Mõiste "islamofoobia" viitab vaenule islami ja moslemite vastu, mis kipub kogu usku dehumaniseerima, kujutades seda põhimõtteliselt võõrana ja omistades sellele omase, oluline kogum negatiivseid jooni, nagu irratsionaalsus, sallimatust ja vägivalda. Ja mitte erinevalt klassikalises antisemitismidokumendis esitatud süüdistustest, Siioni vanemate protokollid, mõned islamofoobia virulentsemad väljendid–nagu Kui Euroopa magas–sisaldama esilekutsumisi islami disainidest, et domineerida läänes.
Islamic institutions and Muslims, of course, should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny and criticism as anyone else. For instance, when a Norwegian Islamic Council debates whether gay men and lesbians should be executed, one may forcefully condemn individuals or groups sharing that opinion without pulling all European Muslims into it, as did Bawer’s Pajamas Media post (8/7/08),
“European Muslims Debate: Should Gays Be Executed?”
Similarly, extremists who justify their violent actions by invoking some particular interpretation of Islam can be criticized without implicating the enormously diverse population of Muslims around the world. Pealegi, reporters managed to cover the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh–an adherent of the racist Christian Identity sect–kasutamata üldistavaid väiteid "kristliku terrorismi" kohta. Samamoodi, meedia on kajastanud juutidest fanaatikute terroriakte–näiteks Hebroni veresaun, mille viis läbi Baruch Goldstein (Lisa!, 5/6/94)–ilma et see hõlmaks kogu judaismi.
| september 16, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Totalitarismi kohta džihaadi islamit ja Challenge Euroopasse ja islam
Bassam Tibi
Lugedes enamus tekste, mis sisaldavad suurt kirjandust, mis on avaldatud isehakanud asjatundjad poliitiliste Islam, see on lihtne jääda asjaolu, et uue liikumise teket. edasi, Selle kirjanduse ei selgita rahuldavalt, et ideoloogia, mis ajab see põhineb eelkõige islamitõlgendus, ja et see on seega politiseeritud usu,
ei ilmalik üks. Ainus raamat, mis poliitilise islami on adresseeritud kui totalitarismiin on üks Paul Berman, Terror ja liberalism (2003). Autor on, siiski, ei ole ekspert, ei saa lugeda islami allikate, ja seetõttu sõltub valikulist kasutamist ühe või kahe teiseste allikate, jättes haarata nähtus.
Üks põhjustest puudusi on asjaolu, et enamik neist, kes püüavad teavitada meid "džihaadiohu" - ja Berman on tüüpiline see stipendium - mitte ainult puudub keeleoskus lugeda allikatest toodetud ideoloogid poliitilise islam, vaid ka teadmatus kultuurilist mõõdet liikumine. See uus totalitaarne liikumine on mitmeti uudne
ajaloos poliitikas, sest see on oma juured kaks paralleelset ja sellega seotud nähtusi: esimene, culturalisation poliitika, mis viib poliitikas on kontseptualiseeritud kui kultuuri süsteemi (eesmärgiga toimitud Clifford Geertz); ja teine tagastamist püha, või "re-lummus" maailma, Reaktsioonina intensiivse ilmalikuks tulenevad globaliseerumisest.
Analüüsi poliitiliste ideoloogiate, mis põhinevad religioonide, ja mis võib avaldada kaebuse poliitiline religioon tagajärjel käesoleva, hõlmab ühiskonnaõpetus mõista rolli religioon mängib maailma poliitikas, eriti pärast bi-polaarne süsteemi külma sõja andnud viis mitmepolaarses maailma. Projektis teostati Hannah Arendt Instituut kohaldamise totalitarismist uuringu poliitilise religioonide, Tegin vahet ilmalik ideoloogia, mis toimivad asenda religioon, ja religioossete ideoloogiate põhineb tõelise usu, mis on nii religioosse fundamentalismi (vt märkus
24). Teine projekt "Poliitiline Religioon", läbi ülikooli Basel, on teinud selgemaks punkt, et uusi lähenemisviise poliitika muutuvad vajalikuks kord usu muutub riietatud poliitiline garb.Drawing kohta autoriteetsed allikad, et poliitilise islami, Selle artikli näitab, et väga erinevaid organisatsioone inspireeritud islami ideoloogia tuleb kontseptualiseeritud nii poliitilise religioonide ja poliitiliste liikumiste. Unikaalne kvaliteet poliitilise islami valesid on asjaolu, et see põhineb riikidevahelisel religioon (vt märkus 26).
| september 15, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Islam, Poliitiline islam ja Ameerika
Araabia Insight
Kas "vennaskond" Ameerikaga on võimalik?
khalil al-anani
"Pole mingit võimalust suhelda ühegi USA-ga. senikaua, kuni USA säilitab oma pikaajalise nägemuse islamist kui reaalsest ohust, vaade, mis paneb USA sionistliku vaenlasega ühte paati. Meil ei ole Ameerika rahva ega USA kohta eelarvamusi. ühiskond ja selle kodanikuorganisatsioonid ja mõttekojad. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, Moslemivennaskonna poliitilise osakonna juhataja telefoniintervjuus.
Al-Iryani sõnad võtavad kokku Moslemivennaskonna vaated Ameerika rahvale ja USA-le. valitsus. Teised Moslemi Vennaskonna liikmed oleksid sellega nõus, nagu ka kadunud Hassan al-Banna, aastal grupi asutanud 1928. Al- Banna pidas läänt enamasti moraalse allakäigu sümboliks. Teised salafid – islami koolkond, mis toetub esivanematele kui eeskujulikele mudelitele – on võtnud USA suhtes sama seisukoha., kuid puudub ideoloogiline paindlikkus, mida toetab Moslemivennaskond. Samal ajal kui Moslemivennaskond usub ameeriklaste kaasamisse kodanikuühiskonna dialoogi, teised äärmusrühmitused ei näe dialoogil mõtet ja väidavad, et jõud on ainus viis USAga toimetulemiseks.
| september 15, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Märkused isokraatse Legacy ja islami poliitilise mõtte: Näide Haridus
JAMES Muir
An unfortunate feature of human history is the tendency for religious differences and con icts to nourish themselves with the poisonous brew of ignorance and prejudice. While much can sometimes be done to reduce prejudice, it seems to me that scholars and educators ought to be primarily concerned with the more fundamental and enduring goal of reducing ignorance. One’s success in reducing ignorance—including one’s own—will depend upon one’s motives.
The study of Islamic educational philosophy may be motivated by current practical concerns: the desire of British Muslims to have Islamic schools, whether funded privately or by the state, is one topical example. From the perspective of educational philosophy, siiski, such a motive is exceedingly narrow, circumscribed by the concepts and categories of the local political disputes of the moment. For those motivated by a desire for knowledge and understanding of a tradition outside their own, it is most doubtful that any study of Islamic philosophy restricted by current practical concerns can be at all productive. There is no simple correspondence between knowledge and “relevance.”
There must, siiski, be some connection between two traditions of thought and practice if there is to be a point of departure, and a point of entry, which allows the scholar to step from one tradition to another. The legacy of Isocrates may constitute one such point of departure, which will help us to understand the relation between two traditions, the classical Greek and the Islamic. The dominance of the Isocratic legacy in Western education is well established and widely known among historians, classicists
and political philosophers, although awareness of it has only just begun to surface among educationists.2 Similarly, the Isocratic legacy to education (and the rich tradition of Arabic Platonism in philosophy) has in uenced Islamic thought, though in ways that are
still not yet well understood. The intention of this paper is to suggest that a modi ed form of the Isocratic educational tradition is a fundamental component of Islamic political thought, namely, Islamic educational thought. This general wording of the intention of this paper in terms of Islamic political thought may give rise to a misunderstanding. Islam, of course, is regarded by its adherents as a uni ed and universal system of belief and behaviour.
| september 09, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: the Search for Common Ground.
Mostapha Benhenda
This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: for example, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regime, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. For example, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (vähemalt, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, tundub huvitav määrata kindlaks islami poliitiliste mudelite aluseks oleva demokraatia kontseptsioon. Teisisõnu, peaksime püüdma välja selgitada, mis on "teodemokraatias" demokraatlik. Selleks, normatiivse poliitilise mõtte islami traditsioonide muljetavaldava mitmekesisuse ja paljususe hulgas, keskendume sisuliselt laiaulatuslikule mõttevoolule, mis ulatub tagasi Abu ‘Ala Maududi ja Egiptuse intellektuaali Sayyed Qutb’i.8 See konkreetne mõttesuund on huvitav, sest moslemimaailmas, see on mõne kõige keerulisema vastuseisu aluseks läänest pärit väärtuste levikule. Lähtudes usulistest väärtustest, see suund töötas välja poliitilise mudeli alternatiivi liberaalsele demokraatiale. Laias laastus, the conception of democracy included in this Islamic political model is procedural. With some differences, this conception is inspired by democratic theories advocated by some constitutionalists and political scientists.10 It is thin and minimalist, up to a certain point. For example, it does not rely on any notion of popular sovereignty and it does not require any separation between religion and politics. The first aim of this paper is to elaborate this minimalist conception. We make a detailed restatement of it in order to isolate this conception from its moral (liberal) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. Tõepoolest, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, näitame, et selline põhimõte ei ole demokraatliku protsessi õigustamiseks vajalik.
| september 09, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Ameerika põhiseadusest Koraani ja Madinahi pakti vaatenurgast
Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad
See artikkel ei ole sugugi Ameerika põhiseaduse ammendav võrdlus Koraani ja Mediina paktiga. Pigem, see uurib, milliseid arusaamu nende kahe dokumendi võrdlusest võib järeldada. Vastavalt, the constitutional topics selected are those in which the author or the commentators on earlier drafts perceived an assessment within the Islamic sources.4 This paper should be taken as an invitation for future studies with more systematic comparisons. In addition to rational inference from the text of the Qur’an and of the Madinah Covenant, I shall draw on the views of the Prophet’s Companions as recorded in the leading Hadith books. Analogously, the views of the Founding Fathers of the American Republic on constitutional
matters are articulated in The Federalist Papers.We shall begin by reviewing the Madinah Covenant, and then evaluate the Constitution’s goals as expressed in the preamble. After that, we shall explore a variety of topics in the main body of the text that lend themselves to the examination proposed here. In particular, these are the roles of the branches of government according to the separation of powers, the role of elections in determining the next head of state, the penalty for treason, the existence of the slave trade and racism, the republican form of government, the provisions for amending the Constitution, religious tests, and the Bill of Rights. lõpuks, we consider the Madisonian arguments on how the Constitution may be considered a model for avoiding fitnah.
The Madinah Covenant That Muslims attach great significance to their organization as a political community can be seen in the fact that their calendar is dated neither from the birth nor the death of the Prophet, but from the establishment of the first Muslim polity in the city-state of Madinah in 622. Before Madinah was founded, the Arabs had no state to “establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty …” The custom at that time was that those who were too weak to protect themselves became clients of a protector (wali). Muhammad, himself an orphan, was brought up under the protection of his uncle Abu Talib.
After his uncle’s death in 619, Muhammad received an invitation from Yathrib’s feuding Arab tribes to govern there. Once in Yathrib, he entered into a covenant with all of its residents, whether they had accepted Islam or not. Even the Jews living on the city’s outskirts subscribed to it.
| september 09, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Islami ja liberaalse demokraatia
Robin Wright
Of all the challenges facing democracy in the 1990s, one of the greatest lies in the Islamic world. Only a handful of the more than four dozen predominantly Muslim countries have made significant strides toward establishing democratic systems. Among this handful–including Albania, Bangladesh, Jordaania, Kyrgyzstan, Liibanon, Mali, Pakistan, and Turkey–not one has yet achieved full, stable, or secure democracy. And the largest single regional bloc holding out against the global trend toward political pluralism comprises the Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa.
Yet the resistance to political change associated with the Islamic bloc is not necessarily a function of the Muslim faith. Tõepoolest, the evidence indicates quite the reverse. Mõnede islamimaailma kõige antidemokraatlikumate režiimide valitsejad–nagu Brunei, Indoneesia, Iraak, Omaan, Katar, Süüria, ja Türkmenistan–on ilmalikud autokraadid, kes keelduvad jagamast võimu oma vendadega.
Üldiselt, poliitilise pluralismi takistused islamimaades ei erine probleemidest, millega varem kokku puututi mujal maailmas: ilmalikud ideoloogiad, nagu baathism Iraagis ja Süürias, Pancasila Indoneesias, või püsiv kommunism mõnes endises Nõukogude Kesk-Aasia riigis ei tekitanud tõelist vastuseisu. Irooniliselt, paljud neist ideoloogiatest olid kohandatud läänest; Baathism, näiteks, oli inspireeritud 1930. ja 1940. aastate Euroopa sotsialismist. Rigid government controls over everything from communications in Saudi Arabia and Brunei to foreign visitors in Uzbekistan and Indonesia also isolate their people from democratic ideas and debate on popular empowerment. In the largest and poorest Muslim countries, moreover, problems common to [End Page 64] developing states, from illiteracy and disease to poverty, make simple survival a priority and render democratic politics a seeming luxury. lõpuks, like their non-Muslim neighbors in Asia and Africa, most Muslim societies have no local history of democracy on which to draw. As democracy has blossomed in Western states over the past three centuries, Muslim societies have usually lived under colonial rulers, kings, or tribal and clan leaders.
Teisisõnu, neither Islam nor its culture is the major obstacle to political modernity, even if undemocratic rulers sometimes use Islam as their excuse. 1 In Saudi Arabia, näiteks, the ruling House of Saud relied on Wahhabism, a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam, first to unite the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula and then to justify dynastic rule. Like other monotheistic religions, Islam offers wide-ranging and sometimes contradictory instruction. In Saudi Arabia, Islam’s tenets have been selectively shaped to sustain an authoritarian monarchy.
| september 08, 2010 | Kommentaarid 2
Islam and the New Political Landscape
Tagasi, Michael Keith, Azra Khan,
Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos
IN THE wake of the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 September 2001, and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 ja 2005, a literature that addresses the forms and modalities of religious expression – particularly Islamic religious expression – has flourished in the penumbral regions that link mainstream social science to social policy design, think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Consultancy, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (Bright, 2006a; Mirza et al., 2007). Studies of Islamism and Jihadism have created a particular focus on the syncretic and complex links between Islamic religious faith and forms of social movement and political mobilization (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Conventionally, the analytical focus has spotlighted the culture of Islam, the belief systems of the faithful, and the historical and geographical trajectories of Muslim populations across the world in general and in ‘the West’ in particular (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade and Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). In this article the emphasis is different. We argue that studies of Islamic political participation need to be contextualized carefully without recourse to grand generalities about culture and faith. This is because both culture and faith are structured by and in turn structure the cultural, institutional and deliberative landscapes through which they are articulated. In the case of the British experience, the hidden traces of Christianity in the formation of the welfare state in the last century, the rapidly changing cartography of spaces of the political and the role of ‘faith organizations’ in the restructuring of welfare provision generate the material social context determining the opportunities and the outlines of new forms of political participation.
| september 08, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam
Dr. Muhammad Iqbal
As a cultural movement Islam rejects the old static view of the universe, and reaches a dynamic view. As an emotional system of unification it recognizes the worth of the individual as such, and rejects bloodrelationship as a basis of human unity. Blood-relationship is earthrootedness. The search for a purely psychological foundation of human unity becomes possible only with the perception that all human life is spiritual in its origin.1 Such a perception is creative of fresh loyalties without any ceremonial to keep them alive, and makes it possible for man to emancipate himself from the earth. Christianity which had originally appeared as a monastic order was tried by Constantine as a system of unification.2 Its failure to work as such a system drove the Emperor Julian3 to return to the old gods of Rome on which he attempted to put philosophical interpretations. A modern historian of civilization has thus depicted the state of the civilized world about the time when Islam appeared on the stage of History: It seemed then that the great civilization that it had taken four thousand years to construct was on the verge of disintegration, and that mankind was likely to return to that condition of barbarism where every tribe and sect was against the next, and law and order were unknown . . . The
old tribal sanctions had lost their power. Hence the old imperial methods would no longer operate. The new sanctions created by
Christianity were working division and destruction instead of unity and order. It was a time fraught with tragedy. Civilization, like a gigantic tree whose foliage had overarched the world and whose branches had borne the golden fruits of art and science and literature, stood tottering, its trunk no longer alive with the flowing sap of devotion and reverence, but rotted to the core, riven by the storms of war, and held together only by the cords of ancient customs and laws, that might snap at any moment. Was there any emotional culture that could be brought in, to gather mankind once more into unity and to save civilization? This culture must be something of a new type, for the old sanctions and ceremonials were dead, and to build up others of the same kind would be the work
of centuries.’The writer then proceeds to tell us that the world stood in need of a new culture to take the place of the culture of the throne, and the systems of unification which were based on bloodrelationship.
It is amazing, he adds, that such a culture should have arisen from Arabia just at the time when it was most needed. There is, siiski, nothing amazing in the phenomenon. The world-life intuitively sees its own needs, and at critical moments defines its own direction. This is what, in the language of religion, we call prophetic revelation. It is only natural that Islam should have flashed across the consciousness of a simple people untouched by any of the ancient cultures, and occupying a geographical position where three continents meet together. The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity in the principle of Tauhâd.’5 Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature. The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to regulate its collective life, for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of perpetual change.
| september 08, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
Islami reformatsiooni
Adnan Khan
The Italian Prime Minister, Silvio Berlusconi boasted after the events of 9/11:
“…we must be aware of the superiority of our civilisation, a system that has guaranteed
well being, respect for human rights and – in contrast with Islamic countries – respect
for religious and political rights, a system that has its values understanding of diversity
and tolerance…The West will conquer peoples, like it conquered communism, even if it
means a confrontation with another civilisation, the Islamic one, stuck where it was
1,400 years ago…”1
And in a 2007 report the RAND institute declared:
“The struggle underway throughout much of the Muslim world is essentially a war of
ideas. Its outcome will determine the future direction of the Muslim world.”
Building moderate Muslim Networks, RAND Institute
The concept of ‘islah’ (reform) is a concept unknown to Muslims. It never existed throughout the
history of the Islamic civilisation; it was never debated or even considered. A cursory glance at classical
Islamic literature shows us that when the classical scholars laid the foundations of usul, and codified
their Islamic rulings (fiqh) they were only looking to the comprehension of the Islamic rules in order to
apply them. A similar situation occurred when the rules were laid down for the hadith, tafseer and the
Arabic language. Scholars, thinkers and intellectuals throughout Islamic history spent much time
understanding Allah’s revelation – the Qur’an and applying the ayaat upon the realities and coined
principals and disciplines in order to facilitate understanding. Hence the Qur’an remained the basis of
study and all the disciplines that evolved were always based upon the Qur’an. Those who became
smitten by Greek philosophy such as the Muslim philosophers and some from amongst the Mut’azilah
were considered to have left the fold of Islam as the Qur’an ceased to be their basis of study. Seega selleks
moslemid, kes üritavad tuletada reegleid või mõista, millist seisukohta konkreetse suhtes võtta
Koraani väljaandmine on selle uuringu aluseks.
Esimene katse islamit reformida toimus 19. sajandi vahetusel. aasta pöördeks
sajandil oli Ummas olnud pikaajaline langusperiood, kus ülemaailmne jõudude tasakaal muutus
Khilafah'st Suurbritanniasse. Paigaldusprobleemid haarasid Khilafahi Lääne-Euroopa ajal
keset tööstusrevolutsiooni. Ummah kaotas oma põlise arusaama islamist, ja
püüdes tagasi pöörata Uthmani omasid haaranud allakäik (Ottomanid) osa moslemeid saadeti sinna
Läände, ja selle tulemusel olid nad nähtust rabatud. Egiptuse Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi (1801-1873),
naastes Pariisist, wrote a biographical book called Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (The
Extraction of Gold, or an Overview of Paris, 1834), praising their cleanliness, love of work, and above
all social morality. He declared that we must mimic what is being done in Paris, advocating changes to
the Islamic society from liberalising women to the systems of ruling. This thought, and others like it,
marked the beginning of the reinventing trend in Islam.
| september 07, 2010 | Kommentaarid 0
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