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Democratization and Islamic Politics: A Study on the Wasat Party in Egypt

Yokota Takayuki

The aim of this article is to explore the often contradictory correlation between democratization and Islamic politics in Egypt, focusing on a new Islamic political party, the Wasat Party (Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ).
Theoretically, democratization and Islamic politics are not incompatible if Islamic political organizations can and do operate within a legal and democratic framework. Por outra banda, this requires democratic tolerance by governments for Islamic politics, as long as they continue to act within a legal framework. In the Middle East, con todo, Islamic political parties are often suspected of having undemocratic agendas, and governments have often used this suspicion as a justification to curb democratization. This is also the case with the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood (Jam‘īya al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn) under the Ḥusnī Mubārak regime. Although the Brotherhood is a mainstream Islamic movement in Egypt, operating publicly and enjoying considerable popularity,
successive governments have never changed its illegal status for more than half a century. Some of the Brotherhood members decided to form the Wasat Party as its legal political organ in order to break this stalemate.
There have been some studies on the Wasat Party. Stacher [2002] analyzes the “Platform of the Egyptian Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Miṣrī 1998] and explains the basic principles of the Wasat Party as follows: democracy, sharī‘a (Dereito islámico), rights of women, and Muslim- Christian relations. Baker [2003] regards the Wasat Party as one of the new Islamist groups that have appeared in contemporary Egypt, and analyzes its ideology accordingly. Wickham [2004] discusses the moderation of Islamic movements in Egypt and the attempt to form the Wasat Party from the perspective of comparative politics. Norton [2005] examines the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party in connection with the Brotherhood’s political activities. As these earlier studies are mainly concerned with the Wasat Party during the 1990s and the early 2000s, I will examine the ideology and activities of the Wasat Party till the rise of the democratization movement in Egypt in around 2005. I will do so on the basis of the Wasat Party’s documents, such
as the “Platform of the New Wasat Party” [Ḥizb al-Wasaṭ al-Jadīd 2004]1), and my interviews with its members.

Islamist Parties : why they can’t be democratic

Bassam Tibi

Noting Islamism’s growing appeal and strength on the ground, many

Western scholars and officials have been grasping for some way to take

an inclusionary approach toward it. In keeping with this desire, posúe

become fashionable contemptuously to dismiss the idea of insisting on

clear and rigorous distinctions as “academic.” When it comes to Islam

and democracy, this deplorable fashion has been fraught with unfortunate

consequences.

Intelligent discussion of Islamism, democracy, and Islam requires

clear and accurate definitions. Without them, analysis will collapse into

confusion and policy making will suffer. My own view, formed after

thirty years of study and reflection regarding the matter, is that Islam and

democracy are indeed compatible, provided that certain necessary religious

reforms are made. The propensity to deliver on such reforms is what

I see as lacking in political Islam. My own avowed interest—as an Arab-

Muslim prodemocracy theorist and practitioner—is to promote the establishment

of secular democracy within the ambit of Islamic civilization.

In order to help clear away the confusion that all too often surrounds

this topic, I will lay out several basic points to bear in mind. The first is

that, so far, Western practices vis-`a-vis political Islam have been faulty

because they have lacked the underpinning of a well-founded assessment.

Unless blind luck intervenes, no policy can be better than the assessment

upon which it is based. Proper assessment is the beginning of

all practical wisdom.

ESTRATEXIAS PARA IMPLICAR O ISLAM POLÍTICO

SHADI HAMID

AMANDA Kadlec

Political Islam is the single most active political force in the Middle East today. Its future is intimately tied to that of the region. If the United States and the European Union are committed to supporting political reform in the region, they will need to devise concrete, coherent strategies for engaging Islamist groups. Yet, the U.S. has generally been unwilling to open a dialogue with these movements. similarmente, EU engagement with Islamists has been the exception, not the rule. Where low-level contacts exist, they mainly serve information-gathering purposes, not strategic objectives. The U.S. and EU have a number of programs that address economic and political development in the region – among them the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), the Union for the Mediterranean, and the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) – yet they have little to say about how the challenge of Islamist political opposition fits within broader regional objectives. U.S. and EU democracy assistance and programming are directed almost entirely to either authoritarian governments themselves or secular civil society groups with minimal support in their own societies.
The time is ripe for a reassessment of current policies. Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, supporting Middle East democracy has assumed a greater importance for Western policymakers, who see a link between lack of democracy and political violence. Greater attention has been devoted to understanding the variations within political Islam. The new American administration is more open to broadening communication with the Muslim world. Meanwhile, the vast majority of mainstream Islamist organizations – including the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Jordan’s Islamic Action Front (IAF), Morocco’s Justice and Development Party (PJD), the Islamic Constitutional Movement of Kuwait, and the Yemeni Islah Party – have increasingly made support for political reform and democracy a central component in their political platforms. Ademáis, many have signaled strong interest in opening dialogue with U.S. and EU governments.
The future of relations between Western nations and the Middle East may be largely determined by the degree to which the former engage nonviolent Islamist parties in a broad dialogue about shared interests and objectives. There has been a recent proliferation of studies on engagement with Islamists, but few clearly address what it might entail in practice. As Zoé Nautré, visiting fellow at the German Council on Foreign Relations, puts it, “the EU is thinking about engagement but doesn’t really know how.”1 In the hope of clarifying the discussion, we distinguish between three levels of “engagement,” each with varying means and ends: low-level contacts, strategic dialogue, and partnership.

Islamist Parties : participation without power

Malika Zeghal

Over the last two decades, social and political movements grounding their ideologies in references to Islam have sought to become legal political parties in many countries of the Middle East and North Africa. Some of these Islamist movements have been authorized to take part lawfully in electoral competition. Among the best known is Turkey’s Justice and Development Party (o AKP), which won a parliamentary majority in 2002 and has led the government ever since. Morocco’s own Party of Justice and Development (PJD) has been legal since the mid- 1990s and commands a significant bloc of seats in Parliament. In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) has never been authorized to form a political party, but in spite of state repression it has successfully run candidates as nominal independents in both national and local elections.
Since the early 1990s, this trend has gone hand-in-hand with official policies of limited political liberalization. Together, the two trends have occasioned a debate about whether these movements are committed to “democracy.” A vast literature has sprung up to underline the paradoxes as well as the possible risks and benefits of including Islamist parties in the electoral process. The main paradigm found in this body of writing focuses on the consequences that might ensue when Islamists use democratic instruments, and seeks to divine the “true” intentions that Islamists will manifest if they come to power.

The Management of Islamic Activism: Salafis, Os Irmáns Musulmáns, and State Power in Jordan

Faisal Ghori

In his first book, The Management of Islamic Activism, Quintan Wiktorowicz examines the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafis through the lens of social movement theory. Unlike some political scientists who dismiss Islamic movements because of their informal networks, Wiktorowicz contends that social movement theory is an apt framework through which Islamic movements can be examined and studied. In this regard, his work leads the field. Yet for all its promise, this book largely fails to deliver.
The book is divided into four primary sections, through which he tries to construct his conclusion: Jordanian political liberalization has occurred because of structural necessities, not because of its commitment to democratization. Ademáis, the state has been masterful in what he dubs the “management of collective action, (p. 3) which has, for all practical purposes, stifled any real opposition. While his conclusion is certainly tenable, given his extensive fieldwork, the book is poorly organized and much of the evidence examined earlier in the work leaves many questions unanswered.

What Leads Voters to Support the Opposition under Authoritarianism ?

Michael D.H. Robbins

Elections have become commonplace in most authoritarian states. While this may seem to be a contradiction in terms, in reality elections play an important role in these regimes. While elections for positions of real power tend to be non-competitive, many
elections—including those for seemingly toothless parliaments—can be strongly contested.
The existing literature has focused on the role that elections play in supporting the regime. Por exemplo, they can help let off steam, help the regime take the temperature of society, or can be used to help a dominant party know which individuals it should promote (Schedler 2002; Blaydes 2006). Yet, while the literature has focused on the supply-side of elections in authoritarian states, there are relatively few systematic studies of voter behavior in these elections (see Lust-Okar 2006 for an exception). Rather, most analyses have argued that patronage politics are the norm in these societies and that ordinary citizens tend to be very cynical about these exercises given that they cannot bring any real change (Kassem 2004; Desposato 2001; Zaki 1995). While the majority of voters in authoritarian systems may behave in this manner, not all do. Centrais, at times, even the majority vote against the regime leading to
significant changes as has occurred recently in Kenya, the Ukraine and Zimbabwe. Yet, even in cases where opposition voters make up a much smaller percentage of voters, it is important to understand who these voters are and what leads them to vote against the
réxime.

Energizing US-Syria Relations: Leveraging Ancillary Diplomatic Vehicles

Benjamin E. poder,

Andrew Akhlaghi,

Steven Rotchtin

The prospect for greater stability in the Middle East largely hinges on the ability to bring Syria into diplomatic and security discussions as a productive stakeholder, necessitating a thaw in the less than normal state of U.S. – Syrian relations. While Syria’s
importance as a keystone state to a Middle East peace process was acknowledged in the 2006 Iraq Study Group Report,1 which called for a shift from disincentives to incentives in seeking constructive results, only in the past few months has there been a demonstrable shift in Washington’s disposition. Recent meetings between high-ranking U.S. officials and their counterparts in Damascus, and even the announcement of reinstating a U.S. ambassador to Syria, have led to widespread speculation in policy circles that a diplomatic thaw is afoot.
This report analyzes key trends in Syria’s domestic and regional socio-political situation that currently function to make Syria a natural ally of the United States.

German Converts to Islam and Their Ambivalent Relations with Immigrant Muslims

Esra Özyürek

“I would never have become a Muslim if I had met Muslims before I met Islam.” I heard these words over and over again during my yearlong ethnographic research among ethnic German converts to Islam in Berlin.1 The first time, it was uttered by a self-declared German imam who had converted to Islam while trying to convert Arabs and Turks to Christianity. The second time, the speaker was a twenty-five-year-old former East German woman who came to Islam through her Bosnian boyfriend, whose family never accepted her. The third time, the comment was made by a fifty-year-old man who converted to Islam about thirty years ago after meeting Iranians who came to Europe to collect money and organize for the Iranian revolution. After that I stopped counting. Although all of the several dozen German converts I talked to (and the dozens of converts whose narratives I read on the internet) claim that they embraced Islam in a context of significant personal relationships with Muslims,2 a substantial portion of German Muslims are quite discontented with born Muslims, especially those of immigrant backgrounds. This paper is an attempt to comprehend the paradoxical feelings of love and hate for Islam and Muslims that many German Muslims experience. My aim in exploring this issue is to understand what it takes to be a (supposed) Islamophile in a political and social context that is highly Islamophobic.

Interview with Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim

Daniel Benaim

In the weeks leading up to Egypt’s Presidential election, I had the opportunity to interview Dr. Saad Eddin Ibrahim. Dr. Ibrahim is
perhaps Egypt’s best-known dissident intellectual and the Founder and Chairman of the Ibn Khaldun Center for Development Studies in Cairo, where I was a Summer Fellow in 2005. In June 2000, Dr. Ibrahim and two dozen of his associates were arrested and jailed on charges ranging from defrauding the European Union to disseminating information harmful to Egypt’s interests. After a
three-year ordeal during which Dr. Ibrahim (62years old at the time) was sentenced to seven years of hard laborall charges against him were dismissed by Egypt’s highest court and he was released from prison in 2003. Sitting in his office in a beautiful Islamic villa in Cairo’s Mokattam Heights, Dr. Ibrahim reflected on the prospects for democratization in Egypt and on his unique role in
Egyptian politics.
People have said that one of the major problems with the United States’ Middle East policy is a failure to predict and account for
change. Are the US and Western governments ready to deal with the possibility of religious
parties taking major roles across the region?
Religious parties have already taken control in Turkey, and I don’t see any reason why they cannot do it here. We are telling policymakers to be ready. I am telling everybody to get ready, because if we don’t open the process to religious
parties, then we will be beholden to the autocrats.
And if the autocrats continue, they will be the greatest help to the theocrats, who are their mirror image.

THE FUTURE FOR EGYPT FOLLOWING THE ELECTIONS AND THE BREAKTHROUGH OF THE MUSLIM BROTHERHOOD

Dimitri DELALIEU

A little less than three months after presidential elections returned Hosni Mubarak to power (see ESISC note of 12.9.05) parliamentary elections ended in unprecedented violence.
The breath of democracy both Egyptians and the international community had hoped to feel hardly lasted any time. The regime of President Mubarak, who saw is power seriously eroded by the extraordinary advance of the Muslim Brotherhood, had no hesitation in turning to those totalitarian methods Egypt has sadly become used to in order to crush opposition: closing polling stations,
mass arrests, intimidation and demonstrations which left at least 12 people dead and hundreds injured.
But the elections, in spite of an extremely feeble turnout of 25%, are undoubtedly a turning point in the country’s fortunes. The result for the Muslim Brotherhood –which becomes the leading opposition party and gains six times as many seats as before, with 88 seats out of a total of 444, or one Islamist out of every five deputies – is a sign of a profound change in the national political
landscape.
But the success of the Islamists is more a result of the accumulation of opposition votes than any ideological rallying by the people to radical Islam – although the rise in power of the Brotherhood is a cause for worry.

A bebida fraternal é un xornalismo puro, non un acordo político con Al Dostour: Eissa

Pierre Loza
CAIRO: Con dous casos xudiciais que dirixen os seus escritos, O editor de Al Dostour, Ibrahim Eissa, tamén está acusado de ser aliado dos Irmáns Musulmáns debido á cobertura en papel do grupo prohibido.
Aínda que esta última acusación non adoptou ningunha forma legal, Eissa di que os que reclaman tales demandas están cegos de que todos os fluxos políticos teñan a oportunidade de publicar as súas opinións no seu xornal.
Eissa, que está a xuízo por difundir rumores falsos sobre a saúde do presidente e apelar outra sentenza que o atopou culpable de insultar símbolos do Partido Demócrata Nacional (NDP) - cre que a liberdade de prensa está en forte ataque en Exipto. Un campión da liberdade de prensa, Eissa foi unha das críticas máis altas do exipcio
liderado.
Noticias diarias Exipto: Vostede foi acusado de ser un aliado da prohibida organización dos Irmáns Musulmáns. Como describirías a túa relación co grupo?
Ibrahim Eissa: Se quere dicir por relación o feito de que teño amigos e coñecidos de entre as filas da Irmandade, si, eu teño unha relación coa Irmandade.
Pero tamén debes considerar que teño relacións con persoas dentro do NDP ás que amo e respecto. Tamén teño amigos que son comunistas.
Son xornalista polo que teño contactos con todos os fluxos políticos. Tamén debes considerar que se trata principalmente de relacións humanas, non as políticas. Pero insinuar ou implicar que o xornal está tendencioso ou cortou un acordo co MB é unha tontería. Nos últimos tres anos, eles [medios de comunicación estatais] estiveron acusándonos de cortar un acordo coa Irmandade, Non obstante, nunca chegaron a presentar ningunha evidencia deste acordo. Esta suposición débese a que publicamos novas sobre a Irmandade todos os días ou cada semana, e
publicamos o seu punto de vista e defendemos aos membros da Irmandade que foron detidos e están en proceso. Na miña opinión, isto é un honor para calquera xornalista. A Irmandade representa 20 por cento do parlamento - 88 asentos. É a oposición principal no parlamento, que [en si mesmo] é insignificante e espido. É como un semi parlamento, algo que se asemella a un parlamento. Os elementos efectivos e activos nel son os da Irmandade Musulmá. Os medios de comunicación do estado non queren que nos acheguemos nunca
Irmandade.
Outro dato é que nos últimos tres anos os membros da Irmandade foron detidos máis que ninguén en Exipto. Eles (a Irmandade) estanse a probar continuamente. Non queren que cubra as probas da Irmandade. Cando eu cubro as probas, queren que presente o punto de vista do oficial de seguridade do estado sobre o caso? Como é posible isto?
calquera profesión, calquera lexislatura ou calquera mentalidade?

Hamas pode poñer un exemplo

Khader Khader

Quizais o aspecto máis importante de Hamas’ vitoria desbordante nas eleccións do Consello Lexislativo palestino o mes pasado é que foi a primeira vez na historia contemporánea de Oriente Medio que a democracia se exercía de xeito real sen ningunha inxerencia externa ou interna directa.. As ramificacións de eleccións libres pode reverbeir en toda a rexión durante os próximos anos e poderían marcar unha nova fase no mapa xeopolítico de Oriente Medio.
Isto, con todo, non foi a primeira vez que un partido político islámico mostrou a súa popularidade nas urnas. O Fronte Islámico de Alxeria apareceu dirixido a certa vitoria nas eleccións a mediados dos anos 90 antes da intervención externa por parte do “democrático” Oeste e os seus aliados de Alxer impulsaron esa experiencia. En Alxeria, o resultado do enterro da democracia foi un conflito extremadamente cruento que aínda segue arrastrando, moito para a vergoña dos países occidentais, que prefiren non comentar. Para o cidadán común no mundo árabe, foi unha experiencia que só se sumou á sensación de opresión e frustración en todos os recunchos da rexión.
Así, Hamás’ A vitoria electoral espertou unha ampla esperanza entre as masas árabes de que teñan outra oportunidade de saber se un partido islámico pode gobernar mellor que os réximes actuais no mundo árabe. Hamas, neste sentido, leva as esperanzas de millóns de árabes e musulmáns en todo o mundo.
Pero con esas expectativas chega un momento cheo de perigo. Hamás e a forma na que xestiona as cuestións nos territorios palestinos poden ser un exemplo moi interesante: se ten éxito; se o demostra, pode dirixir asuntos palestinos de xeito máis transparente e en beneficio de palestinos máis comúns que antes, ao mesmo tempo que xestas duras negociacións con Israel, a experiencia animará a outros movementos islámicos do mundo árabe a usala como exemplo para convencer aos seus cidadáns de que os movementos políticos islámicos son unha alternativa viable.
Pero se Hamas fracasa na súa difícil e desafiante tarefa, o contratempo provocará un golpe devastador para todos os movementos e partidos islámicos da rexión. Un fracaso de Hamás quizais podería enviar a toda a rexión a outro período de deserto político similar á época posterior ao fracaso dos panarabistas.
Así, Hamas no poder é un fenómeno interesante e iluminador, e un que seguirá de cerca todas as partes interesadas. Segundo unha figura de Hamas líder en Khan Yunis, Dr. Younis al-Astal, o Irmán Musulmán Internacional xa amosou a súa disposición a axudar a Hamas con toda a experiencia necesaria para que triunfe na súa misión. A Irmandade será por suposto o principal benefactor de calquera éxito de Hamás.
Do mesmo xeito, con todo, Occidente pode sentirse obrigado agora a facer todos os esforzos posibles para que Hamas fracase, aínda que o movemento resulte exitoso para satisfacer as necesidades da xente. O tema en cuestión non é o eficiente que é un goberno, senón o leal que un goberno se amosa a Occidente. Esta é a medida que Occidente usou normalmente para avaliar Oriente Medio, onde se gastaron miles de millóns de dólares en manter os réximes árabes “moderado e realista”, especialmente en relación ao conflito palestino-israelí.
Hai un curioso paralelo á Guerra Fría na dinámica que se está a desenvolver entre Occidente e o mundo musulmán. Durante a Guerra Fría, Occidente mostrouse confiado en que a democracia levaría o Bloque Oriental ata as rodas e espallou con forza a mensaxe de que a liberdade individual e o dereito de voto eran dereitos humanos por excelencia.
Agora, con todo, esa mesma mensaxe é probable que volva disparar en Occidente. Se se celebraron eleccións reais en Exipto e Xordania, é moi probable que os movementos dos Irmáns Musulmáns chegaran ao poder e poñan en dúbida os tratados de paz entre estes países e Israel, en que Occidente investiu tanto esforzo.
Todo o mundo sabe que a democracia custa en Oriente Próximo. O mundo está preparado para participar neste xogo? A clave probablemente sexa o éxito de Hamas, que funciona en condicións extremadamente adversas. Árabes e musulmáns en toda a rexión, tantas veces deixada por promesa política de varios barrios, Pode que decepcionen de novo. Mentres tanto, as súas esperanzas están cun movemento político que está a supor o primeiro reto serio en décadas para os réximes árabes en todas partes.

NOTAS POLÍTICAS E PRÁCTICAS

Kenneth Roth

Hoxe, practicamente todos os gobernos queren ser vistos como unha democracia, pero moitos se resisten a permitir os dereitos humanos básicos que farían significativa a democracia porque podería prexudicar o seu poder no poder. Pola contra, os gobernos utilizan unha variedade de subfuxios para xestionar ou minar o proceso electoral. A súa tarefa é facilitada pola falta dunha definición amplamente aceptada de "democracia" similar ás regras detalladas do dereito internacional de dereitos humanos. Pero boa parte do problema reside en que, por intereses comerciais ou estratéxicos, as democracias establecidas no mundo a miúdo pechan os ollos ante a manipulación electoral, facilitando aos demócratas fanáticos pasar de si mesmos como a verdade. Esa conciliación socava os esforzos para promover os dereitos humanos porque pode ser máis difícil para as organizacións de dereitos humanos estigmatizar a un goberno polas súas violacións de dereitos humanos cando ese goberno pode manterse como unha "democracia aceptada". O reto que enfronta o movemento de dereitos humanos é para resaltar as trazas empregadas polos réximes ditatoriais para finxir o dominio democrático e para facer presión sobre as democracias establecidas para negarse a admitir a estes pretendentes no club das democracias barato. Palabras clave: sociedade civil, promoción da democracia, ditadura, eleccións,
manipulación electoral, violencia política Poucas veces a democracia foi tan aclamada e tan violada, tan promovido pero tan desaprensivo, tan importante pero tan decepcionante. A democracia converteuse na clave de lexitimidade. Poucos gobernos queren considerarse antidemocráticos. Non obstante, as credenciais dos demandantes non mantiveron o ritmo coa democracia
popularidade crecente. Estes días, incluso ditadores abertos aspiran ao status que lle confire a etiqueta de democracia. Determinado a non deixar que os simples feitos se poñan no seu camiño, estes gobernantes dominaron a arte da retórica democrática que leva
pouca relación coa súa práctica de gobernar.
Esta tendencia crecente supón un enorme desafío para o movemento polos dereitos humanos. Os grupos de dereitos humanos dificilmente se poden opor á promoción da democracia, pero teñen que preocuparse de que o abrazo da democracia non se converta nun subterfuxio por evitar os estándares máis esixentes do dereito internacional de dereitos humanos. Os grupos de dereitos humanos deben insistir especialmente en que os seus aliados gobernamentais naturais - as democracias establecidas - non permiten que os intereses competentes e as estratexias miope se poñan no camiño das súas
abrazo dun rico, concepto máis significativo da democracia.

ISLAM POLÍTICO EN SOMALIA

Georg-Sebastian Holzer

Desde os ataques de 9/11 Somalia converteuse no obxecto de renovada atención dos Estados Unidos e Europa. Como tipo de estado errado, a ameaza que supón equipara á que os Estados Unidos afrontaron en Afganistán e se considera como un terreo fértil para grupos islámicos radicais, en particular al-Qaeda. Non obstante o Islam en Somalia ten unha natureza distinta. Un exame da súa historia leva a comprender a complexa relación entre a relixión e a sociedade baseada en Somaliclan. Unha investigación máis atenta de dous dos grupos islamistas máis importantes, al-Itihaad e o Consello de Tribunais Islámicos, axudará a comprender esta relación no contexto da Somalia contemporánea. finalmente, Este artigo analiza o papel do Islam na nova economía de Somalia ao centrarse no exemplo da compañía de remesas e telecomunicacións al-Barakaat que estivo ligada a Al-Qaeda por parte de EE. UU. 9/11 Os ataques terroristas. DISTINCIONAN A NATUREZA DO ISLAM EN SOMALIA A historia do Islam no Corno de África remóntase aos 1400 anos. A fe chegou ao Corno de África desde a Península Arábiga a través do comercio e migración, principalmente do Iemen e Omán.1By 1400AD, en Somalia estaba a producirse unha conversión a grande escala ao Islam, difundido por primeira vez pola familia do clan Dir, pero seguido polo restof nación.2 En Somalia hoxe, case 100% da poboación son musulmáns sunnitas, xeralmente adheríndose a unha versión Shafi da relixión. Como I.M. Lewis sinalou, isto estivo intimamente ligado aos mitos xenealóxicos da identidade do clan somalí e caracterízase pola veneración dos santos, así como polos antepasados ​​de varios clans somalís. O sufismo politolóxico tradicionalmente dominou esta fe.

Boletín árabe de reforma

grupo de investigadores


Exipto: A regresión na plataforma do partido dos Irmáns Musulmáns?

Amr hamzawy


A redacción da plataforma de partidos dos Irmáns Musulmáns envía sinais sobre as opinións políticas do movemento

e posicións. Aínda que xa foi moi difundido, o documento aínda non ten final
aprobación do gabinete de orientación do movemento.
O tratamento detallado da política sobre a plataforma, social, e as cuestións económicas marcan unha importante partida
desde posicións anteriormente menos desenvolvidas, articulado entre outras cousas a 2004 iniciativa de reforma e a 2005
plataforma electoral para os candidatos parlamentarios da Irmandade. Esta quenda aborda un dos máis
críticas importantes á Irmandade, é dicir, a súa promoción de vagos ideolóxicos e relixiosos

lemas e incapacidade de elaborar prescricións específicas de políticas.
O documento suscita problemas preocupantes, con todo, respecto á identidade dunha futura Irmandade

partido político, así como a posición do grupo en varias cuestións políticas e sociais. Lanzado no
contexto de permanente desfasamento entre o réxime exipcio e a Irmandade, revela significativo
ambigüidades e quizais regresión no pensamento do movemento.
Primeira, os redactores optaron por non abordar a relación futura entre o partido e o movemento. En

facendo iso, ignoraron intencionadamente ideas importantes discutidas recentemente no movemento,
especialmente entre os membros do bloque parlamentario. Inspirado nas experiencias dos partidos islamistas en
Marrocos, Xordania, e Iemen, estes membros propugnan unha separación funcional entre un partido e
o movemento, co primeiro centrouse principalmente na participación política e o segundo en relixiosos
activismo. Ademais do seu tratamento superficial da natureza do partido e da súa organización interna, o
A plataforma non inclúe ningunha declaración clara sobre a apertura de membros a todos os exipcios, independentemente da súa situación
relixión, un dos requisitos para establecer un partido político segundo a constitución exipcia.
Segundo, o borrador da plataforma Brotherhood identifica a implementación de sharia como un dos principais do partido

obxectivos. Aínda que isto é coherente coa interpretación do artigo do grupo 2 da Constitución exipcia
(“O islam é a relixión do estado, e o dereito islámico é a principal fonte de lexislación”), parte do
espírito pragmático de diversas declaracións e iniciativas da Irmandade desde entón 2004 en que menos énfase
deuse a cuestión da sharia. O regreso a un foco na sharia na plataforma provocou posicións
fundamentalmente contra o carácter civil do estado e os dereitos de cidadanía con independencia relixiosa
afiliación.

Islam e Democracia

Dalia Mogahed

Islam in politics has been asserted in many countries in the Muslim world through democratic elections. Islamist parties have gained varying degreesof political power in Turkey, Exipto, Líbano, and the occupied Palestinian territories, and have widespread influence in Morocco and Jordan. Agora, more than ever, Western governments, alarmed by this outcome, have raised the perennial question: Is Islam compatible with democracy?A recent in-depth Gallup survey in 10 predominantly Muslim countries,representing more than 80% of the global Muslim population, shows that whenasked what they admire most about the West, Muslims frequently mention political freedom, liberty, fair judicial systems, and freedom of speech. When asked to critique their own societies, extremism and inadequate adherence to Islamic teachings were their top grievances.However, while Muslims say they admire freedom and an open political system,Gallup surveys suggest that they do not believe they must choose between Islam and democracy, but rather, that the two can co-exist inside one functional government.