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Егіпецкая палітыка 2006

Сара Бэн Néfissa


Год 2006 in Egyptian politics was preceded by aperiod of an unprecedentedly broad-based movement for democracy, political and institutional reforms, the first‘pluralist’ presidential elections, which confirmed Hosni Mubarak in his post and finally, legislative elections, withthe significant entry of the Muslim Brotherhood into thePeople’s Assembly, which won 88 out of a total of 444seats. Год 2006 сам, on the other hand, was characterised by an ebb of democratic activism, the regime’s return to authoritarian methods and above all,the consolidation of the ‘hereditary political succession’scenario, with Gamal Mubarak succeeding his father. Inany case, the regional situation, inparticularwith the victory of Hamas in Palestine, the war waged by Hezbollah against the Israeli military forces in Lebanon and the rise of Iran as a possible future regional power,contributed significantly to diminishing international and particularly US pressure for democratisation of the Egyptian regime. The latter thus consolidated its continuity. Егіпет 2006 was likewise the stage for important social movements, as if the changeof political climate in 2005 had had delayed effects onother spheres, in this case, the social and labourmilieus.The democratic movement instigated and developed among the ranks of the political and intellectual elitesubsided in 2006 due to a series of factors: thedisillusionment generated by the poor political and institutional results of 2005; the demobilisation of part of the actors; the repressive stance taken against them;and finally, increasing internal division. This was preciselythe case with the EgyptianMovement forChange, better known by its slogan, ‘Kifaya,’ or ‘Enough,’ which wassingular because it united all branches of politicalopposition in the country, including the Islamist political tendency.

Эскалацыя на Блізкім Усходзе: працяглы ўрон міру і дэмакратыі

Паола Кота

The rapid and dangerous escalation of war operations in the Middle East has resulted in a very significant loss of life among Lebanese, Palestinians and Israelis, and serious damage to civilian infrastructures. Major operations began with a low-level conflict around Gaza,that involved the launching of some missiles into Israel, some (more deadly) Israeli retaliation on Gaza, and the attack on an Israeli military post outside Gaza to which Israel reacted swiftly and very strongly. In the chain reaction that followed, admittedly Israel’ sintention was, and is, to inflict on the other side a far heavier punishment than that taken by Israel—which may appear as a militarily sound posture aimed at avoiding incidents andattacks, але, in fact, it is the civilian population that has been mainly affected. У выніку,the suffering of the Lebanese and Palestinian civilian populations (in terms of deaths,wounded and destroyed infrastructures) has to date been largely disproportionate to that of Israel. When, in the case of Palestine, this discrimination already follows about 40 years of discrimination in the same direction, hostility and adversarial relations are bound toincrease. So while Israel’s heavy deterrence through punishment may work temporarily and occasionally in preventing or reducing attacks, the general sentiment of hostility in the region is increased, and creates in the long range a bigger obstacle to peace.

Прымусовыя выбары

Хаім Малка

Regardless of what happens in future Palestinian parliamentaryelections, Hamas has already won a historic victory. The organization, whosename is an acronym for “the Islamic Resistance Movement,” enjoyed tremendoussuccess in municipal elections, and its readiness to participate onthe national level constitutes nothing less than an earthquake in Palestinianpolitics, signaling the clear end of one-party rule. For a movement that hasmorphed from a militant organization into a political party in less than a generation,Hamas’s participation on the national level is evidence of theorganization’s adaptability and durability within Palestinian society and politics.Among the United States, Ізраіль, and Europe, as well as Arab governments,speculation and uneasiness has surrounded Hamas’s newfound role.Skeptics argue that electoral politics do not make one democratic, and thatHamas’s electoral ambitions mask the group’s true intention of establishingan Islamic state in all of historic Palestine—a goal that includes Israel’s destruction.1 These critics believe that, once Hamas has secured its positionwithin the Palestinian Authority (PA) and institutions of the Palestine LiberationOrganization (пло), the movement will resume its campaign of terrorand attempt to control the Palestinian national agenda by force.Despite the inherent risks, proponents of expanding Hamas’s role in Palestiniannational politics argue that political activity will ultimately moderatethe movement. These advocates point to the fact that Hamas’s leadershave long called for transparent and accountable governing institutions andhave demonstrated political pragmatism, suggesting that the group could acceptless than its absolutist demands.

Для таго, каб быць мусульманінам

Фатх Yakan

All praises to Allah, and blessings and peace to His Messenger.This book is divided into two parts. The first part focuses on the characteristics that every single Muslim should portray in order to fulfill the conditions of being a Muslim in both belief and practice. Many people are Muslim by identity,because they were ”born Muslim” from Muslim parents. Theymay not know what Islam really means or its requirements, an dso may lead a very secular life. The purpose of this first partis to explain the responsibility of every Muslim to become aknowledgeable and true believer in Islam.The second part of this book discusses the responsibility to become an activist for Islam and participate in the Islamic Movement. It explains the nature of this movement and its goals, philosophy, strategy, and tactics, as well as the desirable characteristics of it members.The failure of various movements in the Islamic world, and especially in the Arab countries, result from a spiritual emptiness in these movements as well as in society generally. In sucha situation the principles and institutions of Islam are forgotten.The westernized leaders and movements collapse when they encounter serious challenges. These leaders and movements and the systems of government and economics they try to imposehave fallen because they lacked a solid base. They fell becausethey were artificial constructs copied from alien cultures anddid not represent the Muslim community. Therefore they wererejected by it. This situation is comparable to a kidney transplantin a human body. Although the body is able to tolerate it painfully for a short period of time, eventually the kidney willbe rejected and die.When the sickness of the Muslim Ummah became acute few Muslims thought of building a new society on Islamic principles.Instead many tried to import man made systems and principles, which looked good but really were grossly defectiveand so could be easily toppled and crushed.

Гэта Палітыка, Дурны

John L. Эспазіта

US foreign policy and political Islam today are deeply intertwined. Every US president since Jimmy Carter has had to deal with political Islam; none has been so challenged as George W. буш. Policymakers, particularly since 9/11, have demonstrated an inability and/or unwillingness to distinguish between radical and moderate Islamists. They have largely treated political Islam as a global threat similar to the way that Communism was perceived. Аднак, even in the case of Communism, foreign policymakers eventually moved from an ill-informed, broad-brush, and paranoid approach personified by Senator Joseph McCarthy in the 1950s to more nuanced, pragmatic, and reasonable policies that led to the establishment of relations with China in the 1970s, even as tensions remained between the United States and the Soviet Union.

As Islamist parties continue to rise in prominence across the globe, it is necessary that policymakers learn to make distinctions and adopt differentiated policy approaches. This requires a deeper understanding of what motivates and informs Islamist parties and the support they receive, including the ways in which some US policies feed the more radical and extreme Islamist movements while weakening the appeal of the moderate organizations to Muslim populations. It also requires the political will to adopt approaches of engagement and dialogue. This is especially important where the roots of political Islam go deeper than simple anti-Americanism and where political Islam is manifested in non-violent and democratic ways. The stunning electoral victories of HAMAS in Palestine and the Shi’a in Iraq, the Muslim Brotherhood’s emergence as the leading parliamentary opposition in Egypt, and Israel’s war against HAMAS and Hizbollah go to the heart of issues of democracy, тэрарызм, and peace in the Middle East.

Global terrorism has also become the excuse for many Muslim autocratic rulers and Western policymakers to backslide or retreat from democratization. They warn that the promotion of a democratic process runs the risk of furthering Islamist inroads into centers of power and is counterproductive to Western interests, encouraging a more virulent anti-Westernism and increased instability. Такім чынам, напрыклад, despite HAMAS’ victory in free and democratic elections, the United States and Europe failed to give the party full recognition and support.

In relations between the West and the Muslim world, phrases like a clash of civilizations or a clash of cultures recur as does the charge that Islam is incompatible with democracy or that it is a particularly militant religion. But is the primary issue religion and culture or is it politics? Is the primary cause of radicalism and anti-Westernism, especially anti-Americanism, extremist theology or simply the policies of many Muslim and Western governments?


Браты-мусульмане ў Егіпце

Уільям Томассон

Is Islam a religion of violence? Is the widely applied stereotype that all Muslims are violently opposed to “infidel” Western cultures accurate? Today’s world is confronted with two opposing faces of Islam; one being a peaceful, adaptive, modernized Islam, and the other strictly fundamentalist and against all things un-Islamic or that may corrupt Islamic culture. Both specimens, though seemingly opposed, mingle and inter-relate, and are the roots of the confusion over modern Islam’s true identity. Islam’s vastness makes it difficult to analyze, but one can focus on a particular Islamic region and learn much about Islam as a whole. Сапраўды, one may do this with Egypt, particularly the relationship between the Fundamentalist society known as the Muslim Brotherhood and the Egyptian government and population. The two opposing faces of Islam are presented in Egypt in a manageable portion, offering a smaller model of the general multi-national struggle of today’s Islam. In an effort to exemplify the role of Islamic Fundamentalists, and their relationship with Islamic society as a whole in the current debate over what Islam is, this essay will offer a history of the Society of Muslim Brothers, a description of how the organization originated, functioned, and was organized, and a summary of the Brother’s activities and influences on Egyptian culture. Вядома, by doing so, one may gain a deeper understanding of how Islamic Fundamentalists interpret Islam


Палітычная эвалюцыя Братоў-мусульман у Егіпце

Стывен Беннетт

“Allah is our objective. The Prophet is our leader. Qur’an is our law. Jihad is our way. Dying in the way of Allah is our highest hope.”

Since its early days in Egypt the Muslim Brotherhood has created much controversy, as some argue that the organization advocates violence in the name of Islam. According to Dr. Mamoun Fandy of the James A. Baker III Institute of Public Policy, jihadism and the activation of the views of the world of the house of Islam and the house of war are the ideas that emerged from the writings and the teachings of the Muslim Brotherhood” (Livesy, 2005). The primary evidence for this argument is notable member of the Brotherhood, Sayeed Qutb, who is credited with developing the revisionist and controversial interpretation of jihad that provided religious justifications for violence committed by offshoot organizations of the Brotherhood like al-jihad, al-Takfir wa al-Hijra, ХАМАС, і al-Qaeda.

Yet that is still a debatable position, because despite being the ideological parent of these violent organizations, the Muslim Brotherhood itself has always maintained an official stance against violence and instead has promoted Islamic civil and social action at the grassroots level. Within the first twenty years of its existence the Muslim Brotherhood gained status as the most influential of all major groups in the Middle East through its popular activism. It also spread from Egypt into other nations throughout the region and served as the catalyst for many of the successful popular liberation movements against Western colonialism in the Middle East.

While it has retained most of its founding principles from its inception, the Muslim Brotherhood has made a dramatic transformation in some crucial aspects of its political ideology. Formerly denounced by many as a terrorist organization, as of late the Muslim Brotherhood has been labeled by most current scholars of the Middle East as politically “moderate”, “politically centrist”, and “accommodationist” to Egypt’s political and governmental structures (Abed-Kotob, 1995, p. 321-322). Sana Abed-Kotob also tells us that of the current Islamist opposition groups that exist today “the more ‘radical’ or militant of these groups insist upon revolutionary change that is to be imposed on the masses and political system, whereas… the new Muslim Brotherhood of Egypt, call for gradual change that is to be undertaken from within the political system and with the enlistment of the Muslim masses”

Поўдзень у Егіпце

Devika Parashar

F. Andy Messing


The parallels between President Hosni Mubarak of Egypt and the deposed shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran, are attention-getting. У 1979, prior to the notorious Islamic Revolution, which was instigated and controlled by radical Muslim cleric Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the shah wielded personal and authoritarian power in a manner comparable to the dictators of the time: Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines, Anastasio Somoza in Nicaragua, and earlier, Fulgencio Batista in Cuba. These rulers brandished their power with little restraint, unencumbered by the rule of law and basically insensitive to the needs of their populace. На жаль, Hosni Mubarak alarmingly resembles these former dictators in social, political, economic and security issues. He is inadvertently pushing his country towards an Islamic revolution. As an earlier example, the shah of Iran slowly strangled his country by reigning with a heavy-hand through his unfettered security force. He narrowed the sociopolitical base of his government and distorted the economy by monopolistic actions. This modus operandi reflects Mr. Mubarak’s current regime, whose survival depends on his ability to reverse these trends. Адпаведна, Mr. Mubarak uses hisCentral Security Force,” that now consists of more than half of his entire military, to impose a measure of censorship on the mass media and ban most forms of political organization, activities and literary expression. Like the shah, he has established control over physical action, selectively executing opposition, imprisoning and exiling thousands of people who oppose his policies. Recently, the leading English language newspaper Al-Ahram Weekly reported an upsurge in deaths due to police brutality. Another Arab news source reported the barring of human-rights groups from attending secret military trials. Economically, Mr. Mubarak monopolistically privatizes the highly regulated Egyptian economy, fostering creation of an exclusive industrial bourgeoisie. He invites only pro-Mubarak businesses to work within his development schemes. Like the shah, he has alienated large sections of the public and private sectors, thus suppressing any real economic growth. Politically, Mr. Mubarak cracks down on civil participation, essentially repressing political opposition; while his lack of government transparency practically guarantees rife corruption throughout the 4 million strong bureaucracy. Equally important, is the lack of government response to crises. Al-Ahram Weekly reported 20 train crashes between 1995 and August 2006. In each case, the government formed an ineffectual and disorganized crisis-management council that failed to correct
the problem. As the government failed to meet the needs of its people, Браты-мусульмане (al-Ikhwan) filled a void by establishing social services, such as health clinics and youth programs, to effectively respond to various situations. The first and best-known example of this was their mobilization after the 1992 earthquake struck Southern Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood provided disaster relief then, and continues to do so, thereby enhancing its traction. Additionally, the Muslim Brotherhood has nonviolently taken control of 15 percent of major professional associations that form the greater part of Egypt’s middle class. In the most recent parliamentary election in 2005, the Muslim Brotherhood presented the largest threat to Mr. Mubarak’s National Democratic Party, securing an unprecedented 34 з 454 месцы. They demonstrated their ability to draw support despite government opposition. Mr. Mubarak unwittingly nurtured the regrowth of the essentially Fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood by alienating segments of the Egyptian populace and eliminating soft-line opposition (such as the secular Wafd and al-Ghad parties). He must seek more innovative methods to remain in power. Напрыклад, Chile managed to open the economy and encourage free enterprise under Augusto Pinochet, even though his government was considered authoritarian. Mr. Mubarak must tap into the tremendous energy of the Egyptian people by increasing the pace of capitalization and democratization, thereby improving their standard of living. If he succeeds, Mr. Mubarak could eventually create a legacy for himself as an Arab leader who effectively modernized and democratized thiskeystonenation. In doing so, he would secure major assets such as the Suez Canal, Egypt’s oil production and tourism, for not only his country but for the global economy, while providing a positive example for the entire Muslim world. Акрамя таго, U.S. ability to deal with Egypt will be enhanced, and our aid to that country will become completely justified. But if Mr. Mubarak fails, his regime will fall to the same type of radical elements that claimed the shah’s government in 1979, creating compounded turmoil for Egypt and the world. Devika Parashar spent eight months in Egypt into 2007 and is a research assistant at the National Defense Council Foundation. F. Andy Messing, a retired Special Forces officer, is NDCF’s executive director and met with a Muslim Brotherhood Representative in Cairo in 1994. He has been to 27 conflict areas worldwide.


Ісламскі рух: Палітычная свабода & дэмакратыя

Доктар Юсуф аль-Карадаві

Гэта абавязак в (ісламскі) Рух на наступнай фазе цвёрда супрацьстаяць таталітарнаму і дыктатарскаму кіраванню, палітычны дэспатызм і ўзурпацыя правоў народа. Рух заўсёды павінен стаяць на баку палітычнай свабоды, як прадстаўлена праўдай,не ілжывы, дэмакратыя. Яно павінна катэгарычна заявіць пра адмову ад тыранаў і трымацца далей ад усіх дыктатараў, нават калі нейкі тыран, здаецца, мае добрыя намеры ў адносінах да яго дзеля нейкай выгады і на час, які звычайна кароткі, як паказаў вопыт.Прарок (ПІЛЫ) сказаў, «Калі вы бачыце, што мой народ стаў ахвярай страху і не скажа крыўдзіцелю, «Вы памыляецеся», тады вы можаце страціць на іх надзею». Дык як наконт рэжыму, які прымушае людзей казаць пагардліваму крыўдзіцелю, «Як проста, які ты вялікі. О наш герой, наш выратавальнік і наш вызваліцель!«Каран асуджае тыранаў, такіх як Нумруд, Фараон, Аман і іншыя, but it also dispraises those who follow tyrants andobey their orders. This is why Allah dispraises the people of Noahby saying, “ But they follow (m en) whose wealth and childrengive them no increase but only loss.” [Surat Nuh; 21]Allah also says of Ad, people of Hud, “ And followed thecommand of every powerful, obstinate transgressor”. [Surat Hud:59]See also what the Quran says about the people of Pharaoh, “ Butthey followed the command of Pharaoh, and the command ofPharaoh was not rightly guided.[Surat Hud: 97] “Thus he made fools of his people, and they obeyed him: truly they were a people rebellious (against Allah).” [Surat Az-Zukhruf: 54]A closer look at the history of the Muslim Nation and the IslamicMovement in modern times should show clearly that the Islamicidea, ісламскі рух і ісламскае абуджэнне ніколі не квітнелі і не прыносілі плёну, калі не ў атмасферы дэмакратыі і свабоды, і засохлі і сталі бясплоднымі толькі ў часы прыгнёту і тыраніі, якія тапталі волю народаў, якія трымаліся ісламу. Такія рэпрэсіўныя рэжымы навязвалі свой секулярызм, сацыялізму ці камунізму на свае народы сілай і прымусам, з выкарыстаннем схаваных катаванняў і публічных пакаранняў, і выкарыстоўваючы тыя д'ябальскія прылады, якія разрывалі плоць,праліць кроў, раздушыў косці і знішчыў душу. Мы бачылі гэтыя практыкі ў многіх мусульманскіх краінах, уключаючы Турцыю, Егіпет, Сірыя, Ірак, (былы) Паўднёвы Емен, Самалі і дзяржавы паўночнай Афрыкі на працягу розных перыядаў часу, у залежнасці ад узросту або праўлення дыктатара ў кожнай краіне.З іншага боку, мы бачылі, як ісламскі рух і ісламскае абуджэнне прыносяць плён і квітнеюць у часы свабоды і дэмакратыі, і пасля краху імперскіх рэжымаў, якія кіравалі народамі са страхам і прыгнётам., Я б не падумаў, што Ісламскі рух можа падтрымліваць што-небудзь іншае, акрамя палітычнай свабоды і дэмакратыі. Тыраны дазвалялі падняць кожны голас, акрамя голасу ісламу, і няхай кожная плынь выяўляе сябе ў форме палітычнай партыі ці нейкага органа, за выключэннем ісламскай плыні, якая з'яўляецца адзінай тэндэнцыяй, якая насамрэч гаворыць ад імя гэтай нацыі і выказвае яе рысу, значэнні, сутнасць і само існаванне.

З'яўляецца меркаваная апазіцыя: Мэты і стратэгія Ikhawan Al-Muslimun у адносінах да дзяржавы.

Ільхама Эль hamoumi

In discussing the political and intellectual nature of governmentsthroughout the Middle East, it is vital to pay attention to notions of definedliberties of the individual within the state in the way to democracy. It isalso imperative to attempt to understand the Islamic resurgence we have seen instates like Egypt. Acknowledging that this phenomenon has emerged as a reactionof failed and corrupt laic governments is important in order to comprehend howgroups such as the Muslim Brotherhood emerge and enjoy great popularity. Inthis paper, I will discuss the causes for the emergence of the MuslimBrotherhood of Egypt and the reasons behind its popularity. I will also discussits positives aspects in trying to revitalize and change the political system inEgypt, in addition to drawing attention to the negative externalities of itsreligiously tainted power.The social discourse on the blatant state infringement on their populacein the Arab world in general and more specifically in the case of Egypt,invariably bifurcates into a confusion on the part of the people between Islamand the state because of their lack of knowledge about their own political andreligious history, and state oppression. Fatima Mernissi’s discussion about thelack of awareness and understanding of history in the Arab world is quitereflective of the ta’a (obedience) of the Muslim populations to their unjustrulers, which initially might seem a little incomprehensible for a westernaudience. Усё ж, how can one expect people to rise against an Imam or vote out apolitical leader when they have no understanding of their religious and/orpolitical histories? On what grounds will they do that? The concept of ta’a orobedience implies a banning of reflection, personal opinion (ra’y) andeventually ihdah (innovation, modernization).

Хасан аль-Банна

Guilain Denoelcx

Hasan al-Banna was the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood or Society of the Muslim Brothers, thelargest and most influential Sunni revivalist organization in the 20th century. Created in Egypt in1928, the Muslim Brotherhood became the first mass-based, overtly political movement to opposethe ascendancy of secular and Western ideas in the Middle East. The brotherhood saw in theseideas the root of the decay of Islamic societies in the modern world, and advocated a return toIslam as a solution to the ills that had befallen Muslim societies. Al-Banna’s leadership was criticalto the spectacular growth of the brotherhood during the 1930s and 1940s. By the early 1950s,branches had been established in Syria, Судан, і Іарданія. Soon, the movement’s influence would be felt inplaces as far away as the Gulf and non-Arab countries such as Iran, Пакістан, Інданезія, and Malaysia. Drivingthis expansion was the appeal of the organizational model embodied in the original, Egypt-based section of thebrotherhood, and the success of al-Banna’s writings. Translated into several languages, these writings haveshaped two generations of Sunni religious activists across the Islamic world.

Жыццё з дэмакратыяй у Егіпце

Daniel Consolatore

У верасні Хосні Мубарэк быў амаль абраны прэзідэнтам Егіпта 2005. Не тое, каб семдзесят сем-гадовы свецкі самадзяржавец, які кіраваў гэтай краінай на працягу апошніх дваццаці чатырох гадоў, прайграў выбары; паводле афіцыйнага падліку, ён узяў амаль 85 адсоткаў галасоў. Яго бліжэйшы канкурэнт, Айман Нур, галоўны кіраўнік новай апазіцыйнай партыі Аль-Гад ("Заўтра"),атрымалася менш, чым 8 працэнтаў. Адзіным іншым кандыдатам, які прыняў які-небудзь важны падлік, быў састарэлы НоманГама шаноўнага аль-Вафда ("Дэлегацыя")партыя, каму ўдалося менш, чым 3 працэнтаў. Іхвана-Муслімэн ("Браты-мусульмане"), баяцца некаторыя заходнікі за пурысцкую ісламскую сацыяльную і палітычную палітыку, Вырашальная перамога Мубарэка, здавалася б, супакойвала большасць людзей - асабліва свецкіх амерыканцаў - занепакоеных будучыняй нешматлікіх заходнерускіх,умераныя арабскія рэжымы, ім пагражае ісламізацыя палітыкі ў рэгіёне. Здавалася б, адміністрацыя Буша зноў была задаволеная, з улікам нядаўняй змены меркавання пра арабскую дэмакратыю. Адсутная ў Іраку хімічная зброя і наступнае апраўданне вайны, паколькі прэцэдэнт дэмакратызацыі натхнілі Белы дом настойваць на як мага большай колькасці выбараў у рэгіёне. На самай справе, калі дзяржсакратар Кандаліза Райс выступала ў Амерыканскім універсітэце ў Каіры ў чэрвені, яна здзіўлена абвясціла, што "на працягу шасцідзесяці гадоў" Злучаныя Штаты памыляліся "[інж] стабільнасць за кошт дэмакратыі »на Блізкім Усходзе. На пакаленні, U.S. эксперты пераконваюцца, што "арабскай вуліцы" нельга давяраць галасаванне, як яны маглі б перадаць уладу камуністам альбо фундаменталісцкім ісламістам. Realpolitik дыктаваў, што аўтакраты і дыктатары, як Мубарэк і Садам Хусэйн, прыйшлося пагладзіць, каб захаваць "стабільнасць" у рэгіёне. Калі б яны потым правялі выбары, адмаўляцца ад іх наогул, адмаўляць свабоду слова,і выпусціць сакрэтную паліцыю, каб тэрарызаваць насельніцтва,Белы дом, верагодна, закрые вочы. Але калі б Мубарэк мог прэтэндаваць на сапраўдны дэмакратычны мандат,гэта было б лепшым з усіх светаў.

Парламенцкія выбары ў Егіпце: Паміж дэмакратызацыяй і аўтакратыяй

Hala G. Тхабет

The dissolution of the 1987 і 1990 parliaments, following two Supreme Courtrulings that the 1984 і 1987 general elections were unconstitutional, and the transfer of the power to supervise elections from the police to the judiciarysignalled an impending political opening, leaving the impression that there waspolitical will to renew the rules governing elections and make them more transparent and equitable. The paper uses the 2000 elections to the People’s Assemblyto assess the democratisation process in Egypt. It examines the extent ofinclusion of all social forces and political parties, and of changes in popular participation. It argues that the 2000 elections bore the marks of electoral anomaliesand manipulations which were characteristic of previous elections. Not withstand in gits flaws the 2000 elections marked a significant step in Egypt’s transition to liberal democracy.

Будучыня Братоў-мусульман

Амр Аль-Chobaki


The Muslim Brotherhood managed to maintain its organizational existence since its establishment in 1928, by the late Hasan Al-Banna. Throughout eight decades, it has managed to exist as a religious movement as well as a political and social organization. Гэта, on one hand, helped it to be sufficiently strong to be distinguished from other political powers, but also made it weak and feeble in some other ways.

The Muslim Brotherhood as a movement is similar to other Egyptian political movements, as it was established at the time of the royal regime and a semi-liberal era. It clashed with the government during the time of President `Abd Al-Nasser, adapted to the regime of President Sadat, and tended to fluctuate in its relationship with President Mubarak, Аднак, the relationship was based on partial elimination, just like the state during the age of President `Abd Al-Nasser. Прычым, it has been outlawed for most of its history; since 1954 until the present time (Я. more than half a century).

The Muslim Brotherhood has continued to be both a witness and a party in the political and cultural dispute in Egypt and the Arab countries, throughout different historical periods; Egypt in the time of the royal regime and in the time of the republic with its three stages. This dispute was about issues of identity and cultural belonging, the relationship between the religion – on one handand politics, the East and the West on the other hand, as well as the coming and the inherited. The Muslim Brotherhood had a flexible political and intellectual reference that gave it a comprehensive conception of Islam.

Ці ўтаймуе палітыка егіпецкіх братоў-мусульман?

Ніл Макфаркуар


CAIRO, Снежань. 7 – When stumping through the port city of Alexandria, whose crumbling mansions and rickety tram lines evoke long-faded glory, Sobhe Saleh of the Muslim Brotherhood vowed he had a different vision for Egypt’s future.

If Islam were applied, no one would be hungry,” he roared recently to a crowd of fully veiled women ululating with joy. “Islam is a religion of construction. Islam is a religion of investment. Islam is a religion of development.

Рэлігія, in fact, should profoundly alter both Egypt’s domestic and foreign policy, said Mr. Saleh, a 52-year-old lawyer with a clipped helmet of steel-gray hair.

If Islam were applied, the television would not show us prostitution and people lacking all decency!” he declared. “If Islam were applied, Iraq could not have been invaded, Israel could not occupy Jerusalem, and aggression could not have been used to humiliate Muslims everywhere!”

A long-expected day of reckoning is at hand in Egyptian politics now that the Brotherhood, an illegal organization with a violent past, is entering the corridors of power for the first time in significant numbers.

The outcome of the freest election in more than 50 years could determine whether political Islam will turn Egypt into a repressive, anti-American theocracy or if Islamic parties across the Arab world will themselves be transformed by participating in mainstream politics.

No sudden earthquake is expected. But initial results from the final round of voting on Wednesday showed that the Brotherhood had gained at least 12 more seats to bring its total to 88, with seven races from all three rounds still unsettled, according to a spokesman. That is five times the 17 seats the group won in 2000.

ПРОФІЛЬ КІРАВАННЯ ЕГІПТА

Монік Nardi Рокет

Mamadi Курума

Major political developments since 1990Egypt is constitutionally a democratic republic based on a multiparty system. Th e 1971 Constitutionprovides for the separation of powers between the Executive, Legislature and Judiciary. Noconstitutional changes have taken place in Egypt since 1980. У 1980 referendum, the currentpresident, Хосні Мубарак, assumed offi ce with a two-thirds majority vote of the People’s Assembly(PA). (Th e president is currently in his fourth presidential term.) He holds wide-ranging authoritiesand is the supreme commander of the armed forces, chair of the higher council for policeagencies, and the higher council for judicial entities. Th e president nominates ministers, appoints10 of the 454 members of the PA and 88 of the 264 members of the Shura Council, appoints anddismisses governors, university chairs, and other high ranking offi cials (to be further discussed insection on “Institutional Eff ectiveness”).Th e president is also the chair of the ruling National Democratic Party (NDP), which has been inpower since it was established by former President Anwar Sadat in 1978 and eff ectively controlslocal government, the media, and the public sector.Egypt’s 16 legally registered opposition parties’ ability to compete has been frustrated by theNDP’s dominance in the PA with a large majority of almost 90% (Малюнак 1). Аднак, NDP hasexperienced a disappointing result in the parliamentary elections of 2000, which has prompted thesubstantial changes introduced to reform the party led by the President’s son Gamal Mubarak.