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Feminism VAHEL ilmalikkuse ja islamismi: CASE Palestiina

Dr, Islah Jad

aastal toimusid Läänekaldal ja Gaza sektoris seadusandlikud valimised 2006 tõi võimule islamistliku liikumise Hamas, mis moodustas enamuse Palestiina seadusandlikus nõukogus ja ka esimese enamusvalitsuse Hamasi. Nende valimiste tulemusel nimetati ametisse esimene Hamasi naisminister, kellest sai naisminister. Märtsi vahel 2006 ja juuni 2007, sellele ametikohale asusid kaks erinevat Hamasi naisministrit, kuid mõlemal oli ministeeriumi juhtimine keeruline, kuna enamik selle töötajatest ei olnud Hamasi liikmed, vaid kuulusid teistesse erakondadesse, ja enamik neist olid Fatahi liikmed, domineeriv liikumine, mis kontrollib enamikku Palestiina omavalitsuse institutsioone. Pingeline võitlusperiood naisteasjade ministeeriumis tegutsevate Hamasi naiste ja Fatahi naisliikmete vahel lõppes pärast Hamasi võimuhaaramist Gaza sektoris ja sellest tulenevat valitsuse langemist Läänekaldal – võitlus mis võttis vahel vägivaldse pöörde. Üks põhjus, miks seda võitlust hiljem selgitati, oli erinevus ilmaliku feministliku diskursuse ja islamistliku diskursuse vahel naiste teemadel.. Palestiina kontekstis omandas see erimeelsus ohtliku iseloomu, kuna seda kasutati verise poliitilise võitluse jätkamise õigustamiseks, Hamasi naiste ametikohalt või ametikohalt kõrvaldamine, ning sel ajal valitsenud poliitilised ja geograafilised lõhed nii Läänekaldal kui ka okupeeritud Gaza sektoris.
See võitlus tõstatab mitmeid olulisi küsimusi: kas peaksime karistama võimule tulnud islamistlikku liikumist, või peaksime kaaluma põhjuseid, mis viisid Fateh'i läbikukkumiseni poliitilisel areenil? Kas feminism võib pakkuda naistele terviklikku raamistikku, sõltumata nende sotsiaalsest ja ideoloogilisest kuuluvusest? Kas naiste ühise ühisosa diskursus aitab neil ühiseid eesmärke mõista ja nendes kokku leppida?? Kas paternalism on ainult islamistlikus ideoloogias?, ja mitte rahvusluses ja patriotismis? Mida me mõtleme feminismi all? Kas on ainult üks feminism, või mitu feminismi? Mida me islami all mõtleme – kas selle nime all tuntud liikumine või religioon, filosoofia, või õigussüsteem? Peame minema nende probleemide põhja ja neid hoolikalt kaaluma, ja me peame nendega kokku leppima, et saaksime hiljem otsustada, kui feministid, kui meie paternalismi kriitika peaks olema suunatud religioonile (usk), mis peaks piirduma uskliku südamega ja millel ei tohi lasta üle maailma kontrolli haarata, või kohtupraktika, mis on seotud erinevate usukoolkondadega, mis selgitavad Koraanis sisalduvat õigussüsteemi ja prohveti ütlusi – sunna.

Islamistlike NAISTE aktivismi okupeeritud Palestiina

Interviews by Khaled Amayreh

Interview with Sameera Al-Halayka

Sameera Al-Halayka is an elected member of the Palestinian Legislative Council. She was

born in the village of Shoyoukh near Hebron in 1964. She has a BA in Sharia (Islami

Jurisprudence) from Hebron University. She worked as a journalist from 1996 kuni 2006 when

she entered the Palestinian Legislative Council as an elected member in the 2006 valimised.

She is married and has seven children.

Q: There is a general impression in some western countries that women receive

inferior treatment within Islamic resistance groups, such as Hamas. Is this true?

How are women activists treated in Hamas?
Rights and duties of Muslim women emanate first and foremost from Islamic Sharia or law.

They are not voluntary or charitable acts or gestures we receive from Hamas or anyone

else. Thus, mis puudutab poliitilist kaasatust ja aktivismi, naistel üldiselt on

samad õigused ja kohustused mis meestel. Pealegi, naised moodustavad vähemalt 50 protsenti

ühiskond. Teatud mõttes, nad on kogu ühiskond, sest nad sünnitavad, ja tõsta,

uus põlvkond.

Seetõttu, Võin öelda, et naiste staatus Hamasis on temaga täielikult kooskõlas

staatus islamis endas. See tähendab, et ta on täispartner kõigil tasanditel. Tõepoolest, see oleks

islami jaoks ebaõiglane ja ebaõiglane (või islamist, kui soovite) naine olla kannatustes partner

samas kui ta on otsustusprotsessist välja jäetud. Sellepärast on naise roll selles

Hamas on alati olnud teerajaja.

Q: Kas teile tundub, et Hamasis on esile kerkinud naiste poliitiline aktiivsus?

loomulik areng, mis sobib kokku klassikaliste islami kontseptsioonidega

naiste staatuse ja rolli kohta, või on see lihtsalt vajalik vastus

modernsusest ja poliitilise tegevuse nõuetest ja jätkumisest

Iisraeli okupatsioon?

Islami kohtupraktikas ega Hamasi põhikirjas ei ole ühtegi teksti, mis takistaks naistel

poliitiline osalus. Usun, et see on vastupidine — seal on palju Koraani salme

ja prohvet Muhamedi ütlused, mis kutsuvad naisi üles olema poliitikas ja avalikkuses aktiivsed

moslemeid puudutavad probleemid. Aga see on tõsi ka naiste puhul, nagu meeste jaoks on, poliitiline aktiivsus

ei ole kohustuslik, vaid vabatahtlik, ja see otsustatakse suuresti iga naise võimete valguses,

kvalifikatsioonist ja individuaalsetest asjaoludest. Sellest hoolimata, ilmutades muret avalikkuse pärast

on kohustuslik igale moslemi mehele ja naisele. Prohvet

ütles Muhammed: "See, kes ei näita muret moslemite asjade pärast, pole moslem."

enamgi veel, Palestiina islamistlikud naised peavad arvesse võtma kõiki kohapealseid objektiivseid tegureid

otsustades, kas liituda poliitikaga või osaleda poliitilises aktivismis.


Islam, Poliitiline islam ja Ameerika

Araabia Insight

Kas "vennaskond" Ameerikaga on võimalik?

khalil al-anani

"Pole mingit võimalust suhelda ühegi USA-ga. senikaua, kuni USA säilitab oma pikaajalise nägemuse islamist kui reaalsest ohust, vaade, mis paneb USA sionistliku vaenlasega ühte paati. Meil ei ole Ameerika rahva ega USA kohta eelarvamusi. ühiskond ja selle kodanikuorganisatsioonid ja mõttekojad. We have no problem communicating with the American people but no adequate efforts are being made to bring us closer,” said Dr. Issam al-Iryan, Moslemivennaskonna poliitilise osakonna juhataja telefoniintervjuus.
Al-Iryani sõnad võtavad kokku Moslemivennaskonna vaated Ameerika rahvale ja USA-le. valitsus. Teised Moslemi Vennaskonna liikmed oleksid sellega nõus, nagu ka kadunud Hassan al-Banna, aastal grupi asutanud 1928. Al- Banna pidas läänt enamasti moraalse allakäigu sümboliks. Teised salafid – islami koolkond, mis toetub esivanematele kui eeskujulikele mudelitele – on võtnud USA suhtes sama seisukoha., kuid puudub ideoloogiline paindlikkus, mida toetab Moslemivennaskond. Samal ajal kui Moslemivennaskond usub ameeriklaste kaasamisse kodanikuühiskonna dialoogi, teised äärmusrühmitused ei näe dialoogil mõtet ja väidavad, et jõud on ainus viis USAga toimetulemiseks.

Märkused isokraatse Legacy ja islami poliitilise mõtte: Näide Haridus

JAMES Muir

An unfortunate feature of human history is the tendency for religious differences and con icts to nourish themselves with the poisonous brew of ignorance and prejudice. While much can sometimes be done to reduce prejudice, it seems to me that scholars and educators ought to be primarily concerned with the more fundamental and enduring goal of reducing ignorance. One’s success in reducing ignorance—including one’s own—will depend upon one’s motives.
The study of Islamic educational philosophy may be motivated by current practical concerns: the desire of British Muslims to have Islamic schools, whether funded privately or by the state, is one topical example. From the perspective of educational philosophy, siiski, such a motive is exceedingly narrow, circumscribed by the concepts and categories of the local political disputes of the moment. For those motivated by a desire for knowledge and understanding of a tradition outside their own, it is most doubtful that any study of Islamic philosophy restricted by current practical concerns can be at all productive. There is no simple correspondence between knowledge and “relevance.”
There must, siiski, be some connection between two traditions of thought and practice if there is to be a point of departure, and a point of entry, which allows the scholar to step from one tradition to another. The legacy of Isocrates may constitute one such point of departure, which will help us to understand the relation between two traditions, the classical Greek and the Islamic. The dominance of the Isocratic legacy in Western education is well established and widely known among historians, classicists
and political philosophers, although awareness of it has only just begun to surface among educationists.2 Similarly, the Isocratic legacy to education (and the rich tradition of Arabic Platonism in philosophy) has in uenced Islamic thought, though in ways that are
still not yet well understood. The intention of this paper is to suggest that a modiŽ ed form of the Isocratic educational tradition is a fundamental component of Islamic political thought, namely, Islamic educational thought. This general wording of the intention of this paper in terms of Islamic political thought may give rise to a misunderstanding. Islam, of course, is regarded by its adherents as a uniŽ ed and universal system of belief and behaviour.

Ameerika põhiseadusest Koraani ja Madinahi pakti vaatenurgast

Imad-ad-Dean Ahmad

See artikkel ei ole sugugi Ameerika põhiseaduse ammendav võrdlus Koraani ja Mediina paktiga. Pigem, see uurib, milliseid arusaamu nende kahe dokumendi võrdlusest võib järeldada. Vastavalt, the constitutional topics selected are those in which the author or the commentators on earlier drafts perceived an assessment within the Islamic sources.4 This paper should be taken as an invitation for future studies with more systematic comparisons. In addition to rational inference from the text of the Qur’an and of the Madinah Covenant, I shall draw on the views of the Prophet’s Companions as recorded in the leading Hadith books. Analogously, the views of the Founding Fathers of the American Republic on constitutional
matters are articulated in The Federalist Papers.We shall begin by reviewing the Madinah Covenant, and then evaluate the Constitution’s goals as expressed in the preamble. After that, we shall explore a variety of topics in the main body of the text that lend themselves to the examination proposed here. In particular, these are the roles of the branches of government according to the separation of powers, the role of elections in determining the next head of state, the penalty for treason, the existence of the slave trade and racism, the republican form of government, the provisions for amending the Constitution, religious tests, and the Bill of Rights. lõpuks, we consider the Madisonian arguments on how the Constitution may be considered a model for avoiding fitnah.
The Madinah Covenant That Muslims attach great significance to their organization as a political community can be seen in the fact that their calendar is dated neither from the birth nor the death of the Prophet, but from the establishment of the first Muslim polity in the city-state of Madinah in 622. Before Madinah was founded, the Arabs had no state to “establish justice, insure domestic
tranquility, provide for the common defense, promote the general welfare, and secure the blessings of liberty” The custom at that time was that those who were too weak to protect themselves became clients of a protector (wali). Muhammad, himself an orphan, was brought up under the protection of his uncle Abu Talib.
After his uncle’s death in 619, Muhammad received an invitation from Yathrib’s feuding Arab tribes to govern there. Once in Yathrib, he entered into a covenant with all of its residents, whether they had accepted Islam or not. Even the Jews living on the city’s outskirts subscribed to it.

Islami ja liberaalse demokraatia

Robin Wright
Of all the challenges facing democracy in the 1990s, one of the greatest lies in the Islamic world. Only a handful of the more than four dozen predominantly Muslim countries have made significant strides toward establishing democratic systems. Among this handfulincluding Albania, Bangladesh, Jordaania, Kyrgyzstan, Liibanon, Mali, Pakistan, and Turkeynot one has yet achieved full, stable, or secure democracy. And the largest single regional bloc holding out against the global trend toward political pluralism comprises the Muslim countries of the Middle East and North Africa.
Yet the resistance to political change associated with the Islamic bloc is not necessarily a function of the Muslim faith. Tõepoolest, the evidence indicates quite the reverse. Mõnede islamimaailma kõige antidemokraatlikumate režiimide valitsejad–nagu Brunei, Indoneesia, Iraak, Omaan, Katar, Süüria, ja Türkmenistan–on ilmalikud autokraadid, kes keelduvad jagamast võimu oma vendadega.
Üldiselt, poliitilise pluralismi takistused islamimaades ei erine probleemidest, millega varem kokku puututi mujal maailmas: ilmalikud ideoloogiad, nagu baathism Iraagis ja Süürias, Pancasila Indoneesias, või püsiv kommunism mõnes endises Nõukogude Kesk-Aasia riigis ei tekitanud tõelist vastuseisu. Irooniliselt, paljud neist ideoloogiatest olid kohandatud läänest; Baathism, näiteks, oli inspireeritud 1930. ja 1940. aastate Euroopa sotsialismist. Rigid government controls over everything from communications in Saudi Arabia and Brunei to foreign visitors in Uzbekistan and Indonesia also isolate their people from democratic ideas and debate on popular empowerment. In the largest and poorest Muslim countries, moreover, problems common to [End Page 64] developing states, from illiteracy and disease to poverty, make simple survival a priority and render democratic politics a seeming luxury. lõpuks, like their non-Muslim neighbors in Asia and Africa, most Muslim societies have no local history of democracy on which to draw. As democracy has blossomed in Western states over the past three centuries, Muslim societies have usually lived under colonial rulers, kings, or tribal and clan leaders.
Teisisõnu, neither Islam nor its culture is the major obstacle to political modernity, even if undemocratic rulers sometimes use Islam as their excuse. 1 In Saudi Arabia, näiteks, the ruling House of Saud relied on Wahhabism, a puritanical brand of Sunni Islam, first to unite the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula and then to justify dynastic rule. Like other monotheistic religions, Islam offers wide-ranging and sometimes contradictory instruction. In Saudi Arabia, Islam’s tenets have been selectively shaped to sustain an authoritarian monarchy.

The Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam

Dr. Muhammad Iqbal

As a cultural movement Islam rejects the old static view of the universe, and reaches a dynamic view. As an emotional system of unification it recognizes the worth of the individual as such, and rejects bloodrelationship as a basis of human unity. Blood-relationship is earthrootedness. The search for a purely psychological foundation of human unity becomes possible only with the perception that all human life is spiritual in its origin.1 Such a perception is creative of fresh loyalties without any ceremonial to keep them alive, and makes it possible for man to emancipate himself from the earth. Christianity which had originally appeared as a monastic order was tried by Constantine as a system of unification.2 Its failure to work as such a system drove the Emperor Julian3 to return to the old gods of Rome on which he attempted to put philosophical interpretations. A modern historian of civilization has thus depicted the state of the civilized world about the time when Islam appeared on the stage of History: It seemed then that the great civilization that it had taken four thousand years to construct was on the verge of disintegration, and that mankind was likely to return to that condition of barbarism where every tribe and sect was against the next, and law and order were unknown . . . The
old tribal sanctions had lost their power. Hence the old imperial methods would no longer operate. The new sanctions created by
Christianity were working division and destruction instead of unity and order. It was a time fraught with tragedy. Civilization, like a gigantic tree whose foliage had overarched the world and whose branches had borne the golden fruits of art and science and literature, stood tottering, its trunk no longer alive with the flowing sap of devotion and reverence, but rotted to the core, riven by the storms of war, and held together only by the cords of ancient customs and laws, that might snap at any moment. Was there any emotional culture that could be brought in, to gather mankind once more into unity and to save civilization? This culture must be something of a new type, for the old sanctions and ceremonials were dead, and to build up others of the same kind would be the work
of centuries.’The writer then proceeds to tell us that the world stood in need of a new culture to take the place of the culture of the throne, and the systems of unification which were based on bloodrelationship.
It is amazing, he adds, that such a culture should have arisen from Arabia just at the time when it was most needed. There is, siiski, nothing amazing in the phenomenon. The world-life intuitively sees its own needs, and at critical moments defines its own direction. This is what, in the language of religion, we call prophetic revelation. It is only natural that Islam should have flashed across the consciousness of a simple people untouched by any of the ancient cultures, and occupying a geographical position where three continents meet together. The new culture finds the foundation of world-unity in the principle of Tauhâd.’5 Islam, as a polity, is only a practical means of making this principle a living factor in the intellectual and emotional life of mankind. It demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature. The ultimate spiritual basis of all life, as conceived by Islam, is eternal and reveals itself in variety and change. A society based on such a conception of Reality must reconcile, in its life, the categories of permanence and change. It must possess eternal principles to regulate its collective life, for the eternal gives us a foothold in the world of perpetual change.

Islamism revisited

MAHA AZZAM

There is a political and security crisis surrounding what is referred to as Islamism, a crisis whose antecedents long precede 9/11. Over the past 25 aastat, there have been different emphases on how to explain and combat Islamism. Analysts and policymakers
in the 1980s and 1990s spoke of the root causes of Islamic militancy as being economic malaise and marginalization. More recently there has been a focus on political reform as a means of undermining the appeal of radicalism. Increasingly today, the ideological and religious aspects of Islamism need to be addressed because they have become features of a wider political and security debate. Whether in connection with Al-Qaeda terrorism, political reform in the Muslim world, the nuclear issue in Iran or areas of crisis such as Palestine or Lebanon, it has become commonplace to fi nd that ideology and religion are used by opposing parties as sources of legitimization, inspiration and enmity.
The situation is further complicated today by the growing antagonism towards and fear of Islam in the West because of terrorist attacks which in turn impinge on attitudes towards immigration, religion and culture. The boundaries of the umma or community of the faithful have stretched beyond Muslim states to European cities. The umma potentially exists wherever there are Muslim communities. The shared sense of belonging to a common faith increases in an environment where the sense of integration into the surrounding community is unclear and where discrimination may be apparent. The greater the rejection of the values of society,
whether in the West or even in a Muslim state, the greater the consolidation of the moral force of Islam as a cultural identity and value-system.
Following the bombings in London on 7 Juuli 2005 it became more apparent that some young people were asserting religious commitment as a way of expressing ethnicity. The links between Muslims across the globe and their perception that Muslims are vulnerable have led many in very diff erent parts of the world to merge their own local predicaments into the wider Muslim one, having identifi ed culturally, either primarily or partially, with a broadly defi ned Islam.

ARUTELU DEMOKRAATIA ÜLE ARAABIA MAAILMAS

Ibtisam Ibrahim

Mis on demokraatia?
Lääne teadlased määratlevad demokraatiat kui meetodit üksikisikute kodaniku- ja poliitiliste õiguste kaitsmiseks. See näeb ette sõnavabaduse, vajutage, usk, arvamus, omandiõigus, ja kokkupanek, samuti hääleõigus, nimetada ja taotleda riigiametit. Huntington (1984) väidab, et poliitiline süsteem on demokraatlik sel määral, et selle võimsaimad kollektiivsed otsustajad valitakse
perioodilised valimised, kus kandidaadid võistlevad vabalt häälte pärast ja millel on hääleõiguslikud praktiliselt kõik täiskasvanud. Rothstein (1995) väidab, et demokraatia on valitsemisvorm ja valitsemisprotsess, mis muutub ja kohandub vastavalt oludele. Ta lisab ka, et läänelik demokraatia definitsioon — lisaks vastutusele, konkurentsi, teatud määral osalemist — sisaldab oluliste kodaniku- ja poliitiliste õiguste tagatist. Anderson (1995) väidab, et mõiste demokraatia tähendab süsteemi, kus kõige võimsamad kollektiivsed otsustajad valitakse perioodiliste valimiste kaudu, kus kandidaadid võistlevad vabalt häälte pärast ja kus peaaegu kogu täiskasvanud elanikkond on hääleõiguslik. Saad Eddin Ibrahim (1995), Egiptuse õpetlane, näeb demokraatiat, mis võiks kehtida araabia maailmas, kui reeglite ja institutsioonide kogumit, mille eesmärk on võimaldada valitsemist rahumeelselt
konkureerivate rühmade ja/või vastandlike huvide juhtimine. Kuid, Samir Amin (1991) lähtus oma demokraatia määratlusest sotsiaalmarksistlikust perspektiivist. Ta jagab demokraatia kahte kategooriasse: kodanlik demokraatia, mis põhineb üksikisiku õigustel ja vabadusel, kuid ilma sotsiaalse võrdsuseta; ja poliitiline demokraatia, mis annab kõigile ühiskonnas elavatele inimestele õiguse hääletada ja valida oma valitsust ja institutsioonide esindajaid, mis aitavad saavutada nende võrdseid sotsiaalseid õigusi.
Selle lõigu lõpetuseks, Ütleksin, et demokraatiale pole ühest definitsiooni, mis näitaks täpselt, mis see on või mis mitte. Kuid, nagu märkasime, enamikul ülalmainitud määratlustel on olulised sarnased elemendid – vastutus, konkurentsi, ja mõningane osalus – mis on saanud domineerivaks läänemaailmas ja rahvusvaheliselt.

Islam ja demokraatia

ITAC

If one reads the press or listens to commentators on international affairs, it is often said – and even more often implied but not said – that Islam is not compatible with democracy. In the nineties, Samuel Huntington set off an intellectual firestorm when he published The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, in which he presents his forecasts for the world – writ large. In the political realm, he notes that while Turkey and Pakistan might have some small claim to “democratic legitimacy” all other “… Muslim countries were overwhelmingly non-democratic: monarchies, one-party systems, military regimes, personal dictatorships or some combination of these, usually resting on a limited family, clan, or tribal base”. The premise on which his argument is founded is that they are not only ‘not like us’, they are actually opposed to our essential democratic values. He believes, as do others, that while the idea of Western democratization is being resisted in other parts of the world, the confrontation is most notable in those regions where Islam is the dominant faith.
The argument has also been made from the other side as well. An Iranian religious scholar, reflecting on an early twentieth-century constitutional crisis in his country, declared that Islam and democracy are not compatible because people are not equal and a legislative body is unnecessary because of the inclusive nature of Islamic religious law. A similar position was taken more recently by Ali Belhadj, an Algerian high school teacher, preacher and (in this context) leader of the FIS, when he declared “democracy was not an Islamic concept”. Perhaps the most dramatic statement to this effect was that of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, leader of the Sunni insurgents in Iraq who, when faced with the prospect of an election, denounced democracy as “an evil principle”.
But according to some Muslim scholars, democracy remains an important ideal in Islam, with the caveat that it is always subject to the religious law. The emphasis on the paramount place of the shari’a is an element of almost every Islamic comment on governance, moderate or extremist. Only if the ruler, who receives his authority from God, limits his actions to the “supervision of the administration of the shari’a” is he to be obeyed. If he does other than this, he is a non-believer and committed Muslims are to rebel against him. Herein lies the justification for much of the violence that has plagued the Muslim world in such struggles as that prevailing in Algeria during the 90s

In Search of Islamic konstitutsionalism

Nadirsyah Püksid

While constitutionalism in the West is mostly identified with secular thought, Islamic constitutionalism, which incorporates some religious elements, has attracted growing interest in recent years. For instance, the Bush administration’s response to the events of 9/11 radically transformed the situation in Iraq and Afghanistan, and both countries are now rewriting their constitutions. As
Ann Elizabeth Mayer points out, Islamic constitutionalism is constitutionalism that is, in some form, based on Islamic principles, as opposed to the constitutionalism developed in countries that happen to be Muslim but which has not been informed by distinctively Islamic principles. Several Muslim scholars, among them Muhammad Asad3 and Abul A`la al-Maududi, have written on such aspects of constitutional issues as human rights and the separation of powers. Kuid, in general their works fall into apologetics, as Chibli Mallat points out:
Whether for the classical age or for the contemporary Muslim world, scholarly research on public law must respect a set of axiomatic requirements.
First, the perusal of the tradition cannot be construed as a mere retrospective reading. By simply projecting present-day concepts backwards, it is all too easy to force the present into the past either in an apologetically contrived or haughtily dismissive manner. The approach is apologetic and contrived when Bills of Rights are read into, say, the Caliphate of `Umar, with the presupposition that the “just” qualities of `Umar included the complex and articulate precepts of constitutional balance one finds in modern texts

Islamophobia and Anti-Muslim Hate Crime

JONATHAN GITHENS-MAZER

ROBERT LAMBERT MBE

The perils of Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime threaten to undermine basic human rights, fundamental aspects of citizenship and co-existing partnerships for Muslims and non- Muslims alike in contemporary Europe. Routine portrayals of Islam as a religion of hatred, violence and inherent intolerance have become key planks for the emergence of extremist nationalist, anti-immigration politics in Europe – planks which seek to exploit populist fears and which have the potential to lead to Muslim disempowerment in Europe. Sections of the media have created a situation where the one serves to heighten the unfounded claims and anxieties of the other – such that politicians from Austria to the Britain, and the Netherlands to Spain, feel comfortable in using terms like “Tsunamis of Muslim immigration”, and accuse Islam of being a fundamental threat to a “European way of life”. While in many cases, the traction of this populist approach reflects an ignorance of Islamic faith, practice and belief, there are many think-tanks which are currently engaged in promoting erroneous depictions of Islam and Muslim political beliefs through unsubstantiated and academically baseless studies, and a reliance on techniques such as ‘junk-polling’. Prior to researching Islamophobia and anti-Muslim hate crime in London, we worked with Muslim Londoners to research the contested notion of what is widely termed by academics and policy makers as “violent radicalisation” (Githens-Mazer, 2010, Lambert 2010). To a large extent it was that prior research experience that persuaded us to embark on this new project. That is to say, there is an important link between the two areas
of work which we should explain at the outset. Since 9/11 Muslim Londoners, no less than Muslims in towns and cities across Europe, have often been unfairly stigmatised as subversive threats to state security and social cohesion, sometimes characterised as a fifth column (Cox and Marks 2006, Gove 2006, Mayer and Frampton 2009). We do not suggest that this stigmatisation did not exist before 9/11, still less do we argue that it revolves solely around the issues of security and social cohesion, but we do claim that the response to 9/11 – ‘the war on terror’ – and much of the rhetoric that has surrounded it has played a significant part in increasing the public perception of European Muslims as potential enemies rather than potential partners and neighbours.

Speech dr,MUHAMMAD BADIE

Dr,Muhammad Badie

In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate Praise be to Allah and Blessing on His messenger, companions and followers
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
I greet you with the Islamic greeting; Peace be upon you and God’s mercy and blessings;
It is the will of Allah that I undertake this huge responsibility which Allah has chosen for me and a request from the MB Movement which I respond to with the support of Allah. With the support of my Muslim Brothers I look forward to achieving the great goals, we devoted ourselves to, solely for the sake of Allah.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
At the outset of my speech I would like to address our teacher, older brother, and distinguished leader Mr. Mohamed Mahdy Akef, the seventh leader of the MB group a strong, dedicated and enthusiastic person who led the group’s journey amid storms and surpassed all its obstacles, thus providing this unique and outstanding model to all leaders and senior officials in the government, associations and other parties by fulfilling his promise and handing over the leadership after only one term, words are not enough to express our feelings to this great leader and guide and we can only sayMay Allah reward you all the best”.
We say to our beloved Muslim brothers who are spread around the globe, it is unfortunate for us to have this big event happening while you are not among us for reasons beyond our control, however we feel that your souls are with us sending honest and sincere smiles and vibes.
As for the beloved ones who are behind the bars of tyranny and oppression for no just reason other than reiterating Allah is our God, and for seeking the dignity, pride and development of their country, we sincerely applaud and salute them for their patience, steadfastness and sacrifices which we are sure will not be without gain. We pray that those tyrants and oppressors salvage their conscience and that we see you again in our midst supporting our cause, may Allah bless and protect you all.
Dear Brothers and Sisters,
As you are aware, the main goal of the Muslim Brotherhood Movement (MB) is comprehensive modification, which deals with all kinds of corruption through reform and change. “I only desire (your) betterment to the best of my power; and my success (in my task) can only come from Allah.” (Hud-88) and through cooperation with all powers of the nation and those with high spirits who are sincere to their religion and nation.
The MB believes that Allah has placed all the foundations necessary for the development and welfare of nations in the great Islam; therefore, Islam is their reference towards reform, which starts from the disciplining and training of the souls of individuals, followed by regulating families and societies by strengthening them, preceded by bringing justice to it and the continuous jihad to liberate the nation from any foreign dominance or intellectual, spiritual, cultural hegemony and economic, political or military colonialism, as well as leading the nation to development, prosperity and assuming its appropriate place in the world.

Vahel eile ja täna

HASAN AL-BANNA

The First Islamic State
On the foundation of this virtuous Qur’anic social order the first Islamic state arose, having unshakeable faith in seda, meticulously applying it, and spreading it throughout the world, so that the first Khilafah used to say: ‘If I should lose a camel’s lead, I would find it in Allah’s Book.’. He fought those who refused to pay zakah, regarding them as apostates because they had overthrown one of the pillars of this order, saying: ‘By Allah, if they refused me a lead which they would hand over to the Apostle of Allah (PBUH), I would fight them as soon as I have a sword in my hand!’ For unity, in all its meanings and manifestations, pervaded this new forthcoming nation.
Complete social unity arose from making the Qur’anic order and it’s language universal, while complete political unity was under the shadow of the Amir Al-Mumineen and beneath the standard of the Khilafah in the capital.
The fact that the Islamic ideology was one of decentralisation of the armed forces, the state treasuries, ja provincial governors proved to be no obstacle to this, since all acted according to a single creed and a unified and comprehensive control. The Qur’anic principles dispelled and laid to rest the superstitious idolatry prevalent in the Arabian Peninsula and Persia. They banished guileful Judaism and confined it to a narrow province, putting an end to its religious and political authority. They struggled with Christianity such that its influence was greatly diminished in the Asian and African continents, confined only to Europe under the guard of the Byzantine Empire in Constantinople. Thus the Islamic state became the centre of spiritual and political dominance within the two largest continents. This state persisted in its attacks against the third continent, assaulting Constantinople from the east and besieging it until the siege grew wearisome. Then it came at it from the west,
plunging into Spain, with its victorious soldiers reaching the heart of France and penetrating as far as northern and southern Italy. It established an imposing state in Western Europe, radiant with science and knowledge.
Afterwards, it ended the conquest of Constantinople itself and the confined Christianity within the restricted area of Central Europe. Islamic fleets ventured into the depths of the Mediterranean and Red seas, both became Islamic lakes. And so the armed forces of the Islamic state assumed supremacy of the seas both in the East and West, enjoying absolute mastery over land and sea. These Islamic nations had already combined and incorporated many things from other civilisations, but they triumphed through the strength of their faith and the solidness of their system over others. They Arabised them, or succeeded in doing so to a degree, and were able to sway them and convert them to the splendour, beauty and vitality of their language and religion. The Muslims were free to adopt anything beneficial from other civilisations, insofar as it did not have adverse effects on their social and political unity.

VÄLJAKUTSED islami PANGANDUS

Munawar Iqbal
AUSAF AHMAD
TARIQULLAH KHAN

Islami pangandus tava, aastal alanud 1970ndate alguses tagasihoidliku ulatusega, on näidanud suurt edu viimasel 25 aastat. Tõsine teadustöö viimase kahe ja poole aastakümne jooksul on tõestanud, et islami pangandus on elujõuline ja tõhus viis finantsvahendus. Number Islami pangad on loodud selle aja jooksul tehtud heterogeense, sotsiaalne ja majanduslik keskkond. Hiljuti, paljud tavapärased pangad, sealhulgas mõned suured rahvusvahelised Lääne pangad, Samuti on hakanud kasutama islami pangandus tehnika. Kõik see on julgustav. Kuid, Islami pangandussüsteemi, nagu mis tahes muu süsteemi, tuleb vaadelda kui arenevat reaalsus. See kogemus tuleb hinnata objektiivselt ja probleemidest tuleks hoolikalt valitud ja mis on adresseeritud.

Just seda eesmärki, et islami teadus-ja koolitustegevuse Instituut (Loobuma) Islami Arengupank (IDB) esitab käesoleva raamatu väljakutsed Islamic Banking, nagu otsustas IDB juhatus tegevdirektori. Meeskond Lahtiühendatud teadlaste koosneb Munawar Iqbal, Ausaf Ahmad ja Tariqullah Khan on valmis paberil. Munawar Iqbal, Chief of Islamic Pangandus ja rahandus Division tegutses projektijuht. Kaks välist teadlased on ka refereeritud uurimus. Lahtiühendatud on tänulik toetuse nende soovitajad. Lõppsaadus on välja antud teine juhtumisi raamatu.

Loodetakse, et tõsist tähelepanu pööratakse väljakutseid islami pangandus tuvastatud paber. Teoreetikud ja praktikud valdkonna islami pangandus-ja finantsõiguse vajadust leida viise ja vahendeid nendele väljakutsetele vastata, et islami pangandus saab hoida kasva nii see läheb 21. sajandi.

Prelude et islami riik

Muhammad Ibn Katebur Rahman

We have been given Islam as guidance and his guidance is divided in to, acts of worship wholly between Allah and His servants and acts of achieving aims to attain the Islamic sovereignty on earth. Acts of worship are Salat, Saum, Zabh, etc which have no rational reasons for its existence. Then there are acts which have reasons for its existence such as spending wealth, Džihaad, speaking truth, fighting injustice, preventing zina, drugs, interests, etc which are there for the benefit and well being of societies and nations. Each intelligent worshipper in order to achieve these goals of universal benefits therefore must always seek ways to attain it and one of it is theological and political unity. In order to envision the gateways in the world to implement and realize these universal interests we then must know about the changing world, we must know about the age of information. We must know about its nature, behavior, progression which includes knowing about politics, history, technology, science, sõjaline, cultures, philosophies, psychology of nations, people of power and values, places of interest and value, resources of earth, international law, Internet, humanity with its divisions on basis of wealth, power and their place in history and progression. Our Prophet (saas) stated that the knowledge is a lost property of a believer and indeed this knowledge is all those knowledge which by knowing benefits Islam and the Muslims both in world and hereafter. The intelligent among us especially the clerics, therefore study books and organizes people of knowledge on basis of their respective expertise so that they can give efficient and effective solutions for the attainment of those Islamic universal benefits. The Islamic politics is just there to realize these universal benefits, to humanity on whole and Muslims in particular