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Demokratizimi dhe islamike Politikë: Një studim për Partinë Wasat në Egjipt

YOKOTA Takayuki

The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratization and Islamic politics in Egypt, duke u përqëndruar në një parti të re politike islamike, Partia Wasat (Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ).
Teorikisht, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic political organizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. Ne anen tjeter, kjo kërkon tolerancë demokratike nga qeveritë për politikën islamike, as long as they continue to act within a legal framework. Në Lindjen e Mesme, megjithatë, Islamic political parties are often suspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as a justification to curb democratization. Ky është rasti edhe me Vëllazërinë Myslimane Egjiptiane (Xhemia al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) nën regjimin Ḥusnī Mubārak. Although the Brotherhood is a mainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, që veprojnë publikisht dhe gëzojnë popullaritet të konsiderueshëm,
qeveritë e njëpasnjëshme kurrë nuk e kanë ndryshuar statusin e saj të paligjshëm për më shumë se gjysmë shekulli. Some of the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order to break this stalemate.
There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platform of the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principles of the Wasat Party as follows: demokraci, sharī‘a (ligjit islamik), të drejtat e grave, and Muslim- Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups that have appeared in contemporary Egypt, dhe analizon ideologjinë e saj në përputhje me rrethanat. Wickham [2004] discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the Wasat Party from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As these earlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s, I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratization movement in Egypt in around 2005. Unë do ta bëj këtë në bazë të dokumenteve të Partisë Wasat, such
as the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews with its members.

Partive islamike : pse ata nuk mund të jetë demokratike

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, it has

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, demokraci, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo

Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo. Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo-

Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo

Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo.

Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo

Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo, Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo. Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo

se, Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo, Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo

Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo.

Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo, Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo

Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo. Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo

Prirja për të kryer reforma të tilla është ajo.

STRATEGJITË PËR Angazhimi ISLAMI POLITIK

SHADI HAMID

Amanda KADLEC

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Akoma, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. Në mënyrë të ngjashme, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. Shtetet e Bashkuara. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (PPE) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. SHBA. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Ndërkohë, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Fronti i Veprimit Islamik i Jordanisë (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. Veç, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

Partive islamike : Pjesëmarrja pa energji

Malika Zeghal

Gjatë dy dekadave të fundit, lëvizjet sociale dhe politike argumentim ideologjitë e tyre në referenca në Islam janë kërkuar për t'u bërë palë juridike politike në shumë vende të Lindjes së Mesme dhe Afrikën e Veriut. Disa prej këtyre lëvizjeve islamiste kanë qenë të autorizuar për të marrë pjesë në mënyrë të ligjshme në konkurrencë elektorale. Në mesin e më i njohur është Partia për Drejtësi dhe Zhvillim e Turqisë (AKP), e cila fitoi një shumicë parlamentare në 2002 dhe ka çuar qeveria që ndonjëherë. Partia e Marokut e Drejtësisë dhe Zhvillimit (PJD) ka qenë i ligjshëm që nga mesi- 1990s dhe komandon një bllok të konsiderueshëm të vendeve në Parlament. Ne Egjipt, Vëllazëria Muslimane (MB) ka qenë kurrë i autorizuar për të formuar një parti politike, por në dritën e represionit shtetëror ka drejtuar me sukses kandidatët si të pavarur nominale në të dy zgjedhjet nacionale dhe lokale.
Që nga fillim të viteve 1990, Ky trend ka shkuar dorë më dorë me politikat zyrtare të liberalizimit politik të kufizuar. së bashku, dy tendenca kanë shkaktuar një debat në lidhje me nëse këto lëvizje janë të angazhuar për "demokraci." Një literaturë e gjerë ka çarë deri për të theksuar paradokse si dhe rreziqet e mundshme dhe përfitimet e përfshirë partitë islamike në procesin zgjedhor. Paradigma kryesore gjenden në këtë trupin e shkrimit fokusohet në pasojat që mund të pasojnë, kur islamistët përdorin instrumente demokratike, dhe kërkon të hyjnore të "vërtetë" synimet se islamistët do të shfaqet në qoftë se ata të vijnë në pushtet.

The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, Vëllazëria Muslimane, and State Power in Jordan

Faisal Ghori

In his first book, The Management of Islamic Activism, Quintan Wiktorowicz examines the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis through the lens of social movement theory. Unlike some political scientists who dismiss Islamic movements because of their informal networks, Wiktorowicz contends that social movement theory is an apt framework through which Islamic movements can be examined and studied. In this regard, his work leads the field. Yet for all its promise, this book largely fails to deliver.
The book is divided into four primary sections, through which he tries to construct his conclusion: Jordanian political liberalization has occurred because of structural necessities, not because of its commitment to democratization. Veç, the state has been masterful in what he dubs the “management of collective action," (p. 3) which has, for all practical purposes, stifled any real opposition. While his conclusion is certainly tenable, given his extensive fieldwork, the book is poorly organized and much of the evidence examined earlier in the work leaves many questions unanswered.

What Leads Voters to Support the Opposition under Authoritarianism ?

Michael DH. Robbins

Elections have become commonplace in most authoritarian states. While this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in reality elections play an important role in these regimes. While elections for positions of real power tend to be non-competitive, many
elections—including those for seemingly toothless parliaments—can be strongly contested.
The existing literature has focused on the role that elections play in supporting the regime. Për shembull, they can help let off steam, help the regime take the temperature of society, or can be used to help a dominant party know which individuals it should promote (Schedler 2002; Blaydes 2006). Akoma, while the literature has focused on the supply-side of elections in authoritarian states, there are relatively few systematic studies of voter behavior in these elections (see Lust-Okar 2006 for an exception). Më tepër, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995). While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. Në të vërtetë, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to
significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. Akoma, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the
regjim.

Energizing US-Syria Relations: Leveraging Ancillary Diplomatic Vehicles

Benjamin E. Pushtet,

Andrew Akhlaghi,

Steven Rotchtin

The prospect for greater stability in the Middle East largely hinges on the ability to bring Syria into diplomatic and security discussions as a productive stakeholder, necessitating a thaw in the less than normal state of U.S. – Syrian relations. While Syria’s
importance as a keystone state to a Middle East peace process was acknowledged in the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report,1 which called for a shift from disincentives to incentives in seeking constructive results, only in the past few months has there been a demonstrable shift in Washington’s disposition. Recent meetings between high-ranking U.S. officials and their counterparts in Damascus, and even the announcement of reinstating a U.S. ambassador to Syria, have led to widespread speculation in policy circles that a diplomatic thaw is afoot.
This report analyzes key trends in Syria’s domestic and regional socio-political situation that currently function to make Syria a natural ally of the United States.

German Converts to Islam and Their Ambivalent Relations with Immigrant Muslims

Esra Ozyurek

“I would never have become a Muslim if I had met Muslims before I met Islam.” I heard these words over and over again during my yearlong ethnographic research among ethnic German converts to Islam in Berlin.1 The first time, it was uttered by a self-declared German imam who had converted to Islam while trying to convert Arabs and Turks to Christianity. The second time, the speaker was a twenty-five-year-old former East German woman who came to Islam through her Bosnian boyfriend, whose family never accepted her. The third time, the comment was made by a fifty-year-old man who converted to Islam about thirty years ago after meeting Iranians who came to Europe to collect money and organize for the Iranian revolution. After that I stopped counting. Although all of the several dozen German converts I talked to (and the dozens of converts whose narratives I read on the internet) claim that they embraced Islam in a context of significant personal relationships with Muslims,2 a substantial portion of German Muslims are quite discontented with born Muslims, especially those of immigrant backgrounds. This paper is an attempt to comprehend the paradoxical feelings of love and hate for Islam and Muslims that many German Muslims experience. My aim in exploring this issue is to understand what it takes to be a (supposed) Islamophile in a political and social context that is highly Islamophobic.

Interview with Dr. Ibrahim Saad Eddin

Daniel Benaim

In the weeks leading up to Egypt’s Presidential election, I had the opportunity to interview Dr. Ibrahim Saad Eddin. Dr. Ibrahim is
perhaps Egypt’s best-known dissident intellectual and the Founder and Chairman of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Cairo, where I was a Summer Fellow in 2005. Në qershor 2000, Dr. Ibrahim and two dozen of his associates were arrested and jailed on charges ranging from defrauding the European Union to disseminating information harmful to Egypt’s interests. After a
three-year ordeal during which Dr. Ibrahim (62years old at the time) was sentenced to seven years of hard laborall charges against him were dismissed by Egypt’s highest court and he was released from prison in 2003. Sitting in his office in a beautiful Islamic villa in Cairo’s Mokattam Heights, Dr. Ibrahim reflected on the prospects for democratization in Egypt and on his unique role in
Egyptian politics.
People have said that one of the major problems with the United States’ Middle East policy is a failure to predict and account for
change. Are the US and Western governments ready to deal with the possibility of religious
parties taking major roles across the region?
Religious parties have already taken control in Turkey, and I don’t see any reason why they cannot do it here. We are telling policymakers to be ready. I am telling everybody to get ready, because if we don’t open the process to religious
parties, then we will be beholden to the autocrats.
And if the autocrats continue, they will be the greatest help to the theocrats, who are their mirror image.

THE FUTURE FOR EGYPT FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS AND THE BREAKTHROUGH OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Vend Dimitri dela

A little less than three months after presidential elections returned Hosni Mubarak to power (see ESISC note of 12.9.05) parliamentary elections ended in unprecedented violence.
The breath of democracy both Egyptians and the international community had hoped to feel hardly lasted any time. The regime of President Mubarak, who saw is power seriously eroded by the extraordinary advance of the Muslim Brotherhood, had no hesitation in turning to those totalitarian methods Egypt has sadly become used to in order to crush opposition: closing polling stations,
mass arrests, intimidation and demonstrations which left at least 12 people dead and hundreds injured.
But the elections, in spite of an extremely feeble turnout of 25%, are undoubtedly a turning point in the country’s fortunes. The result for the Muslim Brotherhood –which becomes the leading opposition party and gains six times as many seats as before, me 88 seats out of a total of 444, or one Islamist out of every five deputies – is a sign of a profound change in the national political
landscape.
But the success of the Islamists is more a result of the accumulation of opposition votes than any ideological rallying by the people to radical Islam – although the rise in power of the Brotherhood is a cause for worry.

Brotherhood overage is pure journalism, not a political deal with Al Dostour: Eissa

Pierre LOZA
CAIRO: With two court cases that target his writings, Al Dostour editor Ibrahim Eissa is also accused of being a Muslim Brotherhood ally due to the paper’s coverage of the banned group.
While the latter accusation hasn’t taken any legal form, Eissa says those who make such claims are blind to the fact that all political streams are given an opportunity to publish their views in his newspaper.
Eissa — who is standing trial for spreading false rumors about the president’s health and appealing another ruling that found him guilty of insulting symbols of the National Democratic Party (PDR) — believes freedom of the press is under severe attack in Egypt. A champion of press freedom, Eissa has been among the loudest critics of the Egyptian
leadership.
Daily News Egypt: You have been accused of being an ally to the banned Muslim Brotherhood organization. How would you describe your relationship with the group?
Ibrahim Eissa: If you mean by relationship the fact that I have friends and acquaintances from among the Brotherhood’s ranks then yes I do have a relationship with the Brotherhood.
But you must also consider that I have relations with people inside the NDP whom I love and respect. I also have friends who are communists.
I am a journalist so I have contacts with all political streams. You must also consider that these are primarily human relationships, not political ones. But to hint or imply that the newspaper is biased towards or has cut a deal with the MB is nonsense. For the past three years, they [state-run media] have been accusing us of cutting a deal with the Brotherhood, yet they never managed to present any evidence of such a deal. This assumption is because we publish news about the Brotherhood everyday or every week, dhe
we publish their point of view and defend Brotherhood members who have been detained and are standing trials. In my opinion this is an honor for any journalist. The Brotherhood represents 20 percent of parliament — 88 vende. It is the foremost opposition in the parliament, që [in itself] is insignificant and bare. It is like a semi parliament, something that resembles a parliament. The effective and active elements in it are those of the Muslim Brotherhood. The state-owned media doesn’t want us to ever come near the
Vëllazëri.
Another point is that over the past three years the Brotherhood’s members have been detained more than anyone else in Egypt. They (Vëllazëria) are being tried continuously. They don’t want me to cover the trials of the Brotherhood. When I do cover the trials, they want me to present the point of view of the State Security officer on the case? How is this possible in
any profession, any legislature or any mentality?

Hamasi mund të vendosë një shembull

Khader Khader

Perhaps the single most important aspect of Hamasoverwhelming victory in Palestinian Legislative Council elections last month is that it was the first time in the contemporary history of the Middle East that democracy was exercised for real without any direct external or internal interference. The ramifications of such free elections may well reverberate around the region for years to come and might mark a new phase in the geopolitical map of the Middle East.
This, megjithatë, was not the first time an Islamic political party showed its popularity at the ballot box. Algeria’s Islamic Front appeared headed to certain victory in elections in the mid-1990s before external intervention on the part of the “demokratik” West and its allies in Algiers nipped that experience in the bud. In Algeria, the result of burying democracy has been an extremely bloody conflict that still drags on, much to the embarrassment of western countries, which prefer not to comment. For the ordinary citizen in the Arab world, it was an experience that only added to the sense of oppression and frustration felt in every corner of the region.
Thus Hamaselectoral victory has sparked widespread hope among the Arab masses that they have another chance to find out if an Islamic party can rule better than the current regimes in the Arab world. Hamasit, in this sense, carries the hopes of millions of Arabs and Muslims all over the world.
But with such expectations comes a time fraught with danger. Hamas and the way it runs matters in the Palestinian territories can set a very interesting example: if it succeeds; if it proves it can run Palestinian affairs more transparently and to the benefit of more ordinary Palestinians than previously, while at the same time managing tough negotiations with Israel, the experience will encourage other Islamic movements in the Arab world to use it as an example to convince their citizens that Islamic political movements are a viable alternative.
But if Hamas fails in its difficult and challenging task, the setback will strike a devastating blow to all Islamic movements and parties in the region. A Hamas failure could perhaps send the entire region into another period of political wilderness akin to the era after the failure of the pan-Arabists.
Kështu, Hamas in power is an interesting and illuminating phenomenon, and one that will be followed closely by all concerned parties. According to a leading Hamas figure in Khan Yunis, Dr. Younis al-Astal, the International Muslim Brotherhood has already expressed its readiness to assist Hamas with all the needed expertise to make it succeed in its mission. The Brotherhood will of course be the principal benefactor of any Hamas success.
By the same token, megjithatë, the West may feel itself forced now to exert all possible efforts to make Hamas fail even if the movement proves successful in meeting the needs of the people. The issue in question here is not how efficient a government is but how loyal a government shows itself to be to the West. This is the measure the West has generally used to assess the Middle East, where billions of US dollars have been spent on keeping Arab regimesmoderate and realistic”, especially in relation to the Palestinian-Israeli conflict.
There is a curious parallel to the Cold War now in the dynamic that is developing between the West and the Muslim world. During the Cold War, the West was confident that democracy would bring the Eastern Bloc to its knees and forcefully spread the message that individual freedom and the right to vote were human rights par excellence.
Now, megjithatë, that same message is likely to backfire on the West. If real elections were held in Egypt and Jordan, it is highly likely that Muslim Brotherhood movements would come to power and cast into doubt the peace treaties between those countries and Israel, in which the West has invested so much effort.
Everyone knows that democracy comes at a cost in the Middle East. Is the world ready to engage in this game? The key is likely to be the success or otherwise of Hamas, which is operating under extremely adverse conditions. Arabs and Muslims across the region, so often let down by political promise from various quarters, may well be disappointed again. But in the meantime their hopes are with a political movement that is posing the first serious challenge in decades to Arab regimes everywhere.

POLICY AND PRACTICE NOTES

Kenneth Roth

sot, virtually every government wants to be seen as a democracy, but many resist allowing the basic human rights that would make democracy meaningful because that might jeopardize their grasp on power. Në vend të kësaj, governments use a variety of subterfuges to manage or undermine the electoral process. Their task is facilitated by the lack of a broadly accepted definition of ‘democracy’ akin to the detailed rules of international human rights law. But much of the problem lies in the fact that, because of commercial or strategic interests, the world’s established democracies often close their eyes to electoral manipulation, making it easier for sham democrats to pass themselves off as the real thing. That acquiescence undermines the efforts to promote human rights because it can be more difficult for human rights organizations to stigmatize a government for its human rights violations when that government can hold itself up as an accepted ‘democracy.’ The challenge facing the human rights movement is to highlight the ploys used by dictatorial regimes to feign democratic rule and to build pressure on the established democracies to refuse to admit these pretenders into the club of democracies on the cheap. Keywords: shoqëria civile, democracy promotion, dictatorship, Zgjedhjet,
electoral manipulation, political violence Rarely has democracy been so acclaimed yet so breached, so promoted yet so disrespected, so important yet so disappointing. Democracy has become the key to legitimacy. Few governments want to be seen as undemocratic. Yet the credentials of the claimants have not kept pace with democracy’s
growing popularity. These days, even overt dictators aspire to the status conferred by the democracy label. Determined not to let mere facts stand in their way, these rulers have mastered the art of democratic rhetoric which bears
little relationship to their practice of governing.
This growing tendency poses an enormous challenge to the human rights movement. Human rights groups can hardly oppose the promotion of democracy, but they must be wary that the embrace of democracy not become a subterfuge for avoiding the more demanding standards of international human rights law. Human rights groups must especially insist that their natural governmental allies – the established democracies – not allow competing interests and short-sighted strategies to stand in the way of their
embrace of a richer, more meaningful concept of democracy.

ISLAMI POLITIK NË SOMALIA

Holzer Georg-Sebastian

Që nga sulmet e 9/11 Somalia është bërë objekt i vëmendjes së përtërirë nga Shtetet e Bashkuara dhe Evropa. Si arketip i një shteti të dështuar, kërcënimi që paraqet është barazuar me atë me të cilin u përball SHBA-ja në Afganistan dhe shihet si një terren pjellor për grupet radikale islamike, në veçanti al-Kaeda. Megjithatë, Islami në Somali ka një natyrë të veçantë. Një shqyrtim i historisë së saj çon në një kuptim të marrëdhënies komplekse midis fesë dhe shoqërisë me bazë në Somaliclan. Një hetim më i afërt i dy prej grupeve më të rëndësishme islamike, el-Itihaad dhe Këshilli i Gjykatave Islame, do të ndihmojë për të kuptuar këtë marrëdhënie brenda kontekstit të Somalisë bashkëkohore. Më në fund, ky artikull analizon rolin e Islamit në ekonominë e re të Somalisë duke u fokusuar në shembullin e kompanisë së dërgesave dhe telekomunikacionit al-Barakaat që u lidh me al-Kaedën nga SHBA pas 9/11 sulmet terroriste. NATYRA E NDRYSHME E ISLAMIT NË SOMALI Historia e Islamit në Bririn e Afrikës shtrihet 1400 vjet më parë. Besimi arriti në Bririn e Afrikës nga Gadishulli Arabik përmes tregtisë dhe migrimit, kryesisht nga Jemeni dhe Omani.1 Deri në vitin 1400 pas Krishtit, në Somali po ndodhte një konvertim në shkallë të gjerë në Islam, përhapur së pari nga familja e klanit Dir, por pasuar nga pjesa tjetër e kombit.2 Në Somali sot, pothuajse 100% nga popullsia janë myslimanë sunitë, përgjithësisht duke iu përmbajtur një versioni shafi'i të fesë.Siç I.M. ka theksuar Lewis, kjo ishte e lidhur ngushtë me mitet gjenealogjike të identitetit të klanit somalez dhe karakterizohet nga nderimi i shenjtorëve, si dhe paraardhësve të klaneve të ndryshme somaleze. Sufizmi apopolitik e ka dominuar tradicionalisht këtë besim.

Buletini Reforma Arab

Grupi i studiuesve


Egjipt: Regres në platformën e partisë së Vëllazërisë Myslimane?

amr Hamzawy


Platforma draft partia e Vëllazërisë Myslimane dërgon sinjale të përziera në lidhje me pikëpamjet politike të lëvizjes

dhe pozicionet. Edhe pse ajo tashmë është qarkulluar gjerësisht, dokumenti nuk ka ende final
Miratimi nga byroja udhëzim të lëvizjes.
Trajtimi i detajuar i politik i platformës së, social, dhe çështjet ekonomike shënon një largim të rëndësishëm
nga pozicionet më parë më pak të zhvilluara, artikuluar ndër të tjera në A 2004 Nisma reforma dhe 2005
Platforma zgjedhore për kandidatët parlamentare Vëllazërisë. Kjo adresat ndryshim një nga më të
kritika të rëndësishme të Vëllazërisë, përkatësisht Përkrahja e saj të paqarta ideologjike dhe fetare

slogane dhe paaftësia për të dalë me receta të veçanta të politikave.
Dokumenti ngre pyetje shqetësuese, megjithatë, në lidhje me identitetin e një të ardhme të Vëllazërisë

parti politike si dhe qëndrimi i grupit në disa çështje politike dhe sociale. Lëshuar në
Konteksti i një stand-off-it të vazhdueshëm ndërmjet regjimit egjiptian dhe Vëllazërisë, ajo zbulon rëndësishëm
paqartësi dhe ndoshta regres në të menduarit e lëvizjes.
I parë, hartuesit nuk zgjodhi për të trajtuar marrëdhëniet e ardhshme midis partisë dhe lëvizjes. Në

duke bërë kështu, ata kanë injoruar qëllimisht ide të rëndësishme të diskutuara kohët e fundit në kuadër të lëvizjes,
sidomos në mesin e anëtarëve të bllokut parlamentar. Frymëzuar nga përvojat e partive islamike në
Marok, Jordan, dhe Jemen, këta anëtarë të avokuar një ndarje funksionale ndërmjet një pale dhe
Lëvizja, me ish fokusuar kryesisht në pjesëmarrjen politike dhe kjo e fundit mbi fetar
aktivizmi. Përveç trajtimit të saj sipërfaqësore të natyrës së partisë dhe organizimit të saj të brendshëm, the
Platforma përfshin asnjë deklaratë të qartë për anëtarësim të palës hapjen e tërë Egjiptasve, pavarësisht tyre
Feja, një nga kërkesat për krijimin e një partie politike sipas kushtetutës egjiptian.
i dytë, draft Vëllazëria platformë identifikon zbatimin e Sheriatit si një i palës, është kryesore

qëllimet. Edhe pse kjo është në përputhje me interpretimin e nenit të grupit 2 të Kushtetutës egjiptian
(“Islami është feja e shtetit, dhe ligji islam është burimi kryesor i legjislacionit”), ajo niset nga
shpirt pragmatik i deklaratave të ndryshme të Vëllazërisë dhe iniciativave që nga viti 2004 në të cilën pak theksuar
i është dhënë çështjes sheriatit. Kthimi në një fokus mbi sheriatit në platformën ka çuar në pozicionet
krejtësisht në kundërshtim me natyrën civile të të drejtave të shtetit dhe të plotë të shtetësisë pavarësisht fetare
përkatësia.

Islami dhe Demokracia

Dalia Mogahed

Islam in politics has been asserted in many countries in the Muslim world through democratic elections. Islamist parties have gained varying degreesof political power in Turkey, Egjipt, Liban, and the occupied Palestinian territories, and have widespread influence in Morocco and Jordan. Now, me shume se kurre, qeveritë perëndimore, alarmed by this outcome, have raised the perennial question: Is Islam compatible with democracy?A recent in-depth Gallup survey in 10 predominantly Muslim countries,representing more than 80% of the global Muslim population, shows that whenasked what they admire most about the West, Muslims frequently mention political freedom, liberty, fair judicial systems, and freedom of speech. When asked to critique their own societies, extremism and inadequate adherence to Islamic teachings were their top grievances.However, while Muslims say they admire freedom and an open political system,Gallup surveys suggest that they do not believe they must choose between Islam and democracy, but rather, that the two can co-exist inside one functional government.