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The Arab Tomorrow
DAVID B. OTTAWAY
Octubre 6, 1981, was meant to be a day of celebration in Egypt. It marked the anniversary of Egypt’s grandest moment of victory in three Arab-Israeli conflicts, when the country’s underdog army thrust across the Suez Canal in the opening days ofthe 1973 Yom Kippur War and sent Israeli troops reeling in retreat. On a cool, cloudless morning, the Cairo stadium was packed with Egyptian families that had come to see the military strut its hardware.On the reviewing stand, President Anwar el-Sadat,the war’s architect, watched with satisfaction as men and machines paraded before him. I was nearby, a newly arrived foreign correspondent.Suddenly, un dels camions de l'exèrcit es va aturar directament davant de l'estand de revisió just quan sis avions Mirage rugien per sobre en una actuació acrobàtica., pintant el cel amb llargs estels de vermell, groc, porpra,i fum verd. Sadat es va aixecar, aparentment es prepara per intercanviar salutacions amb un altre contingent de tropes egípcies. Es va convertir en un objectiu perfecte per a quatre assassins islamistes que van saltar del camió, va assaltar el podi, i va cridar el seu cos amb bales. Mentre els assassins van continuar durant el que va semblar una eternitat ruixant el suport amb el seu foc mortal., Vaig pensar per un instant si topar a terra i arriscar-me a ser trepitjat fins a la mort per espectadors en pànic o romandre a peu i arriscar-me a agafar una bala perduda.. L'instint em va dir que em mantingués de peu, i el meu sentit del deure periodístic em va impulsar a anar a saber si Sadat era viu o mort.
| setembre 26, 2010 | Comentaris 0
L'Islam i la creació del poder estatal
Seyyed Reza Vali Nasr
a 1979 General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq, el governant militar del Pakistan, va declarar que el Pakistan es convertiria en un estat islàmic. Els valors i les normes islàmiques servirien com a fonament de la identitat nacional, Llei, economia, i les relacions socials, i inspiraria tota l'elaboració de polítiques. a 1980 Mahathir Muhammad, el nou primer ministre de Malàisia, va introduir un pla similar de base àmplia per ancorar l'elaboració de polítiques estatals als valors islàmics, i posar les lleis i pràctiques econòmiques del seu país en línia amb els ensenyaments de l'Islam. Per què aquests governants van triar el camí de la "islamització" per als seus països? I com es van convertir els estats postcolonials laics en un temps en els agents de la islamització i en el presagi del "vertader" estat islàmic?
Des de finals de la dècada de 1970 i principis de la dècada de 1980, Malàisia i Pakistan han seguit un camí únic cap al desenvolupament que divergeix de les experiències d'altres estats del Tercer Món.. En aquests dos països la identitat religiosa es va integrar a la ideologia estatal per informar l'objectiu i el procés de desenvolupament amb valors islàmics..
Aquesta empresa també ha presentat una imatge molt diferent de la relació entre l'islam i la política a les societats musulmanes. A Malàisia i Pakistan, han estat institucions estatals més que activistes islamistes (aquells que defensen una lectura política de l'islam; també coneguts com a revivalistes o fonamentalistes) that have been the guardians of Islam and the defenders of its interests. This suggests a
very different dynamic in the ebbs and flow of Islamic politics—in the least pointing to the importance of the state in the vicissitudes of this phenomenon.
What to make of secular states that turn Islamic? What does such a transformation mean for the state as well as for Islamic politics?
This book grapples with these questions. This is not a comprehensive account of Malaysia’s or Pakistan’s politics, nor does it cover all aspects of Islam’s role in their societies and politics, although the analytical narrative dwells on these issues considerably. This book is rather a social scientific inquiry into the phenomenon of secular postcolonial states becoming agents of Islamization, and more broadly how culture and religion serve the needs of state power and development. The analysis here relies on theoretical discussions
in the social sciences of state behavior and the role of culture and religion therein. More important, it draws inferences from the cases under examination to make broader conclusions of interest to the disciplines.
| setembre 25, 2010 | Comentaris 0
EL FEMINISME ENTRE EL SECULARISME I L'ISLAMISME: EL CAS DE PALESTINA
dr, Islah Jad
Eleccions legislatives celebrades a Cisjordània i a la Franja de Gaza 2006 va portar al poder el moviment islamista Hamàs, que va passar a formar la majoria del Consell Legislatiu Palestí i també el primer govern majoritari de Hamàs. Aquestes eleccions van donar lloc al nomenament de la primera dona ministra de Hamàs, que esdevingué la ministra d'Afers de la Dona. Entre març 2006 i juny 2007, dues ministres diferents de Hamàs van assumir aquest càrrec, però a tots dos els va costar gestionar el ministeri, ja que la majoria dels seus empleats no eren membres de Hamàs sinó que pertanyien a altres partits polítics., i la majoria eren membres de Fatah, el moviment dominant que controla la majoria de les institucions de l'Autoritat Palestina. Un tens període de lluita entre les dones de Hamàs al Ministeri d'Afers de la Dona i les dones membres de Fatah va acabar després de la presa de poder per part de Hamàs a la Franja de Gaza i la consegüent caiguda del seu govern a Cisjordània: una lluita. que de vegades donava un gir violent. Una de les raons esmentades més tard per explicar aquesta lluita va ser la diferència entre el discurs feminista laic i el discurs islamista sobre els problemes de les dones.. En el context palestí, aquest desacord va adquirir un caràcter perillós ja que va servir per justificar la perpetuació de la cruenta lluita política., l'eliminació de les dones de Hamàs dels seus càrrecs o càrrecs, i les divisions polítiques i geogràfiques que hi havia en aquell moment tant a Cisjordània com a la Franja de Gaza ocupada.
Aquesta lluita planteja una sèrie de preguntes importants: hem de castigar el moviment islamista que ha arribat al poder, o hem de considerar les raons que van portar al fracàs de Fateh en l'àmbit polític? El feminisme pot oferir un marc integral per a les dones?, independentment de les seves afiliacions socials i ideològiques? Pot un discurs d'un punt en comú compartit per a les dones ajudar-les a realitzar i a consensuar els seus objectius comuns?? El paternalisme només està present en la ideologia islamista?, i no en nacionalisme i patriotisme? Què entenem per feminisme? Hi ha només un feminisme?, o diversos feminismes? Què entenem per islam – és el moviment conegut amb aquest nom o la religió, la filosofia, o l'ordenament jurídic? Hem d'anar al fons d'aquests problemes i considerar-los acuradament, i les hem de posar d'acord per després decidir, com a feministes, si la nostra crítica al paternalisme s'ha de dirigir a la religió (fe), que s'hauria de limitar al cor del creient i que no se'ls permeti prendre el control del món en general, o la jurisprudència, que es relaciona amb diferents escoles de fe que expliquen el sistema legal contingut a l'Alcorà i les dites del profeta – la Sunnah.
| setembre 19, 2010 | Comentaris 0
ISLAMIST WOMEN’S ACTIVISM IN OCCUPIED PALESTINE
Interviews by Khaled Amayreh
Interview with Sameera Al-Halayka
Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. She was
born in the village of Shoyoukh near Hebron in 1964. She has a BA in Sharia (islàmic
Jurisprudence) from Hebron University. She worked as a journalist from 1996 per 2006 when
va ingressar al Consell Legislatiu Palestí com a membre electe del 2006 eleccions.
Està casada i té set fills.
Q: Hi ha una impressió general en alguns països occidentals que reben les dones
tracte inferior dins dels grups de resistència islàmica, com Hamàs. És cert això??
Com es tracten les dones activistes a Hamàs?
Els drets i els deures de les dones musulmanes emanen, en primer lloc, de la xaria o llei islàmica.
No són actes o gestos voluntaris o benèfics que rebem de Hamàs o de ningú
altra cosa. Així, pel que fa a la implicació política i l'activisme, les dones en general tenen
els mateixos drets i deures que els homes. Després de tot, les dones com a mínim constitueixen 50 per cent de
societat. En cert sentit, són tota la societat perquè pareixen, i pujar,
la nova generació.
Per tant, I can say that the status of women within Hamas is in full conformity with her
status in Islam itself. This means that she is a full partner at all levels. Indeed, it would be
unfair and unjust for an Islamic (or Islamist if you prefer) woman to be partner in suffering
while she is excluded from the decision-making process. This is why the woman’s role in
Hamas has always been pioneering.
Q: Do you feel that the emergence of women’s political activism within Hamas is
a natural development that is compatible with classical Islamic concepts
regarding the status and role of women, or is it merely a necessary response to
pressures of modernity and requirements of political action and of the continued
Israeli occupation?
No hi ha cap text a la jurisprudència islàmica ni a la carta de Hamàs que impedeixi a les dones
participació política. Crec que és cert el contrari — hi ha nombrosos versos alcorànics
i les dites del profeta Mahoma que demanaven les dones a ser actives en la política i en el públic
problemes que afecten els musulmans. Però també és cert que per a les dones, com és per als homes, activisme polític
no és obligatori sinó voluntari, i es decideix en gran mesura en funció de les capacitats de cada dona,
qualificacions i circumstàncies individuals. No obstant això, mostrant preocupació pel públic
els assumptes són obligatoris per a tots i cadascun dels musulmans. El Profeta
va dir Muhammed: "Qui no mostra preocupació pels afers dels musulmans no és musulmà".
A més, Les dones islamistes palestines han de tenir en compte tots els factors objectius sobre el terreny
account when deciding whether to join politics or get involved in political activism.
| setembre 19, 2010 | Comentaris 0
IRANIAN WOMEN AFTER THE ISLAMIC REVOLUTION
Ansiia Khaz Allii
More than thirty years have passed since the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran, yet there remain a number of questions and ambiguities about the way the Islamic Republic and its laws deal with contemporary problems and current circumstances, particularly with regard to women and women’s rights. This short paper will shed light on these issues and study the current position of women in various spheres, comparing this to the situation prior to the Islamic Revolution. Reliable and authenticated data has been used wherever possible. The introduction summarises a number of theoretical and legal studies which provide the basis for the subsequent more practical analysis and are the sources from where the data has been obtained.
The first section considers attitudes of the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards women and women’s rights, and then takes a comprehensive look at the laws promulgated since the Islamic Revolution concerning women and their position in society. The second section considers women’s cultural and educational developments since the Revolution and compares these to the pre-revolutionary situation. la third section looks at women’s political, social and economic participation and considers both quantative and qualitative aspects of their employment. A continuació, la quarta secció examina les qüestions de la família, la relació entre la dona i la família, i el paper de la família a l'hora de limitar o augmentar els drets de les dones la República Islàmica de l'Iran.
| setembre 19, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Dones a l'Islam
Amira burghul
Malgrat el gran consens entre un gran nombre de filòsofs i historiadors que el
principis i ensenyaments de l'Islam van provocar un canvi fonamental en la posició de les dones
en comparació amb la situació imperant als països tant de l'Est com de l'Oest en aquell moment, i malgrat
l'acord d'un gran nombre de pensadors i legisladors que les dones durant l'època del
Profeta (PBUH) se'ls van concedir drets i privilegis legals no concedits per lleis creades per l'home fins que
recentment, campanyes de propaganda d'occidentals i gent amb una perspectiva occidentalitzada
consistently accuse Islam of being unjust to women, of imposing restrictions on them, i
marginalising their role in society.
This situation has been made worse by the atmosphere and conditions prevalent across the
Muslim world, where ignorance and poverty have produced a limited understanding of religion
and family and human relations which occlude justice and a civilised way of life, particularly
between men and women. The small group of people who have been granted opportunities to
acquire an education and abilities have also fallen into the trap of believing that achieving justice
for women and capitalising on their abilities is dependent upon rejecting religion and piety and
adopting a Western way of life, as a result of their superficial studies of Islam on the one hand
and the effect of life’s diversions on the other.
Only a very small number of people from these two groups have managed to escape and cast off
their cloaks of ignorance and tradition. These people have studied their heritage in great depth
and detail, and have looked at the results of Western experiences with an open mind. They have
distinguished between the wheat and the chaff in both the past and the present, and have dealt
scientifically and objectively with the problems which have arisen. They have refuted the false
charges made against Islam with eloquent arguments, and have admitted to concealed flaws.
They have also re-examined the sayings and customs of the Infallible Ones in order to
distinguish between what is established and holy and what has been altered and distorted.
The responsible behaviour of this group has established new directions and new ways of dealing
with the question of women in Islamic societies. They have clearly not yet tackled all problems
and found final solutions for the many legislative gaps and deficiencies, but they have laid the
ground for the emergence of a new model for Muslim women, who are both strong and
committed to the legal and effective foundations of their society.
With the triumph of the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the blessing of its leaders, which is the
main religious authority for the participation of women and their effective political and social
participation, the scope for strong debate over women in Islam has been significantly expanded.
The model of Muslim women in Iran has spread to Islamic resistance movements in Lebanon,
Palestine other Arab countries and even the Western world, and as a result, propaganda
campaigns against Islam have abated to some extent.
The emergence of Salafi Islamic movements such as the Taliban in Afghanistan and similar
Salafi movements in Saudi Arabia and North Africa, and their fanatical way of treating women,
have provoked nervous onlookers fearing an Islamic resurgence into launching new propaganda
campaigns accusing Islam of inspiring terrorism and being backwards and unjust towards
women.
| setembre 17, 2010 | Comentaris 0
smearcasting: How Islamophobes spread fear, bigotry and misinformation
FAIR
Julie Hollar
Jim Naureckas
Making Islamophobia Mainstream:
How Muslim-bashers broadcast their bigotry
A remarkable thing happened at the National Book Critics Circle (NBCC) candidatures al febrer 2007: El grup normalment alt i tolerant nominat com a millor llibre en el camp de la crítica, un llibre àmpliament vist com denigrant a tot un grup religiós.
La nominació de While Europe Slept de Bruce Bawer: Com l'islam radical està destruint Occident des de dins no va passar sense polèmica. El passat candidat Eliot Weinberger va denunciar el llibre a la reunió anual de la NBCC, anomenant-lo ''racisme com a crítica'' (Noticies de Nova York, 2/8/07). El president de la junta de NBCC, John Freeman, va escriure al bloc del grup (Massa crítica, 2/4/07): ''Mai he estat
més avergonyit per una elecció del que he estat amb While Europe Slept de Bruce Bawer…. La seva retòrica hiperventilada apunta des de la crítica real a la islamofòbia.
Though it didn’t ultimately win the award, While Europe Slept’s recognition in the highest literary circles was emblematic of a mainstreaming of Islamophobia, not just in American publishing but in the broader media. This report takes a fresh look at Islamophobia in today’s media and its perpetratrators, outlining some of the behind-the-scenes connections that are rarely explored in media. The report also provides four snapshots, or “case studies,” describing how Islamophobes continue to manipulate media to in order to paint Muslims with a broad, hateful brush. Our aim is to document smearcasting: the public writings and appearances of Islamophobic activists and pundits who intentionally and regularly spread fear, bigotry and misinformation. The term “Islamophobia” refers to hostility toward Islam and Muslims that tends to dehumanize an entire faith, portraying it as fundamentally alien and attributing to it an inherent, essential set of negative traits such as irrationality, intolerance and violence. And not unlike the charges made in the classical document of anti-Semitism, The Protocols of the Elders of Zion, some of Islamophobia’s more virulent expressions–like While Europe Slept–include evocations of Islamic designs to dominate the West.
Islamic institutions and Muslims, of course, should be subject to the same kind of scrutiny and criticism as anyone else. For instance, when a Norwegian Islamic Council debates whether gay men and lesbians should be executed, one may forcefully condemn individuals or groups sharing that opinion without pulling all European Muslims into it, as did Bawer’s Pajamas Media post (8/7/08),
“European Muslims Debate: Should Gays Be Executed?”
Similarly, extremists who justify their violent actions by invoking some particular interpretation of Islam can be criticized without implicating the enormously diverse population of Muslims around the world. Després de tot, reporters managed to cover the Oklahoma City bombing by Timothy McVeigh–an adherent of the racist Christian Identity sect–without resorting to generalized statements about “Christian terrorism.” Likewise, media have covered acts of terrorism by fanatics who are Jewish–for instance the Hebron massacre carried out by Baruch Goldstein (Extra!, 5/6/94)–without implicating the entirety of Judaism.
| setembre 16, 2010 | Comentaris 0
The Totalitarianism of Jihadist Islamism and its Challenge to Europe and to Islam
Basso tibi
When reading the majority of texts that comprise the vast literature that has been published by self-proclaimed pundits on political Islam, it is easy to miss the fact that a new movement has arisen. Further, this literature fails to explain in a satisfactory manner the fact that the ideology which drives it is based on a particular interpretation of Islam, and that it is thus a politicised religious faith,
not a secular one. The only book in which political Islam is addressed as a form of totalitarianism is the one by Paul Berman, Terror and Liberalism (2003). The author is, malgrat això, not an expert, cannot read Islamic sources, and therefore relies on the selective use of one or two secondary sources, thus failing to grasp the phenomenon.
One of the reasons for such shortcomings is the fact that most of those who seek to inform us about the ‘jihadist threat’ – and Berman is typical of this scholarship – not only lack the language skills to read the sources produced by the ideologues of political Islam, but also lack knowledge about the cultural dimension of the movement. This new totalitarian movement is in many ways a novelty
in the history of politics since it has its roots in two parallel and related phenomena: first, the culturalisation of politics which leads to politics being conceptualised as a cultural system (a view pioneered by Clifford Geertz); and second the return of the sacred, or ‘re-enchantment’ of the world, as a reaction to its intensive secularisation resulting from globalisation.
The analysis of political ideologies that are based on religions, and that can exert appeal as a political religion as a consequence of this, involves a social science understanding of the role of religion played by world politics, especially after the bi-polar system of the Cold War has given way to a multi-polar world. In a project conducted at the Hannah Arendt Institute for the application of totalitarianism to the study of political religions, I proposed the distinction between secular ideologies that act as a substitute for religion, and religious ideologies based on genuine religious faith, which is the case in religious fundamentalism (see note
24). Another project on ‘Political Religion’, carried out at the University of Basel, has made clearer the point that new approaches to politics become necessary once a religious faith becomes clothed in a political garb.Drawing on the authoritative sources of political Islam, this article suggests that the great variety of organisations inspired by Islamist ideology are to be conceptualised both as political religions and as political movements. The unique quality of political Islam lies is the fact that it is based on a transnational religion (see note 26).
| setembre 15, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Islam, Islam polític i Amèrica
Insight àrab
És possible la "Fraternitat" amb Amèrica?
Khalil al-anani
"No hi ha cap possibilitat de comunicar-se amb cap dels Estats Units. l'administració sempre que els Estats Units mantinguin la seva visió de llarga data de l'islam com un perill real, una visió que posa els Estats Units en el mateix vaixell que l'enemic sionista. No tenim idees preconcebudes sobre el poble nord-americà o els EUA. societat i les seves organitzacions cíviques i grups de reflexió. No tenim cap problema per comunicar-nos amb el poble nord-americà, però no s'estan fent els esforços adequats per apropar-nos,” va dir el Dr. Issam al-Iryan, cap del departament polític dels Germans Musulmans en una entrevista telefònica.
Les paraules d'Al-Iryan resumeixen les opinions dels Germans Musulmans sobre el poble nord-americà i els EUA. govern. Altres membres dels Germans Musulmans hi estarien d'acord, com ho faria el difunt Hassan al-Banna, qui va fundar el grup a 1928. Al- Banna va veure Occident principalment com un símbol de decadència moral. Altres salafis, una escola de pensament islàmica que es basa en els avantpassats com a models exemplars, han pres la mateixa visió dels Estats Units., però no tenen la flexibilitat ideològica defensada pels Germans Musulmans. Mentre que els Germans Musulmans creuen en comprometre els nord-americans en el diàleg civil, altres grups extremistes no veuen sentit al diàleg i sostenen que la força és l'única manera de tractar amb els Estats Units.
| setembre 15, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Notes on the Isocratic Legacy and Islamic Political Thought: The Example of Education
James Muir
An unfortunate feature of human history is the tendency for religious differences and con icts to nourish themselves with the poisonous brew of ignorance and prejudice. While much can sometimes be done to reduce prejudice, it seems to me that scholars and educators ought to be primarily concerned with the more fundamental and enduring goal of reducing ignorance. One’s success in reducing ignorance—including one’s own—will depend upon one’s motives.
The study of Islamic educational philosophy may be motivated by current practical concerns: the desire of British Muslims to have Islamic schools, whether funded privately or by the state, is one topical example. From the perspective of educational philosophy, malgrat això, such a motive is exceedingly narrow, circumscribed by the concepts and categories of the local political disputes of the moment. For those motivated by a desire for knowledge and understanding of a tradition outside their own, it is most doubtful that any study of Islamic philosophy restricted by current practical concerns can be at all productive. There is no simple correspondence between knowledge and “relevance.”
There must, malgrat això, be some connection between two traditions of thought and practice if there is to be a point of departure, and a point of entry, which allows the scholar to step from one tradition to another. The legacy of Isocrates may constitute one such point of departure, which will help us to understand the relation between two traditions, the classical Greek and the Islamic. The dominance of the Isocratic legacy in Western education is well established and widely known among historians, classicists
and political philosophers, although awareness of it has only just begun to surface among educationists.2 Similarly, the Isocratic legacy to education (and the rich tradition of Arabic Platonism in philosophy) has in uenced Islamic thought, though in ways that are
still not yet well understood. The intention of this paper is to suggest that a modi ed form of the Isocratic educational tradition is a fundamental component of Islamic political thought, és a dir, Islamic educational thought. This general wording of the intention of this paper in terms of Islamic political thought may give rise to a misunderstanding. Islam, of course, is regarded by its adherents as a uni ed and universal system of belief and behaviour.
| setembre 09, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Liberal Democracy and Political Islam: the Search for Common Ground.
Mostapha Benhenda
This paper seeks to establish a dialogue between democratic and Islamic political theories.1 The interplay between them is puzzling: for example, in order to explain the relationship existing between democracy and their conception of the ideal Islamic political
regime, the Pakistani scholar Abu ‘Ala Maududi coined the neologism “theodemocracy” whereas the French scholar Louis Massignon suggested the oxymoron “secular theocracy”. These expressions suggest that some aspects of democracy are evaluated positively and others are judged negatively. Per exemple, Muslim scholars and activists often endorse the principle of accountability of rulers, which is a defining feature of democracy. On the contrary, they often reject the principle of separation between religion and the state, which is often considered to be part of democracy (at least, of democracy as known in the United States today). Given this mixed assessment of democratic principles, it seems interesting to determine the conception of democracy underlying Islamic political models. In other words, we should try to find out what is democratic in “theodemocracy”. To that end, among the impressive diversity and plurality of Islamic traditions of normative political thought, we essentially focus on the broad current of thought going back to Abu ‘Ala Maududi and the Egyptian intellectual Sayyed Qutb.8 This particular trend of thought is interesting because in the Muslim world, it lies at the basis of some of the most challenging oppositions to the diffusion of the values originating from the West. Based on religious values, this trend elaborated a political model alternative to liberal democracy. Broadly speaking, the conception of democracy included in this Islamic political model is procedural. With some differences, this conception is inspired by democratic theories advocated by some constitutionalists and political scientists.10 It is thin and minimalist, up to a certain point. Per exemple, it does not rely on any notion of popular sovereignty and it does not require any separation between religion and politics. The first aim of this paper is to elaborate this minimalist conception. We make a detailed restatement of it in order to isolate this conception from its moral (liberal) foundations, which are controversial from the particular Islamic viewpoint considered here. Indeed, the democratic process is usually derived from a principle of personal autonomy, which is not endorsed by these Islamic theories.11 Here, we show that such principle is not necessary to justify a democratic process.
| setembre 09, 2010 | Comentaris 0
On the American Constitution from the Perspective of the Qur’an and the Madinah Covenant
Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad
This paper is by no means an exhaustive comparison of the American Constitution with the Qur’an and the Madinah Covenant. Rather, it explores the kinds of insights that a comparison between these two documents may suggest. D'acord amb, the constitutional topics selected are those in which the author or the commentators on earlier drafts perceived an assessment within the Islamic sources.4 This paper should be taken as an invitation for future studies with more systematic comparisons. In addition to rational inference from the text of the Qur’an and of the Madinah Covenant, I shall draw on the views of the Prophet’s Companions as recorded in the leading Hadith books. Analogously, the views of the Founding Fathers of the American Republic on constitutional
matters are articulated in The Federalist Papers.We shall begin by reviewing the Madinah Covenant, and then evaluate the Constitution’s goals as expressed in the preamble. After that, we shall explore a variety of topics in the main body of the text that lend themselves to the examination proposed here. In particular, these are the roles of the branches of government according to the separation of powers, the role of elections in determining the next head of state, the penalty for treason, the existence of the slave trade and racism, the republican form of government, the provisions for amending the Constitution, religious tests, and the Bill of Rights. Finalment, we consider the Madisonian arguments on how the Constitution may be considered a model for avoiding fitnah.
The Madinah Covenant That Muslims attach great significance to their organization as a political community can be seen in the fact that their calendar is dated neither from the birth nor the death of the Prophet, but from the establishment of the first Muslim polity in the city-state of Madinah in 622. Before Madinah was founded, the Arabs had no state to “establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty …” The custom at that time was that those who were too weak to protect themselves became clients of a protector (wali). Mahoma, himself an orphan, was brought up under the protection of his uncle Abu Talib.
After his uncle’s death in 619, Muhammad received an invitation from Yathrib’s feuding Arab tribes to govern there. Once in Yathrib, he entered into a covenant with all of its residents, whether they had accepted Islam or not. Even the Jews living on the city’s outskirts subscribed to it.
| setembre 09, 2010 | Comentaris 0
Islam i la democràcia liberal
Robin Wright
Of all the challenges facing democracy in the 1990s, one of the greatest lies in the Islamic world. Only a handful of the more than four dozen predominantly Muslim countries have made significant strides toward establishing democratic systems. Among this handful–including Albania, Bangladesh, Jordània, Kyrgyzstan, Líban, Mali, Pakistan, and Turkey–not one has yet achieved full, stable, or secure democracy. And the largest single regional bloc holding out against the global trend toward political pluralism comprises the Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa.
Yet the resistance to political change associated with the Islamic bloc is not necessarily a function of the Muslim faith. Indeed, the evidence indicates quite the reverse. Rulers in some of the most antidemocratic regimes in the Islamic world–such as Brunei, Indonèsia, Iraq, Oman, Qatar, Síria, and Turkmenistan–are secular autocrats who refuse to share power with their brethren.
Overall, the obstacles to political pluralism in Islamic countries are not unlike the problems earlier faced in other parts of the world: secular ideologies such as Ba’athism in Iraq and Syria, Pancasila in Indonesia, or lingering communism in some former Soviet Central Asian states brook no real opposition. Ironically, many of these ideologies were adapted from the West; Ba’athism, per exemple, was inspired by the European socialism of the 1930s and 1940s. Rigid government controls over everything from communications in Saudi Arabia and Brunei to foreign visitors in Uzbekistan and Indonesia also isolate their people from democratic ideas and debate on popular empowerment. In the largest and poorest Muslim countries, a més, problems common to [End Page 64] developing states, from illiteracy and disease to poverty, make simple survival a priority and render democratic politics a seeming luxury. Finalment, like their non-Muslim neighbors in Asia and Africa, most Muslim societies have no local history of democracy on which to draw. As democracy has blossomed in Western states over the past three centuries, Muslim societies have usually lived under colonial rulers, kings, or tribal and clan leaders.
In other words, neither Islam nor its culture is the major obstacle to political modernity, even if undemocratic rulers sometimes use Islam as their excuse. 1 In Saudi Arabia, per exemple, the ruling House of Saud relied on Wahhabism, a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam, first to unite the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula and then to justify dynastic rule. Like other monotheistic religions, Islam offers wide-ranging and sometimes contradictory instruction. In Saudi Arabia, Islam’s tenets have been selectively shaped to sustain an authoritarian monarchy.
| setembre 08, 2010 | Comentaris 2
Islam and the New Political Landscape
tornar la, Michael Keith, Azra Khan,
Kalbir Shukra and John Solomos
IN THE wake of the attack on the World Trade Center on 11 setembre 2001, and the Madrid and London bombings of 2004 i 2005, a literature that addresses the forms and modalities of religious expression – particularly Islamic religious expression – has flourished in the penumbral regions that link mainstream social science to social policy design, think tanks and journalism. Much of the work has attempted to define attitudes or predispositions of a Muslim population in a particular site of tension such as London or the UK (Barnes, 2006; Ethnos Consultancy, 2005; GFK, 2006; GLA, 2006; Populus, 2006), or critiqued particular forms of social policy intervention (Bright, 2006a; Mirza et al., 2007). Studies of Islamism and Jihadism have created a particular focus on the syncretic and complex links between Islamic religious faith and forms of social movement and political mobilization (Husain, 2007; Kepel, 2004, 2006; McRoy, 2006; Neville-Jones et al., 2006, 2007; Phillips, 2006; Roy, 2004, 2006). Conventionally, the analytical focus has spotlighted the culture of Islam, the belief systems of the faithful, and the historical and geographical trajectories of Muslim populations across the world in general and in ‘the West’ in particular (Abbas, 2005; Ansari, 2002; Eade and Garbin, 2002; Hussein, 2006; Modood, 2005; Ramadan, 1999, 2005). In this article the emphasis is different. We argue that studies of Islamic political participation need to be contextualized carefully without recourse to grand generalities about culture and faith. This is because both culture and faith are structured by and in turn structure the cultural, institutional and deliberative landscapes through which they are articulated. In the case of the British experience, the hidden traces of Christianity in the formation of the welfare state in the last century, the rapidly changing cartography of spaces of the political and the role of ‘faith organizations’ in the restructuring of welfare provision generate the material social context determining the opportunities and the outlines of new forms of political participation.
| setembre 08, 2010 | Comentaris 0
El principi del moviment en l'estructura de l'islam
dr. Muhammad Iqbal
Com a moviment cultural, l'Islam rebutja la vella visió estàtica de l'univers, i arriba a una visió dinàmica. Com a sistema emocional d'unificació, reconeix el valor de l'individu com a tal, i rebutja les relacions de sang com a base de la unitat humana. La relació de sang és arrelament a la terra. La recerca d'un fonament purament psicològic de la unitat humana només esdevé possible amb la percepció que tota la vida humana és espiritual en el seu origen.1 Aquesta percepció és creadora de lleialtats noves sense cap cerimonial per mantenir-les vives., i fa possible que l'home s'emancipi de la terra. El cristianisme, que havia aparegut originàriament com una ordre monàstica, va ser provat per Constantí com un sistema d'unificació.2 El seu fracàs de funcionar com a tal sistema va impulsar l'emperador Julià3 a tornar als antics déus de Roma sobre els quals va intentar donar interpretacions filosòfiques.. Així, un historiador modern de la civilització ha descrit l'estat del món civilitzat en l'època en què l'Islam va aparèixer a l'escenari de la Història.: Semblava aleshores que la gran civilització que havia trigat quatre mil anys a construir estava a punt de desintegrar-se., i que la humanitat probablement tornaria a aquella condició de barbàrie on cada tribu i secta estava en contra de la següent, i la llei i l'ordre eren desconeguts . . . la
les antigues sancions tribals havien perdut el seu poder. Per tant, els antics mètodes imperials ja no funcionarien. Les noves sancions creades per
El cristianisme treballava la divisió i la destrucció en lloc de la unitat i l'ordre. Va ser una època plena de tragèdies. Civilització, com un arbre gegantí, el fullatge del qual havia cobert el món i les branques del qual havien donat els fruits daurats de l'art, la ciència i la literatura., es va quedar tambalejant, el seu tronc ja no viu amb la saba que flueix de la devoció i la reverència, però podrit fins al nucli, arrasat per les tempestes de la guerra, i subjectes només per les cordes d'antics costums i lleis, que es pot trencar en qualsevol moment. Hi havia alguna cultura emocional que es pogués introduir?, per reunir una vegada més la humanitat en la unitat i salvar la civilització? Aquesta cultura ha de ser una cosa d'un nou tipus, perquè les velles sancions i cerimonials estaven morts, i construir-ne altres del mateix tipus seria la feina
L'escriptor ens diu que el món necessitava una nova cultura per substituir la cultura del tron., i els sistemes d'unificació que es basaven en la relació de sang.
És increïble, afegeix, que una cultura així hauria d'haver sorgit d'Aràbia just en el moment en què era més necessària. Hi ha, malgrat això, res sorprenent en el fenomen. La vida del món veu intuïtivament les seves pròpies necessitats, i en els moments crítics defineix la seva pròpia direcció. Això és el que, en la llengua de la religió, anomenem revelació profètica. És natural que l'Islam hagi transcendit a través de la consciència d'un poble senzill al marge de cap de les cultures antigues., i ocupant una posició geogràfica on es reuneixen tres continents. La nova cultura troba el fonament de la unitat del món en el principi de Tauhâd.’5 Islam, com un govern, és només un mitjà pràctic per fer d'aquest principi un factor viu en la vida intel·lectual i emocional de la humanitat. Demana lleialtat a Déu, no als trons. I ja que Déu és la base espiritual definitiva de tota vida, la lleialtat a Déu equival pràcticament a la lleialtat de l'home a la seva pròpia naturalesa ideal. La base espiritual definitiva de tota la vida, tal com va concebre l'Islam, és etern i es revela en varietat i canvi. Una societat basada en aquesta concepció de la Realitat s'ha de conciliar, en la seva vida, les categories de permanència i canvi. Ha de posseir principis eterns per regular la seva vida col·lectiva, perquè l'etern ens dóna peu al món del canvi perpetu.
| setembre 08, 2010 | Comentaris 0
reforma Islàmica
Adnan Khan
El primer ministre italià, Silvio Berlusconi va presumir després dels fets de 9/11:
“...hem de ser conscients de la superioritat de la nostra civilització, un sistema que té garantit
benestar, respecte als drets humans i – en contrast amb els països islàmics – respecte
pels drets polítics i religiosos, un sistema que té els seus valors comprensió de la diversitat
i tolerància... Occident conquistarà els pobles, com si va conquerir el comunisme, encara que això
significa un enfrontament amb una altra civilització, la islàmica, enganxat on estava
1,400 fa anys..." 1
I en a 2007 informe l'institut RAND va declarar:
"La lluita en curs a gran part del món musulmà és essencialment una guerra de
idees. El seu resultat determinarà la direcció futura del món musulmà".
Construir xarxes musulmanes moderades, Institut RAND
El concepte d'"islah" (reforma) és un concepte desconegut pels musulmans. No va existir mai al llarg del
història de la civilització islàmica; mai va ser debatut ni tan sols considerat. Un cop d'ull al clàssic
La literatura islàmica ens mostra que quan els estudiosos clàssics van posar les bases d'usul, i codificat
els seus governs islàmics (fiqh) només buscaven la comprensió de les regles islàmiques per tal de
aplicar-los. Una situació similar es va produir quan es van establir les regles per al hadiz, tafseer i el
llenguatge àrab. Estudiosos, pensadors i intel·lectuals al llarg de la història islàmica van passar molt de temps
entendre la revelació d'Al·là: l'Alcorà i aplicar l'ayaat a les realitats i encunyades
principis i disciplines per tal de facilitar la comprensió. Per tant, l'Alcorà va seguir sent la base
l'estudi i totes les disciplines que van evolucionar es van basar sempre en l'Alcorà. Els que es van convertir
encisat per la filosofia grega com els filòsofs musulmans i alguns d'entre els Mut'azilah
es considerava que havien abandonat l'islam quan l'Alcorà va deixar de ser la seva base d'estudi. Així per
qualsevol musulmà que intenti deduir regles o entendre quina posició s'ha d'adoptar davant d'un determinat
L'Alcorà és la base d'aquest estudi.
El primer intent de reforma de l'islam es va produir a principis del segle XIX. Pel torn del
segle, la Ummah havia estat en un llarg període de decadència on l'equilibri de poder global va canviar
del Khilafah a la Gran Bretanya. Els problemes creixents van engolir el Khilafah mentre hi havia Europa occidental
en plena revolució industrial. La Ummah va arribar a perdre la seva comprensió prístina de l'Islam, i
en un intent de revertir la decadència que va engolir la dels Uthmani (otomans) alguns musulmans van ser enviats a la
oest, i com a resultat van quedar encisats pel que van veure. Rifa'a Rafi' al-Tahtawi d'Egipte (1801-1873),
al seu retorn de París, va escriure un llibre biogràfic anomenat Takhlis al-ibriz ila talkhis Bariz (la
Extracció d'or, o una visió general de París, 1834), lloant la seva neteja, amor pel treball, i a dalt
tota la moral social. Va declarar que hem d'imitar el que es fa a París, defensant canvis a
la societat islàmica des de la liberalització de les dones als sistemes de govern. Aquest pensament, i d'altres semblants,
va marcar l'inici de la tendència reinventadora de l'islam.
| setembre 07, 2010 | Comentaris 0
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