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Los movimientos islámicos y el uso de la violencia:

Soplando Kirdis

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A pesar de enfoque académico reciente y popular en las redes transnacionales de violencia terrorista islámica,hay una multiplicidad de movimientos islámicos. Esta multiplicidad se presenta con dos estudiosos rompecabezas. El primer enigma es comprender por qué los movimientos islámicos de orientación interna que se formaron como reacción al establecimiento de estados-nación seculares trasladaron sus actividades y objetivos a un espacio transnacional de múltiples capas.. El segundo enigma es comprender por qué grupos con objetivos y objetivos similares adoptan diferentes estrategias de uso de la violencia o la no violencia cuando “se vuelven transnacionales”. Las dos preguntas principales que abordará este artículo son: ¿Por qué los movimientos islámicos se vuelven transnacionales?? Y, ¿Por qué toman formas diferentes cuando se transnacionalizan?? Primero, Argumento que el nivel transnacional presenta un nuevo escenario político para los movimientos islámicos que están limitados en sus reclamos a nivel nacional.. Segundo, Argumento que la transnacionalización crea incertidumbre para los grupos sobre su identidad y reclamos a nivel transnacional. El medio adoptado, i. uso de la violencia versus la no violencia, depende del tipo de transnacionalización, los actores se encuentran a nivel transnacional, y las interpretaciones del liderazgo sobre hacia dónde debe ir el movimiento a continuación. Para responder a mis preguntas, Voy a ver cuatro casos: (1) Islam turco, (2) la Hermandad Musulmana, (3) Jemaah Islamiyah, y (4) Tablighi Jamaat

Evaluación de la corriente principal islamista en Egipto y Malasia

Más allá del 'terrorismo' y la 'hegemonía estatal': evaluación de la corriente principal islamista en Egipto y Malasia

Enero FUERTE

Las redes internacionales de “terrorismo” islámico han servido como la explicación más popular para describir el fenómeno del Islam político desde el 11 ataques de septiembre.

Este artículo argumenta que tanto el autoproclamado Islam doctrinal de los militantes como las percepciones occidentales de una amenaza islamista homogénea deben ser deconstruidos para descubrir las manifestaciones a menudo ambiguas del Islam "oficial" y de "oposición"., de la modernidad y el conservadurismo.

Como una comparación de dos países islámicos, Egipto y Malasia,que reclaman un papel de liderazgo en sus respectivas regiones, espectáculos, Los grupos islámicos moderados han tenido un impacto considerable en los procesos de democratización y el surgimiento de la sociedad civil durante el cuarto de siglo desde el “resurgimiento islámico”.

Las experiencias compartidas, como la formación de coaliciones y la participación activa dentro del sistema político, demuestran la influencia y la importancia de grupos como los Hermanos Musulmanes egipcios., el Movimiento de la Juventud Islámica de Malasia (ABIM) o el Partido Islámico de Malasia (NO).

Estos grupos han dado forma al panorama político en una medida mucho mayor de lo que sugiere la actual preocupación por la "amenaza terrorista".. El desarrollo gradual de una “cultura de diálogo” ha revelado más bien nuevos enfoques hacia la participación política y la democracia a nivel de base..

Mahmoud Ezzat en una entrevista exhaustiva con Ahmed Mansur de Al Jazeera

Dr.. Mahmoud Ezzat, Secretario General de los Hermanos Musulmanes, en una entrevista exhaustiva con Ahmed Mansour de Al Jazeera, aseguró que las elecciones para presidente de la Hermandad Musulmana programadas para el próximo período por miembros de la Oficina de Orientación están abiertas a todos los que deseen presentar sus documentos de nominación como candidato..

En su declaración al programa de entrevistas Bila Hedood (Sin Fronteras) es Al-Jazeera TV, Ezzat explicó que los documentos de nominación generalmente no deben usarse para los candidatos de la Hermandad Musulmana, sino que se presenta una lista completa de los 100 miembros del Consejo Shura de la Hermandad para elegir al Presidente de la Hermandad y al Buró de Orientación.. Negó que la Guía General de la Hermandad para el liderazgo del Consejo General Shura no le permita la libertad de trabajar por su cuenta para tomar su decisión final.. También reveló que el Consejo tiene la autoridad para responsabilizar al presidente por cualquier falla y, si surge la necesidad, destituirlo en cualquier momento..

Hizo hincapié en que el movimiento está listo para hacer el último sacrificio para practicar el principio de Shura. (consulta) dentro de las filas de, señalando que el Consejo Shura elegirá al Presidente y una nueva Oficina de Orientación el próximo año.

Comentó sobre la cobertura de los medios de lo que realmente sucedió detrás de escena en la Oficina de Orientación., citando que el comité que estaba formado por figuras destacadas como el Dr.. Essam el-Erian y varios miembros de la Oficina de Orientación responsables de imprimir la declaración semanal del Presidente se opusieron al Sr.. El deseo de Mahdi Akef es una pequeña diferencia de opinión.. El primer mandato de Akef terminará en enero 13, 2010 sin embargo, ha anunciado anteriormente; aún tomará una decisión sobre si permanecerá en el cargo por un segundo mandato como guía general del grupo.

Continuó diciendo que Akef, de 81 años, había informado anteriormente a los miembros de la Oficina de Orientación que tenía la intención de renunciar y no serviría por un segundo mandato.. Los miembros de la Mesa respondieron de inmediato instándolo a permanecer en el cargo..

En su mensaje semanal, Mahdi Akef se refirió vagamente a sus intenciones de no presentarse a un segundo mandato y agradeció a la Hermandad Musulmana y a los miembros de la Oficina de Orientación que compartieron con él la responsabilidad como si pretendiera que fuera su discurso de despedida.. El domingo, Octubre 17 los medios aseguraron que el presidente de la Hermandad había anunciado su renuncia; sin embargo, el presidente ha negado repetidamente las acusaciones de los medios en las que acudió a la oficina al día siguiente y se reunió con los miembros.. Más tarde emitió un comunicado revelando la verdad.. Alegaciones de los medios sobre la falta de voluntad de la Oficina de Orientación para nombrar al Dr.. Essam el-Erian son totalmente falsos.

Dr.. Mahmoud Ezzat aseguró que el movimiento se complace en brindar a los miembros la oportunidad de compartir sus opiniones., haciendo hincapié en que es una manifestación de poder que coincide con su gran tamaño existente y su papel principal, indicando que el presidente de la Hermandad Musulmana está muy complacido de hacerlo.

Destacó que todos los temas vuelven a la Oficina de Orientación para la decisión final donde sus resoluciones son vinculantes y satisfactorias para todos., independientemente de las diferencias de opinión.

“No subestimo lo que ya pasó o simplemente diría que no hay crisis, al mismo tiempo, no debemos sacar las cosas de su contexto, estamos decididos a aplicar el principio de Shura”, añadió.

Se discutió anteriormente en la reunión posterior de la Oficina de Orientación que el Consejo Shura del grupo tiene el derecho exclusivo de elegir miembros de la Oficina de Orientación a cualquier miembro., él explicó. Dr.. El propio Essam estuvo de acuerdo en que no era adecuado nombrar un nuevo miembro en la Oficina de Orientación de la Hermandad ya que la elección estaba cerca..

Ezzat declaró que el episodio fue presentado al Consejo Shura por recomendación de la oficina de orientación en medio de frecuentes arrestos y detenciones realizadas por la seguridad del estado.. Nos esforzamos arduamente para involucrar al Consejo de Shura para elegir al próximo presidente y miembros de la Oficina de Orientación.. Se espera que todo el asunto se resuelva., Alá quiere, antes de enero 13.

En esta reunión, el presidente y los miembros de la Oficina de Orientación de MB decidieron enviar una carta al Consejo de Shura., destacando que la fecha para estas elecciones no será posterior a los seis meses. Se supuso que los procedimientos se llevarían a cabo antes o durante las elecciones en las que 5 el año pasado se eligieron nuevos miembros. Es la decisión del Consejo de Shura y no de la Oficina de Orientación de MB.. Como consecuencia, el Consejo Shura del grupo general finalmente llegó a su decisión unánime de celebrar elecciones lo antes posible.

Destacó que los Hermanos Musulmanes, con la aplicación de la Shura está organizado por sus reglamentos internos. Regulaciones que son adoptadas y defendidas por las leyes del Consejo Shura y están sujetas a cambios. La modificación más reciente en curso con una de sus cláusulas es la duración del mandato de un miembro de la Oficina de Orientación establece que un miembro no debe servir más de dos mandatos consecutivos..

Algunos miembros de la Oficina de Orientación fueron acusados ​​de su adhesión a permanecer en el cargo durante muchos años.; Dr.. Ezzat afirmó que los arrestos frecuentes que no excluyeron a nadie del Buró Ejecutivo nos llevaron a modificar otro artículo en el Reglamento interno que establece que un miembro mantenga su membresía incluso si fue detenido.. La ausencia del honorable trabajo por el bienestar de su patria y la sublime misión nos llevó a insistir en que mantuvieran su membresía.. El ingeniero Khayrat Al-Shater permanecerá como segundo vicepresidente de la MB y el Dr.. Mohammed Ali Bishr miembro del Buró Ejecutivo de la HM. Se espera que Bishr sea lanzado el próximo mes..

Dr.. Mahmoud Ezzat negó completamente los rumores sobre conflictos internos dentro del grupo de oposición con respecto al liderazgo., subrayando que los mecanismos, reglamentos y términos allanan el camino para seleccionar a los líderes del movimiento. También señaló que la situación geográfica de Egipto y su considerable peso moral dentro del mundo musulmán justifican la necesidad de que el presidente de la HM sea egipcio..

“La Oficina de Orientación actualmente está explorando la tendencia general del Consejo Shura de 100 miembros de la Hermandad con respecto a la nominación de un candidato adecuado elegible para asumir el cargo de Presidente.”, él dijo.

“Es extremadamente difícil predecir quién será el próximo presidente, señalando que 5 minutos antes de la designación del Sr.. Akef como presidente nadie sabía, las papeletas solo decidieron quien sería el nuevo líder”, él dijo.

Dr.. Mahmoud Ezzat atribuyó los aparentes informes contradictorios de los medios sobre sus alegatos sobre los comentarios sobre los principales líderes de la Hermandad a las mismas inconsistencias de los informes de los medios sobre los principales líderes que varían de un periódico a otro..

Dr.. Mahmoud Ezzat arrojó cifras sobre las redadas de seguridad que llevaron al arresto de algunos 2696 miembros del grupo en 2007, 3674 en 2008 y 5022 en 2009. Esto resultó en la incapacidad del Consejo Shura para celebrar reuniones y disputar elecciones..

También enfatizó que la Hermandad Musulmana está muy interesada en mantener la seguridad nacional de Egipto y su’ interés en lograr una reforma pacífica en la sociedad. “Somos muy conscientes de que las reuniones de la Oficina de Orientación están vigiladas por seguridad aunque solo pretendemos practicar la democracia.. De hecho, no queremos provocar la hostilidad y animosidad de los demás”.

También enfatizó que las diferencias dentro de la organización no están motivadas por el odio o las diferencias personales, ya que los temperamentos decentes fomentados por las sublimes enseñanzas del Islam nos alientan a tolerar la diferencia de opiniones.. Agregó que la historia ha demostrado que el movimiento de los Hermanos Musulmanes se ha enfrentado a circunstancias mucho más difíciles que la crisis actual..

Los medios de comunicación han proyectado una imagen negativa de la Hermandad Musulmana en la que se basaron en las investigaciones de SSI para obtener información.. Es imperativo que los periodistas obtengan datos de las fuentes originales si quieren tener algún tipo de credibilidad.. De hecho, el Poder Judicial ha invalidado todas las acusaciones denunciadas en la investigación estatal., él dijo.

Dr.. Mahmoud Ezzat se mostró optimista de que la actual crisis política pasará y afirmó que los acontecimientos demostrarán que los Hermanos Musulmanes con todas sus nobles costumbres, objetividad, y la práctica de la democracia brillarán con gran éxito.

Publicado en Ikhwanweb

Disidente Hermanos

Khalil Al-Anani

Fundado en 1928, la Hermandad Musulmana (MB) nunca ha experimentado una crisis de liderazgo tan grave como la que estalló hace dos semanas. Como ya es bien sabido, el problema se originó con la negativa por parte del Buró de Orientación de la MB (el máximo órgano ejecutivo de la organización) aceptar a Essam El-Erian como miembro para reemplazar a Mohamed Hilal tras la muerte de este último hace cuatro semanas. Fue un claro acto de desafío contra el Guía Supremo Mohamed Mahdi Akef que quería promover a El-Erian y que sostenía que el reglamento interno de la HM le otorgaba ese derecho.. Ante la negativa Akef ha amenazado con dimitir y ha cedido la mayor parte de sus poderes a su primer adjunto, Mohamed Habib.

por supuesto, la crisis va mucho más allá de la cuestión de la promoción de El-Erian. Esta no es la primera vez que la guía suprema encuentra resistencia.. El problema tiene sus raíces en la forma en que la HM maneja sus disputas internas y en su lectura de la escena política egipcia en lo que respecta a la imagen y las actividades de la organización.. Aunque en el curso de las últimas dos décadas la HM ha logrado lidiar con claridad y firmeza con la oposición interna, disciplinar y marginar a los disidentes, ha fallado notablemente en beneficiarse de cualquier diversidad intelectual e ideológica entre sus filas. Como consecuencia, ha perdido un activo político importante que necesita desesperadamente en sus confrontaciones con los adversarios.

Las tensiones en los niveles superiores de la jerarquía de MB son demasiado agudas para barrerlas debajo de la alfombra de la manera habitual.. El guía supremo se ha puesto en contra de la voluntad del ala conservadora de la dirección sobre la promoción de El-Erian, quien él cree que merece la oportunidad de servir en la Oficina de Orientación. Pero independientemente de las acciones que tome, incluyendo la amenaza de dimitir, hay señales inequívocas de que no podrá reinar en los conservadores. Desde que se convirtió en líder del movimiento en enero 2004 Akef ha trabajado duro para mantener relaciones fluidas entre las diferentes tendencias ideológicas dentro de la HM. Casi siempre, sin embargo,, sus esfuerzos se han producido a expensas de los reformistas o pragmáticos, ya sea por la relativa debilidad de su influencia dentro de la organización en comparación con los conservadores o porque temía una ruptura que haría que la organización fuera vulnerable a las tácticas políticas y de seguridad del régimen..

El hecho de que las tensiones hayan llegado a su punto actual se debe al conflicto que se está gestando sobre la sucesión en el cargo que ahora ocupa Akef.. En marzo, Akef anunció que no tenía la intención de nominarse a sí mismo para un nuevo mandato., que comenzaría el 13 enero. Su decisión marcó la primera vez en la historia del grupo que un guía supremo ha renunciado voluntariamente en el apogeo de su carrera.. Los seis de sus predecesores murieron mientras aún estaban en el cargo.. Akef sin precedentes y, aparentemente, decisión inesperada, desencadenó una lucha de poder inicialmente silenciosa sobre quién ocuparía su puesto. Curiosamente, la lucha no ha sido entre conservadores y reformistas, sino más bien entre los de línea dura y los pragmáticos dentro del campo conservador.

La situación actual es significativa por varias razones. Rara vez las diferencias internas han saltado a la vista del público. Esta vez, sin embargo,, los principales jugadores han estado compitiendo ferozmente por la atención de los medios.

Luego está la amenaza de Akef., posteriormente negado, que dimitiría. El hecho de que Akef haya sido impulsado a dar ese paso refleja la magnitud de las presiones y la ira que ha enfrentado durante su mandato de casi seis años.. Habiendo servido de quilla entre diversas tendencias, La amenaza de Akef debe reflejar su sensación de fracaso al controlar a los conservadores.’ hegemonía sobre todos los órganos de la organización y los mecanismos de toma de decisiones.

Que Akef haya delegado muchas de sus facultades en su primer adjunto tampoco tiene precedentes, además de estar en violación de las normas internas del grupo. Artículo 6 de los estatutos de la HM establece que el guía supremo puede dejar su puesto bajo tres condiciones — mal desempeño de sus funciones, renuncia o muerte. Dado que ninguna de estas condiciones se cumple, Akef no tenía derecho a delegar sus responsabilidades en su primer adjunto..

La crisis ha puesto de relieve un gran problema en la estructura constitucional de la HM, la falta de una autoridad de arbitraje institucionalizada capaz de resolver disputas entre la guía suprema y la Oficina de Orientación. También ha demostrado que muchos de los tabúes internos del grupo con respecto a la reverencia por, y la obediencia acrítica a, sus líderes se han resquebrajado.

El liderazgo de la HM sin duda intentará resolver la crisis lo más rápido posible., para que no se propague por las bases del movimiento. Por esta razón, el Consejo General Shura de la HM llevará a cabo elecciones para el próximo guía supremo en las próximas dos semanas. Aún así, es dudoso que el nuevo líder goce del mismo nivel de prestigio que sus antecesores y, Como consecuencia, ser obstaculizado en cualquier intento de mantener el equilibrio dentro del grupo. Ni el Secretario de la MB- General Mahmud Ezzat, o Primer Adjunto al Guía Supremo Mohamed Habib, los dos principales aspirantes al puesto, tener la legitimidad histórica de Akef, el último de la generación fundadora de la MB.

Pero la elección del próximo guía supremo no es el único problema con el que debe lidiar la MB. no menos importante, o problemático, es la necesidad de elegir una nueva Mesa de Orientación. La mesa actual fue elegida en 1995, desde entonces, se han agregado algunos miembros a través de la promoción, como fue el caso de Mohamed Mursi, quien se convirtió en presidente del comité político en 2004, y otros mediante las elecciones parciales en 2008. Hace un año deberían haberse celebrado elecciones integrales a la mesa, luego de la elección del nuevo MB Shura Council, que es responsable de seleccionar a los miembros de la Oficina de Orientación y la guía suprema.

La MB entra en una fase muy delicada de su historia. Incluso si los líderes de la HM logran suavizar la crisis actual, sus efectos continuarán reverberando debajo de la superficie y, indudablemente, estallar una vez más.

Publicado en Al-Ahram Semanal

Siria los Hermanos Musulmanes y la relación sirio-iraní.

Dr.. Yvette Talhamy

Los alauitas de Siria son parte de la corriente chiíta; esto ha llevado a una alianza con Irán, el centro del Islam chiíta. Esta alianza agravó a los opositores Hermanos Musulmanes sirios. (MB), cuyos miembros han estado en el exilio desde 1982. Según ellos, la alianza es una etapa en un esquema chiíta para apoderarse de los países sunitas, incluida Siria. Sin embargo, durante el año pasado la MB ha cambiado su estrategia, y actualmente asistimos a un acercamiento entre la Hermandad y Damasco.

El propósito de este artículo es examinar la actitud de los Hermanos Musulmanes sirios hacia el régimen alauita como un régimen chiíta sectario y como parte de un esquema chiíta/iraní que pretende apoderarse del mundo sunita..

Los Hermanos Musulmanes de Siria, la oposición prominente al régimen actual, son un movimiento islamista sunita, mientras que los alauitas, los actuales gobernantes de Siria, se definen como chiítas. Esto trae a la superficie el antiguo cisma entre sunitas y chiitas en el que cada uno acusa al otro de haberse desviado del verdadero camino del Islam.. La situación en Siria, en el que una minoría chiíta gobierna sobre una mayoría sunita a través del Partido Baaz secular, es considerado inaceptable por los Hermanos Musulmanes Sunitas, que creen que esta situación debe cambiar – incluso por el uso de la fuerza. Los Hermanos Musulmanes creen que Siria debe ser gobernada por la ley islámica sunita (ley islámica) y no por el hereje Nusayris, como se llama a los alauitas chiítas. Como resultado de la violenta resistencia musulmana al régimen secular Ba'th durante la década de 1960 y contra el régimen secular, régimen sectario de Asad durante las décadas de 1970 y 1980, muchos Hermanos fueron asesinados y encarcelados mientras los líderes de la Hermandad salían de Siria y nunca se les ha permitido regresar. Hoy los Hermanos Musulmanes sirios residen en Londres, bajo el liderazgo de ‘Ali Sadr al-Din al-Bayanuni.

Los nusayris de Siria

Los alauitas, la élite dominante de Siria, eran conocidos hasta la década de 1920 como Nusayris. El término Nusayris se deriva del nombre Muhammad ibn Nusayr, que vivió en el siglo IX.. Ibn Nusayr afirmó que 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, el primo y yerno del Profeta, fue divino, y lo colocó por encima del profeta Mahoma. Los nusayris también creen en el concepto trinitario de 'A.M.S.. (Ali. Mahoma. Salmán.).1 Creen en la transmigración de las almas, y recurren al disimulo religioso, o taqiyya. Desde el siglo XIII habitan la región montañosa conocida por su nombre, Jabal al-Nusayriya (la montaña Nusayriya) en el noroeste de Siria y en la región de Hatay en el sur de Turquía.2

Por siglos, los nusayris, aunque se considera una secta musulmana extremista, fueron maltratados por los sunitas sirios locales y por los sucesivos gobiernos sunitas, que los consideraba herejes fuera del Islam. Los Nusayris vivían aislados en sus montañas., y sus encuentros con los habitantes locales, tanto musulmanes como cristianos, eran raros. No cultivaban sus tierras y vivían asaltando pueblos vecinos y robando a los viajeros., lo que les valió una reputación negativa.

Al comienzo del período del mandato francés en Siria (1920-1946), el grupo cambió su nombre a “'Alauitas.” algunos investigadores, como Daniel Pipes, dicen que los franceses les dieron este nombre para ganárselos a su lado.3 Otros argumentan que los Nusayris fueron los que querían cambiar su nombre a “alauitas,” es decir, los adherentes de 'Ali ibn Abi Talib, lo que los vinculó más estrechamente al Islam.4 Adoptar el nombre de ‘alauíes y obtener fatawa (opiniones legales) que los relacionaba con el chiísmo se suponía que los ayudaría a integrarse con la población musulmana siria y terminar con su estatus de hereje. como nusayris, eran considerados una secta marginada, pero como 'alauíes, y los adherentes de 'Ali, eran parte del chiísmo y, por lo tanto, parte de la comunidad musulmana. Aunque durante el Mandato francés y la lucha por la independencia, Los nacionalistas sunitas habían puesto la solidaridad nacional por encima de la lealtad religiosa y reconocieron a los alauitas como compañeros árabes., todavía había muchos que se referían a ellos como “Nusayris,” lo que implica que eran incrédulos y extremistas que no están relacionados ni con el Islam sunita ni con el chiíta.5 Sin embargo,, a diferencia de los sunitas, los chiítas abrazaron a los alauitas y finalmente ganaron su apoyo.

El cisma suní/chiíta

Para comprender las divisiones entre chiitas y sunitas, primero debemos comprender las raíces históricas y las diferencias doctrinales que llevaron a esta dicotomía.. Tras la muerte del Profeta Mahoma en el siglo VII y las disputas internas sobre quién heredaría el lugar del Profeta como líder de la comunidad musulmana, se produjo una división entre los sunitas y los chiítas. Los desacuerdos entre ambos se agudizaron especialmente en cuanto al proceso de sucesión. (frente al Califato y el Imamato) y el papel de la ley islámica en ausencia de una declaración coránica clara sobre un asunto determinado.

Hoy en día, los chiítas son una minoría en el mundo musulmán que consta de aproximadamente 10%-15% de la población, incluyendo todas las diferentes sectas como los ismaelitas, Zaydis, y los alauitas. Aunque los alauitas son considerados una secta dentro de la doctrina chiita, hay pocas similitudes entre los chiítas y los alauitas. Ambos veneran a ‘Ali y al 12 imanes – aunque tienen puntos de vista diferentes sobre ellos – y ambos recurren al disimulo religioso (taqiyyah), Pero las similitudes terminan ahí. Por ejemplo, los nusayris/alauitas tienen muchas creencias que no son aceptadas por los chiítas, como la creencia en la transmigración de las almas, su colocación de 'Ali por encima del profeta Mahoma, y sus propios libros y ceremonias religiosas.

Sin embargo, sus diferencias teológicas no impidieron que los dos estados chiítas de Irán y Siria se convirtieran en aliados.. Algunos consideraban que la alianza se basaba en motivos políticos., seguridad, e intereses económicos, pero los Hermanos Musulmanes de Siria lo vieron de otra manera. Según ellos, esta alianza es solo una etapa en el esquema iraní/chiíta de formar un imperio iraní/chiíta en todo el mundo musulmán con el propósito de apoderarse del mundo sunita. Antes de continuar examinando el tema en profundidad, primero debemos responder la pregunta de cómo y cuándo los nusayris se convirtieron en chiítas..

Convertirse en chiíta

Durante siglos, los alauitas/nusayris habían sufrido tanto social como económicamente bajo los sucesivos gobernantes sunitas.. Bajo los otomanos, que gobernó Siria durante 400 años, los alauitas sufrieron mucho. Aislados en sus reductos de montaña, vivir en pueblos destartalados, tuvieron que soportar el hambre y la pobreza mientras eran explotados por sus terratenientes, principalmente sunitas., quienes los despreciaron y los consideraron infieles.7 Después de la caída del Imperio Otomano en 1918, Siria quedó bajo el mandato francés en 1920. Esto fue visto por los nusayris como una oportunidad para obtener la autonomía o la independencia en la región de la montaña Nusayriya, donde constituían la mayoría..

Con el inicio del Mandato francés en Siria, los líderes alauitas pidieron a los franceses que les dieran su propio estado. El francés, que siguió una política de divide y vencerás, otorgó a los alauitas su propio estado, la “Estado de los alauitas” (1920-1936) en la zona montañosa de Nusayriya a lo largo de la costa de Siria, impidiendo así que las regiones interiores de Siria tengan una salida al mar Mediterráneo. Aunque gozaron de autonomía durante esos años, los alauitas estaban divididos entre ellos. Algunos alauitas, principalmente aquellos que fueron educados, apoyó un nacionalismo más amplio y deseaba la unificación de toda Siria, mientras que otros apoyaban el separatismo y querían mantener su estado independiente. Entre los separatistas estaba ‘Ali Sulayman al-Asad, el padre de Hafiz al-Asad. Mientras que los partidarios del separatismo se basaron en las diferencias religiosas como base para su demanda de un estado independiente, se tomaron medidas serias, principalmente por los nacionalistas alauitas, para enfatizar sus vínculos con la doctrina chiíta.8

Los alauitas que apoyaban el nacionalismo vieron que la única forma de preservar su existencia era a través de la integración dentro de una Siria unida en lugar de tener su propio país., y fomentaron esta idea a partir de la década de 1920. Se dieron cuenta de que era importante para ellos primero ser reconocidos como parte de la comunidad musulmana como chiítas.. Como nusayris, tanto los sunitas como los chiítas los consideraban infieles., pero como alauitas se convertirían en parte del Islam y ya no serían considerados una secta marginada.

En 1926 los 'alauitas dieron el primer paso para convertirse en parte de la fe musulmana cuando un grupo de 'jeques alauitas emitieron una proclamación declarando que: “Todo alauí es musulmán … todo ‘alawi que no confiese su fe islámica o niegue que el Corán es la palabra de Dios y que Mahoma es su profeta no es ‘alawi … Los alauitas son musulmanes chiítas … ellos son los adherentes del Imam ‘Ali.”9 En abril 1933 un grupo de 'ulemas alauitas’ celebró una reunión y emitió una declaración conectando a los 'alauitas con el Islam, y pidió ser reconocido en los registros de población con el nombre “musulmanes alauitas.”10 En julio 1936 se dio otro paso importante para apoyar la integración de los alauitas en la fe musulmana cuando el muftí palestino, Hayy Amin al-Husayni,11 un panárabe que apoyó la idea de la Gran Siria, emitió una fatwa reconociendo a los alauitas como musulmanes. Su fatwa fue publicada en el periódico sirio al-Sha’b [La gente].12 El objetivo de Hajj Amin era unir a todos los árabes musulmanes por una causa. – La unidad árabe y la lucha contra la ocupación por parte de las potencias occidentales. Esta fatwa fue el primer decreto religioso oficial que reconoce a los alauitas como musulmanes..

Fue durante este año que los alauitas perdieron su independencia., estado autónomo y fueron anexados a Siria, que entonces todavía estaba bajo el mandato francés. Durante el Mandato (1936-1946), los alauitas que apoyaban el separatismo continuaron exigiendo que los franceses restablecieran su independencia, pero fue en vano. Al mismo tiempo, la corriente nacionalista entre los alauitas ganaba fuerza. Por un lado, los nacionalistas alauitas continuaron enfatizando su conexión con el Islam, y por otro lado la comunidad musulmana, tanto sunitas como chiítas, quería ganárselos para la causa del estado-nación sirio mediante la emisión de varios fatwas y declaraciones que legitimaban la secta alauita como parte de la fe musulmana. Los franceses abandonaron Siria en abril. 1946, y los alauitas que apoyaban el separatismo sabían que no tenían otra alternativa que la integración con el estado independiente de Siria.

Aunque durante el 26 años del mandato francés, los alauitas adoptaron el chiismo, ayudándolos a integrarse con el mundo musulmán y en la nación siria, nunca habían aprendido sus doctrinas. En 1947, la principal autoridad chiíta en Najaf, Ayatullah Muhsin al-Hakim, decidió dar el primer paso formal para abrazar a los alauitas y hacerlos parte de la comunidad chiíta. En 1948, la primera delegación de estudiantes ‘alauitas fue a Najaf para estudiar teología chiíta y realizar estudios jurídicos.13 Este paso no tuvo éxito, ya que los estudiantes alauitas se enfrentaron a la hostilidad chiita y fueron vistos como extremistas (Espere), haciendo que la mayoría de los estudiantes abandonen la escuela y regresen a casa. Después de este fracaso, a Ja’fari (doce) La sociedad se estableció en Latakia, que realizaba una labor educativa y de orientación religiosa, e inauguró varias sucursales en otras localidades como Jabla, en Tartu, y banias.

A pesar de estas acciones, los alauitas aún no eran considerados verdaderos musulmanes ni siquiera por los chiítas, que creían que necesitaban más orientación.14 Entre 1950-1960 algunos estudiantes alauitas estudiaron en la Universidad sunita al-Azhar en El Cairo, que otorgó a sus graduados un diploma reconocido en Siria.15 Fue durante esos años que el Partido Baaz, bajo el liderazgo de los alauitas, tomó el poder en Siria como etapa preliminar para apoderarse de todo el país.. Como dice Martín Kramer: “Esta situación era rica en ironía.. Los alauitas, habiendo sido negado su propio estado por los nacionalistas sunitas, había tomado toda Siria en su lugar.”16

El régimen alauita y los Hermanos Musulmanes sirios

Hubo dos canales principales que ayudaron a los alauitas a tomar el poder en Siria: el socialista, Partido Baaz secular, which especially attracted the rural class and non-Sunni minorities, and the armed forces, where various religious minorities were over-represented during the French Mandate and continued to be so after their departure. The coup d’etats of March 1963 and February 1966, in which the ‘Alawis played a major role, marked the ‘Alawis’ consolidation of power. The last Syrian coup occurred in November 1970, and was known as the “Asad coup.”17 En 1971 Hafiz al-Asad became the first ‘Alawi President of Syria. Sin embargo, some branches of the Syrian nation refused to accept this fact. These were mainly the Muslim Brothers of Syria who, de 1964 to today, are the main Syrian opposition to the rule of the Ba’th Party and to the “sectarian” rule, as they call it, of the Asad family.18 In 1945-1946, Dr.. Mustafa al-Siba’i founded the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, which fought against the French for an Islamic state.19 During the first years after its establishment, the society published newspapers and literature and played an active role in Syrian politics. Within that same period the secular Ba’th evolved, and in contrast with the Muslim Brothers, who fought against secularization, it gained support from different sectors of Syrian society, especially among minorities, thus becoming the most important political party in Syria.

The secular doctrine of the ruling Ba’th Party only augmented the fears of the Sunnis, and clashes between the secular, socialist Ba’th and the religious Muslim Brothers were inevitable. En 1964, the Ba’th regime outlawed the Muslim Brothers, and its new leader, ‘Isam al-‘Attar, was exiled. During the same year a revolt led by the Muslim Brothers and other opposition factions, including socialists, liberals, and Nasserists, erupted in the city of Hama against the secular, rural, and minority nature of the Syrian ruling elite. The revolt was put down after a bombing of the city’s Al-Sultan Mosque, which caused many casualties.20

Clashes between the two sides were renewed in April 1967 when a young ‘Alawi officer named Ibrahim Khallas published an article in the army magazine Jaysh al-Sha’b (The Army of the People) under the title “The Path Towards the Creation of a New Arab Man,” wherein he announced that belief in God and religion, feudalism, capitalism, imperialism, and all of the values that had controlled society should be placed in a museum.21 This article caused strikes and disturbances in different parts of Syria, which were led by the ‘ulama’, including members of the Muslim Brotherhood and even Christian clergy. As a result, Khallas was discharged from office.22 According to the Muslim Brothers, they opposed the Ba’th because it was a secular party. They believed that Islam should be declared the state religion and that Shari’a should be the basis of legislation.23 They also opposed Asad not because of his ‘Alawi origins, but because, in their view, his regime was sectarian, tyrannical, corrupt, opresivo, and unjust.24

During the 1970s, relations between the Asad regime and the Muslim Brothers deteriorated. En 1973, disturbances erupted again when the Syrian Constitution was publicized and did not designate Islam as the state religion. The Muslim Brothers demanded that Islam be the state religion, although it had never been designated as such. En 1950, the Syrian assembly announced the Syrian Constitution and, at the request of the MB, added a clause that the religion of the Head of State would be Islam. This clause was later omitted, and after ascending to the presidency, Asad reinserted this clause into the Syrian Constitution, but when the Constitution was introduced for public census, the clause was once again omitted. This act caused a wave of angry demonstrations organized by the Muslim Brothers, who referred to Asad as the “enemy of God” and called for a jihad against him and against his “atheist and corrupt regime.”25As a result, Asad reinserted a clause into the Constitution that “Islam shall be the religion of the head of the state,” meaning that since he was the President, he considered himself a Muslim. In addition, during that same year, he ordered the printing of a new Qur’an with his picture on the frontispiece, to be called the “Asad Qu’ran,” thereby arousing the anger of the Sunnis and the Muslim Brothers.26

Asad made many conciliatory gestures to gain the trust of the Sunni majority and the Muslim Brothers. He prayed in mosques on Fridays27 and on the main Muslim holidays such as ‘Id al-Fitr and ‘Id al-Adha.28 He abolished restrictions on religious institutions and allowed the construction of new mosques.29 In December 1972, he obtained a legitimization from Hasan al-Shirazi, an Iraqi Shi’ite cleric in exile in Lebanon, stating that “the beliefs of the ‘Alawis conformed in every respect to those of their Twelver Shi’ite brethren.”30 Later, in July 1973, Musa al-Sadr, head of the Lebanese Shi’ite Supreme Council and a confidant of Asad,31 declared that the ‘Alawis were a Shi’ite sect,32 and the following year Asad performed the ‘umrah to Mecca. Asad also was declared a devout Muslim by the Grand Mufti of Syria, Shaykh Ahmad Kaftaru.33 But the Muslim Brothers still considered him a non-Muslim and led a violent struggle against the Asad regime.34

During the 1970s the Muslim Brothers also suffered from internal problems, splitting into two factions. One faction, which was in Jordan, opposed violent opposition, while the other faction, stationed in Aleppo, called for jihad against the Asad regime and for its replacement by a Sunni regime.35 From 1976 a 1982, the Asad regime faced both secular and Islamist opposition. The intervention in Lebanon in 1976 and domestic problems such as inflation, official corruption, and the domination of the ‘Alawis in every sphere of life in Syria were the driving force for the opposition’s efforts to overthrow Asad’s non-Muslim, tyrannical regime.36 The Asad regime was viewed as a sectarian government in which an infidel religious minority ruled over the majority. According to the Muslim Brothers, this was an unnatural situation that ought to be changed.

En 1979 the Muslim Brothers carried out an armed attack against the Aleppo Artillery School where 83 young recruits, all ‘Alawis, were killed.37 The Minister of the Interior, ‘Adnan Dabbagh, accused the Muslim Brothers of being agents subservient to the United States and “the Zionist influence,”38 and as a result many Islamists were imprisoned and others were executed.39 In April 1980, armed clashes between the Muslim Brothers and the security forces occurred in the city of Aleppo. Using tanks, armored vehicles, and rockets, the government troops, backed by armed party irregulars,40 occupied the city after killing between 1,000 y 2,000 people and arresting some 8,000.41

In June 1980, the Muslim Brothers were accused of a failed attempt to assassinate President Asad, and as a result Rif’at al-Asad, the President’s brother, led a revenge campaign against the Muslim Brothers held in Tadmor (Palymra) prison, massacring hundreds of defenseless Islamist prisoners.42 The Muslim Brothers struck back by attacking ‘Alawi officials and placing car bombs outside government installations and military bases, killing and injuring hundreds. In response, the government carried out brutal reprisals against the Islamists. Many were arrested, summary executions were carried out, and thousands went into exile.43 In July 1980, membership or association with the Muslim Brothers was made a crime punishable by death.44

In November 1980, as the next step in their anti-regime struggle, the Muslim Brothers issued a manifesto that contained their detailed program for the future Islamic state of Syria. The manifesto included an attack against the corrupt, sectarian ‘Alawi regime of the “Asad brothers,” and emphasized that a minority cannot and should not rule over a majority.45

The Hama Massacre

The city of Hama was one of the main centers of the Muslim Brotherhood opposition to the regime. The first encounter between the Muslim Brothers and the military in the city occurred in April 1981 when the Brothers ambushed a security checkpoint. In revenge, special forces units moved into the city and began a house-to-house search. About 350 people were killed, many fled into exile, others disappeared or were imprisoned, and clashes between the two sides continued.46 When Anwar al-Sadat was killed by Islamists on October 6, 1981, flyers were distributed in Damascus threatening Asad with the same fate, and the confrontation between the rival forces became inevitable.47 In February 1982, bloody clashes between the Syrian army and the Muslim Brothers occurred in the city of Hama, where about 100 government and party representatives were killed by the armed Brothers. Special forces were sent to the city to fight the rebels. The city was strafed by helicopters and bombarded with rocket, artillery, and tank fire. Large parts of the city were destroyed, leaving hundreds of people homeless. Many more deserted the city. Estimates of the number killed vary, but it is clear that thousands were killed or injured.48

In the same period, there were several violent demonstrations against the regime that were unrelated to the Muslim opposition. In March 1980, violent demonstrations against the government erupted in the small town of Jisr al-Shughur (between Aleppo and Latakia). The government regained control in the town after using mortars and rockets. Many houses and stores were destroyed and 150-200 people were killed. Demonstrations also erupted in Idlib, Ma’arra (Marzo 1980), and Dayr al-Zur (April 1980).49

After the clashes with the Muslim Brothers, Asad felt that his position was in danger, and he accused Israel, Egipto, and the United States of using the Muslim Brothers against him.50 In a speech that he gave on the 19th anniversary of the Ba’th revolution, Asad shouted, “Death to the hired Muslim Brothers who tried to play havoc with the homeland! Death to the Muslim Brothers who were hired by US intelligence, reactionaries and Zionists!”51

During the following years Asad decided to change his internal and external policy. Internally, many Muslim Brothers in Syria and abroad were granted amnesty, and many were released from jails. He also allowed the opening of new Qur’anic schools and the building of new mosques, and he lifted the restrictions on Islamic publications and dress.52 Externally, he was alienated since, in addition to his unfriendly relations with the West, his relations with some Arab countries, such as Iraq, Egipto, and Jordan, were remarkably bad. He felt that he needed new allies in the region, and therefore began to enhance his relations with different countries and Muslim organizations. Among the countries with which Asad chose to strengthen his alliance was the Islamic Republic of Iran. Among the Muslim organizations that gained Asad’s support and hospitality were the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (Sunni) and the Lebanese Hizbullah (Shi’ite).53 After the peace treaties signed by Israel with Egypt and Jordan, and the unofficial relations between Israel and other Arab countries, Syria under the Asads (both father and son) remained the only frontline Arab country carrying the banner of the pan-Arab, anti-Zionist, and anti-Israeli campaign, thus gaining the support of the Arab population.54 However, the recent Syrian-Iranian alliance has aroused suspicion among the Arab population and leadership concerning the motivations for this alliance with the Shi’ite, non-Arab Islamic Republic of Iran.

Syria and Iran Become Allies

The relationship between Syria and Iran began in the 1970s. During those years the Syrian authorities accorded privileges and protection to some major Iranian opposition figures.55 In 1978, President Asad offered to receive the main Iranian opposition leader, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,56 in Damascus after he was expelled from Iraq in 1978. Khomeini declined Asad’s invitation, and instead settled in Paris until the 1979 revolution, when he returned to Iran as head of state and became the only leader in the Muslim world to combine political and religious authority through the doctrine of velayat-e faqih.57 The Muslim Brothers in general, including those in Syria, supported the Iranian Islamic Revolution and saw it as a revolution of all the Islamic movements of the various schools and sects. Shortly after assuming his position, Khomeini began calling for Islamic revolutions across the entire Muslim world. The Syrian Muslim Brothers saw this as a positive step for change, and hoped that it would lead to a similar revolution in Syria and the overthrow of the oppressive “Asad rule.”58 Although the Brothers had publicly stated their support of the Iranian Revolution, to their disappointment the Islamic Republic of Iran maintained close relations with the Asad regime59 despite the fact that the Ba’th Party proclaimed itself to be a socialist, secular, Arab party whereas Iran was a Muslim, non-Arab theocracy.60

Since the 18th century, the Iranian Shi’ite ‘ulama’ have enjoyed wide religious and political power, but during the 20th century the Pahlavi Shah of Iran, Muhammad Reza, took official measures to erode the position of the ‘ulama’. Following the revolution and the overthrow of the Shah, Iran became a kind of informal center for the Shi’a of different countries. The Iranians tried to export their revolution to neighboring Arab states, causing turbulence in Arab Gulf states with Shi’ite populations such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Bahrain. En 1981, the Iranians even backed an unsuccessful plot to overthrow the Sunni government of Bahrain, a country with a Shi’ite majority.61 Later, the Gulf region became an arena of terrorism against local and Western targets, and was shaken by suicide attacks. These Iranian terrorist actions in support of other Shi’ites led to a violent response by the Kuwaiti Sunni Muslim Brothers, who bombed Iranian offices in Kuwait. The Kuwaiti Brothers even denounced the Shi’a as anathema.62 Today, in retrospect, the Kuwaiti Brothers perceive these terrorist actions as part of a long-term Shi’ite scheme to take over the Sunni world.

It is hard to explain the reasons behind Khomeini’s preference for Asad over the Muslim Brothers, or as Martin Kramer puts it, “when religion is subordinate to politics, miracles again become possible, and Syria’s ‘Alawis may get recognition as Twelver Shi’is.”63

During the Iran-Iraq War (1980-88), Siria, unlike other Arab countries, supported Iran, and the cooperation and strategic alliance between the two countries grew stronger in the following years.64 In exchange for their support, the Iranians supplied Syria with free petroleum products and oil at concession rates.65 In April 1980, when there were clashes between the Muslim Brothers and security forces in Syria, the Iranians condemned the actions of the Muslim Brothers, accusing them of conspiring with Egypt, Israel, and the United States against Syria.66 For their part, the Syrian Muslim Brothers, as well as the Kuwaiti Muslim Brothers, began to view Iran as a sectarian Shi’ite regime. Parallel with the growing ties between Syria and Iran, the Muslim Brothers of Syria supported and were supported politically and financially by the Iraqi regime under Saddam Husayn.67 In the 1980s, the attacks of the Muslim Brothers against the Islamic Republic of Iran intensified. In a book written by Sa’id Hawwa, the chief ideologist of the Syrian Muslim Brothers in the 1980s, he stressed that the People of the Sunna are the real Muslim community, thus widening the gap between the Muslim Brothers and Iran.68 In April 1982, a coalition of different Syrian opposition groups, including the Syrian MB, set up the “National Alliance for the Liberation of Syria,” which was backed by the Iraqi regime.69 During the 1980s relations between Iran and Syria remained generally close, despite the fact that some Iranian actions had aggravated the Syrians, such as the announcement of a four-stage plan for the establishment of an Islamic Shi’ite regime in Iraq in early 1982. In March of the same year, some Iranian “tourists” (who were actually Iranian revolutionary activists) had visited Syria and distributed posters of Khomeini and hung religious slogans on the walls of the Damascus airport and its surroundings.70 Such actions caused a cooling in the relationship between the two countries, but since Iran was alienated from the rest of the region due to the war with Iraq, its relations with the Arab countries were nearly universally poor, making Syria too precious an ally for Iran to lose. The Iranian leadership did whatever was needed to maintain its alliance with Syria, the only Arab state with which it had good relations.

At present, the Shi’ite Hizbullah of Lebanon, currently under the leadership of Secretary General Hasan Nasrallah, is another ally of the Asad regime, constituting the third component of the Shi’ite triple alliance. In the early 1980s, while the Syrians were in Lebanon, the Iranians began to cultivate the Shi’ite community of Lebanon. Iran sent Shi’ite clerics to the country to indoctrinate the local Shi’ites with their ideology.71 Iran regarded Lebanon as fertile soil for exporting its revolution, and Hizbullah was the means through which Iran planned to “overcome” Lebanon in order to attack the “Zionist” enemy, Israel, from the north, and to liberate Palestine. Iran supplied Hizbullah with money, weapons, and military and religious guidance,72 in addition to supporting health, education, and social welfare institutions.73

According to the Syrian Muslim Brothers, the basis of the alliance between the three parties – Siria, Irán, and Hizbullah – is their common Shi’ite doctrine. This allegation was not true in the 1980s, when the relationship between Hizbullah and the Asad regime was marked by tension. During the 1980s, relations between Syria and Hizbullah were indeed more of a rivalry than an alliance, despite Iran’s dissatisfaction with this lack of accord between her two allies.74 In February 1987, the Syrians even perpetrated a massacre against Hizbullah militiamen. After Hizbullah abducted a number of Western citizens, Syrian troops deployed in Beirut’s southern suburbs, where 23 Hizbullah members were subsequently killed. As a result thousands of outraged Lebanese Shi’ite mourners protested against Syria, with some even accusing it of conspiring with Israel.75 For its part, Iran never held Syria responsible for this action but rather attributed it to renegades within the Syrian army. But Iran, knowing this was not true, warned Syria that any action against its allies in Lebanon would be considered an attack against Iran.76

Despite the tension between the two states, Iran was careful not to lose its ally and continued to supply it with free or discounted crude oil. As it became increasingly isolated from the rest of the Arab and Western states, Iran’s relations with Syria became more valuable, especially since there were some diplomatic efforts made on the part of the Arab states to separate the two allies and restore Arab unity.77 During 1987, Iran faced another problem that needed Syrian mediation when Iranian pilgrims demonstrated in Mecca, resulting in bloody clashes with the Saudi security forces. In the incident, 275 Iranians and 85 members of the Saudi security forces were killed, causing a crisis in Saudi/Arab- Iran relations. This incident was regarded by Saudi Arabia as an Iranian plot intended to shake the foundations of Sunni Saudi Arabia. The situation deteriorated to a level where the Iran-Iraq War became regarded as war between the Arabs and the Persians.78

According to the Syrian Muslim Brothers, considering all the aforementioned violent actions committed by Iran in different Arab countries, the Shi’ite Iranians, under the cover of Islam, are more dangerous to the Muslim countries than the Zionists or the Americans. According to the Brothers, the latter’s plan is obvious, but the Shi’ite Iranians manage to obtain Sunni support by waving the flag of war against the Zionists and the Americans, while their genuine aim is to take over these countries and rebuild the Shi’ite Safavid empire.79

En 1987, Sa’id Hawwa, the chief ideologist of the Syrian Muslim Brothers, wrote a book called The Khumayniyya: Deviation in Beliefs and Deviation in Behavior (al- Khumayniyya: shudhudh fi al-‘Aqa’id wa-shudhudh fi al-Mawaqif), in which he presents the disappointment of the Muslim Brothers in the Islamic Revolution in Iran and exposes the “deviation” of Khomeini. In his book, Hawwa quotes from works written by Khomeini himself that, according to Hawwa, reveal the deviation in Khomeini’s thoughts and Shi’ite beliefs. Hawwa goes so far as to regard the Shi’ites and Khomeini as a danger to the existence of the Sunni world, warning young Sunnis against believing the false statements of this “Muslim Revolution.”80 According to Hawwa, the purpose of this revolution is to take over the Sunni world and turn it into a Shi’ite world. To prove his claims, Hawwa points to the Iranian interference in Lebanon and its support for Shi’ite movements such as Hizbullah and Amal, and also presents the odd relationship between Iran and Syria. In his view, the main purpose of the Iran-Iraq War was to “conquer” Iraq and turn it into a Shi’ite state, and then conquer the rest of the Gulf Arab states as a preliminary stage in taking over the whole of the Sunni world.81 Hawwa concludes his book by stating that the Shi’a are different from the Sunnis, their beliefs are different, their prayers are different, and whoever supports them is considered a traitor against God and his Prophet.82

The Iran-Iraq War ended in 1988, and Khomeini died the following year. ‘Ali Khameine’i, who had been Iran’s President, became its Supreme Leader,83 and Akbar Hashimi Rafsanjani84 was elected President, remaining in office until 1997. Rafsanjani and the Presidents who suceeded him, under the guidance of Khameine’i, pursued Khomeini’s legacy. In March 1991, the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), Egipto, and Syria participated in the Damascus meeting,85 and later on in October, the Arab countries, incluida Siria, participated in the Madrid peace talks with Israel. These actions caused tension between Syria and Iran, but after the failure of these talks, the tension between the two allies declined.86 During the 1990s, Syria also played an important role as mediator between Iran and the Arab Gulf states.87 Syria played a mediating role in the dispute between Abu Dhabi and Iran over Iran’s annexation of Abu Musa Island in the Persian Gulf in early 1992, and in the internal Shi’ite disturbances in Bahrain in early 1995.88

Until the 1970s, the ‘Alawis and later President Asad sought religious confirmation as Shi’ite Muslims from prominent Muslim leaders, and especially from Shi’ite leaders. After the Iranian Revolution and the imposition of religious rule, Iran sought an ally in the region, and Syria was that ally. It is fair to say that these two countries built their alliance out of mutual necessity. Over the years their alliance faced numerous obstacles, but managed to survive. Many elements contributed to the survival of this alliance, amongst them the failure of the peace talks in the Middle East, the Palestinian problem, and Western policy that seemed to favor the Israeli side, thus driving Syria to seek a strong ally as a counterweight. Asad’s commitment to the Palestinian cause did not change the attitude of the Muslim Brothers towards him, because they still regarded his regime as an oppressive, sectarian regime and sought to overthrow it, and his alliance with Shi’ite Iran only aggravated them and aroused their suspicions.

The Shi’ite Revolution

The Muslim Brothers of Syria view the ‘Alawi/Shi’ite Asad regime as a part of a Shi’ite/Iranian scheme intended to establish or restore the glory of the old Persian empire and impose Shi’ite doctrine in the various Arab and Muslim states. To support their claims of this purported scheme, they rely on an alleged secret letter that was published in 1998 by the Iranian Sunni League in London, and which they claim was sent from the Iranian Revolution Assembly to different Iranian provinces. This alleged letter included a very detailed five-stage Iranian/Shi’ite plan on how to “export” the Iranian/ Shi’ite revolution to other Muslim countries. The duration of each stage of this plan is ten years, with a total duration of 50 años. The plan’s goal is to unite the Muslims by striking at the Sunni regimes that consider Shi’ite doctrine heretical. According to the plan, controlling these countries would result in control of half the world.

The first step of this plan is: “To improve the relations between Iran and the neighboring Arab states. When the cultural, the economic and the political relations between Iran and those states are good, it will be easy for Iranian agents to enter those countries as immigrants.”

The Iranian agents will buy houses, apartments, and lands and help their Shi’ite brothers living in these countries. They will foster good business and personal relations with the powerful figures in these countries, obey the laws of these countries, and obtain permits to celebrate their feasts and to build their own mosques … Obtain local nationality through bribes or by using their connections. Encourage the young Shi’ites to incorporate themselves within the local administrations and to enlist in the local army … Arouse suspicion and mistrust between the local authorities and the [Sunni] religious authorities by spreading flyers allegedly published by religious leaders criticizing the actions of the local government. This action would lead to friction in the relations between the two sides causing the government to suspect every act of the religious leaders.

The third step is: “After incorporation within the local bureaucracy and army, the task of the Shi’ite religious leaders, contrary to the local Sunni religious leaders, will be to declare publicly their loyalty to the local government, thus gaining their goodwill and trust. Then begins the step of striking at the local economy.”

The fourth step is: When mistrust is caused between the religious and political leaders and the collapse of their economy, anarchy will prevail everywhere, and the agents will be the only protectors of the country. After building trust with the ruling elite, the crucial stage will begin by announcing the political leaders as traitors, thus causing their expulsion or their replacement by the Iranian agents. Incorporating Shi’a in the different governmental offices will arouse the anger of the Sunnis who will respond by attacking the government. The agent’s role at this point is to ‘stand by’ the head of state and buy the property of those who decide to flee the country.

The fifth step is: “Help to regain peace in those countries by appointing a People’s Assembly, where the Shi’ite candidates will have the majority and will later take over the country, if not through those peaceful measures, then by causing a revolution. After taking over the country, Shi’ism will be imposed.”89

The Syrian Muslim Brothers used this letter to prove90 that the alliance between the ‘Alawi regime and Iran was actually a part of the Shi’ite scheme against the Sunni world. Dr.. Muhammad Bassam Yusuf, a Syrian author of the Muslim Brothers information bureau, published a series of articles on the Syrian Muslim Brothers’ official website under the title “The Suspicious Iranian Safavid Persian Scheme in the Arab and Muslim Countries” (al-Mashru’ al-Irani al-Safawi al-Farisi al-Mashbuh fi Bilad al-‘Arab). The aim of these articles was to reveal the Iranian scheme and the true face of the ‘Alawi regime. In his articles, Dr.. Yusuf begins with a description of how the Shi’ite Safavids took over Iran in 1501, and how their influence expanded to Iraq down to the present time. In addition, he emphasizes that the Iranians’ cruel treatment of the Sunni inhabitants under their rule is an illustration of their hate for the Sunnis.91

Actually, Dr.. Yusuf’s allegations coincide with Khomeini’s declarations. In his speeches and religious sermons, Khomeini regarded some Sunni governments as illegitimate, claiming that the only truly Islamic state was Iran, and thus believing that Iran has the right to force these states (including by the use of violence), even those that claim to advocate Islamic law, to adopt reforms.92 In his sermons and speeches, Khomeini also attacked the Western powers, especially the United States and their allies (or “puppets” as he called them) in the region. He fiercely attacked Saudi Arabia, the unofficial leader of the Sunni world, for betraying Islam, as well as Saddam Husayn’s Iraq, which he regarded as an infidel, atheistic government.93 Khomeini’s death did not end the implementation of the Iranian scheme; his successors continued his legacy. The Muslim Brothers believe that the overthrow of Saddam coincided with the goals of Iran, que, according to the Brothers, is working inside Iraq more than ever to turn it into a Shi’ite state.94

According to Dr. Yusuf, what we are seeing now in countries such as Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Sudán, Yemen, Jordania, Siria, and Lebanon is the implementation of the Iranian five-stage scheme. In Syria, for instance, the plan is being implemented under the protection of the Asad regime, and it is the duty of the Muslim Brothers to stop them and “save” Syria.95 On their official website, the Muslim Brothers elaborate and illustrate the Iranian “conquest” of Syria and their attempts to turn it into a Shi’ite state. “What is conquest?” they ask;

Is it the existence of foreign intelligence in the country that works side by side with local intelligence and controls it? Is it the existence of foreign weapons, troops, and military bases such as the Iranian weapons, troops, and military bases that exist in Damascus? Is not the massive Iranian missionary activity in the villages and the towns of Syria under the protection of the government an attempt to turn them into Shi’a? Is not taking over some regions, by buying them or by using force, and building shrines on them through the help of the government an attempt to turn Syria into a Shi’ite center? They say that they strive for ‘Muslim Unity’ and wage actions against the West and the Zionists to deceive the Muslim world and build their Empire.96

These allegations of the Muslim Brothers are refuted by the Syrian Grand Mufti, Ahmad Badr al-Din Hassun, who has stated that these allegations are false and “ridiculous,” rejecting their doubts that ‘Alawis are Muslims, and emphasizing again that the ‘Alawis, Isma’ilis, and the Druze are all true Muslims.97

The Muslim Brothers view the alliance between Syria, Irán, and Hizbullah (or the “Khameine’i Party,” as they call it) as the implementation of the Shi’ite scheme, since the common link between the three is Shi’ism. According to the Muslim Brothers, Hizbullah’s provocative act, in which two Israeli soldiers were abducted in July 2006, precipitating that summer’s Israel-Hizbullah war, only caused the destruction of Lebanon because the war’s goals, such as freeing Lebanese prisoners in Israel and liberating the Sheb’a Farms, the Golan Heights, and Palestine, were never achieved.98 The only achievements of this “Divine Victory” were the death and injury of many innocent people, the crippling of the Lebanese economy, and the destruction of many houses and villages, which left thousands homeless. According to the Muslim Brothers, the Lebanese discovered that this “Divine Victory” was their destruction, rather than the destruction of the Zionist enemy.

The Muslim Brothers regard the war with Israel as a part of the Iranian scheme. The goal of the war was not to fight in Lebanon’s name, but to destroy the country as a preparatory step to taking it over by causing the fall of its legitimate government, and dominating the country in accordance with the Iranian scheme.99 To support his thesis, Dr.. Yusuf relies on Iranian statements during the war, in which they declared that if the war extended to Syria, they would stand by the side of the Syrian regime. In addition, according to him, it is well known that the Iranians supplied Hizbullah with the weapons used in the war.100 To support their arguments, the Muslim Brothers also quote the words of the Secretary General of Hizbullah, Hasan Nasrallah, who, according to the Brothers, proclaimed that he is merely a “small soldier” under the service of the Imam Khameine’i and that his soldiers fought in the name of Khameine’i and the Imam Husayn (‘Ali ibn Abi Talib’s son), rather than in the name of God. According to the Muslim Brothers these statements are heresy, and Nasrallah’s loyalty is first and foremost to Iran and not to God or the Arab world. His army and military preparations, which were funded by the Iranians, will soon turn against the Arabs, and especially the Syrians, Lebanese, and the Palestinians. The Syrian Brothers believe that it is their duty to warn the Sunni world before it is too late.101

In March 2008, they sent a letter to the Arab leaders at the Arab summit held in Damascus complaining of the Syrian regime’s aggression against the Syrian people and the Syrian Muslim Brothers, underlining the alleged Shi’ite scheme that endangered Syrian identity and demography.102 The bloody clashes in Lebanon on May 7, 2008, when armed Hizbullah “soldiers” turned their weapons against their fellow Lebanese, both Sunnis and Christians, only served to strengthen the claims of the Syrian Muslim Brothers that an Iranian-armed Hizbullah was planning to take over Lebanon to implement velayat-e faqih in Lebanon.103 However, during the June 7, 2009 elections in Lebanon, Hizbullah did not win, as most polls had anticipated. The election results were viewed by the Muslim Brothers as a victory for democracy.104 Some observers say that Hizbullah lost the elections because they had turned their weapons against the Lebanese, which they had promised they would never do, and because Nasrallah called this act of aggression a “glorious day for the resistance,” stating that it would be easy for Hizbullah and its allies to govern Lebanon.105 Some say that this result was due to Western interference, while others say that it was Hizbullah that chose to lose the elections.

During most of 2008, the Muslim Brothers continued their attack against the Syrian-Iranian alliance, accusing Asad of allowing Iran to control Syria’s economy, política, and army.106 According to them, there is a contest in the region between two main forces – Iran and the United States – but Iran has the advantage because it shares the same religion with the people of the region. In their view, neither Israel nor the United States can compete with Iran in this sphere. Since many Muslims regard Iran as a strong Muslim state facing off against the Zionist/American program in the region, there are many “crazy advocates” of Iran, as they call them, who disregard much of Iran’s own program in the region and defend its overall regional policy.107 According to them, the different assassinations that took place in Syria, such as the assassination of Brigadier-General Muhammad Sulayman, Asad’s right hand man and security advisor, are warnings by a fretful Iran and Hizbullah to the Asad regime for making conciliatory gestures towards Israel, Líbano, and the West.108

The Syrian Muslim Brothers continued their attack against Iran’s hidden regional agenda, questioning the real reason for Iran’s eagerness to free Palestine: “Do they want to free Palestine for the Palestinians or for the velayat-e faqih and its interests in the region?”109 Sin embargo, the Syrian Muslim Brothers faced a problem in late 2008 when Israel attacked the Gaza Strip. The prominent supporters of the Hamas government in Gaza were Syria, Irán, and Hizbullah, while Egypt faced heavy criticism for not opening its border with Gaza. Hasan Nasrallah attacked Egypt for its actions and accused it of complicity with Israel. The Egyptian government saw this as an intentional act by Hizbullah, with Iran’s backing, aimed at causing the fall of the Egyptian government. Hizbullah had attempted to undermine Egypt’s role as a leading Arab country, because Egypt had sought to preserve its relations with Israel rather than help the besieged Palestinians. For their part, during the Israeli attack against the Gaza Strip, the Syrian Muslim Brothers decided to suspend their actions against the Syrian regime,110 and this action was considered by some opposition figures as an act of rapprochement towards Damascus.111 Yet the Muslim Brothers were in an awkward situation: it was Syria, Irán, and Hizbullah, their enemies, who stood with the Palestinians, and they could not attack them anymore.

During the months that followed the Gaza Strip war, los Hermanos Musulmanes’ attacks moderated. In March 2009 they published an article under the title “Is It Not about Time?” (“Ama ‘an al-‘awan?”), in which they revealed their disappointment at the cold reaction of the regime towards their attempts at rapprochement. They stated that they wanted to be able to return to their country, to work within Syria for what is best for the nation.112 Since 1982 the main leaders of the Syrian Muslim Brothers had been residing outside Syria, and neither they nor their children were allowed to return.

En abril 2009, when a Hizbullah terrorist cell was caught in Egypt, relations between Egypt and Hizbullah deteriorated even further. The cell was intended to help the Palestinians in Gaza against Israel. Egypt accused Hizbullah of using its soil for terrorist actions and also accused it of spreading Shi’ism in Egypt.113 Like the Syrian Muslim Brothers, Egyptian President Husni Mubarak accused the “Persians” (Irán) of trying to take over the Arab countries;114 sin embargo,, the Muslim Brothers did not make any statement regarding this affair.

Though the Syrian Muslim Brothers believe that Syria is endangered by the Shi’ite Asad regime and that it is their duty to awaken the Sunni community and save it from the Iranian-‘Alawi/Shi’ite scheme before it is too late, they have changed their behavior towards the government. Early in April 2009 they withdrew from the “National Salvation Front,” which had been formed in June 2006 under the leadership of ex-Vice President ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, since, according to them, this alliance only caused damage to their image.115 Khaddam accused them of seeking a rapprochement with Damascus and meeting with agents of the regime.116 Although the Muslim Brothers did not cease their attacks against the Asad regime, Irán, and Hizbullah, they became more moderate. It seems that after over 30 years as an opposition force outside of Syria, they understood that this caused them to be a weak opposition. Este Dia, they no longer have an ally, such as Saddam Husayn, to support them, and the support they receive from some Arab countries, such as Saudi Arabia and Jordan, where some of the Muslim Brothers reside, depends upon the relations between these countries and Syria. When these relations are good, the Muslim Brothers are not granted the same privileges and the freedom to attack the Syrian regime as when relations are bad. They know that they cannot change the situation inside Syria while remaining outside it, and therefore they are striving to return to Syria. But so far the regime is not showing any flexibility in response to their conciliatory actions.

In the last few months we are viewing, to the dissatisfaction of the Muslim Brothers, signs of rapprochement between Syria and some Arab countries such as Jordan and Saudi Arabia, backed by a new American policy towards Syria which attempts to shatter its Iranian alliance and to isolate Iran in the region. The recent bloody disturbances that occurred in Iran after its presidential elections on June 12, 2009 – when the regime was accused of forging the results – might cause Syria to notice that its interests are with the West and the Sunni Arab countries rather than with Iran, where the future of the current regime is in doubt. The Syrian Muslim Brothers supported117 the presidential candidate Mir Hossein Moussavi, who stood for election in opposition to Asad’s ally, Mahmud Ahmadinejad.

Conclusion

The Syrian Muslim Brotherhood has sought to emphasize the religious dimension of the triple alliance between Syria, Irán, and Hizbullah, since they see Shi’ite doctrine as the link among the three. The MB has claimed for several years that these allies portray themselves as protecting the Muslim world from the Zionists and the West, but they have relied on religious segregation to reach their goal. They carry the flag of protecting the Muslim world as a cover for their real intention, which is to take over the Sunni states. The MB has tried to stir up Sunni fears in Syria, and worldwide, of a possible Shi’ite takeover of Syria and other Sunni states. The fact that Iran, Siria, and Hizbullah are regarded by many Muslims worldwide as the primary front against the Zionist/American program has minimized their ability to convince the Muslim world generally and Syrian Sunnis specifically of their claims. To their disappointment, the strategy they had adopted until recently has kept them from emerging as a strong opposition and as a possible future alternative to the existing regime.

As an opposition with a leadership residing outside Syria, they face a major problem because they have lost contact with the Syrians still living in the country and neither they nor their children have been allowed to return to Syria. Their attachment to their mother country is therefore becoming weaker as years go by, and they are viewed by many Syrians as outsiders. With the recent rapprochement in which the United States and the Arab states are courting Syria in order to advance the peace process and weaken its alliance with Iran, the MB has understood that they too should change their approach and adopt a new policy which will help them achieve their aims, since their previous strategy did not garner much success. Probably for this reason, during the past year we have witnessed a significant change in the attitude of the MB. For the first time after more than 40 years of attacking the Ba’th regime, and after 27 years in exile, they finally decided to suspend their opposition to the regime and President Bashar al-Asad. They now claim that the Muslim world is in danger and is under attack and that defending it is more important than fighting the regime in Syria; they do not call for an armed resistance of any kind inside or outside Syria. They also have left the Syrian “National Salvation Front,” which they now view as having damaged their image, particularly in their alliance with ‘Abd al-Halim Khaddam, who was for over 30 years one of the most powerful figures in the Syrian regime. They now emphasize that the suspension of their actions against the regime stems from their perception of a more significant threat to the Muslim world, la “open war against the Arab and Muslim States.” They also emphasize, perhaps for the first time, that they do not hold President Asad responsible for the past, but they want changes in Syria for the benefit of the country and its people. Despite their denial that there is a rapprochement with Damascus, all signs show that the MB has moderated their attack against the regime. Despite these conciliatory gestures, some questions remain: Are these gestures genuine, or are they merely a tactical maneuver to allow the MB leadership to return to Syria and regain their hold inside it? Por otra parte, will President Asad respond positively to these gestures and allow the MB leadership to return to Syria?

1. For more on the Nusayri religion see “A Catechism of the Nusayri religion,” in Meir Bar-Asher and Aryeh Kofsky, The Nusayri-‘Alawi Religion (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 2002), pp. 163-199.

2. About the Nusayriya/’Alawi religion see: Bar-Asher and Kofsky, The Nusayri-‘Alawi Religion.

3. Daniel Pipes, “The Alawi Capture of power in Syria,” Middle East Studies, Vol. 25, No. 4 (1989), pp. 429-450.

4. Umar F. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria (Berkeley: Mizan Press, 1983), p. 44.

5. Martin Kramer, Shi’ism, Resistencia, and Revolution (Boulder: Westview Press, 1987), pp. 237-238.

6. The largest denomination within the Shi’ite sect is Ithna ‘Ashriyya/Twelver Shi’ism, also known as Ja’fariyya or Imamiyya.

7. For more on the history of the ‘Alawis/Nusayris in the 19th century see Yvette Talhamy, “The Nusayriya Uprisings in Syria in the 19th Century,” PhD thesis, Haifa University, 2006.

8. Kais M. Firro, “The ‘Alawis in Modern Syria: From Nusayriya to Islam via ‘Alawiya,” Der Islam, Bd. 82 (2005), pp. 1-31.

9. ‘Ali ‘Aziz Al-Ibrahim, al-‘Alawiyun wa al-tashayyu’ (Beirut, 1992), pp. 87-88.

10. Gitta Yafee, “Between Separatism and Union: The Autonomy of the Alawi Region in Syria, 1920-1936,” PhD thesis, Tel-Aviv University, 1992, pp. 251-257.

11. For the fatwa see: Paulo Boneschi, “Une fatw? du Grand Mufti de J?rusalem Muhammad ‘Amin al-husayni sur les ‘Alawites,” Revue de l’Histoire des Religions [Review of the History of Religions], Vol. 122 (July-August 1940), pp. 42-54.

12. Husayn Muhammad Al-Mazlum, al-Muslimun al-‘alawiyun: bayna muftarayat al-aqlam wajawr al-hukkam (1999), p. 127

13. Sulayman Ahmad Khadir, al-Irfan, Vol. 37, No. 3 (Marzo 1950), pp. 337-338.

14. Ayatullah Muhsin al-Hakim of Najaf assumed the ‘Alawis to be deficient in their understanding of the true religion and in need of additional guidance. Kramer, Shi’ism, Resistencia, and Revolution, p. 244.

15. Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Resistencia, and Revolution, pp. 244-245.

16. Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Resistencia, and Revolution.

17. Pipes, “The Alawi Capture of power in Syria,” p. 440.

18. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 43.

19. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, “The Islamic Movement in Syria: Sectarian Conflict and Urban Rebellion in an Authoritarian-Populist Regime,” in Ali Hilal Dessouki, ed., Islamic Resurgence in the Arab World (New York: Praeger, 1982), p. 151.

20. Hinnebusch, “The Islamic Movement in Syria,” p. 157.

21. Eyal Zisser, “Hafiz al-Asad Discovers Islam,” Middle East Quarterly, Vol. VI, No. 1 (Marzo 1999), p. 49.

22. Adrienne L. Edgar, “The Islamic Opposition in Egypt and Syria: A Comparative Study,” Journal of Arab Affairs, Vol. 6, No. 1 (April 1987), p. 88.

23. Raymond A. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power and State Formation in Ba’athist Syria (Boulder: Westview Press, 1990), p. 278.

24. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 43.

25. Moshe Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Evil’ and ‘Pax Americana’,” in Bruce Cummings et al, eds., Inventing the Axis of Evil: The Truth about North Korea, Iran and Syria (New York: The New Press, 2004), p. 183.

26. Robert Olson, The Ba’th and Syria, 1947 a 1982: The Evolution of Ideology, Party and State from the French Mandate to the Era of Hafiz Al Asad (Princeton: Kingston Press, 1982), p. 169.

27. R. Hrair Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution: Fundamentalism in the Arab World (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1995), p. 107.

28. Mordechai Kedar, “In Search of Legitimacy: Asad’s Islamic Image in the Syrian Official Press,” in Moshe Maoz et al, eds., Modern Syria from Ottoman Rule to Pivotal Role in the Middle East (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 1999), p. 24.

29. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Evil’ and ‘Pax Americana’,” p. 182.

30. Martin Kramer, “Syria’s Alawis and Shi’ism,” in Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Resistencia, and Revolution, p. 249.

31. Patrick Seale, Asad of Syria: The Struggle for the Middle East (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1988), p. 352.

32. Hanna Batatu, “Syria’s Muslim Brethren,” MERIP REPORTS, Vol.12, No. 110 (November/ December 1982), p. 20. Musa al-Sadr was of Iranian origin, and was one of the opponents of the Shah of Iran.

33. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Evil’ and ‘Pax Americana’,” p. 182.

34. The Muslim Brothers accused and still accuse Asad of treason. Según ellos, during the 1967 war, Asad, who served as Minister of Defense, handed the Golan Heights to Israel without a struggle. http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content&task=view&id=2003&itemid=84.

35. The factions also split over questions of leadership. Edgar, “The Islamic Opposition in Egypt and Syria: A Comparative Study,” p. 88.

36. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked: The Suppression of Human Rights by the Asad Regime (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991), p. 8.

37. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 10.

38. Thomas Mayer, “The Islamic Opposition in Syria, 1961-1982,” Orient (1983), p. 589.

39. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 10.

40. Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 328.

41. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 15.

42. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 16.

43. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 17.

44. Dekmejian, Islam in Revolution, p. 109.

45. For the full manifesto translated to English see: Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, pp. 201-267.

46. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 17-21.

47. Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 331.

48. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 17-21.

49. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, pp. 10-13.

50. Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 335.

51. Seale, Asad of Syria, p. 337.

52. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Evil’ y “Pax Americana’,” p. 184.

53. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Evil’ y “Pax Americana’,” p. 185.

54. Ma’oz, “Damascus vs. Washington: Between the ‘Axis of Evil’ y “Pax Americana’,” p. 187.

55. Particularly the opposition to Muhammad Reza Shah’s rule.

56. Khomeini was expelled from Iran in 1964; he spent his exile years in Najaf, Iraq until 1978. When he was exiled from Iraq he moved to Paris, Francia.

57. Hussein J. Agha and Ahmad S. Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation (London: Pinter Publishers, 1995), p. 4. Khomeini was the Supreme Leader of Iran. The Supreme Leader is elected by the Assembly of Experts and is considered the ultimate head of the Iranian political and governmental establishment, above Iran’s President, who is elected by a direct public vote.

58. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 184.

59. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, pp. 186-187.

60. Yair Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple: Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran,” in Moshe Ma’oz and Avner Yaniv, eds., Syria under Assad (London: Croom Helm, 1987), p. 105.

61. Joseph Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” in Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Resistencia, and Revolution, p. 180.

62. Kostiner, “Shi’i Unrest in the Gulf,” p. 184.

63. Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Resistencia, and Revolution, p. 14.

64. Zisser, “Hafiz al-Asad Discovers Islam,” p. 52.

65. Middle East Watch, Syria Unmasked, p. 194.

66. Abd-Allah, The Islamic Struggle in Syria, p. 183.

67. Hinnebusch, Authoritarian Power, p. 285.

68. Batatu, “Syria’s Muslim Brethren,” p. 13.

69. Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple: Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran,” p. 115.

70. Hirschfeld, “The Odd Couple: Ba’athist Syria and Khomeini’s Iran,” pp. 113-114.

71. Jubin M. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran: Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East (London: Tauris, 2006), p. 88.

72. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, p. 144.

73. Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, p. 81.

74. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, pp. 200-206.

75. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, p. 202.

76. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, p. 204.

77. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, pp. 212-217.

78. Goodarzi, Syria and Iran, p. 228.

79. http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content&task=view&id=203&itemid=84.

80. Sa’id Hawwa, al-Khuminyya: Shudhudh fi al-‘Aqa’id wa-Shudhudh fi al-Mawaqif [The Khumayniyya: Deviation in Beliefs and Deviation in Behavior] (Amman: Dar Amman li al-Nashr wa-al- Tawzi’, 1987).

81. Hawwa, al-Khuminyya: Shudhudh fi al-‘Aqa’id wa-Shudhudh fi al-Mawaqif, pp. 45-46.

82. Hawwa, al-Khuminyya: Shudhudh fi al-‘Aqa’id wa-Shudhudh fi al-Mawaqif, pp. 55-56.

83. ‘Ali Khameine’i also served as Iran’s President during 1981-1989.

84. President Rafsanjani was succeeded by Muhammad Khatimi (1997-2005) and later by Mahmud Ahmadinejad (2005 to the present).

85. In March 1991, after Operation Desert Storm, the Arab states of the GCC, Egipto, and Syria participated in the Damascus meeting, issuing the “Damascus declaration” wherein they declared their intention to establish a deterrent force to protect Kuwait.

86. Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, p. 65.

87. Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, p. 31.

88. Agha and Khalidi, Syria and Iran: Rivalry and Cooperation, p. 87.

89. The letter was published on the following website: http://www.alburhan.com/articles. aspx?id=1568&page_id=0&page_size=5&links=False&gate_id=0.

90. This letter was sent from the opposition Iranian Sunni League in London and first published in al-Bayan magazine and later published in several Sunni and anti-Shi’ite websites, magazines, and newspapers. Those publications presented the letter as authentic and regarded the situations in Arab Sunni countries such as Egypt, Túnez, Sudán, Yemen, the Gaza Strip, and others as the implementation of this Shi’ite scheme. The letter seems to be genuine, but one always should bear in mind that since it was published in Sunni media, its publishers may have had an ulterior, sectarian motive in publishing it. Sharif Qindil, http://www.alwatan.com.sa/news/newsdetail.asp?id=72921&issueno=2932.

91. http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content&task=view&id=1967&item id=84.

92. Marvin Zonis and Daniel Brumberg, “Shi’ism as Interpreted by Khomeini: An Ideology of Revolution Violence,” in Kramer, ed., Shi’ism, Resistencia, and Revolution, p. 50.

93. Zonis and Brumberg, “Shi’ism as Interpreted by Khomeini: An Ideology of Revolution Violence,” p. 52.

94. Ma’d Fayad, http://www.asharqalawsat.com/details.asp?section=45&issue=10398&articl e=419648.

95. Muhammad Bassam Yusuf, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content& task=view&id=2223&itemid=84.

96. ‘Abdallah al-Qahtany, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content&task =view&id=3638&itemid=5.

97. http://www.alaweenonline.com/site/modules/news/article.php?storyid=80.

98. Samir Quntar and four Lebanese prisoners were freed from Israeli prisons on July 16, 2008 in exchange for the bodies of the two abducted Israeli soldiers.

99. Muhammad Bassam Yusuf, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content& task=view&id=2876&itemid=84.

100. Muhammad Bassam Yusuf, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_content &task=view&id=2876&itemid=84.

101. Faysal al-Shaykh Muhammad, http://www.ikhwansyria.com/index2.php2?option=com_cont ent&task=view&id=3564&itemid=5.

102. “Kitab maftuh ila al-qadah al-‘arab fi mu’tamar al-qimah,”http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/ index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=7107&Itemid=141.

103. Muhammad Sayf, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie w&id=7744&Itemid=141.

104. Zuhir Salim,

105. Therese Sfeir, “Nasrallah hails May 7 ‘glorious day’ for Resistance,” Daily Star, May 16, 2009, http://www.dailystar.com.lb/article.asp?edition_id=1&categ_id=2&article_id=102027.

106. Muhammad Sayf, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie w&id=8771&Itemid=141.

107. ‘Abdallah al-Qahtany, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task= view&id=8955&Itemid=141.

108. Muhammad Sayf, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=vie w&id=10142&Itemid=141.

109. ‘Abdallah al-Qahtany, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task= view&id=11031&Itemid=141.

110. Zuhir Salim, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id =11558&Itemid=141.

111.”Ab’ad al-inshiqaq fi jabhat al-khalas al-suriyya al-mu’arida, aquí

112. Hassan Riyad, http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view& id=12689&Itemid=141.

113. Bahiya Mardiny, http://www.elaph.com/Web/Politics/2009/4/428050.htm.

114. Ian Siperco, “Irán: Shia Tide Rising,” Middle East Policy Council,http://www.mepc.org/ resources/Siperco001.asp.

115. “Hawl al-mawaqif min jabhat al-khalas al-wataniya,”http://www.ikhwansyrian.com/index. php?option=com_content&task=view&id=12824&Itemid=141.

116. “Jama’t al-ikhwan al-muslimin tansahib min jabhat al-khalas al-wataniya al-suriyya al-muarida,” http://www.aawsat.com/details.asp?section=4&article=513896&issueno=11086.

117. On their site, the MB proclaimed that the Iranians were fed up with 30 years of velayat-e faqih and wanted change. The MB asked the international community to support the Iranian people in achieving this goal. They see Moussavi as a good man who was part of the Iranian Revolution, but who did not join any political party and is very supportive of the poor and stands against Ahmadinejad. For the MB’s support of the Moussavi see: Faysal al-Shaykh Muhammad, ; Faysal al-Shaykh Muhammad, .

Dr.. Yvette Talhamy is Fellow Teacher in the University of Haifa’s Department of Middle Eastern Studies. Her forthcoming publications will appear in the British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies, Middle Eastern Studies, and Chronos History Journal. She spent 2008-9 on a post-doctoral fellowship in Tel Aviv University’s Department of Middle Eastern and African History.

Copyright Middle East Institute Autumn 2009

Provided by ProQuest Information and Learning Company. All rights Reserved

Talhamy, Yvette “Siria los Hermanos Musulmanes y la relación sirio-iraní, El”. Middle East Journal, El. FindArticles.com. 15 Diciembre, 2009. http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_7664/is_200910/ai_n42040707/

¿Agobiado votos

Marc Lynch

Moderate Islamist movements across the Arab world have made a decisive turn towards participation in democratic politics over the last 20 años. They have developed an elaborate ideological justification for contesting elections, which they have defended against intense criticism from more radical Islamist competitors. Al mismo tiempo, they have demonstrated a commitment to internal democracy remarkable by the standards of the region, and have repeatedly proved their willingness to respect the results of elections even when they lose.

But rather than welcome this development, secular authoritarian regimes have responded with growing repression. Again and again, successful electoral participation by Islamists has triggered a backlash, often with the consent – if not the encouragement – of the United States. When Hamas prevailed in the Palestinian parliamentary elections in 2006, the response was boycott and political subversion. When the Egyptian government cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood after elections in 2005, few outsiders objected.

As the door to democracy is slammed in their faces, how have the Islamist groups that embraced participation responded? In some ways, they have passed the test with flying colours. They have remained committed to democratic participation even in the face of massive electoral fraud and harsh campaigns of repression. Their leaders have affirmed their democratic ideals, and have often spoken out to reiterate their ideological and strategic commitment to democracy. En efecto, they have often emerged as the leading advocates for public freedoms and democratic reform. And there is as yet little sign of any such organisation turning to violence as an alternative.

But in other ways, the toll of repression is beginning to show. Doubts about the value of democratic participation inside these movements are growing. Splits in the top ranks have roiled movements in Jordan and Egypt, among others. In many of the cases, a Brotherhood leadership which prefers a moderate, accommodationist approach to the regime has struggled to find a way to respond to the escalating pressures of repression and the closing down of the paths towards democratic participation. In Egypt, frustration over extended detentions of the most moderate leaders have tarnished the coin of those calling for political participation, with a rising trend calling for a retreat from politics and a renewed focus upon social activism and religious work. In Jordan, the influence of those seeking to abandon worthless domestic politics and to focus instead on supporting Hamas has grown.

Critics of the Brotherhood have pointed to these recent struggles as evidence that Islamists cannot be trusted with democracy. But this profoundly misreads the current trends. These crises in fact reflect a delayed response to the blocked promise of democratic participation. The Islamist debate today is not about the legitimacy of democracy – it is about how to respond to frustrated efforts to play the democratic game.

********************************

I recently spent a week in Amman, talking to most of the senior leaders of Jordan’s Muslim Brotherhood as well as a cross-section of the country’s political and journalistic elite. The picture that emerged was one not simply of an Islamist movement in crisis, but also of a blocked and deteriorating political system. The government was in the process of declining to call the Parliament back into session in order to force through its desired legislation as temporary laws of dubious constitutionality. Stories of social conflict among the tribes and of crushing economic problems amid spiralling corruption filled daily conversation.

The Jordanian Brotherhood, established in 1946, is one of the oldest and most deeply rooted branches of the global Islamist organisation. Unlike in many other countries, where the Brotherhood worked in opposition to those in power, in Jordan it played a crucial role for decades in supporting the Hashemite throne against external and domestic challengers. In return, it enjoyed a privileged relationship with the Jordanian state, including control over key ministries, and good relations with King Hussein in spite of his friendly ties with Israel and the United States.

When Jordan lost the West Bank in the 1967 war, it struggled to maintain its role in the occupied territories. En 1988, sin embargo,, as the Palestinian Intifada raged and threatened to spread to the East Bank, Jordan formally renounced its claims, severing its ties and concentrating on developing the East Bank and “Jordanising” the truncated state, a decision that was not accepted by the Brotherhood, which maintained ties with its West Bank counterparts.

When riots broke out throughout the country the next year, King Hussein responded with a remarkable democratic opening which revitalised the Kingdom’s political life. The Brotherhood participated fully in this process, and emerged in the 1989 elections as the dominant bloc in Parliament. The years that followed are fondly remembered in Jordan as the apex of political life, with an effective Parliament, a “national pact” establishing the ground rules of democracy and a vibrant emerging press.

En 1993, sin embargo,, the Jordanian regime changed the electoral law in a way that served to limit Muslim Brotherhood success. As it moved rapidly towards a peace treaty with Israel, the state began to clamp down on the Brotherhood and on all other forms of political opposition. Its interventions in the political process grew so extreme that in 1997 the Brotherhood’s political party, the Islamic Action Front, decided to boycott elections. After King Hussein’s death in 1999, the crown passed to his son Abdullah, who showed little interest in democratic reform, and in 2001 decided to suspend Parliament and rule by emergency law. While formal democracy returned in 2003, political reform efforts failed to gain traction. The extent of electoral fraud against the Brotherhood and other critics of the regime during the 2007 vote shocked even jaded observers.

The Jordanian crackdown has not reached the brutal levels of Syria or Tunisia (where the Islamist opposition was massacred or driven abroad). The Brotherhood continues to operate publicly, and the Islamic Action Front holds six seats in Parliament. But the gerrymandered electoral system and massive fraud has hamstrung Islamist political participation, to the degree that many believe that the Brotherhood is being dared to boycott.

Following the 2007 electoral debacle, the Brotherhood entered a period of intense internal unrest. It dissolved its Shura Council as penance for its fateful decision to participate in the election. The core issue was over how best to respond to the regime’s repression: through confrontation, or through a retreat and consolidation of the political strategy? En abril 2008, the “hawkish” trend won the internal elections to the Shura Council by a single vote, and the pragmatic and domestically-orientated Salem Falahat was replaced by the fiery, Palestine-centric hawk Himmam Said. Said and the new head of the Islamic Action Front, Zaki Bani Arshid, steered the Islamist movement into more direct conflict with the regime, with little success. The reformist trend, led by the soft-spoken intellectual Ruheil Ghuraybeh, avoided open confrontation but advanced an ambitious programme to transform Jordan into a constitutional monarchy.

As the Brotherhood rank and file lost interest in a stalled domestic political process, they were simultaneously galvanised by the electoral success of Hamas and then by the visceral images of Israel’s war on Gaza. The growing interest in Palestinian issues at the expense of Jordanian politics worried not only the regime but also the traditional leadership of the Brotherhood. The leading Jordanian journalist Mohammed Abu Rumman argues that the issue of relations with Hamas has supplanted the traditional “hawk-dove” struggle within the organisation. While both trends support Hamas – “if you are not with Hamas, you are not with the Muslim Brotherhood”, explained one of the “dovish” leaders – they disagree over the appropriate organisational relationship. The “Hamasi” trend supports close ties and the prioritisation of Palestinian issues, and embraces a common Muslim identity over a narrowly Jordanian one. The “reformist” trend insists that Hamas, as the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood, should have responsibility for Palestine while the Jordanian Brotherhood must be a national organisation focused upon domestic Jordanian issues.

This crisis came to a head over the issue of Hamas participation in the administrative structures of the Jordanian Brotherhood. Three leading reformists resigned from the Executive Office, triggering an as-yet-unresolved internal crisis that threatens one of the first serious internal splits in the history of the movement. The media has eagerly egged this conflict on; indeed, a number of Brotherhood leaders told me that what made the current crisis unique was not the issues at stake or the intensity of the disagreement, but the fact that for the first time it had become public.

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The story of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood is many things, but certainly not a story of Islamists retreating from democracy. Similar dynamics can be seen in Egypt, where the Brotherhood’s leadership is similarly divided over how to respond to escalating repression. During multiple trips to Cairo in the last few years, I saw the growing frustration of a generation of reformists who found their every effort to embrace democracy met with force and rejection.

After “independent” Brotherhood candidates scored sweeping victories in the first of three rounds of the 2005 Parliamentary elections, government forces began to intervene to prevent further gains. Despite well-documented fraud and heavy-handed security interference in Brotherhood strongholds, the movement emerged as the largest opposition bloc with 88 seats. As Deputy Supreme Guide Mohammed Habib ruefully told me, their mistake was that they did too well – had they won 50 seats, perhaps they would not have triggered such harsh reprisals.

The subsequent crackdown matched the magnitude of the Brotherhood victory. A series of media campaigns aimed to scare mainstream Egyptians with alleged nefarious Brotherhood schemes (they were supposedly training an underground militia, conspiring with Hizbollah, and more). A wide range of leading Brotherhood figures, including noted moderates such as the financier Khairat el Shater and the intellectual Abd el Monem Abou el Fattouh, were detained indefinitely on trumped up charges.

For a while, the Egyptian Brotherhood held fast in the face of these provocations. They continued to try to participate in elections even as the fraud and overt manipulation mounted. Their Parliamentarians performed well as an opposition. They routinely expressed their ongoing commitment to democracy to every audience which would listen. And they imposed discipline on their own members to prevent the explosion of frustration into violence.

But over time, the pressure began to take its toll. The leadership reined in its freewheeling young bloggers, whose public airing of internal issues was being exploited by the organisation’s opponents. It adopted tougher rhetoric on foreign policy issues such as the Gaza war – attacking the Egyptian government’s enforcement of the blockade of Gaza – in part to rally its demoralised membership. Considerable evidence suggests that the cadres of the organisation were growing disenchanted with politics and preferred to return to the core social and religious mission. And growing voices from inside and outside the movement began to suggest retreating from politics until a more propitious time.

Earlier this month the conflicts inside the Egyptian Brotherhood leapt into the pages of local newspapers, which reported that the movement’s leader, Mohammed Mahdi Akef, had abruptly resigned his post in protest after conservatives refused to appoint the leading reformist Essam el Erian to an open leadership seat. Akef has denied the reports – but the portrait of a movement in turmoil is clear.

The Jordanian, Egyptian and American governments may see all this as something of a success story: the influence of the Islamists has been curbed, both in formal politics and in the social sector, and the restraint exercised by the Brotherhood leadership has meant the states have not faced a backlash. But this is dangerously short-sighted. The campaigns against Islamists weaken the foundations of democracy as a whole, not just the appeal of one movement, and have had a corrosive effect on public freedoms, transparency and accountability. Regardless of the fortunes of the movements themselves, the crackdown on the Islamists contributes to the wider corruption of public life. The growing frustration within moderate Islamist groups with democratic participation cannot help but affect their future ideological trajectory.

Sowing disenchantment with democratic politics in the ranks of the Brotherhood could forfeit one of the signal developments in Islamist political thinking of the last few decades. The failure of the movement’s democratic experiment could empower more radical Islamists, including not only terrorist groups but also doctrinaire salafists less inclined to pragmatic politics. The degradation of its organisational strengths could open up space for al Qa’eda and other radical competitors to move in. The alternative to Ismail Haniya might be Osama bin Laden rather than Abu Mazen, and the exclusion of Essam el-Erian may not produce an Ayman Nour.

Marc Lynch is associate professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs at George Washington University. He writes a blog on Arab politics and media for Foreign Policy.

From the National

Published on October 30, 2009

La política de Internet y de islamistas en Jordania, Marruecos y Egipto.

Andrew Helms

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first saw a dissemination of the Internet as a center of communication, information, entertainment and commerce.

The spread of the Internet reached all four corners of the globe, connecting the researcher in Antarctica with the farmer in Guatemala and the newscaster in Moscow to the Bedouin in Egypt.

Through the Internet, the flow of information and real-time news reaches across continents, and the voices of subalternity have the potential to project their previously silenced voices through blogs, websites and social networking sites.

Political organizations across the left-right continuum have targeted the Internet as the political mobilizer of the future, and governments now provide access to historical documents, party platforms, and administrative papers through their sites. Similarmente, religious groups display their beliefs online through official sites, and forums allow members from across the globe to debate issues of eschatology, orthopraxy and any number of nuanced theological issues.

Fusing the two, Islamist political organizations have made their presence known through sophisticated websites detailing their political platforms, relevant news stories, and religiously oriented material discussing their theological views. This paper will specifically examine this nexus – the use of the Internet by Islamist political organizations in the Middle East in the countries of Jordan, Marruecos y Egipto.

Although a wide range of Islamist political organizations utilize the Internet as a forum to publicize their views and create a national or international reputation, the methods and intentions of these groups vary greatly and depend on the nature of the organization.

This paper will examine the use of the Internet by three ‘moderate’ Islamist parties: the Islamic Action Front in Jordan, the Justice and Development Party in Morocco and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. As these three parties have increased their political sophistication and reputation, both at home and abroad, they have increasingly utilized the Internet for a variety of purposes.

Primero, Islamist organizations have used the Internet as a contemporary extension of the public sphere, a sphere through which parties frame, communicate and institutionalize ideas to a broader public.

Secondly, the Internet provides Islamist organizations an unfiltered forum through which officials may promote and advertise their positions and views, as well as circumvent local media restrictions imposed by the state.

Por último, the Internet allows Islamist organizations to present a counterhegemonic discourse in opposition to the ruling regime or monarchy or on display to an international audience. This third motivation applies most specifically to the Muslim Brotherhood, which presents a sophisticated English language website designed in a Western style and tailored to reach a selective audience of scholars, politicians and journalists.

The MB has excelled in this so-called “bridgeblogging” 1 and has set the standard for Islamist parties attempting to influence international perceptions of their positions and work. The content varies between the Arabic and English versions of the site, and will be examined further in the section on the Muslim Brotherhood.

These three goals overlap significantly in both their intentions and desired outcomes; sin embargo,, each goal targets a different actor: the public, nombra y destituye a los gobernadores, and the regime. Following an analysis of these three areas, this paper will proceed into a case study analysis of the websites of the IAF, the PJD and the Muslim Brotherhood.

Los movimientos islámicos en el Medio Oriente: Egipto como un estudio de caso

ÖZLEM TÜR KAVLİ

The Islamic challenge remains a central issue within the ongoing debate on the nature of Middle East politics. As the main opposition to government policies, the Islamic movements enjoy widespread popularity, especially among the lower echelons of those populations —people who are economically or politically alienated.

Egypt has been a pioneer of Arab countries in many aspects of economic, political and cultural development. It has also been the pioneer in the rise of Islamic movements and the state’s fight with these groups. The aim of this paper is to look at Egypt as a case study in Middle East’s Islamist movements in general.

The first part of this paper looks briefly at nineteenth century Islamic reformers who had an impact on the development of modern Islamic movements. In the second part, the focus will be on the formation of the Islamic movements and their cadres and main ideologies. The third part looks at contemporary movements and their position in Egyptian society.

ISLAMIC REFORMISTS

Islamic reformism is a modern movement that came into the scene in the nineteenth century as a reaction to European supremacy and expansion.

It was during this period that Muslim religious leaders and politicians began to realise that their state of affairs was inferior to that of Europe and was in steady decline. Although Islam has suffered many defeats by Europeans, it was in the nineteenth century that Muslims felt for the first time their weakness and decline and the need to borrow from their ‘enemy’.

This painful awareness made Muslim intellectuals think about the defects and the weaknesses they were suffering from and they started to search for a remedy.On the one hand, Islamic reformists embarked on studies of Europe’s pre-industrial phase in order to trace ways of building a strong state and economy. On the other, they sought viable cultural paradigms capable of checking the dominance of Europe.

The Islamic reformist movement was an urban movement and tried to establish strategies for the development of the Muslim world. The frustration of the early reformists with the status quo did not entail a demonising of the West or even a rejection of modernisation per se.

In their quest for progress, Jamal Al-Din Al-Afghani and Mohammad Abduh looked upon the West both as a model and as a rival. They perceived the challenge the Umma, the Muslim community, was facing as shaped by a need to readjust their worldview to the realities of the approaching new age.

The Muslim people were given priority as citizens, whereas Islam as a normative system “assumed the role of a defensive weapon that had to be restored in order to stop deterioration and check the decline”. Rashid Rida had more radical views about society as being corrupt and the heads of Arab states as being the apostates of Islam and he supported the implementation of Koranic punishments.

These three reformists desired to bring back the glory of Islam by embracing ijtihad, rejecting the superstitions of popular religion and the stagnant thinking of the ulama. They aimed at “creating a synthesis of Islam and the modern West rather than a purified society constructed primarily along Islamic lines”.

It is ironic that these reformists became the founding ideologues of the Islamic movements that demand strictly purified Islamic communities.

La Hermandad Musulmana en los Estados Unidos

The leadership of the U.S. La Hermandad Musulmana (MB, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal

Steven Merley

The leadership of the U.S. La Hermandad Musulmana (MB, or Ikhwan) has said that its goal was and is jihad aimed at destroying the U.S. from within.

The Brotherhood leadership has also said that the means of achieving this goal is to establish Islamic organizations in the U.S. under the control of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Since the early 1960s, the Brotherhood has constructed an elaborate covert organizational infrastructure on which was built a set of public or “front” organizations.

La corriente de EE.UU.. liderazgo de la Hermandad ha tratado de negar esta historia, tanto afirmar que no es precisa y al mismo tiempo que dice que representa una forma antigua de pensamiento dentro de la Hermandad.

An examination of public and private Brotherhood documents, sin embargo,, indicates that this history is both accurate and that the Brotherhood has taken no action to demonstrate change in its mode of thought and/or activity.

La Hermandad Musulmana: Hasan al-Hudaybi e ideología

Barbara SE. Zollner

Hasan Ismail al-Hudaybi led the Society of the Muslim Brotherhood during a time of crisis and dissolution. Triunfar Hasan al-Banna ', who was the founder and first leader of the organisation, al-Hudaybi was to be its head for more than twenty years. Durante su liderazgo, se enfrentó a duras críticas de los Hermanos compañeros.

Tras la Revolución de Julio 1952, he was pitted against the antagonism of Abd al-Nasir, who became increasingly infl uential in the council of leading Free Officers. Abd al-Nasir’s determination to thwart the cause of the Brotherhood and its infl uence on society was part of his path to absolute rule. Considering the signifi cance of al-Hudaybi’s years as leader of the Muslim Brotherhood, es sorprendente que hay poco trabajo académico sobre el tema.

When taking into account that his moderate ideas continue to have a strong infl uence on the policy and attitude of today’s Muslim Brotherhood, g. his conciliatory position towards the state system and his refutation of radical ideas, the fact that so little attention is paid to his writing is even more startling. Ciertamente, there has been interest in the Muslim Brotherhood.

There are quite extensive studies available on Hasan al-Banna’: the founder and fi rst leader of the Muslim Brotherhood has been described as a model figure of Islamic campaigning; others depict him as the originator of threatening political activism in the name of Islam.

There has been even more interest in the ideas of Sayyid Qutb; some see him as the ideologue of Islamist radicalism, cuyos conceptos grupos extremistas entrenados; others describe him as a victim of state persecution who developed a theology of liberation in reaction to his maltreatment.

No hay duda de, it is important to examine the work of these thinkers in order to understand currents of Islamist ideology and Islamist movements. Sea cual sea el veredicto sobre Al-Banna y Qutb, it is a fact that certain ideas of the two thinkers have been incorporated into the modern-day Muslim Brotherhood.

Sin embargo, this focus has led to an incorrect perception that the Islamic movement is necessarily radical in its thinking and/or militant in its deeds, un supuesto que ha, en los últimos años, been questioned by a number of scholars, entre ellos John L. Edwards, Fred Halliday, François Burgat, and Gudrun Krämer.

The following study of Egypt’s Muslim Brotherhood under the leadership of Hasan al-Hudaybi will form an addition to these theses, addressing and reassessing the viewpoint that political Islam is a monolithic block, all in all disposed towards violent means.

There are reasons why al-Hudaybi is hardly mentioned in the literature on the Muslim Brotherhood. The fi rst that comes to mind is the observation that Islamist movements are, por defi nición, visto como fundamentalmente radicales, anti-democratic and anti-Western.

This reasoning questions any distinction between moderate Islamism and its radical counterpart. The argument goes that both have the objective of establishing an Islamic state system, that they both aim to replace existing secular governance and that they therefore differ only in the degree of their methods, pero no, en principio,.

Este libro, sin embargo,, clearly joins the scholarly circle on political Islam, which identifi es arguments such as these as neo-Orientalist. As Esposito shows, this approach to political Islam is based on what he terms ‘secular fundamentalism’.

La vista externa del Islam político se centra principalmente en el pensamiento radical, y esto puede ser debido a la creación, por parte de la política del poder, of a fear of Islam as a religion, que es diferente, extraño y aparentemente en oposición a

El pensamiento occidental. Alternativamente, it may be because radical or even militant groups are constantly appearing in the media by reason of their actions. De hecho, militant Islamists actually seek such publicity.

While radical thought and militant action make it necessary to study extremist groups, the focus on terrorism in the name of Islam marginalises moderate Islamists.

It also makes it difficult to explain the differences between radical and moderate Islamism. En efecto, the scholarly focus on radical or militant groups reinforces the generally negative public perception of Islam in the West.

A further reason why al-Hudaybi in particular has not been studied by Western scholars has to do with the internal affairs of the Brotherhood. It is astonishing that his name is not mentioned much by the writers of the Muslim Brotherhood itself. No hay una explicación sencilla para esta.

One reason may be that members particularly stress their sympathies for al-Banna’, depicting him as an ideal leader who died for his activist convictions. Sin embargo, as many Brothers endured imprisonment, hard labour and even torture insideAbd al-Nasir’s prisons and camps, their personal histories have resulted in a dearth of discourse on Hasan al-Hudaybi.

Por lo tanto, there is a tendency to remember al-Hudaybi’s period of leadership as a time of near defeat and destruction. Todavía, the experiences of the persecuted are caught in the ambiguous relationship between forgetting and reappraisal.

Many personal accounts of the time have been published since the mid 1970s, 2 constancia narrar historias de tortura y subrayando la fe. Only a few of the books written by Muslim Brothers take a broader approach, which includes discussion of a crisis within the organisation and of al-Hudaybi’s part therein. Those authors who do tackle this issue not only reveal the society’s weak position vis-à-vis Abd al-Nasir, sino que también exponen los signos de desintegración en el

La Hermandad Musulmana. 3 Esto ha llevado a diferentes actitudes hacia al-Hudaybi, with most portraying him as an incompetent leader lacking the charismatic personality of his predecessor, al-Banna’. En particular,, he was accused of not commanding the authority to bring together the different wings of the Muslim Brotherhood or to adopt a strong position in relation to the authoritarian state system.

In the latter view lies an ambiguity, for it would appear to show al-Hudaybi not just as a failure, sino también como una víctima de la situación política. Por último, these accounts reveal an ideological gap which opened at the beginning of the period of persecution in 1954.

En cierta medida, Sayyid Qutb les aplicó esta brecha. During his imprisonment he developed a radical approach, rejecting the then state system as illegitimate and ‘un-Islamic’. In developing a revolutionary concept and explaining thereby the reasons underlying the persecution, he turned the condition of victimisation into one of pride.

Por lo tanto, dio encarcelados muchos Hermanos Musulmanes, particularly young members, una ideología que pudieran mantenerse en el.

It has to be said that al-Hudaybi did not react decisively to the situation of internal crisis and dissolution. En efecto, to a certain extent his indecisiveness triggered this situation.

Esto fue especialmente evidente durante el período de persecución (1954–71), when he omitted to provide any guidelines to help in overcoming the feeling hopelessness ushered in by Abd al-Nasir’s mass imprisonments. His reaction to the radical ideas which fl ourished in the prisons and camps among certain, especialmente a los jóvenes, miembros llegaron bastante tarde.

Incluso entonces, his scholarly and juridical argumentation did not have the same sweeping effect as Sayyid Qutb’s writings. En 1969, al-Hudaybi proposed a moderate concept in his writing Duat la Qudat (Los predicadores no jueces).

Esta escritura, which was secretly distributed among fellow Brothers, is considered the fi rst substantial refutation of Sayyid Qutb’s ideas. 5 Qutb, quien fue ahorcado en 1966, was by then considered to be a martyr, sus pensamientos ya que tiene una infl uencia considerable.

This does not mean that the majority of Muslim Brothers did not pursue a moderate approach, but the lack of guidelines left them voiceless and reinforced the perception of al-Hudaybi as a weak leader.

Sin embargo, al-Hudayb’is moderate thought had an impact on his fellow Muslim Brothers. Después de la amnistía general de 1971, al-Hudaybi played a major part in the re-establishment of the organisation. A pesar de que murió en 1973, his moderate and conciliatory ideas continued to be relevant.

The fact that close companions such as Muhammad Hamid Abu Nasr, Umar al-Tilmisani and Muhammad Mashhur, que murió hace poco, succeeded him as leaders shows the continuance of his thought.

Por otra parte, his son Ma’mun al-Hudaybi has played a major role in his capacity as the Brotherhood’s secretary and spokesman.

Another reason why his thinking became important lies in the changed attitude towards the Muslim Brotherhood since Anwar al-Sadat’s presidency. Al-Sadat, who succeeded Abd al-Nasir, released the imprisoned Brothers and offered the organisation a half-legal though not offi cially recognised status.

Un período de reorganización (1971–77) seguido, during which the government lifted the censorship of books written by Muslim Brothers. Muchos de los miembros de las memorias de ex presos fueron publicados, such as Zaynab al-Ghazali’s account or al-Hudaybi’s book Du<que permiten Qudat (Los predicadores no jueces).

Encarar el pasado, these books did not merely preserve the memory of the cruelties of Abd al-Nasir’s persecution.

Al-Sadat followed his own agenda when he allowed these publications to fi ll the market; this was a deliberate political stratagem, implying a change of direction and aimed at distancing the new government from the old.

The posthumous publication of al-Hudaybi’s writings was not merely aimed at providing ideological guidance to the Muslim Brothers; they were distributed because of their statements against radical thought, y para ello se emplean para hacer frente a un problema nuevo y creciente, namely the establishment of Islamist groups, which began to fi ght actively against the political system in the early 1970s. En estos términos, Duat la Qudat remains an important critique of radical thought.

objetivo principal Hasan al-Hudaybi era cambiar la sociedad, i. la sociedad egipcia, que, en su opinión, no era consciente de la naturaleza política de la fe islámica. Por lo tanto, real change could only be brought about through creating awareness and by tackling the issue of Islamic identity (en contraposición a la percepción occidental).

Only through developing a sense of Islamic consciousness could the ultimate goal of the establishment of an Islamic society be reached. Teniendo en cuenta este enfoque, al-Hudaybi refuted revolutionary overthrow, instead preaching gradual development from within. Un punto importante fue el compromiso tanto, la educación y sociales, as well as participation in the political system, apelando a través de la misión ( dawa ) to the consciousness of the individual believer.

Este camino de la suya es ahora seguida por la Hermandad Musulmana de hoy, which endeavors to be recognised as a political party and which infl uences political decision making by infi ltrating the political participatory structures (Parlamento, administración, organizaciones no gubernamentales).

This study of the Muslim Brotherhood from the 1950s until the early 1970s, por lo tanto, is not only a piece of research into the modern political history of Egypt and an analysis of a religious ideology, but has also a relationship to current politics.

Goldstone Informe Sobre la guerra de Israel contra Gaza

1. On 3 April 2009, the President of the Human Rights Council established the United Nations Fact Finding Mission on the Gaza Conflict with the mandate “to investigate all violations of international human rights law and international humanitarian law that might have been committed at any time in the context of the military operations that were conducted in Gaza during the period from 27 Diciembre 2008 y 18 enero 2009, whether before, during or after.”

2. The President appointed Justice Richard Goldstone, former judge of the Constitutional Court of South Africa and former Prosecutor of the International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, to head the Mission. The other three appointed members were Professor Christine Chinkin, Professor of International Law at the London School of Economics and Political Science, who was a member of the high-level fact-finding mission to Beit Hanoun (2008); Ms. Hina Jilani, Advocate of the Supreme Court of Pakistan and former Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the situation of human rights defenders, who was a member of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur (2004); and Colonel Desmond Travers, a former Officer in Ireland’s Defence Forces and member of the Board of Directors of the Institute for International Criminal Investigations.

3. As is usual practice, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) established a secretariat to support the Mission.

4. The Mission interpreted the mandate as requiring it to place the civilian population of the region at the centre of its concerns regarding the violations of international law.

5. The Mission convened for the first time in Geneva between 4 y 8 May 2009. Additionally, the Mission met in Geneva on 20 May, en 4 y 5 Julio, and between 1 y 4 De agosto 2009. The Mission conducted three field visits: two to the Gaza Strip between 30 May and 6 June, and between 25 June and 1 Julio 2009; and one visit to Amman on 2 y 3 Julio 2009. Several staff ofthe Mission’s secretariat were deployed in Gaza from 22 May to 4 Julio 2009 to conduct field investigations.

6. Notes verbales were sent to all Member States of the United Nations and United Nations organs and bodies on 7 May 2009. On 8 June 2009 the Mission issued a call for submissions inviting all interested persons and organizations to submit relevant information and documentation to assist in the implementation of its mandate.

7. Public hearings were held in Gaza on 28 y 29 June and in Geneva on 6 y 7 Julio 2009.

8. The Mission repeatedly sought to obtain the cooperation of the Government of Israel. After numerous attempts had failed, the Mission sought and obtained the assistance of the Government of Egypt to enable it to enter the Gaza Strip through the Rafah crossing.

9. The Mission has enjoyed the support and cooperation of the Palestinian Authority and of the Permanent Observer Mission of Palestine to the United Nations. Due to the lack of cooperation from the Israeli Government, the Mission was unable to meet members of the Palestinian Authority in the West Bank. The Mission did, sin embargo,, meet officials of the Palestinian Authority, including a cabinet minister, in Amman. During its visits to the Gaza Strip, the Mission held meetings with senior members of the Gaza authorities and they extended their full cooperation and support to the Mission.

10. Subsequent to the public hearings in Geneva, the Mission was informed that a Palestinian participant, Mr. Muhammad Srour, had been detained by Israeli security forces when returning to the West Bank and became concerned that his detention may have been a consequence of his appearance before the Mission. The Mission is in contact with him and continues to monitor developments.

El 500 La mayoría de los musulmanes influyentes

The publication is the first of what we hope will be an annual series that provides a window into the movers and shakers of the Muslim world.

Nos hemos esforzado por destacar a las personas influyentes como musulmanes., that is, people whose influence is derived from their practice of Islam or from the fact that they are Muslim.

We think that this gives valuable insight into the different ways that Muslims impact the world, and also shows the diversity of how people are living as Muslims today.

Influence is a tricky concept. Its meaning derives from the Latin word influens meaning to flow-in, apuntando a una vieja idea astrológica de que las fuerzas invisibles (like the moon) afectar a la humanidad. The figures on this list have the ability to affect humanity too. In a variety of different ways each person on this list has influence over the lives of a large number of people on the earth. El 50 most influential figures are profiled. Su influencia proviene de una variedad de fuentes.; however they are unified by the fact that they each affect huge swathes of humanity.

We have then broken up the 500 líderes en 15 categorías—Académico, Político, Administrativo, Linaje, predicadores, Las mujeres, Juventud, Filantropía, Desarrollo, Ciencia y Tecnología, Arte y Cultura, Medios de comunicación, radicales, International Islamic Networks, and Issues of the Day—to help you understand the different kinds of ways Islam and Muslims impact the world today.

Two composite lists show how influence works in different ways: International Islamic Networks shows people who are at the head of important transnational networks of Muslims, and Issues of the Day highlights individuals whose importance is due to current issues affecting humanity.